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West Europe Report

PORTUGAL: AGREEMENT ON EEC,
EURATOM MEMBERSHIP

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18 February 1986

WEST EUROPE REPORT

PORTUGAL: AGREEMENT ON EEC, EURATOM MEMBERSHIP

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pp 1-39

[Text: Treaty of Accession of Portugal to the European Communities]

Treaty between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the French Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (member states of the European Communities) and the Spanish State and the Portuguese Republic relative to the membership of the Spanish State and the Portuguese Republic in the European Economic Community EEC and the European Atomic Energy Community EURATOM.

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Protocol No. 3 - Relative to the exchanges of merchandise between Spain and Portugal during the period of the application of the transitory measures.

(Title II, Articles 30 to 188 inclusive, "Transitory Measures Relative to Spain," was excluded).

His Majesty, the King of the Belgians, Her Majesty, the Queen of Denmark; the President of the Federal Republic of Germany, the President of the Hellenic Republic; His Majesty, the King of Spain; the President of the French Republic; the President of Ireland; the President of the Italian Republic; His Royal Highness, the Grande Duke of Luxembourg; Her Majesty, the Queen of the Netherlands; the president of the Portuguese Republic, Her Majesty, the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

UNITED in the desire to continue the realization of the objectives of the treaty which created the European Economic Community and the treaty which created the European Atomic Energy Community;

DETERMINED, in keeping with the spirit of those treaties, to build an ever-closer union among the European peoples on the foundations already established;

Whereas, Article 237 of the treaty, which created the EEC, as well as Article 205 of the treaty, which created EURATOM, offer the European States the possibility of becoming members of these communities;

Whereas the Spanish State and the Portuguese Republic requested membership in these communities;

Whereas, the Council of European Communities, after obtaining the opinion of the Commission, expressed itself in favor of admitting these states;

Decided to establish by common accord the conditions of this admission and the adaptations to be made in the treaties which created the EEC and EURATOM, and for that purpose they have appointed as plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty, the King of the Belgians; Mr Wilfried Martens, prime minister; Mr Leo Tindemans, minister of foreign relations; Mr Paul Noterdaeme, ambassador, permanent representative to the European Communities.

Her Majesty the Queen of the Kingdom of Denmark, Prime Minister Poul Schluter, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen; Jakob Esper Larsen, ambassador, permanent representative to the European Communities.

The President of the Federal Republic of Germany, Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans-Dietrich Genscher; Gisbert Poensgen, ambassador, permanent representative to the European Communities.

The president of the Hellenic Republic, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ioannis Haralambopoulos; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Theodoros Pagalos; Charge d'Affaires for EEC Affairs Alexandre Zafiriou, ambassador, permanent representative to the European Communities.

His Majesty the King of Spain; President of the Government Felipe Gonzalez Marquez; Minister of Foreign Affairs Fernando Moran Lopez; Secretary of State for Relations with the European Communities Manuel Marin Gonzalez.

The President of the French Republic; Prime Minister Laurent Fabius; Minister of Foreign Affairs Roland Dumas; Minister-Delegate in Charge of European Affairs Catherine Lalumiere; Luc de La Barre de Naneuil, ambassador, permanent representative to the European Communities.

The President of Ireland; Prime Minister Garret FitzGerald; Minister of Foreign Affairs Peter Barry; ambassador, permanent representative to the European Communities. Andrew O'Rourke,

The President of the Italian Republic; President of the Council of Ministers Bettino Craxi; Minister of Foreign Affairs Giulio Andreotti; Pietro Calamia, ambassador, permanent representative to the European Communities.

His Royal Highness, the Grand Duke of Luxembourg; Vice Prime Minister Jaques F. Poos; Minister of Foreign Affairs Joseph Weland, ambassador; permanent representative to the European Communities.

Her Majesty, the Queen of the Netherlands; Prime Minister Ruud F.M. Lubbers; Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans van den Broek; H.J.Ch. Rutten, ambassador, permanent representative to the European Communities.

The President of the Portuguese Republic; Prime Minister Mario Soares; Vice Prime Minister Rui Machete; Minister of Foreign Affairs Jaime Gama; Minister of Finance and Planning Ernani Rodrigues Lopes.

Her Majesty, the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; Sir Geoffrey Howe QC, MP, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs; Sir Michael Butler, ambassador, permanent representative to the European Communities.

WHO, after having verified their full authorities, witnessed in good and due manner, AGREED on the following:

Article 1

1. The Spanish State and the Portuguese Republic become members of the EEC and EURATOM and parties to the treaty which created these communities as changed or complemented.
2. The conditions for admission, and the changes in the treaties which created the EEC and EURATOM resulting from them, are contained in the Act annexed to the present treaty. The provisions of this Act having to do with the EEC and EURATOM are an integral part of the present treaty.
3. The provisions relative to the rights and obligations of the member states, as well as the faculties and competency of the institutions of the communities, as they appear in the treaties referred to in No 1, are applicable in that which has to do with the present treaty.

Article 2

1. The present treaty shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties in compliance with their respective constitutional norms. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the Italian Republic no later than 31 December 1985.

2. The present treaty will go into effect on 1 January 1986, provided all the instruments of ratification have been deposited before that date and that all the instruments of membership in the European Coal and Steel Community ECSC are deposited by that date.

3. If, however, one of the states referred to in No 1 of Article 1 has not deposited the instruments of ratification and accession in due time, the treaty shall go into effect for the other state which has deposited its instruments. In this case, the Council of European Communities, deliberating unanimously, shall immediately decide on the changes, which because of that fact it becomes necessary to introduce into Article 3 of the present treaty, and in Articles 14, 17, 19, 20, 23, 383, 384, 385, 386, 388, 397, and 402 of the Document of Accession; in the provisions of Annex I, which refer to the makeup and operation of the various committees, and in the pertinent articles of Protocol No 1 relative to the European Investment Bank Bylaws, annexed to that document. The Council, deliberating unanimously, can likewise declare obsolete or change the provisions of the documents mentioned above that refer specifically to the state which has not deposited its instruments of ratification or accession.

3. In derogation of No 2, the institutions of the Community can adopt the measures contained in Articles 27, 91, 161, 163, 164, 165, 171, 179, 258, 349, 351, 352, 358, 366, 378, 396 and in Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Protocol No 2 of the document of accession, before the country becomes a member. These measures only go into effect with reservations and depending on the date of effectiveness of this treaty.

Article 3

The present treaty, written in a single copy in German, Danish, Spanish, French, Greek, English, Irish, Italian, Dutch, and Portuguese, any of the texts being valid, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the Italian Republic, which shall send an authenticated copy to each of the governments of the other signatory states.

First Part: Principles

Article 1

For the purposes of the present Act:

"Original Treaties" are understood to be the treaty which created the ECSC; the treaty which created the EEC, and the treaty which created the EURATOM, as they were complemented or changed by treaties or other documents which went into effect before this membership; "ECSC Treaty," "EEC Treaty," and "EURATOM Treaty" are understood to be the corresponding treaties, thus complemented or changed;

"Present member states" are understood to mean the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the French Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;

"Community in its present composition," is understood to be the Community made up of the present members states;

"Community in its expanded composition," is understood to be the Community in its composition after the additions of 1972 as well as after the additions of 1979;

"New member states" are understood to be the Spanish State and the Portuguese Republic.

Article 2

As of their accession, the provisions of the original treaties and the instruments adopted by the institutions of the Communities before their accession, are binding on the new member states and are applicable in those states in the terms of those treaties and the present Act.

Article 3

1. The new member states support by the present Act **all those decisions** and agreements adopted by the representatives of the governments of member states meeting in the Council. They pledge to support, as of the time of their membership, any other agreement entered into by the present member states relative to the operations of the Communities or related to the actions of them.
2. The new member states pledge to support the conventions stipulated in Article 220 of the EEC Treaty, as well as those which are inseparable from the accomplishment of the objectives of that treaty and consequently linked to the community legal order, as well as the protocols relative to the interpretation of those conventions by the Court of Justice, signed by the member states of the Community, in its original or enlarged composition, and to initiate for that purpose, negotiations with the present member states in order that the necessary changes may be introduced.
3. The new member states find themselves in the same situation as the present member states relative to statements, resolutions or other adoptions of position by the Council, as well as those having to do with the European Communities, adopted by common agreement by the member states. Consequently, they will respect the principles and orientations resulting from them and will adopt the measures which appear necessary to insure their application.

Article 4

1. The agreements or conventions entered into by the Communities with one or more third states, an international organization or with a citizen of a third state, bind the new member states under the terms of the original treaties and the present document.
2. The new member states pledge, under the terms of the present Act, to support the agreements or conventions concluded by the member states of the Community, in its original or expanded composition, jointly with one of the Communities, as well as agreements concluded by these states related to those agreements or conventions. For that purpose, the Community and the present member states shall give assistance to the new member states.
3. The new member states support, through the present Act, and under the conditions stipulated in it, the internal agreements entered into by the member states of the Community in its original or expanded composition, for the application of the agreements or conventions referred to in No 2.
4. The new member states shall take the suitable measures for adapting, if required, to the rights and obligations resulting from their membership in the Communities with respect to international organizations and the international agreement of which other member states or one of the Communities are also part.

Article 5

With respect to the new member states, the provisions of Article 23⁴ of the EEC Treaty, and Articles 105 and 106 of the EURATOM Treaty, are applicable to agreements or conventions concluded prior to their accession.

Article 6

The provisions contained in the present document, providing it establishes nothing to the contrary, can only be suspended, altered or revoked pursuant to the processes stipulated in the original treaties which allow the revision of these treaties.

Article 7

The Acts adopted by the institutions of the Communities to which the transitory provisions established in the present Act refer, preserve their legal character, and the processes of alteration of those instruments continue to be particularly applicable to them.

Article 8

The provisions of the present Act, which have the objective or purpose of revoking or altering in a nontransitory manner the Acts adopted by the institutions of the Communities, acquire the same legal character as the

provisions thus revoked or altered and shall remain subject to the same norms as the latter.

Article 9

The application of the original treaties and the acts adopted by the institutions, remains subject temporarily to the derogative provisions stipulated in the present Act.

Second Part: Adaptations of the Treaties

Title I: Institutional Provisions

Chapter I: The Assembly

Article 10

Article 2 of the Act relative to the elections of the representatives to the Assembly by direct universal suffrage, annexed to Decision 76/787/ECSC EEC, EURATOM, will now be written as follows:

"Article 2

The number of representatives elected in each member state is established in the following manner:

Belgium.....	24
Denmark.....	16
Germany.....	81
Greece.....	24
Spain.....	60
France.....	81
Ireland.....	15
Italy.....	81
Luxembourg.....	6
Netherlands.....	25
Portugal.....	24
United Kingdom.....	81

Chapter 2: The Council

Article 11

The second paragraph of Article 2 of the treaty which created the single Council and single Commission of the European Communities, will now read as follows:

"The presidency is exercised in rotation by each member state in the Council for a period of 6 months, in the following order of member states: during

a first cycle of 6 years: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom; during the following cycle of 6 years: Denmark, Belgium, Greece, Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Ireland, Netherlands, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Portugal."

Article 12

Article 28 of the ECSC Treaty will now read as follows:

"Article 28

Whenever the Council is consulted by the High Authority, they will deliberate without necessarily proceeding to a vote. The minutes of the deliberations will be transmitted to the High Authority.

In case the present treaty requires a favorable opinion from the Council, the opinion will be considered granted if the proposal submitted by the High Authority obtains the approval of:

The absolute majority of the representatives of the member states, including the votes of the representatives of two member states, who each guarantees at least one-ninth of the total value of the coal and steel production of the Community; or in case of a tie in the votes, and if the High Authority maintains its proposal after the second deliberation, the votes of the representatives of three member states, who will each guarantee at least one-ninth of the total value of the coal and steel production of the Community.

In case the present treaty requires a unanimous decision or a unanimous favorable opinion, the decision or opinion will be adopted if it receives the votes of all the members of the Council. However, for the application of Articles 21, 32, 32-A, 78-E, 78-H of the present treaty and of Articles 16, the third paragraph of Article 20, the fifth paragraph of Article 28 and 44 of the protocol relative to the Statute of the Court, abstentions by members present or represented will not prevent the decisions which require unanimity from being undertaken by the Council.

The decisions of the Council, which do not require a qualified majority or unanimity, are adopted by the majority of the members who make it up. This majority is considered obtained if it consists of the absolute majority of the votes of the representatives of member states, including the votes of the representatives of two member states who each insures at least one-ninth of the total value of the coal and steel productions of the Community. However, for the application of the provisions of Articles 78, 78-B and 78-E of the present treaty, which require a qualified majority, the following weight is given to the votes of the council: Belgium, 5; Denmark, 3; Germany, 10; Greece, 5; Spain, 8; France, 10; Ireland, 3; Italy, 10; Luxembourg, 2; Netherlands, 5; Portugal, 5; United Kingdom 10. The decisions are adopted if they obtain no fewer than 54 votes cast by no fewer than eight members.

In case of a vote, each member of the Council may only represent one of the other members by a delegated vote.

The Council will deal with the member states through its president.

The deliberations of the Council will be published under the conditions established by it."

Article 13

The fourth paragraph of Article 95 of the ECSC Treaty will now be written as follows:

"Those changes will be the object of joint proposals by the High Authority and the Council, the latter deciding by a majority of ten twelfths of its members, and submitted to the approval of the Court. In its examination the Court has full authority to evaluate all the elements of fact and law. If after the examination the Court believes that the proposals are in conformity with the provisions of the previous paragraph, such proposals will be sent to the Assembly and will become effective if approved by a majority of three-fourths of the votes cast, and by a majority of two-thirds of the members who make up the Assembly."

Article 14

Number 2 of Article 148 of the EEC Treaty and No 2 of Article 118 of the ECSC Treaty will now read as follows:

"2. Relative to the decisions of the Council that require a clear majority, the following weight was given to the votes of its members:

Belgium.....	5
Denmark.....	3
Germany.....	10
Greece.....	5
Spain.....	8
France.....	10
Ireland.....	3
Italy.....	10
Luxembourg.....	2
Netherlands.....	5
Portugal.....	5
United Kingdom.....	10

Decisions are adopted if they obtained at least:

54 votes, providing that pursuant to the present treaty they were adopted under a proposal of the Commission;

54 votes, which represent the favorable vote of no fewer than eight members in the rest of the cases."

Chapter 3: The Commission

Article 15

Number 1 of the first paragraph of Article 10 of the Treaty creating a single Council and a single Commission for the European Communities will now be written as follows:

"1. The Commission is made up of 17 members selected because of their general competency and offer all the guarantees of independence."

Article 16

Article 14 of the Treaty, which created a single Council and a single Commission for the European Communities, is changed as follows:

1) The first paragraph will now be written as follows:

"The president and the six vice presidents of the Commission are appointed from among the members of it for a period of 2 years, pursuant to the process stipulated for the appointment of the members of the Commission. They may be reelected to their functions."

2) The following paragraph is added:

"The council, by unanimous decision, can change the provisions relative to the vice presidents."

Chapter 4: The Court of Justice

Article 17

The first paragraph of Article 32 of the ECSE Treaty, the first paragraph of Article 165 of the EEC Treaty, and the first paragraph of Article 138 of the EURATOM Treaty are now written as follows:

"The Course of Justice now consists of 13 judges."

Article 18

The first paragraph of Article 32-A of the ECSC Treaty, the first paragraph of Article 166 of the EEC Treaty, and the first paragraph of Article 138 of the EURATOM Treaty will now be written as follows:

"The Court of Justice is assisted by six general counsels."

Article 19

The second and third paragraphs of Article 32-B of the ECSC Treaty, the second and third paragraphs of Article 167 of the EEC Treaty and the second

and third paragraphs of Article 139 of the EURATOM Treaty are now written as follows:

"Every three years, there will be a partial substitution of the judges, which will alternately affect seven and six judges.

Every three years there will be a partial substitution of the general counsels which will affect three general counsels each time."

Chapter 5: The Court of Auditors.

Article 20

No 2 of Article 78-E of the ECSC Treaty, No 2 of Article 206 and No 2 of Article 180 of the EURATOM Treaty are now written as follows:

"2. The Court of Auditors is made up of 12 members."

Chapter 6: The Economic and Social Committee

Article 21

The first paragraph of Article 194 of the EEC Treaty and the first paragraph of Article 166 of the EURATOM are now written as follows:

"The number of members of the Committee is established as follows:

Belgium.....	12
Denmark.....	9
Germany.....	24
Greece.....	12
Spain.....	21
France.....	24
Ireland.....	9
Italy.....	24
Luxembourg.....	6
Netherlands.....	12
Portugal.....	12
United Kingdom.....	24"

Chapter 7: The EURATOM Consultative Committee

Article 22

The first paragraph of Article 18 of the ECSC Treaty is now written as follows: "A consultative committee is created beside the High Authority, which will consist of a minimum of 72 members and a maximum of 96, among whom will be an equal number of producers, workers, consumers, and businessmen."

Chapter 8: The Scientific and Technical Committee

Article 23

Number 2 of the first paragraph of Article 134 of the EURATOM Treaty will now be written as follows:

"2. The Committee is made up of 33 members appointed by the Council after consultation with the Commission."

Title II: Other Changes

Article 24

No 1 of Article 227 of the EEC Treaty will now be written as follows:

"1. The present treaty is applicable to the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Spanish State, the French Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland."

Article 25

1. The treaties, as well as the Acts of the European Communities, apply to the Canary Islands and to Ceuta and Meliha, without prejudice to the derogations referred to in numbers 2 and 3 and other provisions of the present Act.

2. The conditions under which the provisions of the EEC and EURATOM Treaties relative to the free movement of merchandise, as well as the acts of the institutions of the Community relative to customs legislation and commercial policy, will apply to the Canary Islands and Ceuta and Meliha, are defined in Protocol No 2.

3. Without prejudice to the specific provisions of Article 155, the acts of the institutions of the European Communities relative to the common agricultural policy and the common fishing policy are not applied to the Canary Island and Ceuta and Meliha.

The Council, deciding by a qualified majority, at the proposal of the Commission, shall determine the provisions of a sociostructural nature, which in the area of agriculture are applicable to the Canary Islands, at the same time making sure that those provisions are compatible with the general objectives of the common agricultural policy.

4. At the request of the Spanish State, the Council, by unanimous decision, at the proposal of the Commission and after consultation with the Assembly may:

decide on the inclusion of the Canary Islands and Ceuta and Meliha in the customs territory of the Community;

define the proper measures for making the provisions of community tariffs in effect extended to the Canary Islands and Ceuta and Meliha.

At the proposal of the Commission, the Council, acting on its own or at the request of a member state, by unanimous decision and after consultation with the Assembly, may decide on the adaptations of the system applicable to the Canary Islands and Ceuta and Meliha which may become necessary.

Third Part: Adaptations of the Acts Adopted by the Institutions

Article 26

The acts enumerated in the list which makes up Annex I of the present Act, are subject to the adaptations specified in the aforementioned annex.

Article 27

The adaptations of the Acts enumerated in the list which makes up Annex II of the present Act, required because of the accession of Portugal and Spain, shall be accomplished pursuant to the orientations defined in the aforementioned annex in accordance with the process and under the conditions stipulated in Article 396.

Fourth Part: Temporary Measures

Title I: Institutional Provisions

Article 28

1. During the first 2 years after accession, each of the new member states will proceed to the election, through direct and universal suffrage, of the 60 representatives of the Spanish people to the Assembly, and of the 24 representatives of the Portuguese People to the Assembly, respectively, under the terms of the provisions of the Act of 20 September 1976 relative to the election of representatives to the Assembly through direct universal suffrage. The term of these representatives expires at the same time as that of the elected representatives of the present member states for the five-year period underway.

2. As of the time of accession, and for the period which will intervene until the realization of each of the elections stipulated in No 1 above, the representatives of the Spanish and Portuguese people to the Assembly shall be appointed by the legislative bodies of the new member states from among their members, pursuant to the procedure established by each of those states.

Article 29

For the purposes of the application of the second paragraph of Article 2 of the treaty which created a single Council and a single Commission for the European Communities, the new order of the member states established in Article 11 of the present Act applies to the terms of the periods of rotation that are underway according to the order of the member states established in the aforementioned Article 29 in its text, which was effective before the joining of Portugal and Spain .

Title III: Temporary Measures Relative to Portugal

Chapter I: The Free Movement of Merchandise

Section I: Custom Tariff List Provisions

Article 189

1. With respect to each product, the base tariff on which the successive reductions stipulated in Articles 190; No 1 of Article 243, and Nos. 1, 2 and 3 of Article 360 must be based, is that which was actually used on 1 January 1985 for the products originating in the Community in its present composition, and in Portugal within the framework of its trade exchanges.
 2. With respect to each product, the base tariff on which the adjustments must be made with respect to the common customs tariff list and the unified ECSC customs list stipulated in Articles 197, in No 2 of Article 243 and in No 4 of Article 360, is that which was actually applied by the Portuguese Republic on 1 January 1985.
 3. However, if after that date, and before accession, a customs tariff list reduction were to be applied, the tariff thus reduced would be considered the base tariff.
 4. When it becomes a member, the Portuguese Republic shall take whatever measures are necessary to suspend its maximum customs tariff list, and will make occasional suspensions of its customs tariffs.
- The customs tariffs of the maximum customs tariff list, as well as the temporarily suspended customs tariffs, are not base tariffs under the definitions of Nos 1 and 2. Whenever such tariffs are actually applied, the base tariffs are the tariffs of the minimum customs list, or when applicable, the conventional tariffs.
5. The Community, in its present composition, and the Portuguese Republic shall inform each other on their respective base tariffs.
 6. In derogation of the provisions of No 1 relative to the products listed in Protocol No 15, the base tariffs are those indicated in the aforementioned protocol in front of each of them.

Article 190

1. The customs tariffs on imports between the Community in its present configuration and the Portuguese Republic, shall be progressively abolished pursuant to the following calendar:

On 1 March 1986 each tariff shall be reduced to 90 percent of the base tariff;
on 1 January 1987, each tariff shall be reduced to 80 percent of the base tariff;
on 1 January 1988, each tariff shall be reduced to 65 percent of the base tariff;
on 1 January 1989, each tariff shall be reduced to 50 percent of the base tariff;
on 1 January 1990, each tariff shall be reduced to 40 percent of the base tariff;
on 1 January 1991, each tariff shall be reduced to 30 percent of the base tariff;
the other two reductions of 15 percent each shall be made on 1 January 1992 and 1 January 1993.

2. In derogation of the provisions of No 1, as of 1 March 1986 the following shall be exempted from customers tariffs:

- a) The imports which benefit from the provisions relative to customs exemptions applicable to persons who travel from one member state to another;
- b) The imports of merchandise in small quantities not of a commercial nature and which benefit from the provisions relative to the customs exemptions among the member states.

3. The rates of tariffs calculated under the terms of No 1 shall be applied by rounding off to the first decimal place, disregarding the second decimal place.

Article 191

In no case shall customs tariffs be applied in the Community that are higher than those which are applied with respect to third countries which are benefitted by the most favored nation clause.

In case of modification or suspension by the Portuguese Republic of the tariffs of the common customs list contained in Article 201, or the co-existence in Portugal of specific tariffs with respect to the Community in its present composition, and of ad valorem tariffs with respect to third countries for the same customs list item or subitem, the Council, deciding by a qualified majority at the proposal of the Commission, may take the measures required to maintain the community preference.

In case of modification or suspension by the Portuguese Republic of the ECSC unified customs list tariffs contained in Article 201, or the coexistence in Portugal of specific tariffs with respect to the Community in its present composition, and of ad valorem tariffs with respect to third countries for the same customs list item or subitem, the Commission may take the necessary measure to maintain the community preference.

Article 192

The Portuguese Republic may suspend, totally or partially, the collection of tariffs applicable to products imported from the Community in its present composition. The Portuguese Republic shall inform the other member states and the Commission of that fact.

The Council, by a qualified majority decision, at the proposal of the Commission, may suspend, totally or partially, the collection of tariffs applicable to products imported from Portugal.

Article 193

As of 1 March 1986, the surcharges equivalent to import customs tariffs existing in the trade exchanges between the Community, in its present composition, and Portugal, shall be abolished.

Article 194

The following surcharges applied by Portugal in its trade exchanges with the Community in its present composition shall be progressively abolished pursuant to the following timetable:

a) The 0.4 percent value added surcharge applied to:

merchandise imported temporarily,
merchandise reimported (with the exception of containers),
merchandise imported under the in bond system characterized by the restitution after export of the tariffs charged on the materials used (drawback),
shall be:

reduced to 0.2 percent on 1 January 1987 and
abolished on 1 January 1988.

b) The 0.9 percent value added surcharge applied to merchandise imported for consumption shall be:

reduced to 0.6 percent on 1 January 1989,
reduced to 0.3 percent on 1 January 1990 and
abolished on 1 January 1991

Article 195

Export customs tariffs and charges equivalent to them existing in trade exchanges between the Community in its present composition and Portugal shall be abolished on 1 March 1986.

Article 196

1. As of 1 March 1986, the Portuguese Republic shall abolish customs tariffs of a tax nature, or the tax element of customs tariffs existing on that date on imports from the Community in its present composition.
2. Customs tariffs of a tax nature or the tax elements of the customs tariffs applied by the Portuguese Republic on the following products shall be abolished pursuant to the timetable stipulated in Article 190.
3. The Portuguese Republic maintains the authority to replace any customs tariff of a tax nature, or the tax element of that tariff, by means of an internal tax, under the terms of Article 95 of the EEC Treaty.

If the Portuguese Republic were to make use of that authority, the element possibly not covered by the internal tax shall be the base tariff stipulated in Article 189. This element shall be abolished in the trade exchanges with the Community and in the adjustment of the common customs tariff list to the ECSC unified customs list, pursuant to the timetable set by Articles 190 and 197.

Article 197

1. Keeping in view the progressive introduction of the common customs list and the unified customs list of the ECSC, the Portuguese Republic shall modify its customs list applicable to third countries in the following terms:

As of 1 March 1986, the Portuguese Republic shall apply a tariff which reduces the difference between the base tariff and that of the common customs tariff list or the unified ECSC customs tariff list by 10 percent.

As of 1 January 1987:

- a) In the cases of customs tariff list items whose base tariffs are no different by 15 percent, more or less, than those of the common customs tariff list or unified ECSC list, the latter tariffs shall be applied to them.
- b) In the remaining cases, the Portuguese Republic shall apply a tariff which reduces the difference between the base tariffs and the common customs tariff list or the unified ECSC customs tariff list according to the following calendar:

Number of common customs list	Description of Merchandise	Customs tariffs	
		Tax Element	Protective Element
17.04	Confectioners products without cocoa: A. Licorish extracts which contain more than 10 percent saccharose by weight without the addition of other materials	5 escudos per Kg	12 esc/kg
21.03	Mustard flour and prepared mustard: A. Mustard flour B. Prepared mustard	13% 13%	22% 22%
22.08	Undenatured ethyl alcohol with an alcoholic proof equal or higher than 80% by volume; denatured ethyl alcohol of any proof B. Undenatured ethyl alcohol with an alcoholic proof of 80% of higher by volume In containers of under 2 liters In containers of over 2 liters	280 esc/100 liters of pure al- cohol 214 esc/100 liters of pure alcohol	2190 esc per 100 liters of pure al- cohol 2256 esc 100 liters of pure alcohol
24.02	Processed tobacco, extracts or tobacco liquids ("praiss") A. Cigarettes ex B. Cigar and cigarettes: wrapped in tobacco leaves ex C. Smoking tobacco: Shredded tobacco ex D. Chewing tobacco and snuff: Shredded tobacco ex E. Other, including bunch tobacco in form of leaves: Shredded tobacco	180 esc/kg 200 esc/kg 170 esc/kg 170 esc/kg 170 esc/kg	exempt exempt exempt exempt exempt

1 January 1987, a reduction of 10 percent
1 January 1988, a reduction of 15 percent
1 January 1989, a reduction of 15 percent
1 January 1990, a reduction of 10 percent
1 January 1991, a reduction of 10 percent
1 January 1992, a reduction of 15 percent

The Portuguese Republic shall use the common customs tariff list and the unified ECSC customs tariff list completely as of 1 January 1993.

2. As an exemption to the provisions of No 1 on the products listed in the Annex of the agreement relative to the sales of civilian aircraft concluded within the framework of trade negotiations of 1973-1979 of the General Agreement on Customs Tariff Lists and Trade, the Portuguese Republic shall use the common customs tariff list entirely as of 1 March 1986.

Article 198

The autonomous tariffs contained in the Community common customs tariff list are the autonomous tariffs of the Community in its present composition. The conventional tariffs of the EEC common customs tariff list and of the unified ECSC customs tariff list are the conventional tariffs of the EEC and the ECSC, with the exception of the adjustment that will be made to take into account the fact that the tariffs now effective in the Spanish and Portuguese customs lists are overall higher than the effective tariffs in the customs tariff lists of the EEC and ECSC in their present composition.

This adjustment, which shall be the object of negotiations within the framework of the General Agreement on Customs Tariffs Lists and Trade, must be maintained within the limits of the possibilities opened by Article XXIV of this agreement.

Article 199

1. Whenever the tariffs of the customs tariffs list of the Portuguese Republic are of a nature that is different than the corresponding tariffs of the common customs tariff list or that of the unified ECSC customs tariff list, the progressive adjustment of the former with respect to the latter two shall be accomplished by adding the elements of the Portuguese base tariff to those of the common customs tariff list or to that of the unified ECSC customs tariff list, progressively reducing to zero the Portuguese base tariff on the basis of the calendars stipulated in Article 197 and No 2 of Article 243, and beginning from zero tariff of the common customs tariff list or of the ECSC unified customs tariff list, so as to progressively reach, according to the same calendars, their final amount.

2. If as of March 1986 any tariffs of the common customs tariff list or the unified ECSC customs tariff list have been modified or suspended, the Portuguese Republic shall simultaneously modify or suspend its customs list in the proportions deriving from the application of Article 197.

3. The Portuguese Republic shall apply the nomenclature of the common customs tariff list or that of the ECSC unified customs tariff list as of 1 March 1986.

The Portuguese Republic may use in these nomenclatures those national subdivisions existing on the date of accession, which may be necessary, so that the progressive adjustment of its customs tariffs with respect to those of the common customs tariff list and those of the ECSC unified customs tariff list may be realized under the terms of the present Act.

In case of a change in the nomenclature of the common customs tariff list or that of the ECSC unified customs tariff list for the products referred to in the present Act, the Council, deciding by a qualified majority, at the proposal of the Commission, may change the nomenclature of those products as is stipulated in the present Act.

4. Having as an objective the application of No 3, and to facilitate the progressive introduction by the Portuguese Republic of the common customs tariff list and the ECSC unified customs tariff list, and the progressive abolishment of the customs tariffs between the Community in its present composition and the Portuguese Republic, the Commission shall decide, if necessary, the rules for the application of the agreement through which the Portuguese Republic shall change its customs tariffs. without these rules meaning any change in Articles 189 and 197.

5. The rates of the tariffs calculated under the terms of Article 197 are applied by rounding off to the first decimal place.

Whenever Portuguese tariffs approach those of the common customs tariff list or that of the ECSC unified customs tariff list, those roundings off are made by disregarding the second decimal place. In the other cases, they are made by applying the next higher decimal place.

Article 200

1. With respect to the products for industrial purposes contained in the list included in Annex XVII, the base tariffs on the basis of which the adjustments must be made relative to the common customs tariff list or the ECSC unified customs tariff list are those tariffs resulting from the application by the Portuguese Republic of the customs tariff list exemptions (total suspensions) and the customs tariff list reductions (partial suspensions) on 1 January 1985.

2. As of 1 March 1986, the Portuguese Republic shall apply a tariff which will reduce the difference between the base tariffs referred to in No 1 and the tariffs of the common customs tariff list or those of the ECSC unified customs tariff list according to the calendar stipulated in Article 197.

3. The Portuguese Republic may waive the customs tariff list more rapidly.
4. As of the time of accession, the Portuguese Republic shall not apply any residual customs tariff to the products under discussion imported from the Community in its present composition, and no tariff shall be introduced on these products with respect to the Community.
5. As of the time of accession, the Portuguese Republic shall apply the progressively adjusted exemptions and customs tariff list reductions of the common customs tariff list and the ECSC unified customs tariff list indiscriminately.

Article 201

The Portuguese Republic maintains the authority to freely modify its customs tariffs more rapidly than that which is stipulated in Article 197, keeping in mind the alignment of its list with the common customs tariff list and the ECSC unified customs tariff list. The Portuguese Republic shall inform the other member states and the Commission of that fact.

Section II: Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions and Measures of Equivalent Effect.

Article 202

The quantitative restrictions to importing and exporting shall be abolished as of January 1986, as will all measures of equivalent effect existing between the Community in its present composition and Portugal.

Article 203

In derogation of the provisions of Article 202, the present member states and the Portuguese Republic may maintain restrictions on exporting of scrap iron and wastes (including those from projects) of cast iron, soft iron or steel, carrying item number 73.03 of the common customs tariff list, in their reciprocal trade exchanges.

This system may be maintained until 31 December 1988 in that which has to do with exports by the member states of the Community in its present composition to Portugal, and until 31 December 1990 in that which has to do with the exports from Portugal to the present member states, providing the system is not more restrictive than that which is applied to exports to third countries.

Article 204

In derogation of the provisions of Article 202, and until 31 December 1988, the Portuguese Republic may continue to require the prior registration of the products not covered by Annex II of the EEC Treaty and the products that are the object of the ECSC Treaty, in imports and exports for strictly statistical purposes.

2. The bulletin of registration shall be automatically issued in a period of 5 working days after the presentation of the request. If after that time has passed the bulletin has not been issued, the merchandise concerned may be freely imported and exported.

3. As of the time of accession, the requirement for any prior registration by the importer or exporter shall be abolished.

Article 205

In derogation of the provisions of Article 202, the Portuguese Republic shall cancel the discriminatory difference existing between the rate of reimbursement practiced by the social security institutions with respect to medications manufactured in Portugal and the rates of reimbursement with respect to medications imported from the present member states. This action shall take place in three annual phases of equal amounts to become effective on the following dates:

1 January 1987;
1 January 1988;
1 January 1989.

Article 206

In derogation of the provisions of Article 202, trade exchanges of certain textile products between Portugal and other member states of the community shall be applied to the system established in Protocol No 17.

Article 207

In derogation of the provisions of Article 202, the Portuguese Republic is authorized to maintain quantitative restrictions on imports of automotive vehicles referred to in Protocol No 18 from the other member states within the limites of the system of quotas of imports described in this protocol.

Article 208

1. With prejudice to the provisions of No 2 of the present article, the Portuguese Republic shall progressively adapt the national monopolies of a commercial nature to the acceptance of No 1 of Article 37 of the EEC treaty as of 1 January 1986, so that before 1 January 1993 the exclusion is assured of all and any discrimination among the national monopolies of the state members with respect to supplies and sales.

The present member states assume similar obligations with respect to the Portuguese Republic.

The Commission shall make recommendations relative to the methods and timetable according to which the adaptation stipulated in the present numbered section shall be accomplished, it being understood that these methods and timetable should be the same for the Portuguese Republic and the present member states.

2. With respect to gasoline for automobiles, petroleum used for lighting, gasoil and fuel oil, of sub items 27.10 A.III, 27.10 B.III, 27.10 C.I and 27. 10 C.II of the common customs tariff list, the adaptation of the exclusive right to sell begins as of the date accession becomes effective. The sales quotas existing in Portugal and authorized to the present beneficiary corporations, with the exception of the public corporation PETROGAL, shall be abolished on 1 January 1986. The total opening of the markets on this product must be concluded on 31 December 1992.

The Commission shall make its recommendations for the adaptations relative to the accomplishment of this opening, taking as a starting point the lowest part of the annual market per product held by the public corporation PETROGAL during the period between 1 January 1981 and 31 December 1985.

As of the effective date of accession, the Portuguese Republic shall open for each of the products under discussion, a quota equal to all the sales quotas given to the corporations prior to that date, with the exclusion of PETROGAL. This allotment shall be progressively increased from the released quantities pursuant to the recommendations of the Commission.

Article 209

1. In derogation of the provisions of Article 202, the owner, or his legal substitute, of a patent for a chemical, pharmaceutical, food, or health product registered in a member state in a period in which the patent for the product would not be obtained in Portugal for that same product, may invoke the right granted him by such patent to prevent the import or sale of that product in the present member state or states in which the product is protected by a patent, even when the aforementioned product had been sold for the first time in Portugal by the owner himself or with his permission.

2. This right may be invoked for the products referred to in No 1 up to 3 years after the introduction by Portugal of the possibility of patenting such products.

Section III--Other Provisions

Article 210

1. The Commission shall determine, taking into due consideration the provisions in effect, specifically those having to do with community movements, those methods of administrative cooperation aimed at insuring that as of 1 March 1986 the merchandise which fills the conditions required shall be benefitted by the elimination of customs duties or equivalent charges, as well as of quantitative restrictions and equivalent effect measures stipulated in the present Act.

2. Up through 28 February 1986, the provisions of the 1972 Agreement between the EEC and the Portuguese Republic, as well as the subsequent protocols relative to the customs system, will continue to apply to trade exchanges between the Community in its present composition and Portugal.

5. The Commission shall determine the provisions that will apply as of 1 March 1986 to the trade exchanges in the Community of the merchandise obtained in the Community in whose fabrication may have been used the following:

products that have not been subjected to customs duties or equivalent effect charges, which were applicable to them in the Community in its present composition or in Portugal, or which had benefitted from the total or partial drawback of those tariffs or surcharges;

agricultural products which do not meet the conditions required for being admitted to free movement in the Community in its present composition or in Portugal.

In adopting these provisions, the Commission shall take into consideration the rules stipulated in the present Act for the elimination of customs duties between the Community in its present composition and Portugal, and for the progressive application by the Portuguese Republic of the common customs tariff list and the provisions in matters of common agricultural policy.

Article 211

1. Except for provisions to the contrary of the present Act, the provisions in force in matters of customs legislation relative to trade exchanges with third countries shall be applicable to trade exchanges within the Community under the same conditions, providing customs duties were charged in those exchanges.

For the determination of the customs values in trade exchanges in the Community, as well as in trade exchanges with third countries up to:

31 December 1992 for industrial products, and
31 December 1995 for agricultural products,
the customs territory to be taken into consideration is that established in the provisions existing in the Community and the Portuguese Republic on 31 December 1985.

2. As of March 1986, the Portuguese Republic shall use the nomenclature of the common customs tariff list and the unified ECSC customs tariff list in trade exchanges in the Community.

The Portuguese Republic may use in those nomenclatures the national subdivisions existing on the date of accession which may be necessary for the progressive elimination of its customs duties in the Community under the conditions stipulated in the present Act.

Article 212

During a period of 5 years as of the date of its accession, the Portuguese Republic shall conclude the reorganization of its iron and steel industry under the conditions established in Protocol No 20.

The period referred to above may be shortened and the methods stipulated in the aforementioned protocol may be changed by the Commission after a favorable opinion by the Council in terms:

of the state of advancement of the Portuguese reorganization plan, taking into consideration the significant elements of the reestablishment of the viability of the enterprise;

of the iron and steel measures which were in effect in the Community after the accession. In this case, the system applicable, after accession, to Portuguese supplies to the Community in its present composition must not lead to fundamental differences of treatment between Portugal and the member states.

Article 213

1. In case the compensatory amounts referred to in Article 240 or the compensatory mechanism referred to in Article 270 are applied in the exchanges between the Community in its present composition and the Portuguese Republic to one or more base products considered as having entered into the fabrication of merchandise which is the object of (EEC) Regulation No 3033/80 of the Council, dated 11 November 1980, which decides the system of trade exchanges applicable to certain merchandise resulting from the transformation of agricultural products, the following transitory measures are applied:

a compensatory amount, calculated on the bases of the compensatory amounts referred to in Article 240 or of the compensatory mechanism referred to in Article 270, and pursuant to the rules stipulated by (EEC), Regulation No 3033/80 for the calculation of the mobile element applicable to merchandise which is the object of this regulation, shall be applied to the imports by the Community in its present composition of the aforementioned merchandise coming from Portugal;

when the merchandise, which is the object of (EEC) Regulation 3033/80, is imported by Portugal from third countries, the movable element fixed by this regulation shall be increased or diminished, depending on the case, with respect to the compensatory amount referred to in the first section;

a compensatory amount, determined on the basis of the compensatory amounts referred to in Article 240 or in the compensatory mechanism referred to in Article 270, established for basic products, and pursuant to the rules applicable to the calculation of restitutions stipulated by (EEC) Regulation 3035/80 of the Council of 11 November 1980, which establishes for certain agricultural products exported in the form of merchandise which is not the object of Annex II of the Treaty, the general rules relative to the granting of restitutions to exportation and the criteria for establishing that amount, shall be applied in the case of merchandise which is the object of that regulation, to the exports of the merchandise to Portugal from the Community in its present composition;

when the products which are the object of (EEC) Regulation No 3035/80 are exported from the Portuguese Republic to third countries, they shall be subjected to the compensatory amount referred to in the third section.

2. The customs duty, which constitutes the fixed element of the applicable imposition on the date of accession, on imports into Portugal from the Community in its present composition of merchandise which is the object of (EEC) Regulation No 3033/80, shall be determined by deducting from the base customs duty applied by the Portuguese Republic to the products originating in the Community in its present composition, a movable element equal to the movable element established in the application of (EEC) Regulation No 3033/80, increased or diminished, depending on the case, for the compensatory amount referred to in the first and third sections.

However, if with respect to the products referred to in Annex XIX, the customs duty which constitutes the fixed element of imposition, calculated pursuant to the provisions of the foregoing paragraph, were less than the duties indicated in that annex, the latter shall be applied.

3. The customs duty which constitutes the fixed element of imposition applicable on the date of accession to imports into Portugal of merchandise from third countries, which is the object of (EEC) Regulation No 3033/80, shall be equal to the highest of the two amounts determined in the following manner:

the amount obtained by deducting from the base customs duty applied by the Portuguese Republic to imports coming from third countries, a movable element equal to the movable element established in the application of (EEC) Regulation No 3033/80, increased or subtracted, depending on the case, from the compensatory amount referred to in the first and third sections of No. 1.

the amount obtained by adding the fixed element applicable to imports to Portugal from the Community in its present composition, to the fixed element of the common customs tariff list (or with respect to third countries who benefit from the community system of generalized preferences, to the preferential fixed element which the Community applies, if such were the case, to imports coming from those countries).

4. In derogation of Article 199, customs duties applied by the Portuguese to imports from the Community and from third countries shall be converted on the date of accession, into the type of duty and the units contained in the common customs tariffs list. This conversion shall be accomplished on the basis of the value of the merchandise imported by Portugal during the course of the last four quarters on which information is available, or in the case of Portugal, if it does not import the merchandise under discussion, on the basis of the unit value of that same merchandise imported into the Community in its present composition.

5. Each fixed element applied in the exchanges between the Community in its present composition and the Portuguese Republic shall be eliminated under the terms of Article 190.

Each fixed element applied by the Portuguese Republic on imports from third countries shall be close to the fixed element of the common customs tariff list (or if such were the case, to the fixed preferential element stipulated by the community system of generalized preferences) under the terms of Articles 197 and 201.

6. In the case a reduction of the movable element of the common customs tariff list is granted to third countries, who benefit from the community system of generalized preferences, the Portuguese Republic shall apply that movable preferential element as of the date it begins during the course of the first year of the second phase of the system of transition to the application of the rules of the second phase for the basic products whose harvest begins last.

Section IV--Trade Exchanges Between the Portuguese Republic and the Spanish State

Article 214

The Portuguese Republic shall apply Articles 189 and 213 in its trade exchanges with the Spanish State without prejudice to the conditions established in Protocol No 3.

Chapter 2--Free Movement of Persons, Services and Capital

Section I--The Workers

Article 215

Article 48 of the EEC Treaty is only applicable in that which has to do with free movement of workers between Portugal and the other member states, with the restrictions contained in the transitory provisions stipulated in Articles 216 and 219 of the present Act.

Article 216

1. Articles 1 and 6 of (EEC) Regulation No 1612/68 relative to the free movement of workers in the Community, are only applicable in Portugal with respect to nationals of the other member states and in the other member states with respect to Portuguese nationals, as of 1 January 1993.

The Portuguese Republic and the other member states have the authority to keep in effect until 31 December 1992 their respective national provisions having to do with nationals of other member states and Portuguese nationals or those provisions resulting from bilateral agreements, which make immigration for the purpose of performing work for wages or employment for salary subject to prior authorization.

However, the Portuguese Republic and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg have the authority to maintain in effect until 31 December 1995 the national provisions referred to in the foregoing paragraph and which were in effect as of the signing of the present Act, respectively, in that which has to do with nationals of Luxembourg and Portugal.

2. As of 1 January 1991, the Council, on the bases of the report of the Commission, shall proceed to examine the result of the application of the measures of derogation referred to in No 1.

At the end of that examination, the Council, by unanimous decision, at the proposal of the Commission, on the basis of new date, may adopt decisions destined to adapt the aforementioned measures.

Article 217

1. Until 31 December 1990, Article 11 of (EEC) Regulation No 1612/68 is applicable in Portugal with respect to nationals from the other member states and in other member states with respect to Portuguese nationals, under the following conditions.

a) The relatives of a worker referred to in Number 1, line a) of Article 10 of the aforementioned regulation, legally living with him in the territory of a member state on the date of the signing of the present Act, have the right, as of accession, to have access to each and every salaried activity in the entire territory of that member state;

b) the relatives of a worker, referred to in Number 1 line a) of Article 10 of the aforementioned regulation, legally living with him in the territory of a member state after the date of the signing of the present Act, have the right to access to each and every salaried activity, providing they have lived there for at least 3 years. This period of residence shall be reduced to 18 months after 1 January 1989.

The provisions of the present number do not prejudice the national provisions or those resulting from more favorable bilateral agreements.

2. The provisions stipulated in No 1 are also applicable to the relatives of the independent worker living with him in a member state.

Article 218

In the degree to which certain provisions of Directive 68/360/EEC, relative to the suppression of restrictions on the movements and remaining of workers and their families of member states in the Community are inseparable from the provisions of EEC Regulation No 1612/68, whose application is postponed by Article 216, the Portuguese Republic on one hand, and the other member states, on the other, have the authority to derogate those provisions, providing that it is necessary for the application of the provisions of Article 216, which derogate the aforementioned regulation.

Article 219

The Portuguese Republic and the other member states shall take, with the help of the Commission, the measures necessary so that the Decision of the Commission of 8 December 1972 relative to the standardized system established in the application of Article 15 of EEC Regulation No 1612/68, system called "SEDOC", and the 14 December 1972 Commission decision relative to the collection and publication of information stipulated in No 3 of Article 14 of EEC Regulation No 1612/68 of the Council, shall be made applicable to Portugal no later than 1 January 1993.

Article 220

1. Until the uniform solution goes into effect for all the member states, as mentioned in Article 99 of the (EEC) Regulation No 1408/71 relative to the application of the systems of social security to all salaried workers, unsalaried workers, and their relatives who may travel in the Community, and no later than 31 December 1988, nos 1 and 3 of Article 73; no 1 of Article 73; no 1 of Article 75 of (EEC) Regulation No 1408/71, as well as Article 86 and 88 of (EEC) Regulation No 574/72, which established the methods for the application of (EEC) Regulation No 1408/71, are not applicable to Portuguese workers who perform a work activity in a member state, with the exception of Portugal and whose relatives live in Portugal.

No 2 of Article 72, no 2 of Article 74 and no 2 of Article 75 of (EEC) and no 9 of Article 94 of (EEC) Regulation No 1408/71, as well as Article 87, 89, 98 and 120 of (EE) Regulation No 574/72, are applicable by analogy to these workers.

However, there is no prejudice to the provisions of the legislation of any member state who stipulate that family allowances are owed to relatives of workers regardless of the country in which they may live.

2. Article 6 of (EEC) Regulation No 1408/71 notwithstanding, the following provisions of the conventions on social security continue to be applicable to Portuguese workers during the period referred to in No 1:

a) Portugal-Belgium

No 2 of Article 28 of the General Convention of 14 September 1970;

Articles 57, 58 and 59 of the Administrative Agreement of 14 September 1970;

b) Portugal-Germany

Nos 1, 2 and 3 of Article 27 of the 6 November 1964 Convention, with the version given by Article 1 of the Complementary Agreement of 30 September 1974;

c) Portugal-Spain

Articles 23 and 24 of the General Convention of 11 June 1969;

Articles 45 and 46 of the Administrative Agreement of 22 May 1970;

d) Portugal-Luxembourg

Article 23 of the 12 February 1965 Convention, with the version given by Article 13 of the Second Complementary Agreement of 20 May 1977;

Article 15 of the Second Complementary Agreement of 21 May 1979 to the General Administrative Agreement of 20 October 1966;

e) Portugal-Netherlands

No 2 of Article 33 of the 19 July 1979 Convention;

Articles 36 and 37 of the 9 May 1980 Administrative Accord.

Section II--The Right of Settlement, Services, Movements of Capital and Transactions in Invisible Items of Trade

Article 221

The Portuguese Republic may maintain restrictions on the right of establishment and the free provision of services:

until 31 December 1988 on activities of travel and tourist agencies;
until 31 December 1990 on activities of the moving picture sector.

Article 222

1. Until 31 December 1989, the Portuguese Republic may maintain a system of prior authorization for direct investments, in the acceptations of the First Directive of the 11 May 1960 Council for the execution of Article 67 of the EEC Treaty, altered and complemented by the Second Directive 63/21/EEC of the 18 December 1962 Council and by the Act of Accession of 1972, by nationals of other member states having to do with the exercise of the right of settlement and free provision of services, and whose overall value exceeds the following amounts respectively:

during 1986, 1.5 million ECU;
during 1987, 1.8 million ECU;
during 1988, 2.1 million ECU;
during 1989, 2.4 million ECU.

2. The foregoing number does not apply to direct investments having to do with the sector of credit establishments.

3. For all proposed investments submitted for prior authorization pursuant to No 1, Portuguese authorities must issue a decision no later than 2 months after the request is presented. If this is not done within the period indicated, the proposed investment may be considered approved.

4. Investors referred to in No 1 may not be discriminated against among themselves nor may they receive a treatment less favorable than that granted to nationals of third countries.

Article 223

1. The Portuguese Republic may postpone, under the conditions and periods indicated in Articles 224 and 229, the release of movements of capital enumerated in lists A and B of the First Directive of the 11 May 1960 Council for the execution of Article 67 of the EEC Treaty and the Second Directive of the 18 December 1962 Council, which complements and alters the First Directive for the execution of Article 67 of the EEC Treaty.

2. The Portuguese authorities and the Commission shall proceed, within a useful time, to suitable consultations on the methods of application of release measures and of flexibility, whose execution may be postponed by the force of subsequent provisions.

Article 224

The Portuguese Republic may postpone the release of direct investments made in the other member states by residents in Portugal until 31 December 1992.

Article 225

1. The Portuguese Republic may postpone until 31 December 1990, the release of transfers relative to the purchase in Portugal by residents in the other member states, of buildings built and devoted to housing, as well as of land already affected by agricultural activities or classified as agricultural land by Portuguese legislation as of the date of membership.

2. The temporary derogation referred to in No 1 does not apply:

to the resident in the other member states included in the category of those who emigrate within the framework of the free movement of salaried and nonsalaried workers;

purchases referred to in No 1 having to do with the exercise of the right of establishment by nonsalaried workers residents in other member states who emigrate to Portugal.

Article 226

1. The Portuguese Republic may maintain until 31 December 1990, and under the conditions established in No 2, restrictions on the transfer of the results of the liquidation of investments made in Portugal by residents in the other member states.

2. a) The transfers of the results of a liquidation shall be released respectively:

as of 1 January 1986, up to the sum of 100,000 ECU;
as of 1 January 1987, up to the sum of 120,000 ECU;
as of 1 January 1988, up to the sum of 140,000 ECU;
as of 1 January 1989, up to the sum of 160,000 ECU;
as of 1 January 1990, up to the sum of 180,000 ECU.

b) In case of a liquidation which exceeds the amount indicated in line a), the transfer of the difference shall be released in five equal annual fractions, the first at the time of the request for the transfer of the product of the liquidation, and the other four in the following 4 years.

3. During the period of application of this transitory measure, the general or special facilities with respect to the free transfer of the product of the liquidation of real estate investments as defined in No 1 and those facilities existing by force of Portuguese provisions or conventions which regulate relations between the Portuguese Republic and any member state or third country, shall be maintained and applied in a nondiscriminatory manner with respect to all the other member states.

Article 227

The Portuguese Republic may postpone until 31 December 1992 the release of transfers relative to real estate investments in any other member state:

by residents in Portugal not included in the category of those within the framework of the free movement of salaried and nonsalaried workers;

by nonsalaried workers residents in Portugal who emigrate, providing that the investments in question are not connected with their settlement.

Article 228

1. The Portuguese Republic may maintain, until 31 December 1990, and under the conditions established in No 2, restrictions on the operations indicated under heading X, points B, C, D, F and H of list A attached to the directives referred to in Article 223 and having to do with the other member states.

2. On 1 January 1986, transfers shall be released up to the amount of 25,000 escudos for operations consisting of points C, D and F, and 10,000

escudos for the operations consisting of points B, E and H. Each of these amounts is established respectively:

on 1 January 1987, at 30,000 and 12,000 ECU;
on 1 January 1988, at 35,000 and 14,000 ECU;
on 1 January 1989, at 40,000 and 16,000 ECU;
on 1 January 1990, at 45,000 and 18,000 ECU.

Article 229

The Portuguese Republic may postpone until 31 December 1990 the release of operations contained in points B 1 and 3 of heading IV of List B attached to the directives referred to in Article 223 and accomplished by residents in Portugal.

However, the operations on bonds issued by the European Communities and the European Investment Bank by residents in Portugal shall be the object of a progressive release during this period as follows:

as of 1 January 1986 the maximum limit for release for subscriptions of those bonds is fixed at 15 million ECU;
as of 1 January 1987, this maximum limit is fixed at 18 million ECU;
as of 1 January 1988 this maximum limit is fixed at 21 million ECU;
as of 1 January 1989 this maximum limit is fixed at 24 million ECU;
as of 1 January 1990 this maximum limit is fixed at 27 million ECU.

Article 230

1. The Portuguese Republic may maintain up until 31 December 1990, and under the conditions indicated in No 2, the restrictions on transfers having to do with tourism.

2. Annual authorization per person for the purchase of foreign exchange for tourist reasons may not be less than:

500 escudos for 1986;
600 escudos for 1987;
700 escudos for 1988;
800 escudos for 1989;
900 escudos for 1990.

Article 231

The Portuguese Republic shall accomplish, if circumstances permit, the release of the movements of capital and transactions on invisible items of trade stipulated in Articles 224 and 230 before the terms fixed in those articles.

Article 232

For the purposes of the application of Articles 223 and 231, the Commission may proceed to consult the Monetary Committee and submit all useful proposals to the Council.

Chapter 3--Agriculture

Section I--General Provisions

Article 233

1. The present chapter has to do with agricultural products, with the exception of the products that are the object of (EEC) Regulation No 3796/81, established by the common market organization in the sector of fishing products.
2. Except for provisions to the contrary in the present chapter, the rules contained in the present Act are applicable to the agricultural products referred to in no 1.
3. Without prejudice to the special provisions of the present chapter, which stipulate different dates or periods, the application of transitory measures with respect to the agricultural products referred to in no 1 ends at the end of 1995.

Article 234

1. The application of the community regulations to products covered by the present chapter shall be accomplished pursuant to a "traditional" transition, or a transition "by phases," whose general rules are defined respectively in Sections II and III of the specific rules, depending on the sectors of products in sections IV and V.
2. Except for provisions to the contrary in specific cases, the Council, deciding by a qualified majority, under proposal of the Commission, shall adopt the provisions necessary for the execution of the dispositions of the present article.

These dispositions may specifically contain the measures needed for preventing deviations in the movement of trade exchanges between Portugal and the other member states.

3. The council, deciding by unanimity, under the proposal of the Commission, and after consultation with the Assembly, may adopt the adaptations of the rules contained in the present chapter which may become necessary as a result of a change in the community regulations.

Section II--Traditional Transition

Subsection I--Framework of Application

Article 235

All agricultural products referred to in Article 233, with the exception of those referred to in Article 259, are subject to the provisions of the present section.

Subsection 2--Approximation and Compensation of Prices

Article 236

Until the first of the approximations of prices referred to in Article 238, the prices to be applied in Portugal shall be established according to the rules stipulated in the common market organization for the sector under discussion at a level which corresponds to the prices established in Portugal under the previous national system for a representative period to be determined for each product.

However, if from the application of the foregoing paragraph there results the establishment of Portuguese prices at a level higher than common prices, the level to be taken into consideration for the fixing of Portuguese prices is that of the prices fixed in Portugal under the previous national system for the season of 1985/1986, converted by means of a conversion rate in escudos existing at the time of the beginning of the sales season of the product under consideration.

If there is no defined Portuguese price for a certain product, the price to be applied in Portugal shall be fixed in terms of the prices actually confirmed in the Portuguese market during a representative period to be determined.

However, if there are no figures on prices in certain products in the Portuguese market, the price to be applied in Portugal shall be calculated on the basis of prices existing in the Community in its present composition for the products or groups of similar products, or those with which they may compete.

Article 237

1. In the case that on the date of accession it is confirmed that the difference between the price level of a product in Portugal and the common price is minimal, the common price may be applied in Portugal for the product under consideration.

2. The difference referred to in no 1 is considered minimal when it is less, or equal, to 3 percent of the common price.

Article 238

1. If from the application of Article 236 a level of prices different than that of the common prices were to result in Portugal, the prices which in Section IV are referred back to the present article shall be approximated, without prejudice to the provisions contained in no 4, to the common prices annually at the beginning of the sales season under the terms of nos 2 and 3.

2. If with relation to a product, the price in Portugal were lower than the common price, the approximation shall be accomplished in seven phases, with the price in Portugal raised in the first six approximations at the successive rates of one-seventh, one-sixth, one-fifth, one-fourth, one-third and one-half the difference existing between the level of the price in that member state and the level of the common prices applicable before each approximation. The price resulting from that calculation shall be increased or diminished proportionately by the possible increase or decrease of the common price for the following season. In the seventh approximation, the common price shall be applied in Portugal.

3. a) In case the price for a product is higher in Portugal than the common price, the price in this member state shall be maintained at the level resulting from the application of Article 236, the approximation then resulting from the changes in common prices during the seven years following accession.

However, the price in Portugal shall be adapted in the degree necessary to avoid an increase in the difference between that price and the common price.

Moreover, if Portuguese prices expressed in escudos established by the previous national system for the 1985/1986 season were to lead to exceeding the difference existing for the 1984/1985 season between Portuguese prices and common prices, the price in Portugal resulting from the application of the two foregoing paragraphs shall be decreased by an amount to be determined equivalent to a part of the excess in such a way that the excess will be completely reabsorbed no later than the beginning of the fifth sales season following accession.

Without prejudice to the provisions of line b) which follows, the common price shall be applied in Portugal at the time of the seventh approximation.

b) At the end of the fifth year after accession, the Council shall make an analysis of the progress of the approximation of prices. For this purpose the Commission shall transmit to the Council, within the framework of the reports referred to in No 2, line c) of Article 264, an opinion accompanied by the suitable proposals, if required.

If from that analysis it results:

that the difference between Portuguese prices and common prices is too great to be reabsorbed during the period of time left for the approximation of prices referred to in no 2, but that it seems, nevertheless, that it can be overcome in a limited period, the time for the approximation of prices initially stipulated may be extended. In that case the prices shall be maintained at their previous levels under the terms of line a);

that the difference between Portuguese prices and common prices is too large to be quickly overcome exclusively by an extension of the period of approximation of prices initially stipulated, it may be decided that in addition to that extension the approximation will be accomplished by means of a progressive lowering of Portuguese prices expressed in real terms, accompanied if necessary by indirect, temporary and degressive help in order to ameliorate the effect of the degressiveness of those prices. Financing of that help shall be supported by the Portuguese budget.

The Council, deciding by a qualified majority, under the proposal of the Commission, and after consultation with the Assembly, shall adopt the measures referred to in the foregoing paragraph.

4. In order to insure the harmonious operation of the process of integration, it may be decided that in derogation of the provisions of No 2, the price of one or several products for Portugal be separated for one season from the prices resulting from the application of that number.

That difference may not exceed 10 percent of the amount of the modification of prices to be made.

In this case, the level of prices for the following season is that which had resulted from the application of no 2, if the difference had not been decided. However, for this season, a new difference with respect to that level in the terms of the first and second paragraphs, may be decided.

The derogation stipulated in the first paragraph does not apply to the last approximation referred to in no 2.

Article 239

If at the date of accession, or during the period of the application of transitory measures, the price on the world market for a certain product exceeds the common price, the common price may be applied in Portugal for the product in question, except if the price in Portugal were higher than the common price.

Article 240

The differences in the levels of prices in relation to those which in Section IV refer back to the present article, shall be compensated for in the following way:

1. For the products whose prices are fixed in the terms of Articles 236 and 238, the applicable compensatory amounts in trade exchanges between the Community in its present composition and Portugal, and between Portugal and third countries, shall be equal to the difference existing between the prices fixed for Portugal and common prices.

However, the compensatory amount established in the terms of the above mentioned rules shall be, if necessary, corrected by the incidence of national help which the Portuguese Republic is authorized to maintain pursuant to Articles 247 and 248.

2. No compensatory amount shall be fixed if a minimum amount results from the application of No 1.

3. a) In trade exchanges between Portugal and the Community in its present composition, compensatory amounts shall be charged by the importing state, or granted by the exporting state.

b) In trade exchanges between Portugal and third countries, **equalizing** duties or other impositions on imports applied within the framework of common agriculture, as well as restitutions to exports, except by express derogation, depending on the case, shall be added or subtracted from applicable compensatory amounts in trade exchanges with the Community in its present composition.

However, customs duties may not be subtracted from the compensatory amount.

4. For the products for which the common customs tariff list is found consolidated within the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT], such consolidation shall be taken into consideration.

5. The compensatory amount charged or granted by a member state under the terms of no 1 may not be greater than the total amount charged by that member state for the imports coming from third countries which benefit from the most favored nation clause.

The Council deciding by a qualified majority, under the proposal of the Commission, may derogate this rule, specifically to prevent deviations of movement and distortions of competition.

6. The Council, deciding by a qualified majority, under proposal of the Commission, may derogate, in the degree necessary for the good operation of the common agricultural policy, the dispositions of no 1, first paragraph, of Article 211 having to do with products to which compensatory amounts are applied.

Article 241

When with respect to a product, the price on the world market is higher than the price taken into consideration for the calculation of the imposition on imports instituted within the framework of the common agricultural policy, decreasing the compensatory amount which is deducted from the imposition on imports under the terms of Article 240, or when restitution to exports to third countries is lower than the compensatory amount, or even if no restitution is applicable, suitable measures may be taken to insure the good operation of the common market organizations.

Article 242

1. The compensatory amounts granted shall be financed by the Community by means of the European Agriculture Guidance and Guarantee Fund [FEOGA], Guarantee Section.

2. Expenditures to be undertaken by the Portuguese Republic in matters of intervention in its domestic market and the granting of restitutions or subsidies to exports to third countries and to other member states, shall continue to be national expenditures up to the end of the first phase, with respect to the products referred to in Article 259.

Beginning with the second phase, expenditures in matters of intervention in the Portuguese domestic market and the granting of restitutions to exports to third countries shall be financed by the Community through the FEOGA, Guarantee Section.

Subsection 3--Free Movement and Customs Union

Article 243

On the products coming from third countries, whose importing into the Community in its present composition is subject to the application of customs duties, the following provisions apply:

1. a) Without prejudice to No 4, imports customs duties in the Community in its present composition relative to products coming from Portugal shall be progressively suppressed pursuant to the following calendar:

on 1 March 1986 each duty shall be reduced to 85.7 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1987 each duty shall be reduced to 71.4 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1988 each duty shall be reduced to 51.1 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1989 each duty shall be reduced to 42.8 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1990 each duty shall be reduced to 28.5 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1991 each duty shall be reduced to 14.2 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1992 all duties shall be abolished.

However,

with respect to orchids, the arums, the strelitzia and proteas classified under item ex 06.03 A of the common customs tariff list,

with respect to preparations or preserves made of tomatoes classified under item 20.02 C of the common customs tariff list,

the Community in its present composition shall reduce its base duties by fractions of 20 percent consecutively on the following dates:

on 1 March 1986
on 1 January 1987
on 1 January 1988
on 1 January 1989
on 1 January 1990.

b) Without prejudice to No 4, import customs duties in Portugal on products which come from the present Community, shall be progressively abolished pursuant to the following schedule:

on 1 March 1986 each duty shall be reduced to 87.5 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1987 each duty shall be reduced to 75 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1988 each duty shall be reduced to 62.5 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1989 each duty shall be reduced to 50 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1990 each duty shall be reduced to 37.5 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1991 each duty shall be reduced to 25 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1992 each duty shall be reduced to 12.5 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1993 all duties shall be abolished.

c) Without prejudice to No 4, and in derogation of the provisions of the foregoing lines a) and b), relative to oleaginous seeds and fruits and the products deriving from them that are the object of Regulation No 136/66 EEC, with the exception of vegetable oils other than olive oil destined for human consumption, import customs duties shall be progressively suppressed between the Community in its present composition and Portugal pursuant to the following schedule:

on 1 March 1986 each duty shall be reduced to 90.9 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1987 each duty shall be reduced to 81.8 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1988 each duty shall be reduced to 72.7 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1989 each duty shall be reduced to 63.6 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1990 each duty shall be reduced to 54.5 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1991 each duty shall be reduced to 45.4 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1992 each duty shall be reduced to 36.3 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1993 each duty shall be reduced to 27.2 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1994 each duty shall be reduced to 18.1 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1995 each duty shall be reduced to 9 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1996 all duties shall be abolished.

d) Without prejudice to No 4, with respect to vegetable oils other than olive oil that are destined for human consumption, the Community in its present composition and the Portuguese Republic shall apply, without alteration, the respective base duties during the period of application in Portugal of certain control mechanisms referred to in Article 292. At the end of that period, the base duties shall be progressively suppressed pursuant to the following schedule:

on 1 January 1991 each duty shall be reduced to 83.3 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1992 each duty shall be reduced to 66.6 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1993 each duty shall be reduced to 49.9 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1994 each duty shall be reduced to 33.2 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1995 each duty shall be reduced to 16.5 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1996 all duties shall be abolished.

2. Keeping in mind the introduction of the common customs tariff list, the Portuguese Republic shall completely apply the duties of the common customs tariff list as of 1 March 1986 with the following exceptions:

a) Without prejudice to No 4, for the products referred to in Annex XX and for the products whose Portuguese base duties are higher than those of the common customs tariffs list, the Portuguese Republic, in order to progressively introduce the common customs tariff list, shall change its tariff list applicable to third countries in the following terms:

aa) For the customs tariff list items whose base duties differ no more than 15 percent from the common customs tariff list, the latter duties shall be applied to them;

bb) In the remaining cases, the Portuguese Republic shall apply a duty which shall reduce the difference between the base duties and the common customs tariff list in eight equal fractions of 12.5 percent on the following dates:

1 March 1986;
1 January 1987;
1 January 1988;
1 January 1989;
1 January 1990;
1 January 1991;
1 January 1992.

The Portuguese Republic shall apply the common customs tariff list in its entirety as of 1 January 1993.

b) Without prejudice to No 4 on the oleaginous seeds and fruits and their byproducts that are the object of Regulation no 136/66 EEC, with the exception of vegetable oils other than olive oil destined for human consumption, the Portuguese Republic, keeping in mind the progressive introduction of the common customs tariff list, shall change its customs tariff list on them applicable to third countries in the following terms:

aa) For the customs tariff list items on which base duties are not more than 15 percent different from those of the common customs tariff list, the latter duties shall be applied to them;

bb) In the remaining cases, the Portuguese Republic shall apply a duty that will reduce the difference between the base duty and the duties of the common customs tariff list pursuant to the following schedule:

on 1 March 1986 the difference shall be reduced to 90.9 percent of the initial difference;
on 1 January 1987 the difference shall be reduced to 81.8 percent of the initial difference;
on 1 January 1988 the difference shall be reduced to 72.7 percent of the initial difference;
on 1 January 1989 the difference shall be reduced to 63.6 percent of the initial difference;
on 1 January 1990 the difference shall be reduced to 54.5 percent of the initial difference.
on 1 January 1991 the difference shall be reduced to 45.4 percent of the initial difference;
on 1 January 1992 the difference shall be reduced to 36.3 percent of the initial difference;
on 1 January 1993 the difference shall be reduced to 27.2 percent of the initial difference;
on 1 January 1994 the difference shall be reduced to 18.1 percent of the initial difference;
on 1 January 1995 the difference shall be reduced to 9 percent of the initial difference;
the Portuguese Republic shall apply the common customs tariff list in its entirety as of 1 January 1996.

c) Without prejudice to No 4 on the vegetable oils other than olive oil destined for human consumption, with respect to which the Portuguese Republic applies its base duties without change during the period of application in Portugal of certain mechanisms of control referred to in Article 292, at the end of that period the Portuguese Republic shall change its tariff list applicable to third countries in the following terms:

aa) For customs list items whose base duties are no different from the duties of the common customs tariff list by more than 15 percent the latter duties shall be applied;

bb) in the remaining cases, the Portuguese Republic shall reduce the difference between the base duty and the common customs tariff list duty pursuant to the following schedule:

on 1 January 1991 the difference shall be reduced to 83.3 percent of the initial difference;
on 1 January 1992 the difference shall be reduced to 66.6 percent of the initial difference;

on 1 January 1993 the difference shall be reduced to 49.9 percent of the initial difference;
on 1 January 1994 the difference shall be reduced to 33.2 percent of the initial difference;
on 1 January 1995 the difference shall be reduced to 16.5 percent of the initial difference;
the Portuguese Republic shall apply the common customs tariff list in its entirety as of 1 January 1996.

3. For the purposes of the provisions of Nos 1 and 2, the base duty is that defined in Article 189.

4. With respect to the products submitted to a common market organization, it may be decided, pursuant to the procedures stipulated in Article 38 of Regulation no 136/66 EEC or, depending on the case, on the pertinent articles of the other regulations which establish a common agricultural market organization, that:

a) the Portuguese Republic, upon its request, shall proceed to:

the suppression of the customs duties referred to in lines b), c) and d) of No 1, or to the approximation referred to in lines a), b) and c) of No 2 more rapidly than stipulated in them;

the total or partial suspension of the customs duties referred to in lines b), c) and d) of no 1, applicable to products imported from present member states;

the total or partial suspension of customs duties applicable to products imported from third countries referred to in lines a), b) and c) of No 2.

b) The Community in its present composition shall proceed:

to the suppression of the customs duties referred to in lines a), c) and d) of No 1 more rapidly than stipulated in them;

the total or partial suppression of the customs duties referred to in lines a), c), and d) of no 1, applicable to products from Portugal.

With respect to products not submitted to a common market organization:

a) There is no requirement for the Portuguese Republic to proceed to the application of the measures referred to in line a), first and second sections of the first paragraph of the present number; the Portuguese Republic shall inform the other member states and the Commission of the measures taken.

b) The commission may totally or partially suppress the customs duties applicable to products imported from Portugal.

Customs duties resulting from an accelerated approximation or suspension may not be lower than those applied to imports of the same products from other member states.

Article 244

1. In trade exchanges between Portugal and the other member states, and between Portugal and third countries, the system applicable in the Community in its present composition in matters of customs duties, equivalent effect charges, quantitative restrictions and measures of equivalent effects, shall be applied in Portugal as of 1 March 1986, without prejudice to the provisions to the contrary of the present chapter for the products subjected to a common market organization, up until the date of accession.

2. With respect with the products which are not subjected to a common market organization on 1 March 1986, the suppression of charges of effects equivalent to customs duties and the quantitative restrictions and equivalent effect measures shall be suppressed on that date, except when such charges, restrictions and measures are an integral part of a national market organization in Portugal or another member state on the date of accession.

The provisions of the foregoing paragraph are only applicable until the beginning of operations of the common market organization for those products, no later than 31 December 1995, and only when it is strictly necessary to insure the maintenance of the national organization.

3. The Portuguese Republic shall apply the nomenclature of the common customs tariff list as of 1 March 1986.

The Council, deciding by a qualified majority, under the proposal of the Commission, may authorize the Portuguese Republic to use in this nomenclature the existing national subitems which may be indispensable for the progressive approximation to the common customs tariff list or the suppression of duties in the Community, to be accomplished under the terms of the present Act, providing that no difficulties result from it in the application of the Community regulations, particularly in the functioning of the common market organization and the transitory provisions stipulated in the present chapter.

Article 245

1. Up to 31 December 1992 the Portuguese Republic may apply quantitative restrictions on imports coming from third countries of the products referred to in Annex XXI.

2. a) The quantitative restrictions referred to in no 1 consist of annual quotas opened without discrimination among the economic operators.

b) The initial quota for each product in 1986, expressed depending on the case, by volume or in ECU's, is fixed :

either at 3 percent of the average of Portuguese annual production during the last 3 years prior to accession on which statistics are available; or at the average of Portuguese imports made during the last 3 years prior to accession on which statistics are available, if this last criterion leads to a higher volume or sum.

3. The progressive increase of quotas is of no less than 20 percent at the beginning of each with respect to the quotas expressed in value, and of no less than 15 percent at the beginning of each year with respect to the quotas expressed in volume.

The increase is added to each quota and the following increase is calculated on the basis of the total figure obtained.

4. Provided that imports made in Portugal during two consecutive years are less than 90 percent of the open annual quota, the quantitative restrictions effective in Portugal shall be abolished.

5. For the period between 1 March and 31 December 1986, the quota applicable is equal to the initial quota diminished by one-sixth.

Subsection 4 - Assistance

Article 246

1. The present article applies to assistance, premiums or other similar sums instituted within the framework of the common agricultural policy with respect to which Section 4 refers back to the present article.

2. For the purpose of the application of community assistance in Portugal, the following provisions are applied:

a) At the level of community assistance to be granted for a certain product in Portugal, as of 1 March 1986 it shall be equal to an amount established on the basis of the assistance granted by the Portuguese Republic during a representative period to be determined under the previous national system. However, this amount cannot exceed the amount of assistance granted on 1 March 1986 by the Community in its present composition. If no similar assistance was granted during the previous national system, and without prejudice to the following provisions, no assistance shall be granted in Portugal on 1 March 1986.

b) At the beginning of the first sales season, or if there is none, at the first period of application of assistance after accession:

either community assistance is introduced in Portugal at a level which represents one-seventh of the amount of Community assistance applicable for the next season or period,

or the level of community help in Portugal is approximated, in case there is a difference, to the level of assistance applicable in the Community in its present composition for the season or following period, by one-seventh of the difference existing between those two assistances.

c) at the beginning of the next seasons or periods of application, the level of community assistance in Portugal shall be approximated to the level of assistance applicable in the Community in its present composition, for the next season or period, by one-sixth, one-fifth, one-fourth, one-third and one-half of the difference existing between those two assistances, successively.

d) The level of Community assistance shall be completely applied in Portugal at the beginning of the seventh sales season or the seventh period of application of assistance subsequent to accession.

Article 247

1. Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 246, the Portuguese Republic is authorized to maintain national assistance whose suppression would cause serious consequences at the level of prices, in production as well as in consumption. However, such assistance may only be maintained on a transitory basis, and in principle degressive, no later than the end of the period of application of the transitory measures.

2. The Council, deciding under the conditions stipulated in Article 258, shall adopt the measures necessary for the application of the provisions of the present article. These measures include, particularly, the list and exact description of the assistance referred to in No 1, its amounts, the schedule of suppression and the possible rate of degressiveness, as well as the rules necessary for the good operation of the common agricultural policy. These rules must, on the other hand, insure equality of access of the Portuguese market.

3. In case it is necessary, during the period of application of the transitory measures, the rate of degressiveness referred to in no 2 may be derogated.

Article 248

1. In duly justified exceptional cases, the Portuguese Republic may be authorized to reintroduce, at the expense of its budget, temporary assistance

to production provided that such assistance has been granted under the previous national system and that the respective suppression prior to accession was shown to have caused serious consequences at the level of production.

2. The national assistance referred to in No 1 may only be reintroduced on a temporary basis and in principle, degressive, no later than up to the end of the period of application of the transitory measures.

The Council, deciding by a qualified majority at the proposal of the Commission, shall approve, if necessary, the measures required which must include the same rules and the same elements as those referred to in No 2 of Article 247.

Subsection 5--Complementary Mechanism for Trade Exchanges

Article 249

1. A complementary mechanism applicable to trade between the Community in its present composition and Portugal is instituted. It shall be called the MCT.

The MCT is applicable from 1 March 1986 until 31 December 1995.

2. The products, whose list contained in Annex XXII, are subject to the MCT.

The list referred to in Annex XXII may be completed according to the procedure stipulated in Article 250 during the first 3 years after accession.

3. The Commission shall present a report on the functioning of the MCT during the course of the previous year to the Council at the beginning of each year.

Article 250

1. An Ad Hoc Committee is instituted, which consists of representatives of the member states and is presided over by a representation of the Commission.

2. Within the Ad Hoc Committee, the votes of the member states have the same weight stipulated in No 2 of Article 140 of the EEC Treaty. The chairman does not vote.

3. In the case that reference is made to the procedure established in the present article, the chairman shall submit the matter to the Ad Hoc Committee without delay, on his own initiative or at the request of a member state.

4. The representative of the Commission presents a plan on the measures to be taken. The Committee utters its opinion within a period the chairman may establish, depending on the urgency of the questions submitted for their evaluation. The Committee decides by a majority of 54 votes.

5. The Commission approves the measures and applies them immediately, provided that they are in conformity with the opinion of the Committee. If they are not in conformity with the opinion of the Committee, or in the absence of an opinion, the Commission immediately submits a proposal relative to the measures to be taken to the Council. The Council approves these measures by a qualified majority.

If at the end of a period of one month, counting from the date in which the matter was submitted to it, the Council has not approved the measures, the Commission shall approve the proposed measures and apply them immediately, except in the case where the Council has expressed itself through a simple majority against the aforementioned measures.

Article 251

1. In principle, at the beginning of each sales season, an anticipatory balance relative to each of the products or group of products subjected to the MCT shall be established pursuant to the procedures stipulated in Article 38 of Regulation No 136/66/EEC or, depending on the case, in the pertinent articles of other regulation which establish the common market organization on agriculture.

This balance shall be established in principle by seasons, in terms of the production and consumption forecasts in Portugal or in the Community in its present composition. An anticipatory schedule relative to the development of trade exchanges and the establishment of a limit indicative of the imports of the market in question shall be established on the basis of this balance in accordance with the same procedure.

For the period beginning 1 March 1986 and ending at the beginning of the 1986/1987 sales season, a specific balance shall be established with respect to each product or group of products.

2. Successive establishments of indicative limits should reflect a certain progressiveness with respect to the trends of traditional trade exchanges in such a way as to insure a harmonious and gradual opening of the market and the complete realization of free movement within the Community at the end of the period of application of the transitory measures.

With this goal, a rate of annual progression of the limit shall be determined pursuant to the procedure referred to in No 1. Within the framework of the overall indicative limit, limits may be established corresponding to the different periods of the sales seasons in question.

Article 252

1. When an examination of the development of intracommunity trade reveals a significant increase in imports made or in foreseeable imports, and if from that situation it results that the indicative limit of imports of a product for a sales season underway, or for part of it, has been reached or exceeded, the Commission, at the request of a member state, or on its own initiative, pursuant to an emergency procedure shall decide:

the precautionary measures necessary and applicable until the effective date of the definitive measures stipulated in no 3;

the convocation of the Management Committee of the sector in question, keeping in mind an analysis of adequate measures.

2. When the situation referred to in No 1 causes a serious disturbance in the markets, a member state may ask the Commission to take the precautionary measures referred to in No 1 immediately. For that purpose, the Commission shall adopt a decision within the 24 hours following the receipt of the request.

If the decision by the Commission has not been made in that period, the requesting member state may take precautionary measures of which the Commission will be immediately notified.

These measures shall remain applicable until the Commission has decided on the request mentioned in the first paragraph.

3. The final measures shall be adopted as soon as possible pursuant to the procedures stipulated in Article 38 of Regulation No 136/66 EEC, or, depending on the case, in the pertinent articles of the other regulations relative to the common organization of agricultural markets.

These measures may specifically include:

a) The revision of the indicative limit if the market in question has not suffered significant disturbances in the course of the development of imports;

b) Depending on the gravity of the situation, evaluated specifically on the basis of the development of market prices and on the quantities which are the object of exchanges, the limitation or suspension of imports into the Community market in its present composition or into the Portuguese market.

The restrictive measures referred to in line b) may only be taken in the degree and time strictly required for putting an end to the disturbance. With respect to the Community in its present composition, these measures may be limited to imported destined for some of its regions, provided they include the proper provisions to prevent deviations of movement.

4. The application of the MCT cannot, under any circumstances, mean a less favorable treatment with respect to the products coming from Portugal or the Community in its present composition, than that applied to products, which coming from third countries, are benefitted by the most favored nation clause and are distributed in the regions in question.

Subsection 6 - Other Provisions

Article 253

The following measures shall be applied with the objective of improving the structures in Portugal:

- a) The execution, as of the intervening period, of specific measures of preparation for the purpose of receiving and applying Community experience specifically in the area of structures of production, transformation and sales, as well as producing organizations;
- b) the application in Portugal, as of the date of accession, of Community regulations in the sociostructural area, including that relative to the producer organizations;
- c) extension to the benefit of Portugal, within the framework of the regulations referred to in line b), of the specific most favorable provisions existing on that date in the lateral communitarian regulations in favor of the more disadvantaged zones of the Community in its present composition;
- d) execution, in addition to that, of structural actions in favor of Portugal in the form of specific program for the development of Portuguese agriculture.

The Council, deliberating under the conditions stipulated in Article 258, shall adopt, if necessary, the measures or methods of the measures mentioned in the first paragraph.

Article 254

The supplies of products that may be found in free movement in Portuguese territory on 1 March 1986, and which exceed the quantities of that which may be considered normal stocks, must be eliminated by the Portuguese Republic and at its expense, within the framework of communitarian procedures to be established within the deadlines to be determined under the terms of Article 258.

The idea of a normal supply stock shall be indicated for each product in terms of the criteria and individual objectives of each common market organization.

Article 255

When establishing the level of the various amounts stipulated within the framework of the common agricultural policy, which are not the prices referred to in Article 236, the compensatory amount applied, or if there is none, the difference of prices confirmed or economically justified, shall be taken into consideration and if necessary, the influence of the customs duty except:

if there is no danger of a disturbance in trade, or, if the good operation of the common agricultural policy requires that such an amount, that difference or that influence not be considered, or that its consideration has become undesirable.

Article 256

1. The Council, deliberating under the conditions stipulated in Article 258, shall approve the system applicable by the Portuguese Republic relative to the Spanish State.

2. The measures made necessary in trade between the new member states and the Community in its present composition for the execution of the system referred to in No 1, shall be adopted, depending on the case, under the conditions stipulated in Article 258 or pursuant to the procedure stipulated in No 2 of Article 234.

Article 257

1. If temporary measures were to be needed to facilitate the passage from the system existing in Portugal to that which shall result from the application of the common market organization in terms of the present title, particularly if the application of the new system on the stipulated date results in considerable difficulty in the Community with respect to certain products, such measures shall be adopted pursuant to the procedure stipulated in Article 38 of Regulation No 136/66/EEC or, depending on the case, pursuant to pertinent articles of other regulations relative to the common organization of agricultural markets. These measures may be undertaken until 31 December 1987; their respective application may not go beyond that date.

2. The Council, by unanimous deliberation, under proposal by the Commission and after consulting the Assembly, may extend the period referred to in No 1.

Article 258

1. Transitory measures with respect to the application of the acts relative to the common agricultural policy and not specified in the present Act, including in the area of structures made necessary as the result of accession, shall be adopted prior to accession pursuant to the procedure specified in No 3, and shall go into effect no later than the date of accession.

2. Transitory measures referred to in No 1 are those mentioned in Articles 247, 253, 254, 256 and No 2 of Articles 263 and 280.

3. The Council, deliberating by a qualified majority, under proposal of the Commission, or the Commission, deciding pursuant to the procedure stipulated in No 1 of Article 257, shall adopt the transitory measures referred to in No 1, pursuant to the initial acts which such measures affect and which may have been adopted by one or the other of these institutions.

Section I--Transition by Phases

Subsection I -- Framework of Application

Article 259

1. The products that are the object of the following acts are subject to transition by phases:

Regulations (EEC) No 804/68, which establishes the common market organization in the area of milk and milk products.

Regulation (EEC) No 805/68, which establishes the common market organization in the sector of beef.

Regulation (EEC) No 1035/72, which establishes the common market organization in the sector of fruit and horticultural products.

Regulation (EEC) No 2727/75, which establishes the common market organization in the sector of cereals.

Regulation (EEC) No 2759/75, which establishes the common market organization in the sector of pork.

Regulation (EEC) No 2771/75, which establishes the common market organization in the sector of eggs.

Regulation (EEC) No 2777/75, which establishes the common market organization in the sector of domestic fowl meat.

Regulation (EEC) No 1418/76, which establishes the common market organization in the rice sector.

Regulation (EEC) No 337/79, which establishes the common market organization in winemaking.

2. The glucose and lactose that are the object of Regulation (EEC) No 2730/75, and the egg albumin and milk albumin that are the object of Regulation (EEC) No 2783/75, remain subject to the same transitory system applicable to the pertinent agricultural products.

Article 260

1. The transition by phases consists of two 5-year periods:

The first phase begins on 1 March 1986 and ends on 31 December 1990;

the second phase begins on 1 January 1991 and ends on 31 December 1995.

The passage from the first phase to the second phase is automatic.

2. In derogation of No 1, the Council, deliberating by a qualified majority under the proposal of the Commission and after consultation with the Assembly, may reduce the first phase to a period of 3 years, which will end on 31 December 1988. In this case, the second phase begins on 1 January 1989 and ends on 31 December 1995.

Subsection 2--First Phase

a) Portuguese Domestic Market

Article 261

1. During the first phase, the Portuguese Republic is authorized to maintain, for the products referred to in Article 259, the regulation in effect under the prior national system for the organization of its domestic agricultural market under the conditions stipulated in Articles 262 and 265 and under the reservations of the special provisions of the section relative to certain products.

2. As a result, and in derogation of the provisions of Article 394, the application of the communitarian regulations relative to the organization of the domestic market in Portugal shall be postponed until the end of the first phase.

Moreover, and except provisions to the contrary in specific cases, the application in the Community in its present composition, and in Portugal, of the changes introduced in the Community regulations by Article 396 shall be postponed until the end of the first phase.

Article 262

In order to allow Portuguese agriculture to enter into the framework of the common agricultural policy in a harmonious and complete manner at the end of the first phase, the Portuguese Republic shall progressively adapt the organization of its market in terms of a certain number of general objectives complemented by specific objectives, which may vary pursuant to the sectors in question.

Article 263

The general objectives referred to in Article 262 consist of accomplishing:

A noticeable improvement in production, transformation and sales conditions for agricultural products in Portugal;

an overall improvement of the structural situation of the Portuguese agricultural sector.

2. In order to favor the accomplishment of the general objectives, the following measures relative to the products referred to in Article 259 shall be applied:

a) The execution, as of the intervening period, of specific measures of preparation, having as an objective the reception and the application of the communitarian experience, specifically in the area of the structures of production, transformation and sales, as well as in the organizations of producers;

b) application in Portugal, as of the date of accession of the communitarian regulations in the sociostructural area, including that relative to the producers organizations;

c) extension for the benefit of Portugal, within the framework of the regulations referred to in line b), of the most favorable specific provisions existing on that date in the lateral communitarian regulations in favor of the most disadvantaged zones of the Community in its present composition;

d) in addition to that, the execution of structural actions in favor of Portugal in the form of a specific development program for Portuguese agriculture.

The Council, deliberating by a qualified majority, under the conditions stipulated in Article 258, shall adopt the measures or methods of the measures referred to in the first paragraph if necessary.

Article 264

1. The specific objectives referred to in Article 262 consist, according to the sector of products in question, of Section V.

2. a) For the purpose of attaining the specific objectives, the Commission shall prepare, during the intervening period, a program of action in close collaboration with the Portuguese authorities,

b) then the Commission shall closely watch the progress of the situation in Portugal in the light of:

The progress made in the accomplishment of fixed objectives;

the results obtained by means of the execution of lateral and specific structural measures.

c) The Commission shall issue its opinion on this progress by means of reports to be transmitted to the Council:

At the end of the intervening period, keeping in mind the establishment of a balance of the progress made prior to the date of accession;

in useful time before the end of the third year after accession;

at any time the Commission judges useful or necessary.

d) Primarily considering the deliberations of the Council on the reports referred to in line c), the Commission may make recommendations to the Portuguese Republic, if necessary, on the actions that must be undertaken, keeping in mind the accomplishment of the objectives in question.

Article 265

During the first phase, the Portuguese Republic shall apply the following disciplines:

1. A discipline of prices:

a) If Portuguese prices expressed in ECU's are lower or equal to common prices:

Without prejudice to the harmonization of prices in the milk sector or that of milk products referred to in line d) of Article 309, the annual increases in prices may not exceed in value the increase in common prices; however:

aa) In case Portuguese prices are lower than common prices, and always provided that in the terms of the discipline of assistance referred to in line c) the suppression of certain assistance--directly granted to the products at the level of primary production or granted to the means of production--results in a decline in the yields of Portuguese producers, an amount complementary to that referred to in the first section, limited to the effects of the assistance suppressed on the yields of the producers, may be applied.

bb) With respect to the products of customs tariffs item 22.05 of the common customs tariff list, by means of which institutional prices are fixed, the annual increase in Portuguese prices may reach, without exceeding, the level of the fraction resulting from an approximation of the prices effected in 10 years.

Portuguese prices may in no case exceed the levels of common prices.

Keeping in view the application of the discipline of prices established in line a), the level of Portuguese prices to be taken under consideration during the first sales season after accession is the level of Portuguese prices established by the 1985/86 season, converted into ECU's at the effective rate at the beginning of this sales season for the products in question.

b) In case the duration of the first phase is not reduced under the terms of No 2 Article 260, and provided that Portuguese prices are lower than common prices, the Portuguese Republic shall proceed during the course of the fifth year of the first phase, at the beginning of the sales season for the product in question, to a movement of approximation of prices with respect to the level of common prices applicable to that same season under terms to be determined.

For that purpose, Portuguese prices to be approximated are the prices expressed in ECU's at the level reached on 31 December 1989 under the terms of the rules of the discipline of prices referred to in line a).

c) If the level reached by Portuguese prices for the 1985/1986 season, expressed in ECU's at the rate of conversion in effect at the beginning of the sales season for the product in question, were to be higher than the level of common prices, the level of Portuguese prices may not be increased with respect to their previous level.

Moreover, if Portuguese prices expressed in ECU's established under the prior national system for the 1985/1986 season, were to lead to exceeding the existing difference for the 1984/1985 season between Portuguese prices and common prices, the Portuguese Republic shall fix its prices to equal those of previous seasons in such a way that this surplus shall be completely reabsorbed during the first seven sales seasons subsequent to accession.

On the other hand, Portugal shall adapt its prices in the degree necessary to prevent an increase in the difference between its prices and common prices.

d) The Commission shall check to insure compliance with the rules heretofore listed. An excess in the level of prices resulting from the application of these rules shall not be taken into consideration with respect to the determination of the level of prices to be taken as the starting level for the approximation of prices during the second phase referred to in Article 285.

2. A discipline of assistance:

With respect to this discipline, and without prejudice to Article 248, the Portuguese Republic is authorized to maintain its national assistance during the first phase.

However, during this period the Portuguese Republic shall seek to carry out a certain dismantlement of national assistance which is not in conformity with the community rules and introduce the system of community assistance into the organization of its domestic market progressively, without it meaning that the level of this assistance will exceed the common level.

3. A discipline of production:

With respect to this discipline, the Portuguese Republic shall take the necessary measure to prevent that in the sectors in which the community regulations establishes rules for the discipline of production:

the possible increases in production taking place in its territory during the course of the first phase will lead to a worsening of the situation of community production as a whole.

the reception of community production as of the beginning of the second phase becomes more difficult.

Article 266

1. No later than the end of the first phase:

The Commission shall issue, if necessary, a report to the Council that will include proposals on the development of the situation in one or in several of the sectors referred to in Article 259 with respect to the objectives indicated for the first phase;

the Council, deliberating unanimously at the proposal of the Commission and after consultation of the Assembly, shall decide on the possible adaptations required in the methods of transition, within the maximum period of 10 years, stipulated for the application of the transition measures, for a period strictly necessary for insuring the operation of the common market organizations.

2. The provisions of No 1 do not affect the automatic nature of the passage from the first phase to the second phase stipulated in No 1 of Article 260 and may not imply a change of Articles 371 and 375.

b) System Applicable in Trade Exchanges between the Community in its Present Composition and Portugal.

Article 267

Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 268 and 276 and Section V, the Portuguese Republic is authorized to apply in its trade with the Community in its present composition, the system in effect prior to its accession relative to these trade exchanges, imports as well as exports, during the first phase and with respect to the products referred to in Article 259.

Article 268

1. With the exceptions of the provisions of No 2, the Portuguese Republic shall eliminate as of 1 March 1986, any collection of customs duties or equivalent surcharges on the imports of products from the Community in its present composition.

2. Relative to the products referred to in Article 259 whose imports from third countries into the Community in its present composition are subject to customs duties, the following provisions are applicable, keeping in view a progressive abolishment of these duties during the course of the first and second phases:

a) Customs duties applicable to imports into the Community in its present composition relative to products from Portugal shall be abolished pursuant to the following schedule:

On 1 March 1986 each duty shall be reduced to 88.9 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1987 each duty shall be reduced to 77.8 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1988 each duty shall be reduced to 66.7 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1989 each duty shall be reduced to 55.8 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1990 each duty shall be reduced to 44.5 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1991 each duty shall be reduced to 33.4 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1992 each duty shall be reduced to 22.3 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1993 each duty shall be reduced to 11.2 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1994 all duties shall be abolished.

However:

With respect to strong and sweetish wines of quality produced in certain regions and contained in item 22.05 of the common tariffs list, the Community in its present composition shall reduce its base duties in three fractions pursuant to the following calendar:

On 1 March 1986 each duty shall be reduced to 66.7 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1987 each duty shall be reduced to 33.4 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1988 all duties shall be abolished.

with respect to dry wines and those from Dao included in item 22.05 of the common tariffs list, the Community in its present composition shall reduce its base duties in four fractions of 25 percent successively, and in accordance with the following dates:

1 March 1986,
1 January 1987,
1 January 1988,
1 January 1989;

relative to the other wines equivalent to those of "v.q.p.r.d." included in item 22.05 of the common tariffs list, the Community in its present composition shall reduce its base duties in six fractions according to the following calendar:

On 1 March 1986 each duty shall be reduced to 83.3 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1987 each duty shall be reduced to 66.6 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1988 each duty shall be reduced to 49.9 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1989 each duty shall be reduced to 33.2 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1990 each right shall be reduced to 16.5 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1991 all duties shall be abolished.

b) The customs duties applicable to the imports by Portugal of products referred to in Article 259 which come from the Community in its present composition, shall be progressively abolished according to the following calendar:

On 1 March 1986 each duty shall be reduced to 90.9 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1987 each duty shall be reduced to 81.8 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1988 each duty shall be reduced to 72.7 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1989 each duty shall be reduced to 63.6 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1990 each duty shall be reduced to 54.5 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1991 each duty shall be reduced to 45.4 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1992 each duty shall be reduced to 36.3 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1993 each duty shall be reduced to 27.2 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1994 each duty shall be reduced to 18.1 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1995 each duty shall be reduced to 9 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1996, all duties shall be abolished.

However:

provided that during the first phase relative to one of the products referred to in Annex XXIII, the customs duty resulting from the application of the previous paragraph is, under the terms of Article 191, limited to the level of the duty applicable to the imports into Portugal from third countries which benefit from the most favored nation clause, and,

provided that this situation is maintained at the beginning of the second phase, the progressive suppression of the residual duty shall be accomplished during the course of the second phase beginning with the level of the duty actually applied at the beginning of the second phase, pursuant to a calendar to be determined.

3. For the purposes of the provisions of Nos 1 and 2, the base duty is that established in Article 189.

However:

For the application of No 2, Line b), and with the exception of the base duty applicable to the products referred to in Annex XXIII, the base duty may not exceed the level of the common tariff list duty;

for strong sweetish wines of quality produced in certain regions, for young wines and the Dao wines, the base duties shall be those actually applied within the framework of tariff quotas under the previous system. The tariff quotas applied under the previous system shall be abolished as of 1 March 1986.

4. Number 4 of Article 243 is applicable, after the necessary changes, during the period of suppression of the customs duties referred to in No 2 of the present article. However, when No 4 of Article 243 stipulates a decision with respect to the Portuguese Republic in accordance with the procedure described in the first paragraph of that number, the member state may act without resorting to this procedure; in such case the Portuguese shall inform the other member states and the Commission of the measures taken.

Except for provisions to the contrary of the present article or of No 4 of Article 243, the provisions of Articles 189 and 195 are equally applicable.

Article 269

1. Without prejudice to the provisions of No 2, the Portuguese Republic shall eliminate the application of any quantitative restriction and of any equivalent effect measure on the imports of products referred to in Article 259 from the Community in its present composition as of 1 March 1986.

2 a) Until the end of the first phase, the Portuguese Republic may maintain quantitative restrictions on imports coming from the Community in its present composition of the products referred to in Annex XXIII.

b) The quantitative restrictions referred to in line a) consist of annual quotas opened without discrimination among economic operators.

The initial quota in 1986 for each product, expressed depending on the case in volume or in ECU's, is fixed:

Either at 3 percent of the average Portuguese annual production for the 3 years previous to accession on which there are statistics available; or of the average of Portuguese imports made during the 3 years previous to accession on which there are statistics available, if the last criterion leads to a higher volume or total.

c) The progressive increase of quotas is of at least 15 percent at the beginning of each year with respect to the quotas expressed in value, and of at least 10 percent at the beginning of each year with respect to the quotas expressed in volume.

The increase is added to each quota and the following increase is calculated on the total figure obtained.

d) Provided that imports made by Portugal for 2 consecutive years are less than 90 percent of the open annual quota, quantitative restrictions in effect in Portugal shall be abolished.

e) For the period between 1 March and 31 December 1986, the quota applicable is equal to the initial quota decreased by one-sixth.

Article 270

1. During the first phase, the Portuguese Republic shall apply a system of equalizing prices or of specific protection to the imports of the products referred to in Article 259 coming from the Community in its present composition as is stipulated by the Community regulations on imports from third countries. This system must be based on identical criteria to those taken into consideration by communitarian regulations for determining the parameters of the equalizing of prices or specific levels of protection.

2. For the products from among those mentioned in Article 259, which are not subject to restrictions in trade exchanges between Portugal and the present member states or between Portugal and third countries, pursuant to Articles 269 and 280, respectively, the Portuguese Republic may apply a system of statistical information prior to import until 31 December 1988. However, that system, which includes the issuance of a national import document, must stipulate the automatic issuance of that document during a maximum period of four working days after the date of the delivery of the request; if that document is not issued during the period stipulated, the imports may be done freely.

Within the framework of the report referred to in No 2 line c), second section, of Article 264, the Commission shall submit to the Council, no later than 3 months before the date of accession, the rules of the systems referred to in Nos 1 and 2.

After examination, the Commission shall transmit that communication to the other member states.

Article 271

During the first phase, the Portuguese Republic may grant aid or subsidies to the products referred to in Article 259 exported to the present member states.

However, the total of those possible aids or subsidies shall be limited to a maximum of the difference between the prices confirmed in Portugal and in the Community in its present composition, and if such is the case, the effects of customs duties.

The establishment of those aids or subsidies may only take place after the accomplishment of the procedures of consultation stipulated in Article 276.

Article 272

1. During the first phase, and without prejudice to No 2 line a) of Article 316, the Community in its present composition shall apply to the imports of the products referred to in Article 259 coming from Portugal the system that it applied with respect to Portugal prior to accession.

2. However, relative to the products subjected to a community system of equalizing import duties, the approximation of the prices possibly made and, if such were the case, the effects of national aid granted in Portugal, shall be taken into consideration when establishing equalizing duties applicable to products imported from Portugal.

3. In trade exchanges between the Community in its present composition and third countries during the first phase, figures relative to the Portuguese market shall not be taken into consideration for the purposes of calculating common prices that serve for the determination of the amounts collected on imports.

Article 273

1. During the first phase, the fixed element destined for insuring protection of the transformation industry used in the calculation for the taxation on imports coming from third countries with respect to the products subjected to the common market organization in the sectors of cereal and rice, shall be collected from imports into Portugal of products coming from present member states.

2. In derogation of No 1, the element of protection to be collected during the first phase from imports into Portugal of the products referred to in Annex XXIV, is fixed in front of each of them.

Article 274

1. Without prejudice to the application of the general protection clause referred to in Article 379, the Portuguese Republic is authorized to adopt measures of protection in the imports of the products referred to in Article 259 coming from the present member states under comparable conditions and criteria as those existing within the framework of each common market organization for the application of measures of protection with respect to third countries.

2. The Portuguese Republic shall immediately notify the Commission of such measures in order to allow it to present, if such is the case, observations as to the justification, nature or duration of the protective measures determined.

The present procedure does not exclude the applicability of the means of recourse stipulated in the terms of the EEC Treaty.

3. No protective measure may be adopted if at least the same measure is not at the same time applicable to imports by Portugal of the same products coming from third countries.

Article 275

1. During the first phase, the Community in its present composition shall apply the system that it applies to exports to third countries, to the products referred to in Article 259 exported to Portugal.

2. However, the amount of possible restitutions applicable is limited to a maximum of the difference between the prices confirmed in the Community in its present composition and in Portugal, and if such is the case, the effects of customs duties.

The establishment of these restitutions may only occur after the realization of the process of consultation stipulated in Article 276.

3. The restitutions referred to in the present article shall be financed by the Community under the EAGGF, Guarantee Section.

Article 276

The application by the Portuguese Republic of the aids or subsidies referred to in Article 271, or of the restitutions by the Community referred to in Article 275, are subordinated to prior consultations that will be accomplished according to the following procedure:

1. Any plan for fixing:

subsidies to exports from Portugal to the Community in its present composition or destined for third countries or restitutions on exports from the Community in its present composition destined for Portugal

shall be the object of an exchange of opinions within the framework of the periodic meetings of the Management Committee instituted by the common market organization to which the product in question is subject.

2. The representative of the Commission shall submit the above mentioned plan for examination. That examination shall primarily focus on the economic aspect of the stipulated exports, as well as on the status and the level of prices on the Portuguese market, the Community market in its present composition, and on the world market.

3. The Committee shall utter an opinion on the plan within a period that the president may set, depending on the urgency of the need for the fixing.

The Committee shall decide by a majority of 54 votes.

The opinion shall be immediately communicated to the authority responsible for the fixing, that is, depending on the case, the Portuguese Republic or the Commission.

In case it is a negative opinion, the pertinent authority:

may only make a fixing applicable, which is not in conformity with that opinion, after the expiration of a period of 10 working days after the date on which the Committee issued its opinion;

shall immediately communicate the fixing measure to the Council, which may deliberate on it and recommend to the pertinent authority that it change its plan or its fixing decision.

c) System Applicable in Trade Exchanges between Portugal and Third Countries

Article 277

1. With respect to the products referred to in Article 259, and without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 278 and 282, the Portuguese Republic shall apply, as of 1 March 1986, the communitarian regulations relative to the applicable system of imports to the Community of products imported from third countries, as is defined in No 3 of Article 272.

2. However, the equalizing duties applicable to imports shall be, if required, increased by the difference existing between the prices applicable in Portugal and the common prices.

Article 278

1. The Portuguese Republic shall completely apply the duties of the common customs tariff list as of 1 March 1986 with respect to the products referred to in Article 259, with the exception of products contained in Annex XXV, to which the common customs tariff list shall be applied no later than the beginning of the second phase.

2. The provisions of No 4 Article 243 are applicable after the necessary changes during the first phase with respect to the products contained in Annex XXV.

Except for the provisions contrary to the present article or to No 4 of Article 243, the provisions of Articles 197 and 201 are equally applicable.

Article 279

The fixed elements meant for insuring the protection of the transformation industry referred to in Article 273 and included in Annex XXIV, during the first phase shall be a substitute in that which has to do with the levy collected by Portugal on imports coming from third countries, for the community element of protection.

Article 280

Until 31 December 1995, the Portuguese Republic may maintain quantitative restrictions on imports of the products referred to in Annex XXVI from third countries, according with regulations to be determined by the Council deliberating under the conditions referred to in Article 258.

Article 281

No 2 of Article 270 and Article 274 apply, the necessary changes having been made, to trade exchanges between Portugal and third countries.

Article 283

1. For the products referred to in Article 259, and subject to the provisions of No 2 of the present article, the Portuguese Republic is authorized to maintain the system in effect before its accession with respect to exports to third countries for those trade exchanges.
2. The amount of aid or subsidies possibly granted by the Portuguese Republic to exports to third countries should be restricted to that which is strictly necessary for insuring the dissemination of the product in question in the market of destination.

That aid or subsidy may only be applied after having accomplished the procedures referred to in Article 276. Those consultations shall particularly focus on the economic aspect of the planned exports, on the prices taken into consideration for the calculation of them, and the status of the markets of origins or destination.

Subsection 3--Second Phase

Article 284

1. Beginning with the second phase, community regulations having to do with the products referred to in Article 259 shall be fully applied subject to the provisions of Articles 239, 240, 241, No 1 of Article 242, Articles 249 to 253, 255, 256, 268, 279, 285 to 288, as well as the specific provisions of Section V relative to certain products.

2. However, the compensatory amount established pursuant to the rules of Article 240 shall be corrected, if necessary, by the effects of national aid that the Portuguese Republic is authorized to maintain pursuant to Article 286.

Article 285

1. a) If under the terms of No 1 Article 260 the second phase were to have a duration of 5 years, the prices to be applied in Portugal shall be fixed at the same level as the results of the application of No 1 of Article 265 until the first of the approximations referred to in No 2 of the present article takes place.

b) If under the terms of No 2 of Article 260 the second phase were to have a duration of 7 years, the prices to be applied in Portugal shall be, until the first of the approximations referred to in No 2 of the present article, the prices expressed in ECU's fixed pursuant to the rules stipulated in the common market organization for the sector in question at the level reached on 31 December 1988, according to the rules of the discipline of prices stipulated in No 1 of Article 265.

2. If from the application of the provisions of No 1, there were to result a level of prices in Portugal different from the common prices, the prices which in Section V refer back to the present article shall be approximated, without prejudice to the provisions of No 6 on common prices, annually at the beginning of the sales season under the terms of Nos 3 and 4.

3. If the price for a product in Portugal were to be lower than the common price, the approximation shall be accomplished as follows:

In 5 years: If the second phase were to have a duration of 5 years, the price in Portugal shall be improved successively during the first four approximations as follows: one-fifth, one-fourth, one-third and one-half of the difference existing between the level of the Portuguese price and the level of the common prices applicable before each approximation;

in 7 years: If the second phase were to have a duration of 7 years, the price in Portugal shall be improved during the first six successive approximations as follows: One-seventh, one-sixth, one-fifth, one-fourth, one-third and one-half of the difference existing between the level of the Portuguese price and the level of the common prices applicable before each approximation.

The price resulting from the calculation made pursuant to one of the two previous sections shall be increased or decreased in proportion to the possible increase or decline in the common price for the following season.

The common price shall be applied in Portugal in 1995 at the beginning of the sale season for the product in question.

4. a) If with respect to a product the price in Portugal were to be higher than the common price, the price in the member state shall be maintained at the level referred to in No 1, approximation being the result of the change in common prices during the 5 or 7 years of the second phase, depending on the case.

However, the price in Portugal shall be adapted in the degree in that it becomes necessary in order to avoid an increase in the difference between this price and the common price.

Without prejudice to the provisions of line b), the common price shall be applied in Portugal in 1995 at the beginning of the sales season of the product in question.

b) Before the end of the eighth year, beginning with the year of accession, the Community shall proceed to accomplish an analysis of the progress of the approximation of prices. For this purpose, the Commission shall send the Council an opinion accompanied by suitable proposals, if necessary, within the framework of the reports referred to in No 2 line c) of Article 264.

If this analysis reveals:

that the difference between Portuguese prices and common prices is too large to be reabsorbed during the period of time remaining for the approximation of prices referred to in No 2, but it appears, nevertheless, that it can be suppressed within a limited period, the period of approximation of prices initially stipulated may be extended; in that case the prices shall be maintained at their previous level under the terms of the rule stipulated in line a);

that the difference between Portuguese prices and common prices is too large to be suppressed exclusively by extending the period of approximation of prices initially stipulated, it may be decided that in addition to this extension, the approximation shall be accomplished by means of a progressive lowering of Portuguese prices expressed in real terms, accompanied if necessary by indirect, temporary and degressive aid in order to attenuate the effects of the degressiveness of these prices. The financing of this aid shall be borne by the Portuguese budget.

The Council, deliberating by a qualified majority, at the proposal of the Commission and after consultations of the Assembly, shall adopt the measures referred to in the preceding paragraph.

5. If at the beginning of the second phase it is noted that the difference existing between the price level of a product in Portugal and the common price does not exceed 3 percent of the common price, the latter price may be applied in Portugal for the product in question.

6. In order to insure the harmonious operation of the integration process, it may be decided that, in derogation of No 3, the price of one or several products for Portugal may deviate for one season from the prices resulting from the application of that number.

This difference may not exceed 10 percent of the amount of the change to be made in prices.

In this case, the level of prices for the next season shall be that which will result from the application of No 3 if the difference has not been decided. However, for this season, a new difference with respect to that level may be decided under the terms of the first and second paragraphs.

The derogation stipulated in the first paragraph does not apply to the last approximation referred to in No 3.

Article 286.

1. As of the beginning of the second phase, the following provisions shall apply in Portugal.

No 1 of Article 244, without prejudice to Articles 268, 280 and 285 and the specific provisions of Section V relative to certain products;

Article 248, the decisions of the Council to be adopted pursuant to the procedures referred to in No 2 of Article 234;

Article 248

Article 254, the date of 1 March 1986 being replaced by the beginning of the second phase;

Article 257, the date of 31 December 1987 being replaced by 31 December of the second year of the second phase.

2. The MCT stipulated by Article 249 shall be applicable under the conditions established in Articles 250 to 252 as of the beginning of the second phase to 31 December 1995. The list of the products to be subjected to the MCT shall be established before the end of the first phase. This list may be completed under the terms of the procedure stipulated in Article 250 during the first 2 years of the second phase.

The Commission shall present a report to the Council at the beginning of each year on the functioning of the MCT during the previous year.

3. The fixed elements designed for insuring protection of the transformation industry referred to in Nos 1 and 2 of Article 273, shall be progressively abolished at the beginning of the second phase pursuant to the following calendar:

On 1 January 1991 each fixed element shall be reduced to 83.3 percent of the fixed base element;

on 1 January 1992 each fixed element shall be reduced to 66.6 percent of the fixed base element;

on 1 January 1993 each fixed element shall be reduced to 49.9 percent of the fixed base element;
on 1 January 1994 each fixed element shall be reduced to 33.2 percent of the fixed base element;
on 1 January 1995 each fixed element shall be reduced to 16.5 percent of the fixed base element,
on 1 January 1996 all fixed elements shall be abolished.

Article 287

1. In derogation of No 3, line b) of Article 240, and of Article 284, equalizing duties or other charges imposed on imports in trade exchanges between Portugal and third countries within the framework of the common agricultural policy shall not be deducted from the compensatory amounts applicable in the trade exchanges with the Community in its present composition.

2. As of the beginning of the second phase, the difference between the fixed elements aimed at insuring the protection of the transformation industry referred to in Article 279 and those which enter into the calculations of charges imposed on imports from third countries shall be reduced pursuant to the calendar referred to in No 3 of Article 286.

As of 1 January 1996 the Portuguese Republic shall apply the fixed element for insuring the protection of the transformation industry, which enters into the calculations of the charges imposed on imports from third countries for the products that are the object of the common market organization in the sectors of cereals and rice.

Article 288

Aid, premiums or other similar amounts instituted within the framework of the common market organization with respect to which in Section V are referred back to the present article, are applied in Portugal pursuant to the following provisions:

a) The level of community aid to be granted to a certain product in Portugal at the beginning of the second phase shall be equal to the amount of aid granted at the end of the first phase.

If no similar aid was granted during the first phase, and without prejudice to the subsequent provisions, no aid shall be granted in Portugal at the beginning of the second phase.

b) At the beginning of the first sales season, or if there is none, at the beginning of the first period of application of aid after the beginning of the second phase:

aa) Either community aid is introduced into Portugal at a level that is:

one-fifth of the amount of community help applicable for the season or the following period, if the second phase were to have a duration of 5 years;

one-seventh of the amount of community aid applicable for the season or the following period, if the second phase were to have a duration of 7 years;

bb) or community aid in Portugal is approximated, in the case there exists a difference, to the level of aid applicable in the Community in its present composition, for the following season or period as follows:

Of one-fifth of the difference existing between those two forms of aid if the second phase were to have a duration of 5 years;

of one-seventh of the difference existing between those two forms of aid if the second phase were to have a duration of 7 years.

c) At the beginning of the following seasons or periods of applications, the level of community aid in Portugal shall be approximated to the level of aid applicable in the Community in its present composition for the following season or period consecutively as follows:

one-fourth, one-third and one-half of the difference existing between the two amounts of aid if the second phase were to have a duration of 5 years,

one-sixth, one-fifth, one-fourth, one-third and one-half of the difference existing between the two amounts of aid if the second phase were to have a duration of 7 years.

d) The level of community aid shall be completely applied in Portugal in 1995 at the beginning of the sales season or the period of application of aid.

Article 289

1. The Portuguese Republic shall progressively apply the preferences on imports granted by the Community to certain third countries by autonomous or conventional means as of the beginning of the second phase.

2. With this objective, the Portuguese Republic shall apply a duty that will reduce the difference between the rate of the duty actually applied at the end of the first phase and the rate of the preferential duty pursuant to the following calendar:

a) If the second phase were to have a duration of five years:

On 1 January 1991, the difference shall be reduced to 83.3 percent of the initial difference,
on 1 January 1992, the difference shall be reduced to 66.6 percent of the initial difference,

on 1 January 1993, the difference shall be reduced to 49.9 percent of the initial difference;
on 1 January 1994, the difference shall be reduced to 33.2 percent of the initial difference;
on 1 January 1995, the difference shall be reduced to 16.5 percent of the initial difference;

b) If the second phase were to have a duration of 7 years:

On 1 January 1989 the difference shall be reduced to 83.3 percent of the initial difference;
on 1 January 1990 the difference shall be reduced to 75 percent of the initial difference;
on 1 January 1991 the difference shall be reduced to 62.5 percent of the initial difference;
on 1 January 1992 the difference shall be reduced to 50 percent of the initial difference;
on 1 January 1993 the difference shall be reduced to 37.5 percent of the initial difference;
on 1 January 1994 the difference shall be reduced to 25 percent of the initial difference;
on 1 January 1995 the difference shall be reduced to 12.5 percent of the initial difference;

c) The Portuguese Republic shall apply the complete preferential rates as of 1 January 1996.

Section IV--Provisions Relative to Certain Common Market Organizations Subject to Traditional Transition

Subsection 1--Fats

Article 290

1. With respect to olive oil, Articles 236 and 240 are applied to the prices of intervention.

2. During the course of the transitional period of 10 years, the price thus fixed relative to Portugal shall be approximated to the level of the common price annually at the beginning of each sales season in the following way:

Until the effective date of the adaptations of community production, the price in Portugal shall be approximated annually by one-twentieth of the initial difference existing between this price and the common price;

after the effective date of the adaptations of community production, the price in Portugal shall be corrected from the difference existing between the price in this member state and the common price applicable before each approximation, divided by the number of seasons that will intervene until the end of the period of application of the transitory measures. The price

resulting from this calculation shall be adapted proportionately to the possible change in the common price for the following season.

3. The Council, deliberating pursuant to the procedure stipulated in No 2 of Article 43 of the EEC Treaty, shall declare that it has confirmed that the condition required for the application of No 2 of the second section of the present article has been fulfilled. The approximation of the price shall be made under the terms of this latter provision as of the beginning of the season subsequent to the confirmation.

4. The compensatory amount resulting from the application of Article 240 shall be adapted, if such were the case, in terms of the difference existing between the community aid to consumption applicable in the Community in its present composition and in Portugal.

Article 291

1. Article 236 is applied to the suggested price of sunflower seeds. With respect to rape, turnip, soybean, and flax seed, the suggested or objective price applicable in Portugal on 1 March 1986 shall be fixed in terms of the difference existing between the prices of the products included in the rotation of crops in Portugal and the Community in its present composition during a reference period to be determined. However, the suggested price or the target price to be applied in Portugal cannot exceed the common price.

2. During the period of application of transitory measures, the prices thus fixed for Portugal shall be approximated to the level of common prices annually at the beginning of the sales season. The approximation shall take place in phases, applying Article 238 after the necessary changes are made.

3. The intervention prices of rape, turnip and sunflower seeds and the minimum price of soybean seed applicable in Portugal shall be derived respectively from the suggested and target prices referred to in Nos 1 and 2 pursuant to the provisions of the common market organization in question.

4. Until 31 December 1990, in trade exchanges of products transformed from vegetable oils destined for human consumption, with the exception of those transformed from olive oil, adequate measures shall be adopted to take into consideration the difference in the prices of these oils in Portugal and in the Community in its present composition.

Article 292

The Portuguese Republic shall apply a system of control in accordance with the methods to be determined, until 31 December 1990:

a) Of the quantities of seeds and oleaginous fruits; of flours from which the oil has not been extracted, as well as of all vegetable oils other than olive oil destined for human consumption, with the objective of avoiding a degradation of the conditions of competition among the different vegetable

oils. The volume of the quantities placed for consumption on the Portuguese market shall be established on the basis of consumption in Portugal, the level of this consumption evaluated within the framework of a balance established for each season pursuant to the procedure stipulated in Article 38 of Regulation No 136/66/EEC in terms of:

Portuguese consumption confirmed during the years 1980 to 1983;

foreseeable development of demand.

Pursuant to that same procedure, this balance could be updated during the season;

b) From the level of the prices to the consumer for vegetable oils referred to in line a) in such a way as to maintain--until 31 December 1991--in principle, the level of prices expressed in ECU's reached during the 1984/1985 season.

The control system referred to in line a) includes the replacement on 1 March 1986 of the sales systems applied to imports in Portugal, by a system of quantitative restrictions on imports, opened without discriminations among the economic operators of the Community in its present composition, as well as with respect to third countries.

2. In the case of exceptional circumstances, the control system described in the present article may be changed with respect to the products subject to it in the degree required to prevent imbalances in the markets of the different oils.

These changes are approved pursuant to the procedures specified in Article 38 of Regulation 136/66/EEC.

Article 293.

Community aid to olive oil production shall be introduced in Portugal at the beginning of the first season after accession, and approximated during the period of application of transitory measures, to the level of aid granted in the Community in its present composition, the provisions of Article 246 being applied after the necessary changes have been made.

Community aid to olive oil consumption shall be introduced in Portugal as of 1 January 1991, pursuant to a calendar to be determined, in the degree needed to reach the common level at the end of the period of application of transitory measures.

2. Aid to rape, turnip, sunflower, soy and flax seeds produced in Portugal shall be:

Introduced into Portugal as of the beginning of the first season after accession and,

increased subsequently during the period of application of the control system referred to in No 1 of Article 292,

in terms of the approximation, depending on the case, of the suggested or target price applicable in Portugal relative to the level of the common price.

At the end of the period referred to in the foregoing paragraph, the aid granted in Portugal shall be equal to the difference existing between the suggested or target applicable in this member state and the price on the world market, this difference being reduced by the effects of the customs duties applied by Portugal on imports from third countries.

3. Aid to the seeds referred to in No 2, produced in Portugal and transformed in the Community in its present composition, as well as the aid for the same seeds produced in the Community in its present composition and transformed in Portugal, shall be adapted in such a way that the respective difference between the level of prices of those seeds and seeds imports from third countries shall be taken into consideration.

4. On the other hand, when making the calculation for aid to the seeds of rape, turnips and sunflowers, the possibly applicable differential amount must be taken into consideration.

Article 294

During the 1986/1987 to 1994/1995 seasons, specific guarantee thresholds will be established for rape and turnip seeds, as well as for the sunflower seeds produced in Portugal.

For the 1986/1987 season, the thresholds are fixed at:

1,000 tons with respect to rape and turnip seeds;

48,000 tons with respect to sunflower seeds.

For the following seasons, these specific guarantee thresholds shall be determined pursuant to criteria comparable to those adopted for the establishment of guarantee thresholds in the Community in its present composition.

If a specific guarantee threshold were to be exceeded, penalties of responsibility shall be applied pursuant to rules similar to those applied in the Community in its present composition and with the same limits.

Article 295

1. The Portuguese Republic shall postpone until the end of the control system referred to in Article 292, the application of the preferential systems, conventional or autonomous, applied by the Community with respect to third countries in the sector of olive oil, oleaginous seeds and fruits and their byproducts.

2. As of 1 January 1991, the Portuguese Republic shall apply a duty which will reduce the difference between the rate of duty actually applied on 31 December 1990 and the rate of the preferential duty pursuant to the following calendar:

On 1 January 1991 the difference shall be reduced to 83.3 percent of the initial difference;

on 1 January 1992 the difference shall be reduced to 66.6 percent of the initial difference;

on 1 January 1993 the difference shall be reduced to 49.9 percent of the initial difference;

on 1 January 1994 the difference shall be reduced to 33.2 percent of the initial difference;

on 1 January 1995 the difference shall be reduced to 16.5 percent of the initial difference.

The Portuguese Republic shall apply preferential rates completely as of 1 January 1996.

Subsection 2--Tobacco

Article 296

The provisions of Article 236, and if necessary, Article 238, are applicable to the price of intervention established for each variety or group of varieties.

Article 297

The target price corresponding to the price of intervention referred to in Article 296 shall be established in Portugal for the first harvest after accession at a level which reflects the relationship existing between the target price and the price of intervention under the terms of No 2, second paragraph of Article 2 of EEC Regulation No 727/70, that establishes a common market organization in the sector of raw tobacco.

Subsection 3--Linen and Hemp

Article 298

The provisions of Article 246 are applicable to the aid to textile linen and hemp.

Subsection 4--Hops

Article 299

Aid to growers of hops referred to in Article 12 of EEC Regulation No 1696/71 shall be completely applied in Portugal as of the first harvest after accession.

Subsection 5--Seeds

Article 300

The provisions of Article 246 apply to the aid for seeds referred to in Article 3 of EEC Regulation No 2358/71.

Subsection 6--Silkworms

Article 301

The provisions of Article 246 apply to the aid to silkworm raising.

Subsection 7--Sugar and Isoglycose

Article 302

1. The provisions of Articles 236, 238 and 240 apply to the price of intervention for white sugar and to the base price of sugar beets. However, the compensatory total shall be corrected in the degree that it is necessary for the good operation of the common market organization because of the effect of the assessment for the leveling of storage costs.

2. Compensatory amounts may be established in the degree required to avoid any danger of an upset in trade exchanges between the Community in its present composition and Portugal with respect to raw sugar, and for products other than fresh sugar beets referred to in No 1 lines d) and f) of Article 1 of EEC Regulation 1785/81, which establishes the common market organization in the sugar sector.

In that case, the compensatory amounts shall result from the compensatory sum applicable to the base product in question, with recourse to a coefficient to be determined.

Article 303

During the period of 7 years after accession, the equalizing duty on raw cane sugar from the Ivory Coast, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Swaziland, which is imported by Portugal up to the limit of a maximum amount of 75,000 tons per year expressed in white sugar, shall be equal to the amount of the equalizing duty on raw sugar calculated pursuant to the rules of the common market organization, deducted from the difference between the threshold price and the price of intervention for raw sugar.

For the period from 1 March to 1 July 1986 and for the period from 1 July to 31 December 1992, the maximum annual amount above mentioned shall be reduced proportionately to the duration of those periods.

If, during the periods referred to above,

a) The forecast Community balance of raw sugar for a certain season or part of a season reveals that supplies of raw sugar are insufficient for insuring a proper supply for Portuguese refineries, or

b) Unforeseen and unusual circumstances justify it during the season or part of a season;

the Portuguese Republic is authorized, pursuant to the procedures stipulated in Article 41 of EEC Regulation No 1785/81, to import from third countries, during the season or part of the season in question, the quantities considered lacking, under the same conditions of reduced equalizing duties as those stipulated for the quantity referred to in the first paragraph.

Subsection 8--Fruits and Transformed Vegetable Products

Article 304

For those products which benefit from the aid stipulated in Article 3 of EEC Regulation No 516/77, which establishes the common market organization in the sector of fruits and transformed vegetable products, the following provisions are applied in Portugal:

1. Until the first approximation of prices referred to in Article 238, the minimum price stipulated in Article 3-B of EEC Regulation No 516/77 shall be established on the basis of:

The price fixed in Portugal under the effective period of the previous national system for the product destined for transformation, or in the absence of that price, on the prices paid in Portugal to the producers for the product destined for transformation, confirmed during a representative period to be determined.

2. If the minimum price referred to in No 1:

were inferior to the common price, the price in Portugal shall be changed at the beginning of each sales season after accession, pursuant to the rules stipulated in Article 238;

were higher than the common price, the latter shall be applied in Portugal as of accession.

3 a) For products transformed on the basis of tomatoes, during the first five seasons subsequent to accession or, in case of the application of No 2 of Article 260, during the first three seasons after accession, the total aid granted to Portugal by the Community shall be the aid calculated for the Community in its present composition, taking into consideration the difference of the minimum prices to the producer resulting from the application of No 2 of the present article, before the latter aid may be possibly reduced in the sequence of the transposition of the guarantee threshold fixed for these products in the Community in its present composition.

In the case of the transposition of the threshold in the Community in its present composition, if that becomes necessary to insure normal conditions of competition between Portuguese industries and those of the Community, a decision shall be made according to the procedure stipulated in Article 20 of EEC Regulation 516/77, that a compensatory amount, at the most equal to the difference between the aid established for Portugal and that which would have resulted from fixed Community aid, shall be applied pursuant to No 3, line a) of Article 240, and collected by the Portuguese Republic in exporting to third countries.

However, at the end of the system referred to by EEC Regulation No 1320/85, no compensatory amount shall be collected provided that there is proof that the Portuguese product did not benefit from the communitarian aid given to Portugal.

In no case shall the aid applicable in Portugal exceed the amount of aid granted in the Community in its present composition.

b) During the period referred to in line a), the granting of community aid in Portugal shall be limited for each season to a number of transformed products which correspond to a volume of fresh tomatoes of:
685,000 tons for the manufacture of tomato concentrate;
9,600 tons for the manufacture of peeled whole tomatoes;
137 tons for other products based on tomatoes.

At the end of that period, the quantities established above, adapted in the terms of the possible change in the community thresholds adopted during the same period, shall be taken into consideration for the establishment of communitarian thresholds.

4. For products based on tomatoes, at the end of the referred to period in No 3 line a) and for the other products during the six seasons subsequent to accession, the amount of that communitarian aid granted in Portugal shall result from the aid fixed for the Community in its present composition, taking into consideration the difference in the minimum prices resulting from the application of No 2.

5. Community aid shall be completely applied in Portugal as of the beginning of the seventh sales season after accession.

6. For the purposes of the application of the present article, the minimum price and the aid in effect in the Community in its present composition refer to the amounts in effect in the Community in its present composition with the exception of Greece.

Article 305

The minimum prices and the financial compensation applicable in Portugal as stipulated by Articles 2 and 3 of EEC Regulation No 2601/69, which stipulates

special measures aimed at favoring the recourse of transformation with respect to certain varieties of oranges, and by Articles 1 and 2 of EEC Regulation No 1035/77, which stipulates special measures aimed at the sale of products transformed on the basis of lemons, shall be fixed in the following way:

1. Until the first approximation of prices referred to in Article 238, the minimum price applicable shall be established on the basis of prices paid in Portugal to the producers of citrus destined for transformation, confirmed during a representative period to be determined. Financial compensation applicable in Portugal at the time of each approximation phase is that of the Community in its present composition, subtracted, if necessary, from the difference existing between the common minimum price and the minimum price applied in Portugal.

2. For subsequent fixings, the minimum price applicable in Portugal shall be approximated to the common minimum price under the terms of Article 238. The financial compensation is that of the Community in its present composition, subtracted, if necessary, from the difference existing between the common minimum price and the minimum price applicable in Portugal.

3. However, if the minimum price resulting from the application of Nos 1 or 2 were higher than the common price, the latter may be definitively applied with respect to Portugal.

Subsection 2--Dry Feed

Article 306

1. The objective price stipulated in Article 4 of EEC Regulation No 117/78 that establishes the common market organization in the sector of dry feed applicable in Portugal on 1 March 1986, shall be fixed on the basis of the differences existing between the prices of the products involved in crop rotation in Portugal and in the Community in its present composition during a reference period to be determined.

Article 238 applies to the objective price calculated in the terms of the first paragraph. However, the objective price to be applied in Portugal may not exceed the common objective price.

2. Complementary aid applicable in Portugal shall be adjusted from an amount equal to:

The possible difference between the objective price in Portugal and the common objective price, multiplied by the percentage referred to in No 2 of Article 5 of EEC Regulation No 1117/78, and

the effects of customs duties applied in Portugal in imports of these products from third countries.

3. Article 246 is applied to the fixed aid referred to in Article 3 of EEC Regulation No 1117/78.

Subsection 10--Peas, Beans, Broad Beans and Sweet Peas

Article 307

1. The threshold price for the release of peas, beans, broad beans and sweet peas used in the manufacture of feed for animals, as well as the objective price for the other peas, beans and broad beans applicable in Portugal on 1 March 1986, shall be established in terms of the difference existing between the prices of the products involved in crop rotation in Portugal and the Community in its present composition during a reference period to be determined.

Article 238 applies to the threshold release price or to the objective price for the aforementioned products. However, the threshold release price or the objective price to be applied in Portugal may not exceed the common price.

2. For the products harvested in Portugal and used in the manufacture of feed for animals, products which are the object of EEC Regulation No 1431/82 that stipulates special measures for peas, beans, broad beans and sweet peas, the amount of aid referred to in No 1 of Article 3 of this regulation shall be subtracted from the possible difference existing between the release threshold price applied in Portugal and the common price.

Without prejudice to the application of the first paragraph, the amount of aid in question for a product transformed in Portugal shall be deducted from the amount of the customs duties applied in Portugal on imports of soybean bagasse from third countries.

The deductions referred to in the first and second paragraphs result from the application of the percentages referred to in No 1 of Article 3 of EEC Regulation No 1431/82.

3. The amount of aid referred to in No 2 of Article 3 of EEC Regulation No 1431 for peas, beans and broad beans harvested in Portugal and used in human or animal food for purposes that is not stipulated in No 1 of the same article shall be subtracted from an amount equal to the different possibly existing between the objective price applied in Portugal and the common objective price. Without prejudice to the application of the first paragraph, the amount of aid in question, for a product transformed in Portugal, shall be subtracted from the amount of the customs duties applied in Portugal on imports of those products from third countries.

Subsection 11--Mutton and Goat Meat

Article 308

In the sector of mutton, Article 236 is applicable to the base prices.

Section V--Provisions Relative to Certain Common Market Organizations Subject to Transition by Phases

Subsection 1--Milk and Milk Products

a) First Phase

Article 309

The specific objectives referred to in Article 264 that are to be reached by the Portuguese Republic during the first phase, as well as the liberalization of milk products, are the following:

- a) Abolishment of the National Livestock Products Board (JNPP) as an agency of the state at the end of the first phase, as well as the progressive liberalization of domestic commerce, imports and exports, having as a goal free competition and free access to the Portuguese market;
- b) creation of a body of intervention and the creation of a material and human infrastructure that will allow operations of intervention;
- c) change of the present price structure in order to allow their free formation in the market, as well as the change of the relationship between the fat content and the nitrogenized content of the milk used in Portugal, approximating it to the relationship in effect in the Community;
- d) harmonization of domestic milk, butter and powdered milk prices on continental Portugal with those existing in the Azores;
- e) abolishment, in the degree possible, of national aid incompatible with the community duty and the progressive introduction of communitarian aid plans;
- f) abolishment of exclusiveness of milk collecting zones and the exclusiveness of pasteurization;
- g) creation of an information service of agricultural markets with a view to recording prices, as well as a suitable formation of administrative services that are necessary for the good operation of the common market organization of the sector in question.
- h) execution of measures aimed at favoring the modernization of production, transformation and sales structures.

a) Second Phase

Article 310

1. Until the first approximation, intervention prices of butter and powdered skim milk applicable in Portugal shall be calculated according to stipulated

rules and on the basis of figures taken into consideration in the common market organization.

Numbers 2 and 6 of Article 285 and Article 287 apply to intervention prices thus calculated.

If intervention prices applicable in the continental part of Portugal and the intervention prices applicable in the Azores are not equalized after the first phase, the approximation of these prices with respect to the common prices shall be carried out in accordance with rules to be determined.

2. For the products referred to in No 1, the compensatory amounts applicable in trade between the Community in its present composition and between Portugal and third countries shall be equal to the difference between common prices and the prices fixed in Portugal, corrected, if necessary, for taking into consideration the prices on the market observed in this member state.

Numbers 2 and 6 of Article 240 and Articles 241, 242 and 255 are applicable.

Article 311

The compensatory amount for milk products other than butter and powdered skim milk shall be fixed on the basis of coefficients to be determined.

Subsection 2--Beef

a) First Phase

Article 312

The specific objectives referred to in Article 264 to be attained by the Portuguese Republic during the first phase in the sector of beef are the following:

a) Abolishment of the JNPP as an agency of the state at the end of the first phase, as well as the liberalization of imports and exports and the progressive liberalization of domestic trade, keeping in view the institution of a system of free competition and free access to the Portuguese market;

b) creation of an intervention agency and the constitution of a material and human infrastructure that will allow the operations of intervention, as well as an adequate formation of the administrative services, indispensable for the good operation of the common market organization of the sector in question;

c) free formation of prices in representative markets to be established;

d) creation of an information system for agricultural markets, keeping in view the recording of prices and the introduction of the communitarian system for the grading of carcasses, keeping in mind the comparability of prices;

e) execution of measures destined to favor the modernization of the structures of production, transformation and sales, keeping in view an increase in the productivity of cattle raising and a greater profitability of the sector;

f) liberalization of trade exchanges on the zootechnical plane.

b) Second Phase

Article 313

1. In the beef sector, Articles 240, 285 and 287 apply to purchase prices of intervention in Portugal and the Community in its present composition, effective for comparable qualities determined on the basis of the communitarian system for the classification of grown cattle.

2. Articles 241, 242 and 255 are also applicable in this sector.

3. The compensatory amount for the other products referred to in No 1, line a) of Article 1 of EEC Regulation No 805/68 shall be fixed with recourse to coefficients to be determined.

Article 314

Article 288 applies to the premium for the maintenance of herds of cows that nurse calves.

Subsection 3--Fruits and Vegetable Products

a) First Phase

Article 315

1. The specific objectives referred to in Article 264 to be attained by the Portuguese Republic during the first phase in the sector of fruits and vegetable products, are the following:

a) Abolishment of the National Fruit Board (JNF) as an agency of the state at the end of the first phase;

b) development of producer organizations in the acceptance of communitarian regulations;

c) progressive and generalized application of common quality standards;

d) creation of an intervention agency and the constitution of a material and human resource infrastructure that will allow the operations of intervention;

e) free formation of prices and the pertinent daily confirmation in representative markets to be established with respect to the different products;

f) creation of an information service for agricultural markets, having in view the daily recording of prices, as well as the suitable formation of administrative services, necessary for the good operation of the common market organization.

2. In order to encourage growers or their organization to sell products in conformity with the standards of quality, the Portuguese Republic shall share, during the first phase, by means of adequate aid, in the costs of packaging and preparation of those products.

Article 316

In derogation of No 1 of Article 272, the reference price applied by the Community in its present composition with respect to Portugal shall be fixed in the terms of the provisions of EEC Regulation No 1035/75 in effect on 31 December 1985.

The possible compensation duties on imports of products from Portugal resulting from the application of EEC Regulation 1035/72 shall be reduced by:

2 percent the first year,
4 percent the second year,
6 percent the third year,
if necessary, 8 percent on the fourth and fifth years subsequent to the date of accession.

b) Second Phase

Article 317

In the sector of fruits and vegetable products, Article 285 is applied to the base price.

Article 255 is likewise applicable in this sector.

Article 318

During the second phase, for the fruit and products from Portugal with respect to which a reference price has been fixed relative to third countries, a mechanism of compensation shall be introduced when it is imported into the Community.

1. This mechanism is regulated by the following rules:

a) A comparison shall be made between one bid price for the Portuguese product, calculated under the terms of line b), and the bid price for the communitarian product. The latter price is calculated annually as follows:

On the basis of the arithmetic average of prices for the production of each member state of the Community in its present composition, to which are added the cost of transportation and packaging, which may burden the products from the producing region, to the representative consumption centers of the Community,

and taking into consideration the changes in the costs of production.

The prices of production referred to correspond to the average prices confirmed during the 3 years which precede the date of fixing the communitarian bid price.

The communitarian bid price cannot exceed the reference price level applied with respect to third countries.

b) The Portuguese bid price is calculated every market day on the basis of representative prices verified or reduced to the importer-wholesaler level in the Community in its present composition. The price of a product coming from Portugal is equal to the lowest representative price or to the average of the lowest representative prices verified with respect to at least 30 percent of the quantities of the products in question sold in all the representative markets with respect to which there are price quotations available. This or these prices shall be previously subtracted:

from the customs duty calculated under the terms of line c);

from the correcting amount possibly instituted under the terms of line d).

c) The customs duty to be deducted from the prices of the Portuguese product is the duty from the common customs tariff list, progressively reduced every year at the beginning of the season:

by one-fifth of its total if the second phase were to have a duration of 5 years;

by one-seventh of its total if the second phase were to have a duration of 7 years.

However, the first reduction shall take place as of the beginning of the second phase.

d) If the price of the Portuguese product calculated under the terms of line b) were to be lower than the communitarian bid price referred to in line a), a corrective amount equal to the difference between these two prices shall be collected from the imports by the Community in its present composition by the importing member state.

e) The collection of the corrective amount is done until investigations made reveal that the price of the Portuguese product is equal to or higher than the communitarian price referred to in line a).

2. If the Portuguese market were to be prejudiced as a result of imports from the Community in its present composition, adequate measures may be adopted, which could stipulate specifically the application of a corrective amount pursuant to rules to be determined with respect to imports into Portugal of fruits and vegetables from the Community in its present composition on which a reference price has been established.

Subsection 4--Cereals

a) First Phase

Article 319

The specific objectives referred to in Article 264 that are to be attained by the Portuguese Republic during the first phase in the sector of cereals are the following:

a) Dismantlement of the sales monopoly by the Cereal Supply Public Company (EPAC) no later than the end of the first phase; the progressive liberalization of domestic commerce and exports, keeping in view the installation of a system of free competition in the Portuguese market.

b) Progressive elimination of the import monopoly held by the EPAC during a period of 4 years.

c) Creation of an intervention agency and the creation of a material and human infrastructure which will allow intervention operations.

d) Free formation of prices.

e) Creation of an information service of agricultural markets with a view to recording prices, as well as the adequate formation of the administrative services needed for the good operation of the common market organization.

Article 320

1. The Portuguese Republic shall progressively adapt, during the course of the first 4 years subsequent to accession, the monopoly held by the EPAC with respect to imports and sales of cereals in Portugal in such a way that at the end of the fourth year the abolishment of any discrimination among the nationals of the member states with respect to conditions of supply and sales shall have been assured.

2. For this purpose the Portuguese Republic shall adapt its regulations referred to in Article 261 and may, in derogation of Article 277, apply a system to imports organized in the following way:

a) Imports of cereals into Portugal shall be made in percentages of the annual quantities imported during the previous year respectively by the EPAC and by private operators up to the limit of the following percentages:

Year	EPAC	Private Operators
1986	80 percent	20 percent
1987	60 percent	40 percent
1988	40 percent	60 percent
1989	20 percent	80 percent
1990	-	100 percent

b) The imports referred to in line a) to be made by private operators shall be assigned by open adjudications without discrimination among the economic operators.

Within the framework of these adjudications, bid prices relative to the products originating in the Community are corrected by:

the difference between the Community market prices and world market prices, and,

an amount corresponding to a fixed preference equal to 5 ECU's per ton.

c) If imports of products from the Community per year do not amount to a minimum quantity of 15 percent of the total amount of cereals imported during that same year, the EPAC shall buy the amount lacking to make up that 15 percent mentioned above from the Community the following year. As a result, this quantity shall be added to the obligation to buy 15 percent in the new year.

A intermediate balance shall be established at the end of the 1988/1989 season. If on the basis of this balance made, it is noted that the obligation to buy for 1989 runs the risk of not being fulfilled, the measures required to guarantee fulfillment with that obligation may be adopted.

b) Second Phase

Article 321

In the sector of cereals, Articles 240, 285 and 287 apply to the prices of intervention.

Also applicable in this sector are Articles 241, 242 and 255.

Article 322

1. With respect to cereals for which an intervention price has not been fixed, the applicable compensatory amount shall result from the applicable to barley, taking into consideration the relationship existing between the threshold prices of the cereals in question.
2. For the products referred to in line c) of Article 1 of EEC Regulation No 2727/75, which establishes the common market organization in the sector of cereals, the compensatory amount shall result from the compensatory amount applicable to the cereals with which those products are related, with recourse to a coefficient to be determined.

Article 323

Article 288 is applied to aid for hard wheat referred to in Article 10 of EEC Regulation No 2727/75.

Subsection 5--Pork

a) First Phase

Article 324

The specific objectives referred to in Article 264, which Portugal must attain during the first phase in the pork sector, are the following:

- a) Abolishment of the JNPP as an agency of the state at the end of the first phase, as well as the progressive liberalization of domestic commerce, imports and exports, having in view the assurance of a system of free competition and free access to the Portuguese market.
- b) The creation of an intervention agency and the creation of a material and human infrastructure that will allow intervention operations adapted to the new conditions of the Portuguese market.
- c) Free formation of prices in representative markets to be established.
- d) Creation of an information service of agricultural markets, having in view the recording of prices, as well as an adequate formation of administrative services needed for the good operation of the common market organization.
- e) Execution of measures destined for favoring the modernization of production, transformation and sales structures, having in mind a greater profitability of the sector.
- f) Continuation and intensification of the fight against African Swine Fever, particularly the development of closed circuit production units.

b) Second Phase

Article 325

1. In the sector of pork, the compensatory amount shall be calculated on the basis of the compensatory amounts applicable to feed cereals. For this purpose, the amount applicable per kilogram of slaughtered pork shall be calculated on the basis of the compensatory amounts applicable to the quantity of feed cereals required for the production of one kilogram of pork in the Community.

However, if that amount were not representative, Articles 240, 285 and 287 apply to the price of this produce in Portugal and in the Community in its present composition.

2. Also applicable in this sector are Articles 241, 242 and 255.

3. For products other than the slaughtered hog referred to in No 1 of Article 1 of EEC Regulation No 2759/75, the compensatory amount shall result from that applied under the terms of No 1 or No 2, with recourse to coefficients to be determined.

Subsection 6--Eggs

a) First Phase

Article 326

The specific objectives referred to in Article 264 to be attained by the Portuguese Republic during the first phase in the egg sector are the following:

a) Abolishment of the JNPP as a state agency at the end of the first phase and the progressive liberalization of domestic commerce, imports and exports, with a view to insuring a system of free competition and free access to the Portuguese market.

b) Free formation of prices.

c) Creation of an information service of agricultural markets, having in view the recording of prices.

d) Execution of measures destined to favor the modernation of the structures of production and transformation.

b) Second Phase

Article 327

1. Articles 240, 241, 242 and 255 apply in the egg sector without prejudice to the provisions of the following numbers.

2. The compensatory amount applicable per kilogram of eggs in the shell shall be calculated on the basis of the compensatory amounts applicable to the quantity of feed cereals required for the production of a kilogram of eggs in the shell in the Community.

3. The compensatory amount applicable per egg for incubation shall be calculated on the basis of the compensatory amounts applicable to the quantity of feed cereals for the production of one egg for incubation purposes in the Community.

4. For the products referred to in No 1, line b) of Article 1 of ECC Regulation No 2771/75, which establishes the common market organization in the egg sector, the compensatory amount shall be the result of the compensatory amount for eggs in the shell, with recourse to coefficients to be determined.

Subsection 7--Domestic Fowl Meat

a) First Phase

Article 328

The specific objectives referred to in Article 264 which are to be attained by the Portuguese Republic during the first phase in the sector of domestic fowl meat shall be the same as those mentioned in Article 326 for eggs.

b) Second Phase

Article 329

1. Articles 240, 241, 242 and 255 apply in the sector of domestic fowl meat without prejudice to the provisions of subsequent numbers.

2. The compensatory amount applicable per kilogram of domestic fowl flesh shall be calculated on the basis of the compensatory amounts applicable to the quantity of feed cereals required for the production of one kilogram of domestic fowl, separated by species, in the Community.

3. The compensatory amount applicable per young chicken shall be calculated on the basis of the compensatory amounts applicable to the quantity of feed cereals required for the production of a young chicken in the Community.

4. For the products referred to in No 2 line d) of Article 1 of EEC Regulation 2771/75, which establishes the common market organization in the sector of domestic fowl meat, the compensatory amount results from that which is applicable to slaughtered fowl, with recourse to coefficients to be determined.

Subsection 8--Rice

a) First Phase

Article 330

The specific objectives referred to in Article 26⁴ that are to be attained by the Portuguese Republic during the first phase in the rice sector, are the same as those mentioned in Article 319 on cereals.

Article 331

1. During the first phase, the Portuguese Republic shall progressively adapt the monopoly exercised by the EPAC with respect to imports and sales of rice in Portugal in such a way that at the end of the first phase the abolishment of any discrimination among the nationals of member states will be insured insofar as conditions of supply and sales on the market are concerned.

2. Article 320 is applicable, after necessary changes are made, on imports of rice into Portugal.

b) Second Phase

Article 332

1. In the rice sector, Articles 240, 285 and 287 apply to the intervention price of unhulled rice (Paddy rice).

Equally applicable in this sector are Articles 241, 242 and 255.

2. For unmilled rice, the compensatory amount shall be that which is applicable to unhulled rice (Paddy rice), converted by means of a conversion rate referred to in Article 1 of EEC Regulation 467/67.

3. For milled rice, the compensatory amount shall be that which is applicable to unmilled rice, converted by means of a conversion rate referred to in Article 1 of EEC Regulation No 467/67.

4. For semimilled rice, the compensatory amount shall be that applicable to milled rice, converted by means of the conversion rate referred to in Article 1 of EEC Regulation 467/67.

5. For the products referred to in No 1 line c) of Article 1 of EEC Regulation 1418/76, which establishes the common market organization in the rice sector, the compensatory amount shall result from that which is applicable to the products related to it, with recourse to coefficients to be established.

6. For broken rice, the compensatory amounts shall be fixed at a level that takes into consideration the difference existing between the supply price in Portugal and the threshold price.

Subsection 9--Wine

a) First Phase

Article 333

The specific objectives referred to in Article 264 to be attained by the Portuguese Republic during the first phase in the wine sector are the following:

a) Abolishment of the National Wine Board (JNV) as an agency of the state at the end of the first phase, the adaptation of other state agencies of the wine sector during the first phase, as well as the liberalization of the domestic market, imports and exports, and the transfer of the activities controlled by the state in matters of storage and distillation in favor of the producers and producer associations.

b) Progressive institution of the system of oversight of vineyards, similar to that of the Community, which allows an actual discipline in plantings.

c) Accomplishment of a project of ampelography (classification of the types of grape vines) and synonymy (equivalence between the names of the types of grape vines in Portugal on one hand, and, on the other, the equivalence between Portuguese names and the names used in the Community in its present composition), prior to the organization of a system of statistical surveys on grape-growing areas, in the acceptance of communitarian regulation and the realization of specific work on a viticultural census.

d) Creation or transference of distillation centers in sufficient number and capacity so as to allow the necessary services to the wine sector.

e) Creation of a service of information on agricultural markets, specifically designed for raising prices and for a regular statistical analysis.

f) Formation of administrative services indispensable for the good operation of the common organization of the wine grape growers market.

g) Progressive adaptation of the Portuguese price system to the community price system.

h) Prohibition of the irrigation of the wine grape vineyards, as well as the planting of any new vineyards on irrigated areas.

i) Execution, within the framework of the system of plantings, of a plan for the restructuring and reconversion of Portuguese vineyards that will correspond with the objectives of the wine grape vineyard policy of the Community.

Article 334

The Portuguese Republic shall take adequate measures to prevent the enlargement of the area of vineyards for producing wine with a natural alcohol assay of 7 percent by volume or less during the first phase.

Article 335

In derogation of communitarian regulations relative to the maximum content of sulphuric anhydrides of wines, the Portuguese Republic is authorized to apply the limits applied in this matter under the previous national system during the first phase with respect to wines produced in its territory.

However, the Portuguese Republic shall take adequate measures so that during the first phase the content of sulphuric anhydrides will be progressively lowered to communitarian levels so that they may be completely complied with as of the beginning of the second phase.

Article 336

During the course of the first phase, the Portuguese Republic shall establish a classification of the "breeds" of grapevines relative to Portuguese vineyards on the basis of the study of ampelography and synonymy referred to in Article 333, under the terms of Article 31 of EEC Regulation No 337/79 and the applicable provisions of the latter article.

b) Second Phase

Article 337

Articles 285 and 287 apply to the guideline prices for table wines in the grape-growing, wine-making sector.

Article 338

1. For the products from Portugal referred to in No 2, with respect to which a reference price has been established within the framework of the common market organization, a mechanism of regulatory amounts shall be introduced with respect to their imports into the Community in its present composition.

2. This mechanism is regulated by the following rules:

a) For table wines, a regulating amount equal to the difference between the guideline prices in Portugal and the Community in its present composition, is charged. However, the level of this amount may be adapted pursuant to the procedure stipulated in Article 67 of EEC Regulation No 337/79 so as to take into consideration the status of market prices, checked according to the different classes of wines and in terms of their quality;

b) for certain wines with a name of origin and for the other products capable of creating a disturbance in the market, a regulating amount may be established pursuant to the procedure stipulated in line a). This regulatory amount will result from that which is applied to table wines pursuant to rules to be determined.

3. The regulatory amount shall be limited to a level that will insure conditions of treatment no less favorable than the conditions existing during the system prior to accession. For that purpose, this amount shall be calculated in such a way that the amount obtained to improve the guideline price applicable in Portugal for the product in question and the customs duties applicable to it, shall not exceed the reference price in effect for the product during the previous season.

4. Taking into consideration the special situation of the market for the different products referred to in No 2, it may be decided, pursuant to the procedure stipulated in Article 67 of EEC Regulation No 377/79, to establish a regulatory amount on exports of one or several of those products by the Community in its present composition to Portugal.

This amount is fixed at a level that will allow the assurance of a normal flow of trade between the Community in its present composition and Portugal that will not create an upheaval in Portuguese markets on the products in question.

5. The regulatory amount granted shall be financed by the Community by means of the FEOGA, Guarantee Section.

Article 339

Article 288 applies to the aid to the use of must or must concentrates to be used for making grape juice.

Article 340

1. The Portuguese Republic, during the second phase, shall proceed to the elimination of the cultivation of land planted in authorized breeds temporarily, pursuant to the classification established under the terms of Article 333.

2. During the second phase, the Portuguese Republic shall proceed to the elimination of cultivation of areas planted with varieties of direct producer hybrids not contained in the classification, pursuant to the provisions of EEC Regulation No 3800/81.

Until the end of the second phase, those varieties shall be equated with the breeds of vines temporarily authorized.

3. In derogation of Article 49 of EEC Regulation No 337/79, grapes of the temporarily authorized breeds under the terms of Nos 1 and 2, may be used for making the products referred to in that article until the end of the second phase.

Article 341

1. Up to the end of 1995, the wines produced in the young wine region with an alcoholic content of less than 8.5 percent by volume may only travel in bulk in the respective region of production.

With respect to these wines, the indication of the alcoholic content acquired must be shown on the label.

Section VI

Other Provisions

Subsection 1--Veterinary Measures

Article 342

With respect to trade in fresh domestic fowl meat in its territory, the Portuguese Republic is authorized to postpone the application of EEC Directive No 71/118 relative to health problems in matters of trade in fresh domestic fowl meat, until no later than 31 December 1988.

Article 343

The Portuguese Republic is authorized to maintain restrictions on imports of purebred beef breeding stock until no later than 31 December 1990, in case the breeds in question are not on the lists authorized in Portugal.

Subsection 2--Measures on Legislation on Seeds and Propagulums

Article 344

1. The Portuguese Republic is authorized to postpone the application of the directives listed below in its territory according to the following calendar:

- a) Until no later than 31 December 1988 with respect to Directives:
 - 66/402/EEC, relative to the sale of forage plant seeds for the species *Lolium multiflorum* Lam., *Lolium Perenne* L. and *Vicia Sativa* L;
 - 66/402/EEC, relative to the sale of seed cereals of the species *Hordium vulgare* L., *Oryza Sativa* L., *Triticum Aestivum* L., *Fiori* and *Pool*, *Triticum Durum* Desf. and *Zea Plus* L.;
 - 70/457/EEC relative to the common catalogue of varieties of the species of agricultural propagules for the species referred to in the foregoing sections;

b) Until no later than 31 December 1990 with respect to Directives:

66/400/EEC relative to the sale of sugar beet seeds,
66/401/EEC for the species that are other than those referred to in the first section of line a),
66/402/EEC for the species that are other than the ones referred to in the second section of line a),
66/403/EEC relative to the sale of seed potatoes,
66/404/EEC relative to the sale of reproductive forestry materials;
68/193/EEC relative to the sale of materials for the vegetative multiplication of grape vines,
69/208/EEC relative to the sale of oleaginous plant seeds and fiber plant seeds,
70/457/EEC for the species that are other than those referred to in the third section of line a),
70/458/EEC relative to the sale of vegetable product seeds,
71/161/EEC relative to foreign quality standards of forestry reproduction materials sold in the Community.

2. The Portuguese Republic shall:

a) Take the necessary measures for progressively complying with the provisions of the directives cited in No 1 no later than the end of the periods referred to in No 1;

b) it may limit, before the end of the periods referred to in No 1, totally or partially, the sale of seeds or propagules of the varieties admitted for sale in its territory. With respect to the varieties referred to in Directives No 70/457/EEC and 70/458/EEC, the varieties admitted for sale in its territory as of 1 March 1986 are those contained in the list revealed in Conference.

During the periods granted to the Portuguese Republic for complying with the two aforementioned directives, this member state shall add to this list every year, in order to insure the progressive opening of the Portuguese market to the other varieties included in the common catalogues;

c) It shall only export to the territory of the present member states those seeds and propagules that are in conformity with the communitarian provisions;

d) it shall subject imported seeds and propagules imported from third countries:

to the communitarian conditions established in the matter of equivalency and, with respect to variety, at least to the same restrictions on sales that are applied to the varieties included in the common catalogues.

3. During the period of application of the derogations referred to in No 1, it may be decided, pursuant to the procedures of the Permanent Committee on Agricultural and Forestry Seeds and Propagules, to effect the progressive liberalization of trade exchanges in seeds and propagules of certain species between Portugal and the Community in its present composition. This liberalization will primarily have to do with the seeds that may be the object of a communitarian decision of equivalency prior to accession. This liberalization shall cover other species provided that it is confirmed that the conditions exist for such liberalization.

Subsection 3--Phytosanitary Measures

Article 345

The Portuguese Republic is authorized to postpone until no later than 31 December 1990, the application of Directive No 69/465/EEC relative to the fight against the golden nematode.

Chapter 4--Fishing

Section I--General Provisions

Article 346

1. Except for provisions contrary to this present chapter, the rules stipulated by the present Act are applicable to the fishing sector.
2. The provisions of No 3 of Article 234; line c) of Article 253 and Article 257 are applicable to the products of fishing.

Section II--Access to Waters and Resources

Article 347

For the purposes of its integration into the communitarian system of conservation and management of fishing resources instituted by EEC Regulation No 170/83, access to the waters under the sovereignty or jurisdiction of the present member states and covered by the International Council for the Exploration of the SEA (ICES), by ships flying the Portuguese flag, is subject to the system described in the present section.

Article 348

Only the ships referred to in Article 349 may exercise their fishing activities in the zones, and under the conditions determined in that respect.

Article 349

1. Fishing activities by Portuguese ships are limited to the ICES sections Vb, VI, VII and VIII a, b, d, with the exception, during the period between

the date of accession and 31 December 1995, of the zone located south of 56 degrees 30 minutes north latitude, east of 12 degrees West longitude and north of 50 degrees 30 minutes north latitude, and within the limits and conditions described in Nos 2, 3 and 4.

2. The possibilities of fishing limited to the catching of pichelim or verdinho and carapau and chicharro. The names rendered as published. [No such names appear in available dictionaries], as well as the number of corresponding ships and the respective rules for access and control, shall be established annually in the terms of Article 11 of EEC Regulation No 170/83 and for the first time before 1 January 1986.

3. In addition, the possibilities of fishing with respect to the species that are not subject to the system of total admissible catches, in the future referred to as "TAC", as well as the number of corresponding ships, may be established in the terms of Article 11 of EEC Regulation No 170/83 on the basis of the existing situation of Portuguese fishing activities in the waters of the Community in its present composition during the period immediately before accession, as well as on the need to insure the conservation of the populational units (stocks), and taking into consideration, moreover, the limits introduced on fishing by ships of the present member states in Portuguese waters with respect to similar species.

4. The conditions of the exercise of specialized fishing activities shall be in keeping with those stipulated for fishing for the same species contained in Article 160.

5. Provisions aimed at insuring compliance by operators of the regulations stipulated in the present article, including those destined to make possible the nonauthorization of the ship in question to fishing during a certain period, shall be adopted before 1 January 1986, pursuant to the procedure stipulated in Article 11 of EEC Regulation No 170/83.

Technical rules corresponding to those referred to in No 3 of the second paragraph of Article 163 shall be adopted before 1 January 1986 pursuant to the procedure stipulated in Article 14 of EEC Regulation No 170/83.

6. The rules for the application of the present article shall be adopted before 1 January 1986, pursuant to the procedure stipulated in Article 14 of EEC Regulation No 170/83.

Article 350

Before 31 December 1992, the Commission shall present to the Council a report on the situation and the prospects for fishing in the Community in terms of the application of Articles 349 and 351. Based on this report, the adaptations of the system stipulated in Articles 349 and 351, which may show themselves to be necessary, including those relative to access to other zones which are not those referred to in No 1 of Article 349, shall be adopted before 31 December 1993 pursuant to the procedure stipulated in Article 143 of the EEC Treaty and will produce effects on 1 January 1996.

Article 351

1. Only the ships flying the flag of a present member state referred to in this article may exercise their fishing activities in waters under the sovereignty or jurisdiction of the Portuguese Republic and only in the zones and under the conditions described in the terms of the following numbers.

2. The number of those ships authorized to perform fishing activities with respect to pelagic species not subject to TAC's and quotas, with the exceptions of the highly migratory species in the ICES IX and X divisions and in the CECAF [Fishery Committee for the Eastern Central Atlantic] in the terms of Article 11 of EEC Regulation No 170/83 on the basis of the existing situation in terms of fishing activities within the Community in its present composition, in Portuguese waters during the period immediately before accession, as well as on the need to insure the conservation of the population units (stocks) and taking into consideration, in addition, the limits introduced into fishing by Portuguese ships in the waters of the Community in its present composition with respect to similar species, for the first time before 1 January 1986.

The conditions for special fishing activities shall be pursuant to those for fishing for the same species in Article 160.

3. Up to 31 December 1995, in the Division X of ICES and in the CECAF zone, without prejudice to No 4 and on the basis of the fishing practices of the present member states during the years prior to accession, fishing for flying tuna is only authorized during a period that does not exceed 8 weeks between 1 May and 31 August of the year in question, by a maximum of 110 fishing ships using lines for trolling, ships whose length must not exceed 26 meters. The list of authorized ships shall be sent to the Commission by the interested member states no later than the 30th day which precedes the opening period of fishing.

4. With respect to tropical tuna, fishing activities are limited until 31 December 1995 to the X Division of the ICES south of 36 degrees 30 minutes North, and to the CECAF zone south of 31 degrees North and north of this parallel to west of 17 degrees 30 minutes West.

5. Provisions aimed at insuring compliance by operators of the regulations stipulated in the present article, including those aimed at making possible the nonauthorization of the ship in question to fish during a certain period, shall be adopted before 1 January 1986 according to the procedure stipulated in Article 11 of EEC Regulation No 170/83.

Technical methods which correspond to those referred to in No 3, second paragraph of Article 163, shall be adopted prior to 1 January 1986 according to the procedure stipulated in Article 14 of EEC Regulation No 170/83.

6. Rules for application of the present article shall be adopted prior to 1 January 1986 pursuant to procedures stipulated in Article 14 of EEC Regulation No 170/83.

Article 352

1. For the purpose of its integration into the communitarian system of fishing resources conservation instituted by EEC Regulation No 170/83, access to ships flying the Spanish flag and enrolled or registered at a port located in territory to which the common fishing policy applies, to waters under the sovereignty or jurisdiction of Portugal covered by the ICES and CECAF, is subject to the system described in Nos 2 to 9 until 31 December 1995.
2. The following activities may be performed by the ships referred to in No 1 as part of the main fishing activity.
3. The use of gill nets is forbidden.
4. Each trawler may not put out more than two trotlines per day; the maximum length of each of these trotlines is fixed at 20 nautical miles and the distance between hooks may not be less than 2.7 meters.
5. Fishing for crustaceans is not authorized. However, the taking of them is authorized when taken during fishing for cod or other bottom species up to the limit of 10 percent of the volume of catches of these species taken on board.
6. The number of ships authorized to fish for flying tuna shall be approved before 1 March 1986, pursuant to the procedure stipulated in Article 11 of EEC Regulation No 170/83.
7. The possibilities and conditions of access to waters under the sovereignty or jurisdiction of Portugal in ICES division X and the CECAF zone shall be approved pursuant to the procedures stipulated in No 3 of Article 155.
8. The technical methods of application of the present article shall be adopted similarly to those included in Annex XI prior to 1 January 1986 in accordance with the procedure stipulated by Article 14 of EEC Regulation No 170/83.
9. The provisions aimed at insuring compliance by operators of the regulations stipulated in the present article, including those aimed at making possible the nonauthorization for the ship in question to fish during a certain period, shall be adopted before 1 January 1986 pursuant to the procedure stipulated in Article 11 of EEC Regulation No 170/83.

Article 353

The system described in Articles 347 to 350, including the adaptations that may be adopted by the Council as stipulated in Article 350, remains applicable until the date of the end of the period set in No 3 of Article 8 of EEC Regulation No 170/83.

Species	Quantities in tons	Zones	Types of Fishing Authorized	Total Number of ships authorized	Number of ships authorized to fish simulta- neously	Authorized fishing period
Bottom species				Basic list	Periodic list	
Cod	850	ICES IX + CECAF (Con- tinental Coast)	Dragnet Dragnet	North of the Peniche Par- allel (Cape Carvoeiro) 17 South of the Peniche par- allel (Cape Carvoeiro) 4	North of the Peniche Par- allel (Cape Carvoeiro) 9 South of the Parallel of Peniche (Cape Carvoeiro) 2	The entire year
Pelagic species						
Carapau and Chicharro	2,250	ICES IX + CECAF (Con- tinental Coast)	Dragnet			
Great mi- grators, with ex- ception of swordfish, shark (Cachar- hidae), xaputa		ICES IX+ CECAF (Con- tinental Coast)	Surface trawl	-	North of the parallel of Peniche (Cape Carvoeiro) 75 South of the parallel of Peniche (Cape Carvoeiro) 15	The entire year
Flying tuna		ICES IX+ CECAF	Trolling	-	To be determined	From May to June

Section III--Foreign Resources

1. As of accession, the management of fishing agreements concluded by the Portuguese Republic with third countries shall be assured by the Community.
2. The rights and obligations resulting for the Portuguese Republic as a result of the agreements referred to in No 1 shall not be affected during the period in which the provision of these agreements were provisionally maintained.
3. As soon as possible, and in any case before the end of the agreements referred to in No 1, the Council, deliberating by a qualified majority and at the proposal of the Commission, shall adopt the suitable decisions in each case for the preservation of the fishing activities resulting from them, including the possibility of extending certain agreement for periods of 1 year as a maximum.

Article 355

1. Exemptions, suspensions or tariff list quotas granted by the Portuguese Republic for fresh fish products from Morocco and from the common enterprises of fishing constituted among single or collective persons of Portugal or Morocco, when directly landed in Portugal, shall be eliminated no later than 31 December 1992.
2. Products imports under the protection of this system may not be considered as of free movement, under the acceptance of Article 10 of the EEC Treaty when reexported to another member state.
3. Only the products referred to in No 1 from the common Luso-Moroccan enterprises and the ships used by those companies, whose list is included in Annex XXVII, may profit from the measures stipulated in the present article.

The ships in question may in no case be replaced in case of their sale, disappearance or demolition.

4. The rules for application of the present article shall be adopted in accordance with the procedure stipulated in Article 33 of EEC Regulation No 3796/81.

Section IV--Common Market Organization

Article 356

1. Guideline prices applicable to Atlantic sardines in Portugal, on the one hand, and in the Community in its present composition, on the other, shall be subject to an approximation under the terms of the provisions of No 2, with the first approximation taking place on 1 March 1986.

2. The guideline prices applicable in Portugal, on one hand, and in the Community in its present composition, on the other, shall be the object of an approximation in ten annual phases with respect to the level of guideline prices for sardines from the Mediterranean on the basis of 1984 prices successively of one-tenth, one-ninth, one-eighth, one-seventh, one-sixth, one-fifth, one-fourth, one-third and one half of the difference between these guideline prices applicable before each approximation. The prices resulting from this calculation shall be established proportionately in terms of a possible adaptation of the guideline price for the following season. The common price shall be adapted as of the date of the tenth approximation.

Article 357

1. During the period of the approximation of prices referred to in Article 356, a system of oversight shall be instituted on the basis of reference prices applicable to imports of Atlantic sardines from Portugal into the Community in its present composition.

2. At the time of each price approximation phase, reference prices referred to in No 1 shall be fixed at the level of call prices applicable in the other member states with respect to Mediterranean sardines.

3. In case of a disturbance in the market due to imports referred to in No 1, caused by prices which are lower than the reference prices, measures similar to those stipulated in Article 21 of EEC Regulation No 3796/81 may be taken according to the procedures stipulated in Article 33 of the aforementioned regulation.

4. The rules for the application of the present article shall be adopted in keeping with the procedure stipulated in Article 33 of EEC Regulation No 3796/81.

Article 358

1. As of accession, a system of compensatory subsidies shall be instituted for the sardine producers of the Community in its present composition with respect to the special price approximation system applicable to this species under the terms of Article 356.

2. Before the end of the period of price approximation, the Council, deliberating by a qualified majority at the proposal of the Commission, shall decide, if necessary, to what degree the system referred to in the present article should be extended.

3. The Council, deliberating by a qualified majority, at the proposal of the Commission, shall adopt the rules for the application of the present article before 31 December 1985.

Article 359

During the period of price approximation, the coefficients of adaptation applicable to sardines in 1984, stipulated in No 1 of Article 12 of EEC Regulation No 3796/81, shall not be changed.

Section V--System Applicable To Trade

Article 360

1. In derogation of Article 190 customs duties applicable to fishing products included in items and subitems 03.01, 02.02, 03.03, 05.15A, 16.05 and 23.01B of the common customs tariff list shall be progressively abolished according to the following calendar:

a) With respect to the products imported into the other member states of the Community from Portugal:

On 1 March 1986 each duty shall be reduced to 85.7 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1987 each duty shall be reduced to 71.4 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1988 each duty shall be reduced to 57.1 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1989 each duty shall be reduced to 42.8 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1990 each duty shall be reduced to 28.5 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1991 each duty shall be reduced to 14.2 percent of the base duty;
the last reduction of 14.2 percent shall be accomplished on 1 January 1992.

b) With respect to the products imported into Portugal from the other member states of the Community:

On 1 March 1986 each duty shall be reduced to 87.5 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1987 each duty shall be reduced to 75 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1988 each duty shall be reduced to 62.5 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1989 each duty shall be reduced to 50 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1990 each duty shall be reduced to 37.5 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1991 each duty shall be reduced to 25 percent of the base duty;
on 1 January 1992 each duty shall be reduced to 12.5 percent of the base duty;
the last reduction of 12.5 percent shall be made on 1 January 1993.

4. In derogation of Article 197, the Portuguese Republic shall change its list applicable to third countries with respect to the fishing products referred to in No 1, reducing the difference between the base duty and that of the common tariffs list in the following terms:

As of 1 March 1986 the Portuguese Republic shall apply a duty that will reduce the difference between the base duty and that of the common tariffs list by 12.5 percent;

as of 1 January 1987:

a) For the list items with respect to which the base duties do not differ more than 15 percent above or below the duties of the common tariffs list, the latter duties are applied;

b) in the other cases, the Portuguese Republic shall apply a duty that will reduce the difference between the base duty and the duties of the common tariffs list in seven equal fractions of 12.5 percent on the following dates:

1 January 1987;
1 January 1988;
1 January 1989;
1 January 1990;
1 January 1991;
1 January 1992.

The Portuguese Republic shall apply the common tariffs list completely as of 1 January 1993.

Article 361

1. Until 31 December 1992, imports from other member states into Portugal of the product that are in part a) of Annex XXVII are subject to a complementary mechanism with respect to trade, defined by the present article.

2. Moreover, until 31 December 1990, imports from Spain into Portugal of the products contained in part b) of Annex XXVIII are subject to the mechanism referred to in No 1.

3. A forecast total of the supplies in Portugal with respect to each product in question shall be established before the beginning of each year on the basis of imports made during the previous 3 years. This balance shall include the imports from other member states, as well as those from third countries. The intracommunity part of this balance shall be improved every year by a progressive factor equal to 15 percent.

4. Beyond the threshold of the intracommunitarian part, measures restricting or halting imports may be taken.

5. Beyond the threshold fixed for the overall total of supplies, the Portuguese Republic may take immediately applicable precautionary measures. These measures shall be immediately relayed to the Commission, which may halt their application in the month following this notification.

6. The rules of application shall be adopted pursuant to the procedure stipulated in Article 33 of EEC Regulation No 3796/81.

Article 362

During the period of the progressive elimination of customs duties between the Community in its present composition and Portugal, the following products

from Portugal may be imported annually into the Community in its present composition with the complete suspension of duties from the common customs tariff list within the limits indicated below:

Number on the Common Customs Tariff List	Description of Merchandise	Quantity in Tons
16.04	Processed or canned fish products including caviar and its substitutes	
	D. Sardines	5,000
	E. Tuna	1,000
	ex F. Bonitos, Spanish mackerel, mackerel, yellow jack and anchovies:	
	--Spanish mackerel, mackerel and yellow jack	1,000

Article 363

1. Until 31 December 1992, and with respect to the products contained in Annex XXIX, the Portuguese Republic may maintain quantitative restrictions with respect to third countries within the limits and methods defined by the Council deliberating by a qualified majority at the proposal of the Commission.

2. The communitarian mechanism of reference prices is applicable to each product as of the time of the abolishment of quantitative restrictions which concern it.

Chapter 5--Foreign Relations

Section I--Common Trade Policy

Article 364

1. The Portuguese Republic shall maintain quantitative restrictions with respect to third countries on the imports of products not yet liberalized with respect to the Community in its present composition. The Portuguese Republic shall not grant third countries any other advantage over the Community in its present composition as to fixed quotas for those products.

These quantitative restrictions shall remain in effect for at least the same time that quantitative restrictions for the same products remain in effect for the Community in its present composition.

2. The Portuguese Republic shall maintain with respect to the countries with state managed trade referred to in EEC Regulations No 1765/82, No 1766/82 and No 3420/83, quantitative restrictions for products not yet liberalized with respect to the countries to which EEC Regulation No 288/82 is applied. The Portuguese Republic shall not grant the countries with state managed trade any other advantage with respect to the countries to which EEC Regulation No 288/82 is applied in that which has to do with fixed quotas for those products.

These quantitative restrictions shall remain in effect for at least as long as quantitative restrictions remain for the same products with respect to all the countries referred to in EEC Regulation No 288/82.

Any change in the import system in Portugal for the products not liberalized by the Community with respect to the countries with state managed trade, shall be accomplished pursuant to the rules and procedures stipulated in EEC Regulation No 3420/83 and without prejudice to the provisions of the first paragraph.

The Portuguese Republic, however, is not obliged to reintroduce, with respect to countries with state managed trade, quantitative restrictions on imports of liberalized products from those countries but which are still subject to quantitative restrictions with respect to member countries of the GATT.

3. Until 31 December 1992, the Portuguese Republic may maintain, without prejudice to the provisions of Nos 1 and 2, quantitative restrictions to imports under the form of quotas for the products and amounts listed in Annex XXX in temporary derogation of the common systems of liberalization of imports stipulated in EEC Regulations No 288/82, No 1765/82, No 1766/82 and No 3419/83, changed by EEC Regulation No 453/84, provided that with respect to member countries of the GATT, those restrictions had been made known prior to accession, within the framework of that agreement.

Imports of those products shall be completely subjected to the common systems of liberalization in effect on 1 January 1993. Those quotas shall be progressively increased until that date under the terms of No 4.

4. The progressive increase of quotas referred to in No 3 is of at least 25 percent at the beginning of each year with respect to the quotas expressed in ECU's, and of at least 20 percent at the beginning of each year with respect to quotas expressed in volume. The increase is added to each quota and the following increase is calculated on the total figure obtained.

Without prejudice to the provisions of Nos 1 and 2, if during the period of application of the transitory measures the imports made during the course of 2 consecutive years were less than 90 percent of the annual quotas opened under the terms of No 3, the Portuguese Republic shall abolish the quantitative restrictions in effect.

5: The Portuguese Republic shall maintain, with respect to all third countries, quantitative restrictions to imports in the form of quotas for the products indicated in Protocol No 23, which are not liberalized by the Community with respect to third countries and for which the Portuguese Republic maintains quantitative restrictions relative to imports from the Community in its present composition, in the amounts, and at least until the dates stipulated respectively, of the aforementioned protocol.

Any change in the system of imports into Portugal of the products referred to in the first paragraph shall be made in conformity with the rules and procedures stipulated in EEC Regulations No 288/82 and No 3420/83, without prejudice to Nos 1 and 2.

6. Keeping in view compliance with the obligations belonging to the Community within the framework of the GATT with respect to the countries of state-managed trade which are members of this agreement, the Portuguese Republic, if necessary, and in the degree necessary, shall extend to the aforementioned countries the measures of liberalization that it must adopt with respect to other third countries members of the agreement, taking into consideration the agreed-upon transitory measures.

Article 365

1. As of 1 March 1986, the Portuguese Republic shall apply the system of generalized preferences for the products other than those listed in Annex II of the EEC Treaty. However, with respect to the products listed in Annex XXI, the Portuguese Republic shall align itself progressively until 31 December 1992 with the rates of the system of generalized preferences based on the base duties referred to in No 2 of Article 189. The calendar for these alignments is the same as that established in Article 197.

2. a) With respect to the products listed in Annex II of the Treaty, the preferential rates stipulated or calculated shall be progressively applied to the duties actually collected by the Portuguese Republic from third countries pursuant to the general rules referred to in line b) or to the special rules referred to in Articles 289 and 295.

b) The Portuguese Republic shall apply, as of 1 March 1986, a duty that will reduce the difference between the rate of the base duty and the rate of the preferential duty in accordance with the following calendar:

On 1 March 1986 the difference shall be reduced to 90.9 percent of the initial difference;

on 1 January 1987 the difference shall be reduced to 81.8 percent of the initial difference;

on 1 January 1988 the difference shall be reduced to 72.7 percent of the initial difference;

on 1 January 1989 the difference shall be reduced to 63.6 percent of the initial difference;

on 1 January 1990 the difference shall be reduced to 54.5 percent of the initial difference;

on 1 January 1991 the difference shall be reduced to 45.5 percent of the initial difference;
on 1 January 1992 the difference shall be reduced to 36.3 percent of the initial difference;
on 1 January 1993 the difference shall be reduced to 27.2 percent of the initial difference;
on 1 January 1994 the difference shall be reduced to 18.1 percent of the initial difference;
on 1 January 1995 the difference shall be reduced to 9.0 percent of the initial difference;
the Portuguese Republic shall apply the preferential rates completely as of 1 January 1996.

c) In derogation of line b), with respect to fishing products included in items 03.01, 03.02, 03.03, 05.15A, 16.04, 16.05 and 23.01B of the common customs tariff list, the Portuguese Republic shall apply, as of 1 March 1986, a duty that will reduce the difference between the rate of the base duty and the rate of the preferential duty according to the following calendar:

On 1 March 1986 the difference shall be reduced to 87.5 percent of the initial difference;
on 1 January 1987 the difference shall be reduced to 75 percent of the initial difference;
on 1 January 1988 the difference shall be reduced to 62.5 percent of the initial difference;
on 1 January 1989 the difference shall be reduced to 50 percent of the initial difference;
on 1 January 1990 the difference shall be reduced to 37.5 percent of the initial difference;
on 1 January 1991 the difference shall be reduced to 25 percent of the initial difference;
on 1 January 1992 the difference shall be reduced to 12.5 percent of the initial difference;
the Portuguese Republic shall apply the preferential rates completely as of 1 January 1993.

Section II--Agreements by the Communities with Certain Third Countries

Article 366

1. The Portuguese Republic shall apply the provisions of the agreements referred to in Article 368 as of 1 January 1986.

The transition measures and possible adaptation shall be the object of protocols to be concluded with cocontracting countries who are parties to those agreements.

2. Those transition measures have the purpose of insuring, after the pertinent term, the application by the Community of a common system in its relations with all cocontracting third countries, as well as the identification of the rights and obligations of the member states.

3. These transition measures applicable to the countries listed in Article 368 do not imply the concession to these countries by the Portuguese Republic of a more favorable treatment than that which is applicable to the Community in its present composition, in any sector.

In particular, all the products that may be the object of measures of transition with respect to quantitative restrictions applicable to the Community in its present composition, are subject to such measures with respect to all the countries listed in Article 368 for the same period, without prejudice to possible specific derogations.

4. These transition measures applicable to the countries listed in Article 368 do not imply the application to these countries by the Portuguese Republic of a less favorable treatment than that which applied to other third countries. In particular, no transition measures may be stipulated on quantitative restrictions on the countries listed in Article 368 for products that are exempt from such restrictions when they are imported into Portugal from other third countries.

Article 367

If the protocols referred to in No 1 of Article 366 are not concluded on 1 January 1986 for reasons other than the will of the Community or the Portuguese Republic, the Community shall take the measures required for righting that situation after accession.

In any case, the Portuguese Republic shall apply the treatment of most favored nation to the countries listed in Article 368 as of 1 January 1986.

Article 368

1. Articles 366 and 367 are applicable to:

The agreements concluded with Algeria, Austria, Cyprus, Egypt, Finland, Iceland, Jordan, Yugoslavia, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Norway, Syria, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia and Turkey, as well as to other agreements concluded with third countries having to do exclusively with trade in the products contained in Annex II of the EEC Treaty.

2. The systems resulting from the Second ACP-EEC Convention African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries-EEC Convention and the agreement relative to the products subjected to jurisdiction of the ECSC signed on 31 October 1979, are not applicable to the relations between the Portuguese Republic and the States of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific.

Article 369

The Portuguese Republic shall denounce the convention that instituted the European Free Trade Association signed on 4 January 1960, effective 1 January 1986.

Section III--Textiles

Article 370

1. As of 1 January 1986 the Portuguese Republic shall apply the 20 December 1970 Agreement relative to the international trade in textiles, as well as the bilateral agreements concluded by the Community within the framework of this agreement or with other third countries. Protocols of adaptation of those accords, in order to establish voluntary restrictions on exports destined for Portugal relative to products and their origins, for which there are limitations on exports to the Community, shall be negotiated by the Community with third countries who are parties to the agreements.

2. If those protocols are not concluded on 1 January 1986, the Community shall take measures to right that situation with respect to the transitory adaptations necessary for insuring the application of the agreements by the Community.

Chapter 6--Financial Provisions

Article 371

1. The 21 April 1970 decision relative to the replacement of financial contributions by the member states with own Community resources, which shall be known henceforth as the "21 April 1970 Decision," is applied under the terms of Articles 372 and 375.

2. Any reference to the 21 April 1970 Decision made in the articles of the present chapter, must be understood as referring to the decision of the Council on 7 May 1985 relative to the system of own Community resources as of the effective date of the last decision.

Article 372

The revenues called "agricultural equalizing duties" referred to in line a) first paragraph of Article 2 of the 21 April 1970 Decision, also cover the revenues from any net totals in imports in trade between Portugal and the other member states and between Portugal and third countries under the terms of Articles 233 to 345 and No 3 of Article 210 and Article 213.

However, these revenues will only cover equalizing duties and other amounts referred to in the first paragraph, paid with respect to the products subject to transition by phases pursuant to Articles 309 and 341 as of the beginning of the second phase.

In derogation of the provisions of the foregoing paragraph, the Council, deliberating unanimously at the proposal of the Commission, may decide before the end of the first phase to return to Portugal, within the limits, and in agreement with rules to be established and for a period that shall not exceed 2 years, the revenues resulting from the compensatory amounts "accession," applied by Portugal on cereals imported from the other member states.

Article 373

Until 31 December 1992, the revenues known as "customs duties" referred to in line b), first paragraph, Article 2 of the 21 April 1970 Decision, shall cover the customs duties calculated as if Portugal were applying as of accession, in its trade with third countries, the rates resulting from the common customs tariff list and the reduced rates resulting from any tariff list applied by the Community. For customs duties having to do with oleaginous seeds and fruits and their byproducts, that are the object of EEC Regulation No 136/66, as well as for agricultural products subject to a transition by phases pursuant to Articles 309 and 341, the same rule applies until 31 December 1995.

However, these revenues do not cover the customs duties during the first phase that affect agricultural products imported into Portugal and which are subject to the system of transition by phases pursuant to Articles 309 and 341.

If the provisions adopted by the Commission under No 3 of Article 210 of the present Act were applied, and in derogation of the provisions of the first paragraph, customs duties shall be the total calculated in accordance with the rate of the equalizing compensating duty fixed by those provisions relative to third products which enter into the manufacturing process.

The Portuguese Republic shall proceed to a monthly calculation of these customs duties on the bases of customs declarations for a single month. The presentation to the Commission under the conditions established by EEC Regulation (EEC/EUROTOM/CECA) No 2891/77, shall take place relative to the customs duties thus calculated in terms of the payments made during the course of the month in question.

As of 1 January 1993, the total of established customs duties is completely owed. However, with respect to the products referred to in Articles 309 to 341 subject to transition by phases, as well as oleaginous seeds and fruits and their byproducts that are the object of EEC Regulation 136/66, the total of those duties is owed entirely as of 1996.

Article 374

The total of the duties paid as own resources derived from the value added tax or from financial contributions based on the Gross National Product, is entirely owed in application of Nos 1 to 5 of Article 4 of the 21 April 1970 Decision. The derogation referred to in line 15 of Article 15 of the Sixth Directive, 77/388/EEC of the Council, does not affect the total of the duties owed pursuant to the first paragraph.

The Community shall return to the Portuguese Republic, in conformity with the general budget of the European Communities, a share of the amount of the payments made in terms of own resources deriving from valued added taxes or from financial contributions based on the Gross National Product, on the month following that in which the amount was placed at the disposal of the Council in the following terms:

87 percent in 1986
70 percent in 1987
55 percent in 1988
40 percent in 1989
25 percent in 1990
5 percent in 1991.

The percentage of this degressive restitution is not applied to the amount corresponding to the part which falls to Portugal in financing the deduction stipulated by No 3, lines b), c) and d) of Article 3 of the Council's 7 May 1985 Decision relative to the system of own resources of the Communities in favor of the United Kingdom.

Article 375

In order to avoid the Portuguese Republic having to bear the cost of reimbursement of advance payments granted to the Community by the member states prior to 1 January 1986, the Portuguese Republic shall benefit from a financial compensation because of that reimbursement.

Chapter 7--Other Provisions

Article 376

In derogation of the provisions of Article 60 of the ECSC Treaty and the pertinent provisions of application, Portuguese steel companies may apply a price CIF port of destination equal to a parity price in effect in the continental territory of the Portuguese Republic until 31 December 1992 in the Autonomous Regions of the Azores and Madeira.

Article 377

Until 31 December 1992 the Portuguese Republic may derogate the provisions of Article 95 of the EEC Treaty which has to do with the special tax on the consumption of processed tobaccos produced in the Autonomous Regions of the Azores and Madeira, under the conditions established in Annex XXXII for the application of Directive 72/464/EEC of the Council dated 19 December 1972.

Title IV--Other Provisions

Article 378

1. The acts specified in the list which makes up Annex XXXII of the present Act, apply to the new member states under the conditions fixed in that annex.

2. Before 1 January 1986, at the duly founded request of the Spanish State or the Portuguese Republic, the Council, deliberating unanimously under the proposal of the Commission, may take measures that imply temporary derogations of acts of the institutions of the Community adopted between 1 January 1985 and the date of signing of the present Act.

Article 379

1. Until 31 December 1992, in case of serious difficulties susceptible to persisting in a sector of economic activity, as well as difficulties that may result in a serious deterioration of a regional economic situation, either one of the new member states may ask that it be authorized to take protective measures that will allow it to bring back a balance to the situation and adapt the sector in question to the common market economy.

Under the same conditions, a present member state may ask that it be authorized to adopt protective measures relative to one or both new member states.

This provision is applicable until 31 December 1995 relative to the products and sectors for which transitory derogation measures for equivalent effective periods are stipulated under the terms of the present Act.

2. At the request of the interested state, the Commission, through an emergency process, shall establish the protective measures it may consider necessary, specifying the conditions and methods of their application. In case of serious economic difficulties, and at the express request of the interested member state, the Commission provided with the respective material for evaluation shall deliberate within a period of 5 working days as of the day the request was received. The measures thus decided shall be immediately applicable.

When trade between the Community in its present composition and either of the two new member states, or between them, in the sector of agriculture and fishing, without prejudice to the provisions of Chapters 3 of Titles II and III, causes or threatens to cause serious disturbances in the market of a member state, the Commission, at the request of the affected member state, shall deliberate on the protective measures it considers necessary 24 hours after it receives that request. The measures thus decided shall be immediately applicable and must take into consideration the interests of all the interested parties, specifically the problems of transportation.

3. The measures authorized under the terms of No 2 may contain derogations of the EEC and ECSC Treaties and of the present Act up to the limit, and during the periods, strictly necessary for attaining the objectives stipulated in No 1. Priority in selection must be given to the measures that mean the minimum of disturbance in the functioning of the common market.

4. In case of serious difficulties which may persist in the employment market of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, that state may request that under the terms of the procedure stipulated in the first and second paragraphs of No 2 and the conditions defined in No 3, it be authorized to apply temporary protective measures until 31 December 1995, within the framework of national provisions that regulate the change of employment, with respect to national workers from one of the two new member states admitted, who emigrate to the Grand Ducy to perform salaried work after the date of that authorization.

Article 380

1. If prior to the end of the period of application of transitory measures established for each case under the terms of the present Act, the Commission, at the request of a member state or another interested party, and in accordance with the rules of the procedure to be adopted after accession by the Counsel deliberating by a qualified majority and at the proposal of the Commission, were to confirm that the practice of dumping exists between the Community in its present composition and the new member states, or between the new member states, it shall make recommendations to the author or authors of those practices with the objective of putting an end to them.

If, however, such practices were to be continued, the Commission shall authorize the injured member state or member states to take the protective measures whose conditions and methods it would establish.

2. For the application of the present article to the products listed in Annex II of the EEC Treaty, the Commission shall apply all the relevant factors, particularly the level of prices at which imports are made from other sources of the market in question, taking into consideration the provisions of the EEC Treaty relative to agriculture, particularly those of Article 39.

3. The measures adopted prior to accession under the provisions of EEC Regulation No 2176/84 and EEC Decision No 2177/84 ECSC with respect to the new member states, as well as those adopted before accession under the provisions of antidumping legislation of the new member states with respect to the Community in its present composition, remain temporarily in effect and shall be the object of a reexamination by the Commission, which shall decide on the pertinent change or abolishment. This change or abolishment is made, depending on the case, by the Commission or by the national authorities in question. The procedures initiated before accession in Spain, Portugal or in the Community in its present composition shall have continuity under the terms of the provisions of No 1.

Fifth Part--Provisions Relative to the Application of the Present Act

Title I--Installation of Institutions

Article 381

The Assembly shall meet within the maximum period of a month after accession. The Assembly shall introduce into its internal regulations the adaptations required as a result of accession.

Article 382

The Council shall introduce into its internal regulations the adaptations required as a result of accession.

Article 383

1. As of accession, three new members shall be named to the Commission and a sixth vice president shall be appointed from among the members of the expanded Commission. The term of office for the members named shall end on the same date as that of the members in office on the date of accession.

The term of office of the sixth vice president appointed shall end on the same date as that of the other five vice presidents.

2. Prior to 31 December 1986, the Council shall for the first time examine whether it is necessary to apply the fourth paragraph of Article 14 of the Treaty which instituted an only Counsel and an only Commission of the European Communities.

3. The Commission shall introduce into its internal regulations the adaptations required as a result of accession.

Article 384

1. As of accession, two new judges shall be named to the Court of Justice.

2. The term of office of one of the judges named under the terms of No 1 shall end on 6 October 1988. This judge is selected by lottery. The term of office of the other judge shall end on 6 October 1991.

3. As of accession, a sixth general counsel, whose term of office ends on 6 October 1988, shall be named.

4. The court shall introduce into its procedural regulations the adaptations required as a result of accession. The procedural regulations thus adapted shall be submitted for approval by unanimity of the Council.

5. For the trial of cases pending before the court on 1 January 1986, relative to which the oral phase has been initiated prior to that date, the court in plenary session, or the sections, shall meet with the same composition they had prior to accession and apply the procedural regulation that was in effect on 31 December 1985.

Article 385

As of accession, two new members shall be named to the Court of Auditors. The terms of office of the members thus named shall end at the same time as that of the members in office on the date of accession.

Article 386

As of accession, 33 new members, representatives of the different sectors of the economic and social life of the new member states, shall be appointed to the Economic and Social Committee. The term in office of those members ends at the same time as that of the members in office on the date of accession.

Article 387

As of accession, new members shall be named to the ECSC Consultative Committee. The term of office of those members ends at the same time as that of the members in office on the date of accession.

Article 388

As of accession, five new members shall be named to the Scientific and Technical Committee. The term of office of those members end at the same time as that of the members in office on the date of accession.

Article 389

As of accession, the new members representing the new member states shall be named to the Monetary Committee. The term of office of those members shall end at the same time as that of the members in office on the date of accession.

Article 390

The adaptations of the internal statutes and regulations of the committees instituted by the originating Treaties, required as a result of accession, shall be accomplished as soon as possible after accession.

Title II--Applicability of the Acts of Institutions

Article 392

As of accession, the new member states are considered as being the addressees, and as having been notified of the directives and decisions, in the acceptance

of Article 189 of the EEC Treaty and Article 161 of the EURATOM Treaty, as well as the recommendations and decisions in the acceptance of Article 14 of the ECSC Treaty, provided that those directives, recommendations and decisions were communicated to all present member states.

Article 393

The application in each of the new member states of the acts contained in the list that makes up Annex XXXV of the present Act is deferred until the dates stipulated in that list.

Article 394

1. Deferred until 1 March 1986 are:

a) The application to the new member states of the communitarian regulations established for the production and trade of agricultural products and for the commercial exchanges of certain merchandise resulting from the transformation of agricultural products that are subject to a special system;

b) the application to the Community in its present composition of the changes made in those regulations by the present Act, including those that result from Article 396.

2. No 1 does not apply to the adaptations of the acts of institutions of the Community relative to common agricultural policy, adaptations which shall be made under the terms of Article 396 of the present Act, having in view the determination of the number that will make up a qualified majority after accession within the framework of the procedures of the Management Committees or other similar committees instituted in the area of agriculture.

3. Until 28 February 1986 the system applicable to trade between one of the new member states, on one hand, and the Community in its present composition, the other new member state, or third countries, on the other, is the one applied before accession.

Article 395

The new member states shall put into effect the measures necessary for complying, as of accession, with the provisions in the directions and decisions, in the acceptance of Article 189 of the EEC Treaty and of Article 161 of the EURATOM Treaty, as well as the recommendations and decisions in the acceptance of Article 14 of the ECSC Treaty, unless a period is fixed in the list included in Annex XXXVI or other provisions of the present Act.

Article 396

1. Adaptations of the acts of the institutions of the Community, that are not contained in the present Act or in its annexes, made prior to accession in keeping with the process stipulated in No 2 for making such acts compatible

with the provisions of the present Act, specifically with those of its Fourth Part, shall become effective as of accession.

2. The Council, deliberating by a qualified majority at the proposal of the Commission, or the Commission, depending on whether the initial acts had been adopted by one or another of those institutions, shall establish the texts required for that purpose.

Article 397

The texts of the acts of the Community institutions adapted prior to accession, and which were established by the Council or the Commission in Spanish and in Portuguese, are effective as of accession under the same conditions as the texts written in the present seven languages. Those texts shall be published in the Official Newspaper of the European Communities in the cases where the texts in the present languages have been the object of such publication.

Article 398

The agreements, decisions and practices entered into and existing on the date of accession, and which because of that accession are covered by the provisions of Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty, must be communicated to the Commission in the maximum period of 3 months after accession. Only the agreements and decisions communicated shall remain temporarily in effect until the Commission has made a decision.

Article 399

The legislative, regulatory and administrative provisions aimed at insuring health protection in the territory of the new member states for the population and the workers against the dangers resulting from ionizing radiations shall, under the terms of Article 33 of the EURATOM Treaty, be communicated by those member states to the Commission within the period of 3 months as of accession.

Title III--Final Provisions

Article 400

Annexes I to XXXVI and Protocols Nos 1 to 25 attached to the present Act are an integral part of it.

Article 401

The Government of the French Republic shall send the Government of the Spanish State and the Portuguese Republic an authenticated copy of the treaty that instituted the ECSC and the treaties that changed it.

Article 402

The Government of the Italian Republic shall send the Governments of the Spanish State and the Portuguese Republic an authenticated copy of the treaty that instituted the EEC, the treaty that instituted EURATOM and the treaties that changed or complemented them, including the treaties relative to the accession to the EEC and EURATOM, respectively, of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Hellenic Republic in the German, Danish, French, Greek, English, Irish, Italian and Dutch languages.

The texts of these treaties, written in Spanish and Portuguese, shall be added to the present Act. These text are effective under the same conditions as the texts of the treaties referred to in the first paragraph and written in the present languages.

Article 403

An authenticated copy of the international agreements deposited in the archives of the secretary general of the Council of the European Communities shall be sent to the governments of the new member states by the secretary general.

Protocol (No 3) Relative to Exchanges of Merchandise between Spain and Portugal During the Period of Application of the Transitory Measures.

Article 1

1. Except for the products included in Annex II of the EEC Treaty, and without prejudice to the provisions of the present protocol, Spain and Portugal shall apply in their trade exchanges the treatment agreed upon between those states, on one hand, and the Community in its present composition, on the other, as is established in Chapter 1 of Title II and in Chapter 1 of Title III of the Fourth Part of the Act of Accession.

2. To the products originating in Portugal included in Chapters 25 to 99 of the Common Customs Tariff List, with the exception of those that are the object of EEC Regulations No 2783/75, No 3033/80 and No 3035/80, the Spanish State shall apply the same system that is applied by the Community in its present composition to Portugal, specifically with respect to the elimination of customs duties and equivalent effect charges, as well as of quantitative restrictions to imports and exports and measures of equivalent effect on merchandise that is the object of the EEC Treaty and which in Portugal fulfills the conditions of Articles 9 and 10 of this same treaty, as well as the merchandise that is the object of the ECSC Treaty and that is handled freely in Portugal under the terms of this treaty.

The Portuguese Republic shall apply to the products originating in Spain, and which are included in Chapters 25 to 99 of the Common Customs Tariff List, with the exception of those that are the object of EEC Regulations No 2783/75, No 3033/80 and No 3035/80, the same system that it applied with respect to the Community in its present composition.

3. The Council, deliberating by a qualified majority, at the proposal of the Commission, shall adopt the rules of origin applicable to trade between Spain and Portugal before 1 March 1986.

Article 2

For the purposes of the provisions of Article 48 of the Act of Accession, with respect to the products included in the list consisting of Annex A, the abolition of the exclusive import duties in Spain, stipulated in No 3 of the aforementioned article, is accomplished as of 1 March 1986 through the progressive opening of the import quota for products originating in Portugal. The amounts of the quotas for 1986 are indicated in the aforementioned list.

The Spanish State increases the amounts of the quotas under the conditions indicated in the same annex. The increases, expressed in percentages, are added to each quota and the next increase is calculated on the basis of the total value thus obtained.

Article 3

1. In derogation of Article 1, the Spanish State shall install for the products originating in Portugal included in Annex B, as of 1 March 1986 and until 31 December 1990, tariff list limitations with zero duties. In the case that the quantities stipulated for each one of the aforementioned limits are reached, the Spanish State may reintroduce customs duties until the end of the calendar year underway. They shall be, in that case, identical to those that Spain is applying at the same time to the Community in its present composition.

The volume of the limits for 1986 is indicated in Annex B and the annual calendar for the progressive increase is as follows:

1987: 10 percent
1988: 12 percent
1989: 14 percent
1990: 16 percent

The increase is added to each quota and the following increase is calculated on the basis of the total value obtained.

2. The system of tariff list limits stipulated in No 1 shall be equally applicable with respect to 1990 to textile products making of Annex C.

3. The Spanish State and the Portuguese Republic may subject, until 31 December 1990, imports of products included in Annex B to a prior inspection for exclusively statistical purposes.

In any case, imports of the products referred to above may not undergo any delay as a result of the statistical inspection.

Article 4

Up until 31 December 1990, the Spanish State may submit imports of the following products originating in Portugal to a prior inspection for purely statistical purposes:

No on the Common Customs
Tariff List

Description of Merchandise

47.01
48.01

Paper pulp
Paper and cardboard, including
cellulose pulp in rolls or
sheets.

In any case, imports of the products referred to above may not undergo any delay resulting from the application of that statistical inspection.

2. Under the conditions, and within the periods, stipulated in No 1, the Portuguese Republic may subject the products referred to in No 1 that originate in Spain to an inspection prior to import for purely statistical purposes.

Article 5

1. Until 31 December 1988, the Portuguese Republic may subject the following products originating in Spain to an inspection for exclusively statistical purposes prior to import:

a) Products subject to the jurisdiction of the ECSC Treaty.

b) No on the Common
Customs List

Description of Merchandise

73.14

Soft iron wire or steel wire, coated or not,
with the exception of insulated wire for
electrical uses.

73.15

Special steels and fine or carbon steel in the
conditions to which Nos 73.06 and 73.14, inclu-
sive, refer:

A. Fine and carbon steel:

ex VIII. Wire, coated or not with the exception of insulated wire for electrical uses; uncoated.

73.18

Pipes (including drafts) of soft iron or steel, with the exclusion of the products of No 73.19.

In any case, imports of the products mentioned above may not undergo any delay as a result of that statistical inspection.

The two parties may by common agreement extend the system of statistical inspection for a period not to exceed 31 December 1990. In case of disagreement and at the request of one of the two states, the Commission may decide on the extension of the aforementioned system if importance disturbances are confirmed in the Portuguese market.

2. Under the conditions stipulated in the second paragraph of No 1, the Portuguese Republic may subject imports of the following products originating in Spain to a prior inspection for purely statistical purposes until 31 December 1992:

No on the Common Customs
Tariff List

Description of Merchandise

22.02

Soft drinks, aromatized sparkling or mineral waters and other nonalcoholic beverages, with the exception of fruit juices or vegetable products included in 20.07.

22.03

Beer

3. Under the conditions stipulated in the second paragraph of No 1, the Spanish State may subject the products included in Annex VII of the Act of Accession, as well as spirituous beverages included in subitem 22.09 C of the Common Customs Tariff List, originating in Portugal, to an inspection prior to import for exclusively statistical purposes, until 31 December 1992.

Article 6

1. With respect to the products mentioned in Article 4, if up until 31 December 1990 any sudden and important changes are noted in the respective traditional trends in trade, the Spanish State and the Portuguese Republic shall meet within a maximum period of 5 working days as of the date of the request made by one of these member states, for an examination of the situation with the objective of obtaining an agreement with respect to possible measures to be adopted.

2. With respect to the products mentioned in No 1 of Article 5, if up until 31 December 1988 any sudden and important changes in imports into Portugal of Spanish products are noted, the Spanish State and the Portuguese Republic shall meet within a maximum period of 5 working days as of the reception of the request by the Spanish State for the examination of the situation with the objective of obtaining an agreement as to possible measures to be adopted.

3. If in the meetings stipulated in Nos 1 and 2 the Spanish State and the Republic of Portugal do not reach an agreement, the Commission, taking into consideration the criteria that regulate the protective clause of which Article 379 consists, shall establish through an emergency procedure, the protective measures it may consider necessary, fixing the respective conditions and rules of application.

Article 7

1. In case that the compensatory amounts mentioned in Articles 72 and 240 of the Act of Accession, or of the mechanism of compensatory amounts mentioned in Article 270, are applied in trade between Spain and Portugal to one or several base products considered as having been used in the manufacture of merchandise that is the object of EEC Regulation No 3033/80 of the Council of 11 November 1980 that determines the system of trade applicable to certain merchandise that results from the transformation of agricultural products, the transitory measures applicable are determined pursuant to the rules stipulated in Articles 53 and 213 of the aforementioned Act. The compensatory amounts applicable in trade between the Spanish State and the Portuguese Republic are collected or granted by the state in which the prices of the base agricultural products in question are the highest.

2. The customs duty which makes up the fixed element of the applicable charge, at the date of accession, on imports into Portugal from Spain and reciprocally that of the merchandise that is the object of EEC Regulation No 3033/80, is determined pursuant to the provisions of Articles 53 and 213 of the Act of Accession.

However, if with respect to products which make up Annex XIX of the aforementioned Act, the customs duty that makes up the fixed element of the charge applicable by Portugal on imports from Spain, calculated according to the provisions mentioned above, were less than the duties indicated in that annex, the latter are the ones to be applied.

If, relative to the same products, this customs duty were higher than the customs duty that makes up the fixed element of the charge applicable by Portugal on imports from the Community in its present composition, the latter shall be applied.

The foregoing paragraph is not applicable to chocolate and other food preparations that contain cocoa of item 18.06 of the common customs tariff list. With respect to them, the fixed element of the charge applicable by Portugal on imports from Spain cannot be more than 30 percent.

Article 8

1. The Commission determines, taken due account of the provisions in effect, particularly those relative to communitarian traffic, the methods of administrative cooperation aimed at insuring that the merchandise that fulfill the conditions required for them may benefit from the treatment stipulated by the present protocol.

These methods shall particularly include the measures needed for insuring that the merchandise that has benefitted from the aforementioned treatment in Spain or in Portugal, at the time of their reshipment to the Community in its present composition, shall be subject to the same treatment as that which would be applied to them in case of their direct import respectively.

2. Up until 28 February 1986, the systems that now rule trade relations between the Spanish State and the Portuguese Republic remain applicable to trade between Spain and Portugal.

3. The Commission shall determine the provisions applicable as of 1 March 1986 to trade between Spain and Portugal in the merchandise obtained in Spain or in Portugal in the manufacture of which the following were used:

Products that were not subject to the customs duties or equivalent effect charges that were applicable to them in Spain or Portugal, or which have benefitted from total or partial drawback of these duties or charges;

agricultural products that do not fulfill the conditions required for being admitted to free circulation in Spain or in Portugal.

Upon adopting these provisions, the Commission takes into consideration the rules stipulated in the Act of Accession for the elimination of the customs duties between the Community in its present composition and Spain and Portugal, and for the progressive application by the Spanish State and the Portuguese Republic of the common customs tariff list, as well as the provisions in matters of a common agricultural policy.

Article 9

1. Except for provisions to the contrary of the Act of Accession and the present protocol, the provisions in effect in matters of customs legislation relative to trade with third countries, shall be applied in the same conditions to trade between Spain and Portugal when customs duties are collected at the time of that trade.

For the determination of the customs value in trade between Spain and Portugal, as well as in trade with third countries until:

31 December 1992 for industrial products and
31 December 1995 for agricultural products,
the customs territory to be taken into consideration is that one defined by the legislation in effect in the Spanish State and the Portuguese Republic on 31 December 1985.

2. The Spanish State and the Portuguese Republic shall apply the nomenclature of the common customs tariff list and the ECSC unified tariff list as of 1 March 1986.

Article 10

The Portuguese Republic, within the framework of trade with the Canary Islands, Ceuta and Medilha, applies the specific systems agreed upon in this respect between the Community in its present composition and the Spanish State referred to in Protocol No 2.

Article 11

Without prejudice to the provisions of No 2, second paragraph of Article 1, the Commission shall adopt, as of accession, any measure of application that may show itself to be necessary, keeping in view the execution of the provisions of the present protocol, particularly the rules of application of inspection stipulated in Articles 3, 4, and 5.

Annex A--List Stipulated in Article 2 of Protocol No 3

Quota No	Common Customs Tariff List Number	Description of Merchandise	Volume of base Volume 1986	Rate of annual increase Percent
1	24.02	Processed Tobacco; tobacco extracts and bunches:		
2		A. Cigarettes.....	300,000,000	20
3		B. Cigars and small cigars.....	3,510,000	20
		C. Smoking tobacco.....		
		D. Chewing tobacco and snuff.....	60 tons	20
		E. Others, including bunch tobacco in leaves.....		
4	27.10	Oils derived from petroleum and bi- tuminous ores (except crude oil); products not specified nor contained in other items, that contain at least 70 percent of those oils by weight, which should make up their base weight, which should make up their base ele- ment.		
		ex A. Light Oils:		
		Excluding motor oil and kerosenes.....	7,400 t	10
5		Motor oils.....	9,531 t	10
6		Kerosenes.....	6,000 t	10
7		C. Heavy Oils		
		1. Gasoil.....	7,400 t	18.5
8		2. Fuel oil.....	13,600 t	12.5
9		3. Lubricating and other oils..	850 t	10
	34.03	Lubricating preparations and prepar- ations of the type used to grease or impregnate textile materials, hides or skins or other materials, except those that contain 70 percent by weight of oils derived from petroleum or bituminous ores:		

ex A. That contain oils derived from
petroleum or bituminous ores:

Except lubricating preparations
for the treatment of textiles,
hides, skins and furs.....

850 t 10

10	27.11	Petroleum gas and other gaseous hydrocarbons.....	17,000 t	10
11	27.12	Vaseline.....		
	27.13	Paraffin, petroleum or bituminous ore... waxes, ozocerite, lignite wax, peat wax and paraffinic residues (gatsch, slack wax, etc), including red.	400 t	10
	27.14	Petroleum bitumens and coke and other byproducts of petroleum oils or of bitumenous ores.....		
	27.15	Natural bitumens and asphalts; bituminous schists and sands, asphalt- ic rocks.....	6,000 t	10
	27.16	Bituminous mixtures that have natural asphalt or bitumens as a base, petro- leum bitumen, ore tar or mastic made from ore tar (such as bituminous mastics and cut backs).....		

Annex B--List of Products Mentioned in Article 3 of Protocol No 3

Number of Limit	Common Customs Tariff List Number	Description of Merchandise	Base Volume 1986
1.	ex 58.04	Velvets, plushes, loop weave, lace edging, with the exception of products contained in Nos 55.08 and 58.05: Made of cotton.....	
	58.09	Tulles, thread, and net weaves with designs; lace (hand or machine-made), in pieces, strips or applied:	
		B. Lace:	
		ex I. Hand-made: with the exception of lace made of cotton, wool, artificial and synthetic fibers.....	65 t
		II. Machine-made.....	
	60.01	Mesh fabrics, nonelastic, without rubber, in remnants:	
		C. Of other textile materials:	
		I. Cotton.....	
	60.04	Underwear, nonelastic mesh, without rubber	
2.		A. Baby clothing, clothing for girls up to size 96 inclusive:	
		I. T shirts	
		a) cotton.....	

II. Undershirts:

a) cotton.....

III. Others:

b) cotton.....

B. Others:

IV. Others:

d) cotton:

1. For men and boys:

bb) Pajamas.....

2. For women, young women and children:

aa) Pajamas.....

bb) nightshirts.....

60.05

Outer wear, pertinent accessories and other items of non-elastic weave without rubber:

A. Outer wear and pertinent accessories:

II. Other:

ex a) Mesh fabric outer wear of No 59.08:
cotton.....

b) Other:

1. Baby clothing, clothing for girls to size 86 inclusive:

cc) cotton.....

2. Swim suits and trunks:

bb) cotton.....

3. Sports exercise suits:

bb) cotton.....

4. Other outer wear:

cc) Dresses:

44. Cotton.....

dd) Skirts, including pant-skirts:

33. Cotton.....

ee) Trousers:

ex 33. Of other textile materials:

Cotton.....

ff) Suits and ensembles for men and boys
except ski clothing:

ex 22. Of other textile materials:

cotton.....

gg) Skirt-jackets and ensembles for women,
girls and children, except ski clothing:

44. Cotton.....

ijij) Anoraks, flight jackets and similar items:

6 t

ex 11. Wool or fur, cotton, synthetic
or artificial fibers:

Cotton.....

kk) Suits and ensembles for skiing made up
of two or three pieces:

ex 11. Wool or fine hair, cotton, synthetic
or artificial fibers:

Cotton.....

ll) Other outer wear:

44. Cotton.....

5. Dress accessories:

44. Cotton.....

B. Others:

ex III. Of other textile materials:

Cotton.....

60.01

Outer wear for men and boys:

A. Cowboy-type clothing and similar clothing for
costumes or recreational purposes of size
smaller than 159; woven clothing of numbers
59.08, 59.11 or 59.12:

II. Other:

ex a) Long trousers:

Cotton.....

ex b) Other:

Cotton.....

B. Other:

I. Work clothing:

a) One-piece overalls, smocks, bib
aprons:

Cotton.....

b) Other:

Cotton.....

II. Bathing suits and trunks:

ex b) Of other textile materials:

Cotton.....

III. Bathrobes, lounging robes and jackets
and similar lounging clothing:

b) Cotton.....

IV. Parkas, Anoraks, flight jackets, etc.

b) Cotton

10 5

V. Other:

a) Coats:

3. Cotton.....

b) Overcoats, raincoats and other long
coats, including capes:

3. Cotton.....
- c) Suits and ensembles except ski clothing.....
- f) Suits and ensembles for skiing made up of two or three pieces:
- ex 1. Of wool or fine hair, cotton, synthetic or artificial fibers:
- Cotton.....
- g) Other clothing:
3. Cotton.....
- Outer wear for women, young ladies and children:
- A. Baby clothing, clothing for girls up to size 86, inclusive; cowboy-type clothing and other similar clothing for disguise or reason of size under 185:
- I. Clothing for babies; clothing for girls up to size 86, inclusive:
- a) Cotton.....
- B. Other:
- I. Woven clothing from Nos 59.08, 59.11 or 59.12:
- ex a) Long coats:
- Cotton.....
- ex b) Other:
- Cotton.....

61.02

II. Others:

a) Aprons, blouses and other work clothing:

1. Cotton.....

b) Bathing suits:

ex 2. Of other textile materials:

Cotton.....

c) Bathrobes, other robes, reading jackets and other similar lounging clothing:

2. Cotton.....

d) Parkas, anoraks, flight jackets and similar items:

2. Cotton.....

e) Other:

1. Coats:

cc) Cotton.....

2. Long coats and raincoats, including capes:

10 t

cc) Cotton.....

3. Skirts, coats and ensembles, except ski clothing:

cc) Cotton.....

	4. Dresses:	
	ee) Cotton.....	
	5. Skirts, including cullotes:	
	cc) Cotton.....	
	8. Suits and ensembles for skiing made up of two or three pieces:	
	ex aa) Wool or fine hair, cotton, synthetic, or artificial textile fibers:	
	Cotton.....	
	9. Other clothing:	
	cc) Cotton.....	
61.03	Underwear for men and boys, including collars, front closings and cuffs:	
	B. Pajamas:	
	II. Cotton.....	
	C. Others:	
	II. Cotton.....	
61.04	Underwear for women, young ladies and children:	
	A. Baby clothing, girl's clothing up to size 86, inclusive:	
	I. Cotton.....	

5	B. Others:		
	I. Pajamas and night shirts:		
	b)	Cotton.....	
	II. Others:		
	b)	Cotton.....	
	60.04	Underwear of nonelastic fabric without rubber:	
	B. Others:		
	IV. Others:		
	b)	Of textile and synthetic fibers:	
	1.	For men and boys:	
6	cc)	Slips, shorts and similar items.....	
	2.	For women, girls and children:	
	dd)	Slips, shorts and similar items.....	1 million units
	d) Cotton:		
	1.	For men and boys:	
	cc)	Slips, shorts and similar items.....	
	2.	Slips, shorts and similar items.....	
	39.02	Products of polymerization and copolymerization (polyethylene, polytetra-aliethylenes, polyisobutylene, polystyrene, polyvinyl chloride, polyvinyl acetate, polyvinyl chloracetate and other polyvinyl derivatives, polyacrylic derivatives, polymetacrylic derivatives and coumarine-indene resins, etc.).....	12,000 t

7	45.02	Natural cork in cubes, sheets, strips, including cubes or squares for making cork stoppers.....	1 t
8	45.03	Natural cork items.....	200 t
9	45.04	Compressed cork, with or without glue, respective products.....	500 t
1	55.05	Cotton thread not suitable for retail sales	245 t
2	35.09	Other cotton fabrics.....	
3	56.07 A	Textiles of artificial or synthetic fibers, non-continuous:	
		A. Synthetic textile fibers.....	325 t
4	60.04	Underwear, nonelastic fabric without rubber:	
		B. Others:	
		I. T-shirts.....	
		II. Undershirts:	
		a) Cotton.....	
		b) Synthetic textile fibers.....	
		c) Artificial textile fibers.....	
		IV. Others:	
		b) Synthetic textile fibers:	
		1. For men and boys:	
		aa) Shirts.....	814,000 units
		bb) Others.....	

2. For women, girls and children:

ee) Others.....

d) Cotton:

1. For men and boys:

aa) Shirts.....

dd) Others.....

2. For women, girls and children:

dd) Others.....

60.05

Outerwear, pertinent accessories and other items of non-elastic fabric without rubber:

A. Outerwear and pertinent accessories:

I. Camisoles and pullovers with at least 50 percent by weight in wool and weighing 600 grams or more per unit; cowboy type clothing and similar clothing for disguise or recreation of a size smaller than 158:

a) Camisoles and pullovers with at least 50 percent by weight of wool and weighing 600 grams or more per unit.....

II. Other:

b) Other:

4. Other outerwear:

bb) Camisoles, pullovers (with or without sleeves) twin sets, vests and coats, except jackets mentioned in subitem 60.05, A,II,b) 4, hh): 652,000 units

11. For men and boys:

- aaa) Wool.....
- bbb) Fine hair.....
- ccc) Synthetic textile fibers.
- ddd) Artificial textile fibers.
- eee) Cotton.....

22. For women, girls and children:

- bbb) Wool.....
- ccc) Fine hair.....
- ddd) Synthetic textile fibers..
- eee) Artificial textile fibers.
- fff) Cotton

61.01 Outerwear for men and boys:

B. Other:

V. Other:

d) Trousers and shorts:

- 1. Wool or fine hair.....
- 2. Synthetic or artificial textile fibers.....
- 3. Cotton.....

e) Trousers:

- 1. Wool or fine hair.....
- 2. Synthetic or artificial textile fibers.....
- 3. Cotton.....

61.02 Outerwear for women, girls and children: 407,000 units

B. Other:

II. Other:

e) Other:

6. Trousers:

- aa) Wool or fine hair.....
- bb) Synthetic or artificial textile fibers.....
- cc) Cotton.....

60.05 Outerwear, pertinent accessories and other products of non-elastic fabric without rubber:

A. Outerwear and pertinent accessories:

II. Other:

b) Other:

4. Other outerwear: 293,000 units

aa) Shirts, blouses, blouse-shirts and blouses for women, girls and children:

- 22. Wool or fine hair.....
- 33. Synthetic textile fibers.....
- 44. Artificial textile fibers.....
- 55. Cotton.....

61.02	Outerwear for women, girls and children:	
	B. Other:	
	II. Other:	
	e) Other:	
	7. Shirtwaists, blouse-shirtwaists and blouses:	
	bb) Synthetic textile fibers.....	
	cc) Cotton.....	
	dd) Other textile materials.....	
	Wool or fine hair.....	
61.03	Underwear for men and boys, including collars, front closing and cuffs:	
	A. Shirts:	
	I. Synthetic textile fibers.....	814,000 units
	II. Cotton.....	
	ex III.	
	Wool or fine hair.....	
	Artificial textile fibers.....	
55.08	Cotton loop material ("Turkish weave")	
62.02	Bed-clothes, tablecloths, pantry or kitchen toweling, curtain drapes, and other articles for furnishing interiors:	
	B. Others:	325 t
	III. Dresser, pantry or kitchen toweling.	

10		a) Cotton.....	
		1. With loops of Turkish type.....	
	61.05	Handkerchiefs and pocket handkerchiefs:	
		A. Cotton.....	1.6 t
		ex C. Other textile materials:	
		Wool and fine hair.....	
		Synthetic or artificial textile fibers.....	
11	62.02	Bed-clothes, tablecloths, dresser scarves, pantry and kitchen toweling; curtains and drapes or other materials for furnishing interiors:	
		B. Others:	
		I. Bed-clothes:	
		a) Cotton.....	407 t
		ex c) Other textile materials:	
		Wool or fine hair.....	
		Synthetic or artificial fibers.....	
12	51.04	Fabrics of textile fibers, synthetic or artificial, continuous (including monofilament fabrics or of sheets in Nos 51.01 or 51.02):	
		A. Synthetic textile fiber fabrics:	
		III. Fabrics obtained from sheets or similar forms of polyethylene or polypropylene of the following width:	

325 t

a) Less than 3 m.....

62.03

Sacks and similar items for packing:

B. Woven from other textile materials:

II. Others:

b) Synthetic fiber fabrics:

1. Obtained from polyethylene or polypropylene
sheets.....

62.02

Bed-clothes, tablecloths, napkins, dressing table scarves, pantry
and kitchen towelling, curtains and drapes and other items for
furnishing interiors:

B. Others:

II. Tablecloths and napkins:

a) Cotton.....245 t

ex c) Other textile materials:

Wool or fine hair.....
Synthetic or artificial fibers.....

III. Dressing table scarves, pantry and kitchen
towelling:

a) Cotton..... 245 t

2. Other:

ex c) Other textile materials:

8908

CSO: 3542/5

14

59.04
of
which
ex
59.04

Wool or fine hair.....
Synthetic or artificial fibers..

String cord, and ropes, braided or not..... 2,282 t

Synthetic textile fibers..... 1,466 t

END

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19 February 1986

West Europe Report

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19 February 1986

WEST EUROPE REPORT

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POLITICAL

DENMARK

SOCIALIST PEOPLE'S PARTY CHIEF BACKS ALLIANCE WITH SDP

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 24 Dec 85 p 7

[Editorial by Thorkild Dahl: "SF will Support S-Government in Minority"]

[Text] SF [Socialist People's Party] leader Gert Petersen welcomes Social Democrat [S] Mogens Lykketoft's offer of a Social Democratic minority government supported by the Socialist People's Party and says that he has a "greater liking" for such cooperation in a labor majority than for the Social Democrat's policy of twisting the SF's arm.

It is a step forward in the Social Democrat's relations with the Socialist People's Party that former tax minister Mogens Lykketoft is opening things up for a formal parliamentary cooperation. The SF is willing to join in such cooperation but we want discussions begun before a parliamentary election.

So says SF leader Gert Petersen after Mogens Lykketoft in yesterday's BERLINGSKE TIDENDE indicated that after a parliamentary election "a Social Democratic government could be formed with the SF as a supporting party either within or without the government."

Tax Reform No Obstacle

"Lykketoft's comments are gratifying, and it's news to me that the Social Democrats are ready to be a minority government and be supported by us," says Gert Petersen to BERLINGSKE TIDENDE. He adds that he has "a greater liking for such a solution where arms are not twisted and the SF must simply accept Social Democratic policies."

Disagreement over the tax reform that the Social Democrats have agreed on with the government parties and the Radicals will not stand in the way of cooperation between the Social Democrats and the SF. Mogens Lykketoft has so expressed himself, and he is backed by the SF leader.

"The SF has at no time said that the tax reform would trip up any cooperation with the Social Democrats, and nor will we say so now," says Gert Petersen, who, however, adds that "the cooperation can become more difficult as a consequence of the tax reform, but that does not prevent cooperation." Gert Petersen points out that not only the SF criticizes the tax reform but

also social democratic members of the Folketing like Karl Hjortnaes and Jens Risgaard are among the critics.

Mogens Lykketoft maintains that the cooperation should first be tried after a parliamentary election, but SF leader Gert Petersen wants the cooperation started at once.

Advance Discussion Important

"Things will go much more smoothly after a parliamentary election if we have discussed the cooperation in advance," says Gert Petersen, who thinks that "much now points to a labor majority after a parliamentary election."

There is still much that separates the Social Democrats and the SF, not least in the area of foreign policy.

"If the SF should participate in a government, it must be on the condition that the Social Democrats go much further along the alternative security policy line towards which the party has moved in the last few years," says Gert Petersen, who points to an end to Social Democratic cooperation with the Conservatives and the Moderate Liberal Party.

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POLITICAL

DENMARK

COMMUNIST PARTY SEEN READY TO PICK NEW CHAIRMAN

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 27 Dec 85 p 12

[Editorial: "Out in the Cold"]

[Text] When Aksel Larsen left the Communist Party he had served for so many years, the party slipped quickly out of the Folketing. He was replaced by the media-safe Knud Jespersen, who succeeded in leading the communists back into the Folketing. After the 1977 election, the Danish Communist Party still had seven seats. But then Knud Jespersen died while still quite young and was replaced by Jorgen Jensen. Ever since, the reversal has been uninterrupted. During the first general election under his leadership, the communists slipped out, and they have not succeeded in coming back since. On the contrary, election after election there have been large reverses. The communists received no more than 23,000 votes in the 1984 election. It is understandable that Jorgen Jensen wants to step down as party leader. In any case, there must certainly be plenty of others who want the job. But who? Of course, the party organ LAND OG FOLK has nothing to say about the matter, but the daily AKTUELT names a list of candidates. Besides a couple of trade unionists, the paper points to the driving forces behind the Popular Movement against the EEC, Jens-Peter Bonde and Else Hammerich. The latter is, of course, not a party member, but that can certainly be taken care of, and it is true that the communists must look at the popular movement as the kind of work they have had the best luck with these past few years. They command an organization whose circles and fields of interest extend far beyond their own narrow ranks. It may be this roundabout strategy that brings the communists in from the cold.

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POLITICAL

DENMARK

PAPER PROFILES PARTIES 'CROWN PRINCES,' 'CROWN PRINCESSES'

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 27 Dec 85 p 14

[Article by Carl Otto Brix: "Politicians in the Second Row--Headed for the first"]

[Text] A look at crown princes and crown princesses in political life.

Of course only in hereditary monarchies can crown princes count on becoming kings, but in democratic organizations, too, it is worthwhile to cast a glance at who sits in the second row in order to judge who will end up in the first.

Political parties have their number two men, and they have no guarantee of eventually sitting on the throne. But some of them most certainly will.

There are two obvious names for the country's largest party. There is deputy chairman and party spokesman Svend Auken, and there is the group's deputy chairman Ritt Bjerregaard.

If they were to be characterized rather narrowly, then Svend Auken stands for the more traditional social democratic line. He is the one who maintains close contact with the labor movement and the one who can talk with the other parties. He is a mediator where Ritt Bjerregaard is the sharp ideologist: the one who lays down a party line and follows it. If the Social Democrats are the popular party that also in the future will be able to govern and create a broad unity that extends to some degree across the nonsocialist side of the dividing line, then the leader's name will be Auken. If it is to be the ideology of democratic socialism, of cultural struggle, of peace before security, then the word is Bjerregaard.

Unifying Social Democratic Candidate

Should the two opposing tendencies in the large party be about to upset everything, then there is a unifying candidate, crown prince in waiting Svend Jakobsen, who probably is a little further upstage in the limelight than another serious top figure, Mogens Lykketoft.

Thus there are enough to choose from. In contrast to another large party, the Conservative People's Party. If one must name a replacement for the all-dominating leader, Poul Schluter, Palle Simonsen's name first comes to mind. But he has the regrettable attribute in a crown prince of being nearly as old as the king.

Among the Conservatives, the development has been such that for a time Poul Schluter was both leader of the Folketing group and the organization. Then Ib Stetter became organization chairman for a period, after which Schluter as prime minister again took over the post.

Thus there has not been a chance for any rising star to find a place in the organization that ever since Christmas Moller's and Poul Sorensen's days has been a conservative leader's base.

Some young conservative or other can look forward to a jump promotion.

The third largest party--according to pollsters the Socialist People's Party (SF)--has similar problems.

Gert Petersen is such a dominating leader that the undergrowth has difficulty in growing to its full height.

If the identity cannot be guessed, then the sex can. The SF has through positive affirmative action advanced many women to the highest ranks. Yes, it is the only party with a woman group chairman and a woman member of the Folketing's presidium, respectively Ebba Strange and Lili Gyldenkilde, who today are both good bids to become leader.

But some rulers keep themselves in power a long time, so it is probably from among the younger women party members that a successor must be sought. Environment mayor of Copenhagen Charlotte Ammundsen is a refreshing possibility.

Line of Succession Laid Down

The Liberal Party laid down its line of succession this summer when Anders Fogh Rasmussen was elected deputy chairman ahead of two others who could also be candidates: Ministers Elsebeth Kock-Petersen and Bertel Haarder.

At the first opportunity, perhaps this summer, he will have his ministerial apprenticeship to gain administrative and political experience. If he passes his journeyman's exam, he can count on getting his chance. He has the right background, the right education, and the right age.

Center Democrats do not have a crown prince but a crown princess, the daughter of the party's founder moreover. Mimi Stilling Jakobsen, in contrast to the other aspirants, is plainly the choice of the party's convention (even though this meeting does not mean so much in the party).

The Radical Liberal Party does not seem to need to think about a line of succession. The group has been put together without renewals in the same way

for years. The reigning party chief Niels Helveg Petersen is, moreover, of the younger generation, so the need is not nearly so pressing.

If it is not Chr. Christiansen who will lead the Christian People's Party, then it is Flemming Kofod-Svendsen, who already possesses half the kingdom. And on the Progressive Party's little island appears Pia Kjaersgaard as the leader who can follow in Helge Dohrmann's steps while listening to His Master's Voice.

Photo Captions [photos not reproduced]

Svend Auken--pragmatist who can talk with people.

Ritt Bjerregaard--the hard party ideologist.

Svend Jakobsen--unites the two wings.

Palle Simonsen--favorite to replace Schluter.

Ebba Strange--a likely candidate for a high level post.

Charlotte Ammundsen--refreshing possibility.

Anders Fogh Rasmussen--ministerial apprentice.

Mimi Stilling Jakobsen--crown princess.

Pia Kjaersgaard--a possibility in the FRP.

Flemming Kofod-Svendsen--a possibility in the KRF.

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POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

GREENS FACE DECISIONS CRUCIAL FOR PARTY SURVIVAL

Bonn DAS PARLAMENT (AUS POLITIK UND ZEITGESCHICHTE supplement) in German
9 Nov 85 pp 19-25

[Article by Marie-Luise Weinberger: "End of the Green Era?"]

[Text] I. Introduction

Their rise was cometlike: effortlessly, the Greens took one electoral hurdle after the other. And this despite the fact that they were against everything: against growth, against atomic power, against industrial society. It seemed as if more and more citizens wanted to join the young protest party's critique of our culture. Everyone joined in: APO-granddads, frustrated housewives, beknickered local-patriot friends of nature, purple feminists, student "spontis," prophets of the new inwardness, former K-group members with visions of world revolution, honest farmers, youth, and refugees from the SPD. Just as varied as this outward picture is the matter of content: there is agreement only on the basic values: ecological, grass-roots democratic, non-violent, and socially aware.

But the charm of novelty is gone. The voters in North Rhine-Westphalia and in the Saarland have made it clear to the Greens that no state-within-a-state is going to be set up on fundamentalist survival demands in the Federal Republic. The Greens are at the crossroads. Will the green protest- and movement-party become a parliamentary party with a program? Can the Greens hard-headedly put through all the interests of the new social movements, even under pressure to compromise? Can the Greens manage a reform of their own radicalness - the difficult journey from utopia to reality?

II. The Greens: Expression of a Social Crisis or Indication of an Epochal Shift?

The Greens are the result of the institutionalization and parliamentarization of the new social movements (NSM) active outside of parliament in the late seventies and early eighties: citizens-initiative movement, environmental and anti-nuclear-weapons movement, women's movement, self-help and alternative lifestyle movement, and peace movement. These movements were, from a sociological standpoint, more defensively oriented, against the "colonialization of life" (Habermas) and against the prevalent economic and bureaucratic

rationality (Footnote 1) (See J. Habermas, Theory of Communicative Behaviour, Vol. 2, Frankfurt/M. 1981, pp 490 ff). The following are adduced, among others, in the social-science literature as further reasons for the rise of the Greens and of the new social movements:

Shifts of values and changes of paradigms (Inglehart, Hildebrandt/Dalton, Raschke)

Pervasive hedonistic ethos (Bell)

Cultural crisis of the West (Loewenthal)

Momentum of welfare-state demands (Klages) (Footnote 2))The causes of the rise of the new social movements and of the Greens have by now been extensively dealt with in the social-science literature; this can therefore be dispensed with in the present connection. See especially M.-L. Weinberger, Setting Out for New Shores?, Bonn 1984; K.W. Brandt, New Social Movements, Opladen 1982; K.W. Brandt, D. Buesser, D. Rucht, Setting Out for a New Society, Frankfurt/M. 1985; D. Bell, The Future of the Western World, New York 1985; R. Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics, Princeton 1977; J. Raschke, "Politics and Value Shifts in Western Democracies," in AUS POLITIK UND ZEITGESCHICHTE, Vol 36/80; R. Loewenthal, Social Change and Cultural Crisis, Frankfurt/M. 1979; H. Klages, Listless Citizen, Listless State, Frankfurt/M. 1982; G. Langguth, Protest Movement, Cologne 1983; W. Schaefer, New Social Movements, Frankfurt/M. 1983; W.P. Buerklin, Green Politics, Opladen 1984; E. P. Mueller, The Greens and the Party System, Cologne 1984; G. Langguth, The Green Factor - From Movement to Party, Zurich 1984; Th. Kluge, Green Politics: Status of a Confrontation, Frankfurt/M. 1984; K. Gotto, H.-J. Veen, The Greens - Reluctant Party, Mainz 1984).

But the loss of leadership and initiative in the social-liberal style of governing also led to the Greens' being able to establish themselves as a fourth in the West German party system. Two social counter-ideals took shape against the industrial-society-cum-welfare-state legitimism of the SPD: a neo-conservatism which believes in growth, and the Green political model, critical of growth (Footnote 3) (J. Habermas, "The Crisis of the Welfare State and the Exhaustion of Utopian Energy," in his The New Imponderability, Frankfurt/M. 1985, p 152). Neo-conservatism is oriented on industrial society, but has an anti-welfare-state focus. It aims consciously at the "strata immediately involved in the production process, who have an interest in defending capitalistic growth as the basis of the welfare-state compromise" (Footnote 4) (J. Habermas, cited in footnote 1, p 577), and it in return accepts and approves the split in society between the economically active and the non-economically active.

The Green model of politics, on the other hand, aims at the "highly variegated periphery on the other side" (Footnote 5) (J. Habermas, cited in footnote 1, p 577), at the "anti-productivist alliance": women (housewives) and jobless,

the old, high school and university students, homosexuals and handicapped, foreigners and members of alternative-culture circles. These are joined by members of the new middle class of the social and services professions: the "therapeutocracy" with its "white-collar radicalism." "The distinct concentration of the Greens in the realm of the non-economically active and of the social-service professions indicates that a constituency is already in being for an independent political organization, which, in its daily experience and in its world of ideas, is sharply distinguished from the productivist producing core of industrial society. With a little courage for bold formulations, one could call these sectors of the population, which are liberated from the down-to-earth business pressures of a technologized and bureaucratized work world--borrowing from Habermas' behaviour types--'the communicative class.' Just as the collective-instrumental activity of the factory world moulded the egalitarian-solidaristic value scheme of the labor movement, so the structural principles of alternative politics find their basis in the social milieu of these post-industrial states: operating a town-meeting democracy is only going to be able to work in the longer run with a membership relatively free to dispose of its time; these activist groups have fields of professional activity that are mostly characterized by relatively surveyable dimensions, so that unforced understanding (the consensus principle) seems possible instead of formalized hierarchies; non-material goals, such as self-realization, independence and enjoyment of life, reside higher on personal-values scales than the pursuit of money, power and prestige, which is regarded as alienated" (Footnote 6) (D. Lehnert, "Alternative Politics: The New Social Movements Between Protest Potential, Values Conservatism and Environmental Socialism," in POLITISCHE VIERTELJAHRESSCHRIFT 1985, 1, p 33. Lehnert's conclusion: an opposition SPD, revived in terms of peace policy and environmentalism, will not make the Greens superfluous. This expectation, in his estimation, was unrealistic from the outset.).

The new world-picture developed by the Greens' adherents can be sketched as follows:

1. Anti-modernism: rejection of the growth-oriented consumption and throw-away society, and of technological progress as the engine of industrial development: the leftist critique of capitalism is complemented by a critique of the silent majority's life-style.
2. Anti-nuclear stance and pacifism: resistance on principle to military and civilian use of nuclear energy; plea for thoroughgoing non-violence.
3. Decentralization and grass-roots democracy: higher value in principle on smaller units, and self-determination for all.
4. Culture of "concern": belief in emotions and in subjective behaviour, and the attempt to practice non-violent, democratic and solidaristic social manners with one another (Footnote 7) (See K.J. Scherer and F. Vilmar, Environmental Socialism, Berlin 1980, p 34).

The Greens are not only an expression of a situation of social crisis, to the mind of such analysts, but possibly an indicator of an epochal social change. But "theory is gray" - let's look at the Greens' practice. Here four important currents have formed: the red and radical-environmentalist fundamentalists, who are consistent in wanting to get out of the dominant system; the practitioners of real-politik, who want to reform our industrial society; the economic libertarians, who aim at conservative voting groups; and finally, women, who aim at becoming a pivotal factor in the Green party, thereby assuring the political integration of the centrifugal currents.

III. Intra-Party Tendencies Among the Greens

1. The Fundamentalists, or Traditionalization and Theologization of Politics

The environmental socialists and the radical environmentalists belong to this current within the Green party.

The dogmatic-Marxist environmental socialists are in fundamental systemic opposition to capitalism and the bourgeois state - the old reds in chic new green clothing. With them, Marxist anti-revisionism, Rosa Luxemburg's critique of revisionism, and a one-dimensional emphasis on the property question and the class struggle continue to be dominant (Footnote 8) (See especially Trampert and Ebermann, The Future of the Greens. A Realistic Concept for a Radical Party, Hamburg 1984, and also Trampert and Ebermann, "Power Factor or Power Fantasy?" Konkret 1984-1985, and the discussions in the environmental-socialist internal periodical MODERNE ZEITEN). According to the environmental socialists, the Greens must develop a "strategy for overcoming the system," which would formulate the needs of various segments of the population--animal protectors, farmers, or steelworkers--and put them through against the interests of capital. The economic-policy ideas of this group: "Elimination of atomic plants, comprehensive industrial clean-up programs, and shutdowns in the chemical industry and in industrial and private combustion processes, clean-up of soils and waters, discouraging and forbidding the introduction of new techniques in the economy such as use of new media and genetic engineering. Departure from the modern agricultural industry, development of landscape protection and of technologies adapted to regions instead of wholesale paving-in and building-over, creation of regionally-patterned residential and economic structures instead of often wholly unassimilable industrial complexes" (Footnote 9) (Trampert and Ebermann (Note 8), p 275; see also North-Rhine-Westphalian electoral platform and the keynote motion of the national committee at the Hamburg party conference in December 1984, as well as the discussion of Green economic policy in the journal.).

Along with the plea for decentralized production, the dismantling of the Federal Republic as an exporting nation is advocated (but at the same time the West German welfare state is to be expanded), and, for example, a guaranteed minimum wage is argued for, with--truly hedonistically--work when and as one pleases. Guidance and planning in such a green economic order would take place a) through each individual involved and b) corporatively through

industrial councils, social councils and environmental councils. The contradictions of such a green economic policy can be seen in the example of the socialized steel area: on the one hand the extra (that is, uneconomic) capacity is to remain in being, yet at the same time a comprehensive humanization program (35-hour week, abandonment of shift work, and early retirement) is to be introduced (Footnote 10) (See especially the critique of H. Wiesenthal, "A Fundamentalist Model Program," in TAZ, 21 Mar 85).

The simple question of who is to pay for all this goes--prudently--unanswered. The dominant political type among the prophets of nationalization and the technology Cassandras is the former K-Group official who has been busily engaged since the seventies in finally moving German labor to revolution. The momentum for system change proceeds, in this political schema, from the new social movements, which operate outside of parliament. Great things still lie ahead for the women's movement, the environmental movement, the anti-nuclear movement and the peace movement: they are now also to become "the only relevant protagonists of the proletarian class struggle" (Footnote 11) (Trampert and Ebermann (Note 8), Chapter "New Social Movements and Workers Movement," pp 116 ff).

For the radical environmentalists, the issue is not so much Marxist categories as it is a "right to life" for nature, "ecological justice": "without ecological justice there can be no social justice... On the analogy of the fundamental human right to life, a standing in law must be conceded to nature and its manifold lifeforms. In cases of conflict, this standing affects the weights assigned to the legitimate interests on either side" (Footnote 12) (Words of the Green "philosopher" Maron-Manon Griesebach, one of the chief figures of the radical environmentalists, at the Green party conference in Baden-Wuerttemberg, in TAZ 13 May 85).

Intransigence, 5-minutes-to-12 thinking, moralistic rigidity, and the policy of prohibition characterize the fundamentalist environmentalists' understanding of politics. And: all hope is directed to the notion that people--spurred on by continued proselytizing--will inwardly and truly turn away from the industrial system and will live and work with ecological awareness in small self-governing units. Only thus, and not by looking around anxiously for majorities, can the final saving escape from catastrophe be found. On peace and security issues, too, behaviour is radical: immediate exit from NATO is heralded, as well as rigorous demilitarization and a break with the dominant bloc thinking; social defense or non-violent principles are promoted instead. On economic and social policy issues, there is a broad lack of ideas. Here, too, notions are reduced to a naive and helpless fundamentalism: "the Greens were always strong where they specified the price in nature, landscapes, environmental quality, human happiness, wasted resources, and burdens on the future for this policy" (Footnote 13) (So, for example, writes Antje Vollmer in a reply to Peter Glotz on the interior political situation of the Greens; see TAZ 14 May and 16 Jul 85).

In short, a theologization of politics is going on here, which (as with the red traditionalists) is not dealing seriously with political realities, or even seriously taking up the attempt to develop alternative, feasible policy concepts. Predominant, too, therefore, with fundamentalists of this stripe, are the "good shepherds," the "radical devotees," and the "alternative-lifestyle innocents with Manichaeian ideology," whose utopian alternative systems often display embarrassingly totalitarian characteristics (Footnote 14) (See in this connection the excellent presentation of political types by K.-H. Bohrer, "Innocence in Power," MERKUR 1985, 1).

The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu comments on the rise of these naive idealists and their rhetoric of innocence: "It is the new academic petty bourgeoisie that is breaking with value systems that, developed from a West European political tradition, are still dominant in the West" (Footnote 15) (Bohrer (Note 14); particularly in France, this concept of politics encounters deep mistrust; see for example B. Sauzay, German Lightheadedness, Paris, 1985). Instead of continuing to develop the dialog of the Enlightenment and of modern times, they want to change our society into an all-things-for-all-men Linderhof (one of Ludwig of Bavaria's ruinous never-never castles), in which morality and virtue, rather than the compromise of interests, represent the highest priorities, and in which all would peacefully reach out to one another in support groups. "What the Greens call fundamentalism is, more than anything else, an instrumentalization of politics in the service of self-discovery, estheticism posing as politics, resting on the notion that the world--this ecological vale of tears--is in the final analysis nothing other than occasion, parable and raw material for the search for one's own identity" (Footnote 16) (J. Strasser, "Search for Identity or Politics," in L'80 (1980) 33, p 27).

2. Women, or Housewife-ization of Politics

The representatives (or representatresses) of this tendency are less striking for their substantive differences than for their positive valuation of one property: femininity. The prescribed atmosphere in the "culture of concern" of the new social movements is, as we know, warm, unalienated, genuine, open. Peaceable woman can handle this better than the male chauvinist every time. Entirely in tune with presently fashionable theories of women as survival-bearers, the Green women are supposed to play an important intermediary role among the gamecocks of real-politik, of fundamentalism, and of ecolibertarianism.

This proposition has been tried in practice with the Bundestag delegation in the setting of the one-year Feminine - and a new form of political division of labor was tested: with the commitment of social workers and the corresponding atmosphere, the women improved the working climate (just as the housewife does within the family), thereby quietly and gently keeping the parliamentary machine going. Although the 6-woman team did not enter upon its duties with the pretension of acting as the delegation's "denmothers," it was thrust into precisely this role. Incipient conflicts were smoothed out at the outset, compromises were made. Instead of intrigue, the Green women wanted to try out honesty and openness; instead of using the elbows, they put their money

on cooperation and group dynamics. Instead of hardness they showed civility. The Machiavellian higher strategists (as published: "higher strategies"), by contrast, determined the Green programs in ways that were effective with public opinion, putting their rhetorical and histrionic talents forward in full parliamentary sessions (Footnote 17) (See TAZ 4 Dec 85, which captioned its background article "We're So Sweet and Good, No One Minds Us Any More." Eight months of Green Feminine: see "Against Male Power Politics as a Political Culture," a talk with Antje Vollmer in TAZ 12 Oct 84). "I myself, however, am not completely comfortable with the idea that women today don't just keep their own livingrooms nice and cozy, but are suddenly supposed to add the whole world to the chore. Instead of the emotional work in the private realm's being redistributed, it is simply being expanded: the removal of the difference between public life and the immediate sphere of living, the "be-housewifing" of politics, so to speak, simply raises the multiple burden on women to the level of the colossal" (Footnote 18) (C. Stephan, Real Relaxed in the Supermarket: Life and Love in the Late 20th Century, Berlin 1985, p 85).

The Green women, however, no longer want to accept this housewifization and emotionalization of politics. After barely a year of Feminine, they have become harder, more severe, more authoritarian; they have learned that not being willing to exercise power leads to minority-lobbyism; they had to learn that confrontation and controversy are needed for success. In other words, one must also practice up on primarily "male" characteristics if she wants to become politically effective. Despite all this: the female delegation managers paid off for the Greens in any case. Apart from the environmental theme, the greatest credibility is accorded the Greens in the matter of equal rights for women. Precisely the young women between 15 and 30 are in sympathy with the Green party's sense of politics and with its methods. "Hence arises a potential for female politicization--far removed from the traditional parties--which will play a significant role for political culture in the Federal Republic in the coming years," reads a report by SINUS Institute to the Federal Ministry for Youth, Family and Health. Perhaps a new "female majority, which will then of course not be a silent one," (Footnote 19) (See SINUS, "Young Women Between 15 and 30: Role Shifts and Daily Life Under Emancipation," Special Evaluation for the research project Changes in the Motivational Structure of Youth and Young Adults, Heidelberg, Nov 83, p 29) is being formed here.

This forecast can be empirically corroborated by a political change of consciousness. If women were traditionally rather conservative in political orientation earlier, the exact opposite is the case today: 54.1 percent of the young women between 15 and 30 favor a red-green majority on the national level. Even among those 25 to 35 it's still 50.5 percent (Footnote 20) (SINUS (Note 19), as well as W. A. Perger, "The Courage to be a New Woman," DEUTSCHES ALLGEMEINES SONTAGSBLATT 3 Feb 85). Based on these findings, women represent a central factor for the future of the Greens. The party strategists have recognized this, too: they argue for the formation of a green center, which is to act as a connecting link among the inimical male camps, and is to be actively forwarded by women (Footnote 21) (See TAZ 4 Mar 85, "The Issue is an Alternative Power Structure").

3. The Ecolibertarians, or Bourgeoisization of Politics

The ecolibertarians represent the surviving bourgeois wing within the Green Party. Substantively they stand for a liberal humanism that is tied to republican-liberal traditions. Although anarchistic tendencies play no part in their ranks, they call themselves libertarian. The ecolibertarians, among whom members of the classic bourgeois middle classes and older citizens are clearly overrepresented, aim their critique above all at socialist ideas of change: "the socialist experiment cannot do otherwise than bet on further acceleration of progress." And: "For this reason, the much-praised link between environmentalism and socialism is in fact dangerous. For it brings two authoritarian tendencies together: biological ecologism and the good old educationally dictatorial Jacobinism of the socialists." A further statement: "True, there really is a social question, but it is today a derivative problem of industrialism, and thus also a subordinate problem" (Footnote 22) ("Ecolibertarian Declaration of Principles," TAZ 7 Mar 84). With over 2 million officially registered unemployed (plus the "silent reserve"), with the marginalization of significant portions of the population, and in view of the cuts in the social field, this is a cynical observation.

In ecolibertarian commentaries--just as in conservative-liberal publications--polemics against the unions, against the bureaucratic, statist welfare state, and against social innovations through government bureaucracies, are often found. The social-ecological reconstruction of society is to come about through market-economic methods and mechanisms. Therefore, it is not surprising that some prominent ecolibertarians come out for black-green coalitions (Footnote 23) (So for example the ecolibertarian Hoplitschek in the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG 3 Mar 84. Schmid, too, argues for cooperation with the enlightened "Spaeth" capitalists toward the achievement of a guaranteed minimum income. See on this Th. Schmid, Liberation from Pseudowork, Berlin 1984, p 15).

The ecolibertarians' substantive orientations rest upon an estimate of the green electoral potential: "At the organizer level, it is true, the Green Party is still pretty firmly in the hands of cadres with Marxist-Leninist backgrounds - their clientele, however, in great part belongs univocally to the new middle class... The party of opposition-on-principle has thus been thrust up into parliament not least by the higher new bourgeoisie, to which the theatrical left's radicalism--rather unconcerned about concrete successes --is alien" (Footnote 24) (Th. Schmid in FREIBEUTER 15, p 25).

4. The Realpolitikers, or Secularized Movement Activists

For the representatives of the real-politik tendency, the Greens' prospects for development are: parliamentarization, alliance, compromise. According to their views, one cannot with impunity win elections and then act as if nothing had happened. The new social movements have been integrated into the parliamentary system by the Greens. Now the next step must logically follow: institutionalization and professionalization. The realization of this necessity leads necessarily to consequences also in respect to organizational

policy: the grassroots-democratic model of politics must be revised. Substantively, the issue for the adherents of real-politik is a social-reform path in the direction of an environmentalist and radical-democratic social order.

Some of the "realos" criticize the Marxological "junior-high level" of the dogmatical red fundamentalists, as well as the spirit of revelation that hovers over the radical-ecological world reformers. In the future the Greens should be, not a hotbed of protest or an arena for backward-looking ideologs and party-line beadles (with their drive for a dictatorship of the activists), but rather a bearer of hope as an alternative popular party which appeals to 10 percent of the population. Characteristic for methods among the real-politikers is the secularized movement activist who has shed his "sponti" skin to become a high strategist.

But the Green delegates in almost all the municipal and state legislatures, as well as in the Bundestag, are also realpolitikers. The reason: they quickly come to feel the (thitherto hated and denied) pressure of facts when they are faced with translating green demands into concrete executive instructions. Thus, we may read in the parliamentary delegation's report that the much-invoked grassroots activities cannot be carried over into the shifting Bonn arena. An example of this: "Out there you hear about leaving NATO and disbanding the Bundeswehr; but in here it's dogged detail-work to fight for a reduction of the arms budget. Out of sheer necessity, parliamentary measures will be modest in comparison with platform principles" (Footnote 25) (See TAZ 30 Nov 80).

The Greens in parliament are considered an active and industrious delegation: through September 1985, they have made more than 33 major interpellations, 568 minor ones, and 193 motions in the Bundestag. But in the parliamentary work to date, the Greens have succeeded with a motion on only one point: they obtained an import ban on sea turtles.

The Greens face stiffer sailing now than previously, as the other parties begin to take up green themes and integrate them into their parliamentary efforts and political platforms. So, for example, the CDU/CSU members on the Bundestag's Interior Committee indeed began by rejecting the Green bill for a washing-material law, only to bring in their own bill shortly thereafter - two-thirds of it copied from the Green paper. The same procedure was applied with the waste-water-fee bill, with the soil-protection amendments, and with women's affairs (Footnote 26) (See TAZ 4 Mar 85).

IV. The Voter: Fundamentalism - No, Thanks!

The various substantive concepts and strategic ideas within the Green Party were put on the electoral "market" for a vote in this year's state legislative elections in the Saarland and North Rhine-Westphalia, in the House of Delegates elections in Berlin, and in the municipal elections in Hesse. In Berlin and in North Rhine-Westphalia, fundamentalist cocktails with hors d'oeuvres were served. In Berlin the Alternative List presented itself as a

Dutch-uncle sect, pursuing a rigid prohibitionist policy (auto-free city, withdrawal of allied troops). In the traditionally conservative Saarland the Greens at first didn't want to enter the state legislature at all after Oskar Lafontaine's offer of coalition. The perception was, "We can change things only with extra-parliamentary pressure, and not with 2 token ministers" (Footnote 27) (See TAZ 7 Jan 85). The Greens made the Movement their idol, simultaneously gazing at the red-green Oskar Lafontaine with fearful fascination. The real-politik result of the strategy of denial: the Greens had to content themselves with 2.4 percent. In North Rhine-Westphalia, minorities within the party like pederasts and dogmatic eco-socialists had the last word. Their fine hand was evident in the 650-page platform which inter alia set forth "survival demands" for the SPD: abandonment of atomic energy, departure from lignite coal over the intermediate run, renunciation of new technologies, industrial clean-up programs, and programs to reduce mass unemployment while simultaneously moving away from the economy's export orientation (Footnote 28) (See FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU 17 Dec 85 and FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG 25 Dec 85. TAZ commented: "There is no social basis for bringing about what the Greens articulated this weekend. All that's left here is Bahro's vision of a non-violent popular insurrection," in TAZ 18 Dec 84.).

Both in the Saar and in North Rhine-Westphalia, it was very easy for the SPD to push the Greens under the 5-percent barrier, because the Greens here a) came across as being in desolate condition both in people and in organization, and b) couldn't distinguish themselves early on through parliamentary activity. In Hesse, the red-green alliance was confirmed by the voters. That example shows: "Where Green alliances have even a ghost of a chance of coming to pass, the voters can actively support the process" (Footnote 29) (Th. Schmid, "Plea for an Electable Green Platform," TAZ 23 Mar 85).

Konrad Adenauer Foundation staff came to the following conclusions (Footnote 30) (See H. J. Veen, "The Greens at the Limits of Growth: An Analysis of Their Voters and Representatives Before the 1984 and 1985 Elections," Politische Studien Jul/Aug 85, pp 356 ff): the Greens' ups and downs depend on the SPD's situation. Where the SPD comes across assertively, with its candidates and/or with its program, the Greens have little chance to surmount the 5-percent hurdle. Nevertheless, the Adenauer Foundation researchers reckon on a Green parliamentary presence up to the end of this decade (only, however, if the Greens establish themselves on the left with the SPD). The reason for this assumption: in 6 states (Hamburg, Lower Saxony, Bremen, Hesse, Baden-Wuerttemberg, Berlin) and in the municipal elections, the Greens, while indeed passing their zenith, have at the same time been able to consolidate at a lower level.

The following is adduced in the literature, inter alia, as causes of the end of the Greens' growth:

1. The momentum of value shifts, which made an essential contribution to the rise of the Greens, has halted at least for the moment. Traditional material values predominate once again with first-time voters (Footnote 31) (See on this the analysis of the pollster M. Guellner for the municipal elections in

North Rhine-Westphalia in KOELNISCHE RUNDSCHAU 27 Nov 85. Guellner calls some of the young voters super-operatives of conformity. See also Th. Sommer, "Greening of the Electorate Too?" DIE ZEIT 22 Apr 85).

2. The Greens have stagnated in their big-city citadels, and have been able to win no new segments of the electorate. In addition, the electorally decisive Green shift-voters have been frightened off by the fundamentalist orientation (Footnote 32) (See FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU 14 May 85: The CDU campaign raised home-state patriotism and so SPD loyalty. The Cologne election researcher Guellner points to an interesting trend that became visible in the North Rhine-Westphalia state legislative elections: the FDP was especially successful in the service-industry centers with above-average education. Thus also in D. Oberndoerfer and G. Mielke, "Handwriting on the Wall for Bonn," FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG 15 May 85. The reason: segments of the upwardly mobile middle classes, the "young urban professionals," are turning away from the Greens.).

3. The Greens have far overestimated their own degree of appeal: not only is the charm of novelty much diminished, but the current market value of protest themes from the late seventies and the eighties (atomic energy, environment, full rearmament) has also fallen (or else these themes have been taken up in the other parties' programs, as the example of the SPD "Work and Environment" program shows) (Footnote 33) (See C. Offe and H. Wiesensthal, "The Green Fear of Reformism," TAZ 13 May 85).

V. The Green Reformism Debate

Formulation of a program adapted to governing and to political life is the order of the day for the Green Party. The ecolibertarian Thomas Schmid comes to the conclusion that "the Greens are still wanted...as people who have intelligent suggestions of moderate scope to make toward dismantling industrial society" (Footnote 34) (Th. Schmid, "Plea for an Electable Platform," TAZ 28 Mar 85 [but note the citation in Footnote 29]). If this perception becomes acceptable to the majority, the Greens must revise their previous understandings of politics and of organization at 3 decisive points:

1. Clear profession of faith in reform as opposed to revolution, and in parliamentary alliances;
2. Development of alternative policy ideas capable of winning majorities;
3. Reform of grassroots-democratic style of organization.

1. Reformism and Parliamentary Alliances

If the Greens want to contribute over the long haul to the shaping of the political landscape in the Federal Republic, there is no alternative to reformism for them. If they make a final decision for anti-reformism, consistent in its convictions and anchored to principle, with its partly pedagogical, partly idealistic volunteerism, their future is already behind them.

The question of yes or no to reformism within the Greens' discussion is closely linked with the question of parliamentary alliances--particularly with the SPD. For the red fundamentalists, nothing is possible with the SPD (they do go in for negotiation with the SPD--as in Hamburg--but only with the aim, in the good old leftist way, of unmasking the SPD). The environmental fundamentalists, in adolescent love-hate, call old mother SPD names, and want nothing to do with her. But learning processes are going on--the normative power of the real is beginning to have its effect. Whilst the fundamentalists at the Hamburg party congress wanted to bring the Greens to a course of absolute refusal, the decision was otherwise at the Hagen party congress (after the desolating electoral defeats): from opposition-on-principle all the way to red-green alliances, everything is now possible (Footnote 35) (Some advanced thinkers, such as the designated Hesse Environment Minister Joschka Fischer, are now eyeing co-operation with the Christian Unionists. He argues that the SPD could come too much into dependence on its growth wing, and that alliances on the left have no prospects in the southern German states. See TAZ 4 Mar 85. On the Hagen party conference, see FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU 24 Jun 85, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG 24 Jun 85, SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG 24 May 85).

The first showing of a red-green coalition is now to get its try-outs in Hesse. Besides the environmental and energy portfolios, the Greens are getting a State Secretary for Women's Affairs. The Greens were not successful with the Social Democrats on their original demand for a women's ministry (Footnote 36) (Here arises the fundamental question whether it is meaningful to respond with bureaucratization to the social-political challenge of "equal rights for women." And: a (probably powerless) Women's Ministry could easily be made into an excuse for shunting aside wider-ranging demands.). This demand could have developed into a "breaking point" for the coalition negotiations, if the Greens had insisted on the portfolio in order to maintain their identity. But the Greens had gone through a learning process--and the coalition negotiations themselves showed this: here they no longer confused politics with the search for identity. A classic example of such a case was the near parting of the ways over the Hanau atomic plants Nukem/Alkem. "Anyone who in this way makes the actualization of his own model of society a precondition for day-to-day politics is renouncing in advance any chance of changing the conditions he objects to. The point is then reached at which the effort to stabilize a common identity makes the achievement of common interests impossible. For achieving one's interests requires political behaviour. But politics in our society is, according to a plain but profound definition by Max Weber: 'the effort to obtain power shares or to influence the distribution of power...with-in a state among the groups of people it includes'" (Footnote 37) (S. Neckel, "Political Identity and Social Interests," L'80 (85) 33, p 54).

It is important for the Greens to go through learning processes like this. For a functioning red-green coalition, in which the Greens give proof of their aptness for politics and of their reliability, raises their chances for the 1987 Bundestag elections.

2. Conceptual Reorientation

The future task of Green politics is no longer the formulation of anti-propositions (against growth, against atomic energy, renunciation of industrial society, retreat from NATO), but rather the design of ecologically oriented alternative policy concepts for the fields of economic, social, environmental and peace policy. Here, too, there are first indications of maturity: for the 1987 Bundestag elections the Greens want to come forward with an ecologically oriented restructuring program (which is to be produced with scientific consultation). The central point of the substantive revision debate will be the relationship of the social-worker and teacher party to the new technologies. The Greens entered as an anti-modernist grouping inimical to technology. Now they are confronted with the proverbial irony of fate: precisely their protest is contributing to industry's environmental-technological modernization. Looked at from the reform-politics viewpoint, the Greens have in the final analysis had a stabilizing effect on the industrial system, and they are the true unleashers of an enormous future growth push in the area of environmental technology. The SPD is taking account of this fact in its new party platform (which will aim at incorporating Green voters): it is still betting on industrial-state/welfare-state legitimism, but will develop it further in terms of peace policy, women's policy and environmental policy. And: enormous shortenings of work schedules, which are to be used for creating open spaces for the creative aspects of life, are hoped for for the coming decades from the use of the new technologies (Footnote 38) (On this see especially P. Glotz, The Task of Issue-Making, Berlin 1985; see P. Glotz, "Green Politics Between Diagnosis and Therapy," TAZ 14 May 85. The Social Democratic labor-union wing also declares for this strategy; see the paper of Rappe and Steinkuehler, "The Market Alone Cannot Assure Lasting Progress.").

The Greens' aspiration of overcoming social-democratic/economic modernism requires a central policy-strategic and intellectual effort, "namely the achievement of finding politically convincing answers to the question of how the social-justice and social-security problem is to be coped with, even with the renunciation of the modernist growth myth" (Footnote 39) (C. Offe and H. Wiesensthal, "Green Fear of Reform House," TAZ 31 May 85 [probably in fact the article cited in Note 33]). The Greens can only cut loose from this much-maligned modernism when they offer the voter convincing and thought-through answers to questions of work and employment, defense and social security. For the Greens, torn with strife among themselves, this is a task that can hardly be managed.

3. Reform of Inner Structures

The third point of the Green revisionism debate is reform of the grassroots-democratic political model. The footwork-vs-footing model of a Green anti-party party corresponds to the unstructuredly dynamic movement and protest phase of the new social movements. The principles of rotation, of openness of all forums to members, and of consensus have proven counterproductive in the conduct of everyday political business. The footwork-footing theory has been turned inside out: the new social movements have gone rigid--the

parliamentary footwork element has become the Greens' footing. Instead of completing this development, the Greens' leaders are taking refuge in fetishizing the new social movements (Footnote 40) (Similarly the spokesman of the Green parliamentary delegation, Christian Schmidt, who expressed himself thus after the electoral defeat: "Let us work less for the German Bundestag and more in the service of social movements" [TAZ 21 Jan 85]. The national committee spokesmen Rainer Trampert and Jutta Ditfurth also argue in a similar way; for both, the failure to reach the 5-percent mark is no longer a problem. See TAZ 14 May 85 and 4 Jun 85 and the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG 14 May 85).

Conscious renunciation of professional politics leads before very long--even in a party with a statistically high educational level among its potential recruits--to the "dominance of the pallid busyworkers," under which the incompetent, inexperienced political amateur has the last word. The principle of rotation--as experience on federal and state levels proves--leads to a loss of efficiency and to mediocrity of Green policy (Footnote 41) (Also worthy of note in this connection is the result of a study by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (Note 30). This advocates the proposition that the later Green generations in almost all cases advocate more radical concepts than did their predecessors. Stephan Russ-Mohl demonstrates in a research paper that reform cycles begin with innovation in people and concepts, and end in mediocrity and bureaucratization; see St. Russ-Mohl, "Dramaturgy of Political Reforms," AUS POLITIK UND ZEITGESCHICHTE B 26/82.).

The openness of Green forums to members allows the rival groupings within the party to reduce these meetings to a tool. Owing to the right of speech for all present (which has been limited to 5 minutes), the costs, both political and personal, and in terms of time, of achieving agreement rise to intolerable levels. The Greens' members' meetings, instead of being forums for political discussion, have developed into incalculable "comic-strip one-liner subcultures," in which disagreeable and disputed subjects are excluded (both at the Hamburg and at the Hagen party congresses, themes like rotation, structural reform, and the Greens' future conceptual orientation were set aside). The hitherto voluntary party workers must also be replaced by headquarters staffs.

Will the Greens be able "to formally limit the runaway forms?" (Footnote 42) (C. Offe and H. Wiesensthal [Note 39]). They will be able to survive as a party--this can be said even today--only if they accept organizational structures similar to those of the established parties, that is the principles of professionalism, expertise, division of labor, obligatoriness, assured procedural rules, and discipline. In such a case, of course, a further Green dream would have failed: the belief that the highly professionalized and specialized industrial-technocratic system can be countered by a lay system.

The results of the Green revisionism debate are presently still open. But the trend is running in favor of real-politik. Thus, Karl Kautsky may be proven right once more: "If conditions are such as to favor revisionist attitudes, there is then no longer any holding back, the majority goes over to revisionism" (Footnote 43) (K. Kautsky, quoted from Textbook and Exercises on the German Labor Movement, vol. 1, Bonn 1984, p 221).

POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

STUDY FINDS FRG FRIENDLIER TO FOREIGNERS THAN IT REALIZES

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 7 Dec 85 p 1

[Article by gs: "Pollsters Find No Evidence of Xenophobia--Allensbach Analysts Say Germans See Great Problems But Have a 'Rather Friendly' Attitude"]

[Text] Bonn, 6 Dec 85--An opinion poll of the Allensbach Institute for Opinion Polls [IfD] made public Friday [6 December] shows that FRG citizens are "rather friendly" and by no means xenophobic toward foreigners in the FRG. The poll had been commissioned by the Federal Ministry of the Interior.

For its analysis (entitled "Between Tolerance and Concern--Attitudes of the German Population Toward Topical Problems of Xenophobia") the IfD polled about 2,250 FRG citizens in January and February 1985. These included 250 persons residing in areas with a particularly high proportion of foreigners. There are about 4.36 million foreigners in the FRG at present, which amounts to a good 7 percent of the total population.

According to the IfD study, the relationship between Germans and foreigners is "more relaxed than the constant portrayal of it as fraught with problems, in the media and in public discussions, would make them believe." Every other person polled, says the study, thought that a great deal was being exaggerated in this matter. Every third person, however, expressed the opinion that there were indeed great difficulties.

According to the analysis, great difficulties in the coexistence of Germans and foreigners are indicated to an above-average extent by citizens living in a neighborhood with a high proportion of foreigners. Compared with an overall average of 33 percent, 42 percent of Germans in those areas speak of great difficulties. On the other hand, citizens personally acquainted with foreigners state with particular frequency (55 percent) that the problems are portrayed in an exaggerated manner.

The image of foreigners gained on the basis of personal experience ("close image"), according to the IfD, is more friendly throughout than the image of foreigners as a whole in this country ("remote image"). Thus 65 percent of FRG citizens who know a foreigner personally consider him "friendly,

courteous." Foreigners as a whole are afforded this praise by only 16 percent of those polled, however.

According to the IfD study, German xenophobia is not shown either in the assesment of the role of foreigners on the labor market. Here there are, however, great disparities between the close and the remote image. The argument that foreigners are taking jobs away from German workers is supported substantially (39 percent) only by groups which are not particularly friendly toward foreigners. Among Germans who work together with foreigners, on the other hand, it plays a comparatively minor role (12 percent).

Among persons who stand out among the total population by their strongly pronounced tolerance, the following groups are clearly overrepresented: The young, particularly people under 30; persons with higher education; and Green voters. At the other end of tolerance scale are the fairly old, particularly people over 60; persons with an ordinary education; and supporters of the CDU and CSU.

A limitation of the influx of foreigners is endorsed by 75 percent of those polled, according to the IfD. There is no majority support, on the other hand, for limiting the opportunity for children to join their families in the FRG to children no older than 6. Only 27 percent are for it, 46 percent are against, and 27 percent are undecided. Introduction of the 6-year limit has been among the demands made by Minister of the Interior Friedrich Zimmermann (CSU).

A relative majority of the population is prepared to grant German citizenship to children of foreigners who have grown up in the FRG when they come of age (42 percent for, 29 percent against, 29 percent undecided). Naturalization of Turkish children, however, is advocated by only 32 percent with 33 percent against and 35 percent undecided.

In the question as to whether foreigners living in the FRG should be deported if they commit a punishable offense, the responses depend on the gravity of the offense. There are clear majorities for deportation in the case of extremist political activity (57 percent) and trade in drugs (70 percent). A right to vote for foreigners in the FRG is rejected by a majority, with 52 percent of those polled holding the view that only Germans should be entitled to vote. The right to vote for foreigners in Bundestag elections is endorsed by 19 percent, the right to vote in municipal elections by 27 percent. Demonstrations by foreigners in the FRG against conditions in their home countries are rejected by 56 percent of SPD supporters, 53 percent of FDP supporters, and only 21 percent of Greens.

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POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

LITTLE CHANGE SEEN IN RELATIONS WITH USSR AFTER SUMMIT

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 13 Dec 85 p 5

/Article by Rolf Zundel: "Economically Valued, Politically Upbraided--A Trip Without Any Big Events"/

/Text/ Bonn, early December--The waterway carries along the small one, says a political aphorism by the Federal chancellor. Applied to East-West relations, it would mean that the communicative style of Geneva also ought to make itself felt in Bonn's contacts with the East. The Bundestag delegation which visited the Soviet Union last week returned with divided impressions. Though it has not dried out or come to a halt, the river of German-Soviet relations is meeting a number of obstacles.

To be sure, protocol was satisfied; the last delegation, in 1973, had not been treated any better. One could have talked of a quite normal trip except for the fact that great expectations had been raised frivolously before the trip had begun, which then were followed during the stay in the Soviet Union by grumbling comments about the lack of appreciation by the Soviets of the importance of the party leader in the German Bundestag (which in turn were dispatched back to the FRG in pointed form by the agencies, only to be turned into burning protests there by overeager commentators). The great event, however--a meeting with Foreign Minister Zhevarnadze, not to speak of one with General Secretary Gorbachev, was denied to the delegation. The Germans did not get to see any of Gorbachev's new people.

The talks were described as "courteous and respectful" (Dregger) and "open and friendly" (Jenninger), only a shade more cordially than by the Soviets, who spoke more of a businesslike manner and sobriety. Nor did the delegation want to have its positive impression spoiled by their last talk, shortly before its departure. With the help of Soviet interpretation, the "outburst" by Central Committee official Zimyanin was played down as a "human particularity." A somewhat doubtful procedure in that this outburst was also, and much more so, part of a mixed strategy which was intended to make clear to the Bonn parliamentarians both the continuing Soviet interest in cooperation in all areas and its limits and conditions.

Closely Knit Relations

In fact there exist (Soviet and Bonn interlocutors agree on this) comparatively closely knit relations between the FRG and the Soviet Union. Economic relations are working well. When the chairman of the board of the Deutsche Bank shows up in Moscow, he (like the leaders of the SPD)--I almost said as a matter of course--is received by the General Secretary. Cultural relations are not bad. (In the Moscow Intourist Hotel there were posters drawing attention to a Janssen exhibit.) There are hardly any complaints at the political working level, including the contacts between the Bonn foreign minister and his Soviet counterpart on the fringe of international conferences.

In the political-climate sphere, however, things look different. There may be a number of special reasons why the figures of German repatriates have been dropping for years, why the construction of the new German embassy in Moscow is 8 months behind schedule, and why comparatively few Soviet people show up at receptions of the German Embassy, but accumulatively the picture remains an unfriendly one. And if General Secretary Gorbachev visits London before he assumes office and then, while in office, first goes to Paris, then meets with Reagan, and plans a visit to Rome but so far shows no inclination to pay a visit to Bonn, it shows that the weights have shifted. The FRG has been demoted from its position of preferred partner, and the Soviets make no secret of that either. At present the place of the FRG has been taken by France.

SDI Position Not Convincing

Actually there is a trend to measure the FRG by particularly strict standards. A number of reasons may be cited for this: disappointment at the FRG not having played the desired special role in Western Europe and wrong Soviet estimates in the question of the stationing of missiles. Ever since April 1984 (the reaction to the Bonn decision about the stationing of missiles coincided with the Soviet celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the end of the war) the Soviet press, with varying intensity but along identical lines, has described the FRG as a stronghold of revanchism. This makes some sense from the Moscow point of view. Except for FRG consent, it would hardly have been possible to station new U.S. nuclear weapons in West Europe, and FRG support for SDI, the new irritant in German-Soviet relations, is also of considerable significance.

The rejoinder by the German parliamentarians that in the case of the SDI the FRG is not the culprit but a victim is unlikely to have convinced the Soviet interlocutors. As far as Moscow is concerned, SDI is not only a question of security but a question of how it uses its resources. After all, Gorbachev's aim to modernize industry and improve income--imparted to the German delegation in many variants--is affected by how much money has to be put into armament. Gromyko's warning that the framework of German-Soviet relations would become narrower if SDI was implemented is therefore more than a tactical political move. There would be less money available, even with German aid, for the development of civilian industry and technology.

Economic relations certainly were the most pleasant subject of the Moscow talks. There was again mention of the inexhaustible treasuries of the Soviet Union, and also of the fact that the FRG was the most dependable economic partner. This definitely should be taken literally. What is meant by it is the punctuality and quality of German deliveries but also the fact that Bonn's economic policy is affected much less than U.S. economic policy by the changing political climate.

Industry is doubtless the most uncontroversial part of German-Soviet relations. This lures a number of FRG politicians into the somewhat careless presumption that despite SDI things will not be so bad: after all, they need us. This accords with the triumphant statement by CDU/CSU politicians that despite the stationing of missiles there has been no start of an ice age, and no impenetrable fence of missiles across Europe has been erected. This is an argument useful in domestic politics but harmful in foreign policy. Moreover it is only partly true, for apart from German-Soviet economic relations it is based primarily on inter-German experience, which in Bonn's eyes has covered up the political unfriendliness of the Soviets.

Here the judgment of the German delegation was divided along party lines. One extreme was marked by Dregger, leader of the CDU/CSU deputies in the Bundestag, who thought that the Soviets of course wanted to prevent SDI but once a decision had been made politics would continue on their normal course. Social Democrats and Greens are taking the Soviet warnings more seriously. What is right about Dregger's opinion is that economic relations will also weather a temporary freeze. This does not mean, however, that the SDI decision will not have any consequences. They might become noticeable in other spheres.

It is no coincidence that the Soviet side has kept saying that the further development of relations must proceed on the basis of the treaties and security interests. In the eyes of the Soviets, the border discussions in the FRG and the demonstrative references to the open German question appear to be a departure from the earlier interpretation of the treaties. This evaluation is connected with the suspicion that, in a sort of reversal of a former Bonn Ostpolitik maxim, Bonn is trying to conduct an Ostpolitik which bypasses not the GDR but Moscow. Seen in this light, Zimyanin's outburst definitely makes sense--his brusque answer to the inquiry about Honecker's visit of "why do you not ask him?" and his harsh accusation that the FRG, though no longer trying to wage war against the GDR, is attempting to devour it politically.

The attractiveness of the FRG to the East European states, particularly the GDR, apparently is a thorny problem for the Soviets. It is a question of power for them. Bonn would probably be well advised to take this sensitivity on the part of Moscow seriously. From several remarks on the fringe of the Moscow visit, it was possible to gain the impression that a Honecker trip to the FRG is not among Moscow's favorite projects.

This concern is one more reason why the FRG for the time being cannot leave the political penalty bench. It continues to be quite useful as a bogeyman for disciplining the East European states. Nothing about that will change over the short term--certainly not before Bonn's decision on SDI, and probably not all that fast either afterward, when it has been made contrary to Soviet wishes and warnings. Is there a big power that likes to be portrayed as a paper tiger?

For the German delegation the visit certainly was useful experience, not least for Dregger, who on his first trip to the Soviet Union developed an amazing amount of understanding for Soviet politics and interests. No one commemorated the dead of the Fatherland War in as dignified a way as he did. No one accepted the big-power position of the Soviet Union so readily. No one talked with such a lack of self-consciousness of things in common, for example of the fact that both countries have experienced war on their own soil.

Some of this, the Soviets found tactless, but they were not unimpressed for all that, and in all they found Dregger to be an agreeable and certainly useful interlocutor--a Deutsch-Nationaler /prewar nationalist party/ who does not think in terms of systems but in terms of categories of power and patriotism and who if addressed that way can also be influenced.

This experience actually ought to encourage the Soviets also to invite Franz/-Joseph Strauss. He certainly is no less eager for such a visit than Dregger was. Though no Deutsch-Nationaler, he would be hardly less impressionable.

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POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

BRITISH STUDY CALLS UNITED SOCIALIST GERMANY THREAT TO USSR

Bonn DIE WELT in German 21 Dec 85 p 5

[Article by Rainer Gatermann: "A Reunified Germany Seen as 'Challenge' to Moscow--British Study Says Threat Exists Particularly If This Happens Under Socialist Auspices"]

[Text] London--Can it in fact be an objective of Soviet policy to strive for a reunified and socialist Germany? British diplomat Roland Smith poses this question in his study "Soviet Policy Towards West Germany" and reaches the conclusion that such a Germany "would represent a more delicate and momentous threat than would ever be the case with a reunified capitalist Germany which was a member of NATO, for it might turn into a genuine challenge for the Soviet leadership of the Warsaw Pact."

Roland Smith, 42, has been with the Military Mission in Berlin since mid-1984. In his study, published by the respected London Institute for Strategic Studies, he disputes the notion that the Federal Republic is a military threat to the Soviet Union. He sees a threat (from Moscow's point of view) in other fields--the political and economic ones.

The Federal Republic, says the British diplomat, is the only West European country which, albeit by peaceful means, aims at a change of the status quo between West and East in Europe, and moreover, on the basis of the traditionally close economic contacts, which also lead to a comparison between the German development and its own, Moscow could perceive "a kind of German threat."

Roland Smith describes the maintenance of the status quo in Europe as a "minimum aim" of Soviet policy and says that its final aim remains the "expansion of Soviet influence over the entire European continent." The Kremlin was trying to realize this aim with various tactics, but one had to ask oneself whether this effort really could be the optimum aim of Soviet policy.

In this context Smith draws the "extreme scenario" of a reunified socialist Germany. Even a neutral Federal Republic, he says, would mean instability and unrest for the Kremlin rather than a strengthening of socialism and political advantage. The natural result of such a development would then be for the

"GDR" to ask itself whether it was not time to leave the Warsaw Pact and for the Soviet forces to withdraw.

A neutral Federal Republic would call into question the role of the Soviet forces in various East European states. Even greater would be the "threat" to Moscow by a reunified but socialist Germany. "Moscow continues to be the Jerusalem of communism. In a reunified Germany under socialist auspices, the danger would emanate from Berlin of its arrogating this role or at least sharing it. This would call into question the image that the Soviet Union has of itself, and its role in the world."

In the diplomat's opinion, the German question has not been solved. In saying so, he is thinking not so much of the German eastern border, for which he believes there is "no real basis" for a change, as of Berlin and the "legitimacy of the 'GDR.'" He states that "by its very existence West Berlin keeps reminding one that something remains unsolved."

The problem of legitimacy, Roland Smith says, is shared by the "GDR" with the other East European states, but in the case of the "GDR" the question of national integrity is added. In light of its general experience in East Europe, it was necessary for the Soviet Union "to consider the possibility that it might one day have trouble with the 'GDR' again. This could lead to the national question."

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POLITICAL

FINLAND

STALINIST NEWSPAPER HITS NEW INSTANCES OF TILT TOWARDS WEST

EFTA Membership One Example

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 19 Dec 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Finland and EFTA"]

[Text] Finland's accession to EFTA as a full member, which was brought about by the Government with right wing support, is another new and far-reaching step in strengthening Finland's ties to the West. For the first time Finland has joined a Western organization as a full member.

The Government and Foreign Trade Minister Jermu Laine tried to push the EFTA decision through as stealthily as possible. When the matter finally began to be talked about an attempt was made to pass the decision off as a mere formality.

In fact from the standpoint of trade policy this decision is closely linked to Finland's EEC policy. It is well known that relations between the EEC and EFTA are becoming closer at present. Last year the first joint ministerial council meeting of the organizations was held. It is noteworthy that the Foreign Trade Minister announced Finland's plans to become a full member just before leaving for negotiations with the EEC.

The decision is by no means simply a trade policy matter but also one of foreign policy. It is thus no coincidence that the deputies nearest the far right in the Diet lauded the Government for its "courage" when the EFTA accession was implemented.

The question is the direction of the measures. Within only about half a year we had Finland's ties to the Western Eureka project before the nature of the whole undertaking was even clear, the EFTA decision and Minister Laine's disparaging speeches about trade between Finland and the Soviet Union. At the same time Western capital imports into Finland have facilitated and correspondingly Finnish capital has been sent abroad.

All of this has several consequences. Tying Finland more firmly than previously to the Western economy, which is subject to depression and crises, makes Finland more vulnerable than before. It is also a question of the

direction of resources: if the main emphasis is placed on expanding Western trade, then Eastern trade, which has guaranteed employment and economic stability, will necessarily be neglected; signs of this can already be seen. A still greater dependence on the West will also narrow our internal democracy, as the authority for economic decision declines further than before.

It is clear that the Government has still more plans for tying Finland closer to the West in its back pocket. They should be put on ice and a start should be made on an open and broad discussion of the way in which the foundations of our foreign policy and trade policy are being changed and how these changes affect our security policy.

'Self-Finlandization' Charged

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 20 Dec 85 p 2

[Article by Aleksandrovits "Self-Finlandizers"]

[Text] Three fresh examples of how the self-Finlandizers operate: the case of Radio City and Siitoin, the case of the Paasikivi diary and the Metzger case.

Radio City interviewed the neofascist Pekka Siitoin. The Ministry of Communications reprimanded it.

There were rumors of sensational disclosures in the Paasikivi diary even before the work appeared and afterwards. Kalevi Sorsa found it justified to warn about the misuse of the diary. Even before him TIEDONANTAJA had written about the same thing.

Otava was supposed to bring out the memoirs of Hans Metzger, who served in Helsinki as a nazi German diplomat during the war, for the Christmas market. In it there were a number of long excerpts quoted from the aggressive anti-Soviet essays written by Urho Kekkonen under the name Pekka Peitsi during the war.

Urho Kekkonen's son Matti forbade the quotation of the essays on the basis of the copyright. Otava postponed the publication of Metzger's book and destroyed the edition taken from it.

Were the top officials in the Ministry of Communications, Kalevi Sorsa and Matti Kekkonen self-Finlandizers in these cases? In my opinion the self-Finlandizers are those who raised a groundless and disproportionate fuss about these cases.

Self-Finlandizers could have admitted that a fascist should not and according to the peace treaty may not be granted a platform in the information media. Instead of that they resorted to acting indignant on behalf of Pekka Siitoin's "freedom of speech."

The self-Finlandizers could have recognized that there is justification for taking the views expressed by Sorsa into account. Instead of that the spectacle, "We boys were just pulling old guardian Sorsa's leg" began.

They could have behaved in the same way in connection with the Metzger case. Or at least shown a calm sense of proportion.

Placing the rejection of Metzger's book on a par with nazi book burning does not show any sense of proportion, although it does convey a sick humor. Among others Heikki Brotherus in his memoirs calls Metzger a "hardened nazi."

Self-Finlandizers are characterized by weak self-assurance, dependence and subservience in relation to right wing opinion in the so-called free West. The self-Finlandizers are worrying all the time, "What are the people over there thinking about us?"

And before people in the "free West" know anything or react to anything that happens in Finland, the self-Finlandizers themselves begin to wail and raise a ruckus and tell the world: just look at how we are censored and how Finlandized we are!

In its zeal ILTALEHTI went so far as to fix Urho Kekkonen's personal history and way of thinking. "Pekka Peitsi's line in the war years was rigidly anti-Soviet. And what else could it have been? Finland was waging war against its Eastern neighbor. Kekkonen's line was in accordance with official foreign policy."

ILTALEHTI "forgets" that Kekkonen adjusted his position in the latter part of the war and that the starting point of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line was the renunciation of the "rigidly anti-Soviet" line and the way of thinking in accordance with which "it could not be otherwise."

What would U. K. Kekkonen say if he had his strength back? Boiling of parasites?

12893/9435
CSO: 3617/55

POLITICAL

FRANCE

SOFRES POLL SHOWS SIGNIFICANT OPPOSITION INCREASE

Paris LE FIGARO in French 23 Dec 85 p 8

[Article by Charles Rebois]

[Text] Twenty-four days before the legislative elections, 58 percent of those polled by FIGARO-SOFRES have indicated their intention to vote for the opposition, with 38 percent for the Left, that is, an advantage of 20 points for the opposition. Such a short time before election day the spread continues to be important, even though over the past month it has narrowed a bit. The socialist are said to be noting a "quaking." Doubtless they are right if the word is to be understood in its etymological meaning of agitation. Reportedly, they are even surprised that the current disarray in the government apparatus has not produced greater effect.

With 49 percent of the vote commitments, the parliamentary opposition would still have an absolute majority of the seats. The Socialist Party from a purely symbolic standpoint could claim to be the number one party in France. But its gain of 4 points results in part from the fact that in November the radicals of the Left were represented under their own colors.

At each end of the political spectrum, the Communist Party and the National Front are firmly planted in their positions, the former with 10 percent, the latter with 9 percent.

Neither is benefitting here from the upsurge noted in the last cantonal elections. As for the marginal parties which are making a lot of noise without bringing themselves recognition, their chances appear to be increasingly slim. With the approach of the elections, the reflex movement of the meaningful vote to the major parties is already being translated into vote commitments.

It is difficult to judge the respective chances of the RPR [Rally for the Republic] and the UDF [French Democratic Union] because of the establishment of common slates in two-thirds of the departments. This unification strategy benefits the UDF. It can deprive the RPR of the satisfaction of outstripping the PS [Socialist Party] in number of votes. However, the distribution of the rest of the votes between the two majority bloc parties will assure them a gain in seats.

On the basis of the latest poll figures, the projection of seats in Metropolitan France would give 307 places to the parliamentary opposition compared to 214 for the Left (a simple majority is 278). Therefore, the RPR and the UDF will not have to call upon the National Front to govern, even if their safety margin has decreased. The more so because the Right-Left distinction has been blurred in the minds of the electorate ever since the communists became fierce opponents of the socialists and also since the latter have been attempting to take quick measures tinged with liberalism to solicit the maximum number of votes.

A detailed analysis of this poll's data indicates that, public opinion has not changed appreciably since September. A somewhat more marked disaffection toward the Left was manifested in November. We find in December the same figures as in September, almost to the percentage point. Deep inside themselves, an equal number of Frenchmen are wishing for RPR's and the UDF victory. As for the possibility of a victory by the Left, like Michel Rocard, most Frenchmen still do not believe it will happen (only 12 percent are predicting such a victory). This is in spite of the puffery of the socialist political bosses.

On the other hand, even though political change is generally acknowledged, in the minds of 46 percent of those polled this should not bring about the departure of Francois Mitterrand.

Unemployment: Manipulations

Will this political change be peaceful or fraught with conflict? The choice of the prime minister will be decisive in this regard. In the prognostications, Jacques Chirac and Jacques Chaban-Delmas are at the top of the list ahead of Francois Leotard. It goes without saying that the nature of cohabitation will depend upon the future chief of government, as will the composition of the next government, a government which 31 percent see composed of socialists, and members of the UDF and RPR.

But Francois Mitterrand has taken many risks by advancing to the forefront to defend the socialist program. Doubtless his pretext is a slight rise in the polls, however, he is forgetting that his popularity rating continues to be very low. More than half those polled still intend to take advantage of the legislative elections to demonstrate their dissatisfaction.

A dissatisfaction which is also directed against the government. The economic achievements of the latter are not taken into account. The French are more sensitive to the drop in their standard of living than to the price index, whose improvement results primarily from external factors. The same is true of the fight against unemployment, in whose results the government takes pride, but which are looked upon as the results of manipulation. TUCs and summer training programs are considered to be artifices. It has not escaped the French that in this way the socialists are creating a subproletariat in the youth sector.

This attitude of the electorate, which could pass as fatalism, is marked by great skepticism. Some 48 percent say that nothing can influence them from now until the month of March. Not even a drop in unemployment will change the vote of 27 percent of the persons polled. Only two concerns are gaining ground in the sensibilities of public opinion: insecurity and immigration. The events of the past few days can only increase this trend.

Two and a half months before the elections, the electorate is beginning to mobilize. We note growing interest in the elections (58 percent compared to 53 percent in September). This slow increase in awareness goes hand in hand with a decrease in the number of those who are undecided. Some 17 percent have not yet chosen sides. This floating electorate is up for grabs. In it reside the last hopes for the Left. The scope of political change will also depend upon the vote of the undecided. The RPR and even more so the UDF, would do well to keep this in mind when François Mitterrand and the socialists pull out all the stops in their campaign.

I. - Les intentions de vote

2 (Sur 100 suffrages exprimés)

3

4

5	Rappel enquête Figaro- Sofres novembre 1985		Décembre 1985	
- Listes du parti communiste	10		10	
- Listes du P.S.U. et de l'extrême gauche	2		1	
- Listes du parti socialiste et du M.R.G. ..	22		26	
- Listes autonomes du M.R.G. et listes divers gauche	2		1	
TOTAL GAUCHE	36		38	
6 - Listes du mouvement écologiste	4		4	
7 - Listes d'union U.D.F.-R.P.R.	18		21	
- Listes séparées U.D.F.	9		9	
- Listes séparées R.P.R.	16		13	
- Listes de divers opposition (compre- nant le C.N.I.)	8		6	
- Listes du Front national	9		9	
TOTAL DROITE	60		58	
	100 %		100 %	

8 (N'ont pas exprimé d'intention de vote : 12 %)

Key on following page

[Key to chart on previous page]

1. I. VOTING INTENTIONS
2. (out of 100 preferences expressed)
3. Results of FIGARO-SOFRES November 1985 Poll
4. December 1985
5. --Communist Party slates
--PSU and Extreme Left slates
--Autonomous MRG and miscellaneous Left slates
TOTAL LEFT
6. Ecological Movement slates
7. --UDF-RPR unification slates
--Separate UDF slates
--Separate RPR slates
--Miscellaneous opposition slates (including the CNI)
--National Front Slates
TOTAL RIGHT
8. (Did not express voting intention: 12%)

1 II. - Les souhaits

2 QUESTION. - Au fond de vous-même, qui souhaitez-vous voir l'emporter aux prochaines élections législatives ?

	3	4	5	6
	Rappel enquête Figaro- Sofres septembre 1985	Rappel enquête Figaro- Sofres octobre 1985	Rappel enquête Figaro- Sofres novembre 1985	Décembre 1985
7				
- Le R.P.R. et l'U.D.F.	47	44	48	46
- La gauche.....	34	31	32	33
- Sans opinion .	19	25	20	21
	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %

1. II. HOPES
2. QUESTION.-Deep down inside of you, who do you hope will win the upcoming legislative elections?
3. Results of FIGARO-SOFRES September 1985 poll
4. Results of FIGARO-SOFRES October 1985 poll
5. Results of FIGARO-SOFRES November 1985 poll
6. December 1985
7. --RPR and UDF
--The Left
--No opinion

1 III. - Pronostics

2 QUESTION. - A votre avis, qui a le plus de chances
de l'emporter : le R.P.R. et l'U.D.F. ou la gauche ?

	Rappel enquête Figaro- Sofres septembre 1985	Rappel enquête Figaro- Sofres octobre 1985	Rappel enquête Figaro- Sofres novembre 1985	Décembre 1985
7 - Le R.P.R. et l'U.D.F.	62	60	62	60
- La gauche.....	13	13	13	12
- Sans opinion .	25	27	25	28
	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %

1. III. PROGNOSTICATIONS
2. QUESTION.-In your opinion who has the best chance of winning:
The RPR and UDF or the Left?
3. Results of FIGARO-SOFRES September 1985 poll
4. Results of FIGARO-SOFRES October 1985 poll
5. Results of FIGARO-SOFRES November 1985 poll
6. December 1985
7. --RPR and UDF
--The Left
--No opinion

1 IV. - L'Assemblée de mars 1986

2 **QUESTION.** - Sur la base des intentions de vote et des règles du nouveau mode de scrutin (représentation départementale à la plus forte moyenne avec seuil de 5 %), la simulation des sièges en France métropolitaine (555 sièges attribués) donne les résultats suivants :

3	- Parti communiste	42	
	- P.S.U. et extrême gauche	0	
	- Parti socialiste et M.R.G.	172	
	- M.R.G. autonome et divers gauches	0	4
	TOTAL GAUCHE	214	sièges
5	- Mouvement écologiste	2	
6	- U.D.F. (listes d'union et listes séparées)	137	
	- R.P.R. (listes d'union et listes séparées)	163	
	- Divers opposition	7	7
	TOTAL OPPOSITION PARLEMENTAIRE	307	sièges
8	- Front national	32	
	TOTAL DROITE	339	sièges

10 Dans ce cas de figure, l'opposition parlementaire disposerait sur la France métropolitaine d'une majorité absolue de 29 sièges (le seuil de la majorité absolue se situant à 278) et d'une avance sur la gauche de 93 sièges.

1. IV. THE MARCH 1986 ASSEMBLY
2. QUESTION.-On the basis of voting intentions and the new election method (departmental representation to the majority bloc with a margin [seuil] of 5 percent), the projection of seats in Metropolitan France (555 to be filled) produces the following results:
3. --Communist Party
--PSU and Extreme Left
--Socialist Party and MRG
TOTAL LEFT
4. seats
5. --Ecological Movement
6. --UDF (unification and separate slates)
--RPR (unification and separate slates)
--Miscellaneous opposition
TOTAL PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION
7. seats
8. National Front
TOTAL RIGHT
9. seats
10. In these calculations, the parliamentary opposition would have an absolute majority of 29 seats in Metropolitan France (a simple majority is 278) and an advantage over the Left of 93 seats.

¹V. - Blâmer Mitterrand

²QUESTION. - Souhaitez-vous qu'aux prochaines élections législatives

	³	⁴	⁵	⁶
	Rappel enquête Figaro- Sofres septembre 1985	Rappel enquête Figaro- Sofres octobre 1985	Rappel enquête Figaro- Sofres novembre 1985	Décembre 1985
⁷ ... les électeurs mani- festent leur soutien à l'égard de M. Mit- terrand et du gou- vernement.....	25	22	24	26
... ou les électeurs profitent de cette élection pour mani- fester leur mécon- tentement.....	54	53	54	53
- Sans opinion .	21	25	22	21
	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %

1. V. BLAME MITTERRAND
2. QUESTION.-In the upcoming legislative elections would you like for...?
3. Results of FIGARO-SOFRES September 1985 poll
4. Results of FIGARO-SOFRES October 1985 poll
5. Results of FIGARO-SOFRES November 1985 poll
6. December 1985
7. --the voters to show their support for Mitterrand and the government
--or for the voters to take advantage of this election to show their dissatisfaction
--No opinion

1 VI. - Le président n'a pas à démissionner

2 QUESTION. — En cas de victoire de l'opposition aux prochaines élections législatives, souhaitez-vous que... ?

		3	4	5
		...M. Mitterrand reste président de la République jusqu'à la fin de son mandat	...ou qu'il démissionne	Sans opinion
TOTAL : 100 %		46	37	17
SEXE 6				
- Homme	100 %	47	39	14
- Femme	100 %	46	35	19
AGE				
- 18 à 24 ans	100 %	44	41	15
- 25 à 34 ans	100 %	53	33	14
- 35 à 49 ans	100 %	47	35	18
- 50 à 64 ans	100 %	42	41	17
- 65 ans et plus	100 %	43	40	17
PROFESSION DU CHEF DE FAMILLE (nouvelle nomenclature P.C.S.)				
- Agriculteur	100 %	38	42	22
- Artisan, commerçant, chef d'entreprise ..	100 %	41	46	13
- Cadre, profession intellectuelle supé- rieurs	100 %	45	44	11
- Profession intermédiaire et employé	100 %	52	32	16
dont : - Profession intermédiaire	100 %	54	34	12
- Employé	100 %	49	31	20
- Ouvrier	100 %	51	33	16
- Inactif, retraité	100 %	42	40	18
PRÉFÉRENCE PARTISANE				
- Parti communiste	100 %	66	9	25
- Parti socialiste	100 %	83	11	6
- U.D.F.	100 %	19	68	13
- R.P.R.	100 %	19	68	13
- Front national (*)	100 %	19	77	4

7
(*) En raison de la faiblesse des effectifs, les résultats sont à interpréter avec prudence.

1. VI. THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT HAVE TO RESIGN
2. QUESTION.—In the event of an opposition victory in the upcoming legislative elections, would you like for...?
3. ...Mitterrand to remain as president of the republic until the end of his term
4. ...or for him to resign
5. --No opinion
6. SEX
 - Men
 - Women

[key continued on following page]

AGE

- 18 to 24
- 25 to 34
- 35 to 49
- 50 to 64
- 65 and over

PROFESSION OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD

(new PCS nomenclature)

- Farmer
- Craftsman, merchant, company head
- Manager, higher intellectual profession
- Intermediate profession and employee, including:
 - Intermediate profession
 - Employee
- Worker
- Unemployed, retired

PARTY PREFERENCE

- Communist Party
- Socialist Party
- UDF
- RPR
- National Front (*)

7. (*) Because of the small number of persons polled, the results should be interpreted with discretion.

1 VII. - Les motivations

2 QUESTION. - D'ici au mois de mars, qu'est-ce qui peut faire changer votre vote ?

3 4

	Rappel enquête Figaro- Sofres septembre 1985	Décembre 1985
5		
- Les problèmes de l'insécurité	11	14
- L'évolution du chômage	31	27
- Les problèmes des immigrés	9	13
- L'évolution de votre pouvoir d'achat	20	15
- La place de la France dans le monde	7	5
- Le maintien des acquis sociaux	13	13
- Une progression de la construction européenne	5	4
- La défense des libertés	16	14
- Rien du tout	40	48
- Sans opinion	5	5
	%	

[Key to chart on previous page]

1. VII. MOTIVATIONS
2. QUESTION.-From now until the month of March, what could change your vote?
3. Results of FIGARO-SOFRES September 1985 poll
4. December 1985
5. --Problems of insecurity
 - Improved unemployment figures
 - Problems of immigrants
 - Improvement in your purchasing power
 - France's place in the world
 - Maintenance of social achievements
 - Progress in European construction
 - Defense of freedoms
 - Nothing
 - No opinion

1 VIII. - La détermination

2 QUESTION. - Tout compte fait, êtes-vous

	3 Rappel enquête Figaro- Sofres septembre 1985	4 Rappel enquête Figaro- Sofres octobre 1985	5 Rappel enquête Figaro- Sofres novembre 1985	6 Décembre 1985
7 ... sûr de voter pour une liste de gauche	30	27	26	29
... sûr de voter pour une liste d'opposi- tion	43	42	44	42
... ou hésitant entre la gauche et l'op- position	18	18	20	17
- Sans opinion	9	13	10	12
	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %

1. VIII. DETERMINATION
2. QUESTION.-Everything considered, are you...?
3. Results of FIGARO-SOFRES September 1985 poll
4. Results of FIGARO-SOFRES October 1985 poll
5. Results of FIGARO-SOFRES November 1985 poll
6. December 1985
7. ...certain of voting for a Leftist slate
 - ...certain of voting for an opposition slate
 - ...or vacillating between the Left and the opposition
 - No opinion

¹ IX. – L'intérêt des élections

² QUESTION. – Vous personnellement, vous intéressez-vous aux élections législatives de mars 1986.
³ ⁴ ⁵ ⁶

	Rappel Enquête Figaro Sofres septembre 1985	Rappel Enquête Figaro Sofres octobre 1985	Rappel Enquête Figaro Sofres novembre 1985	Décembre 1985
⁷ ... beaucoup	21 } 53	22 } 54	21 } 58	24 } 58
... assez	32 }	32 }	35 }	34 }
... peu	31 } 47	29 } 48	29 } 44	29 } 42
... ou pas du tout	18 }	17 }	15 }	13 }
	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %

1. IX. INTEREST IN ELECTIONS
2. QUESTION.-Are you personally interested in the March 1986 legislative elections?
3. Results of FIGARO-SOFRES September 1985 poll
4. Results of FIGARO-SOFRES October 1985 poll
5. Results of FIGARO-SOFRES November 1985 poll
6. December 1985
7. --very much
--somewhat
--not much
--or not at all

1 X. – Quel gouvernement ?

2 QUESTION. – Quel est le gouvernement que vous souhaitez voir former après les prochaines élections législatives ?

	3	4
	Rappel enquête Figaro / Sofres octobre 1985	Décembre 1985
5		
- Un gouvernement comprenant le parti socialiste et le parti communiste	10	11
- Un gouvernement comprenant le parti socialiste seul	16	16
- Un gouvernement comprenant le parti socialistes, l'U.D.F. et le R.P.R.	30	31
- Un gouvernement comprenant le R.P.R. et l'U.D.F.	23	22
- Un gouvernement comprenant le R.P.R., l'U.D.F. et le Front national de J.-M. Le Pen	7	7
- Sans opinion	14	13
	100 %	100 %

1. X. WHAT KIND OF GOVERNMENT?
2. QUESTION.-What kind of government would you like to see formed after the upcoming legislative elections?
3. Results of FIGARO-SOFRES October 1985 poll
4. December 1985
5. --A government consisting of the Socialist and Communist Parties
 --A government consisting of the Socialist Party only
 --A government consisting of the Socialist Party, UDF, and RPR
 --A government consisting of the RPR and UDF
 --A government consisting of the RPR, UDF, and the National Front of J-M Le Pen
 --No opinion

1 **XI. — Premier ministre : Chirac ou Chaban-Delmas**

2 **QUESTION.** — En cas de victoire de l'opposition, en mars 1986, sachant que M. Barre ne veut pas être premier ministre, quel serait selon vous, face à François Mitterrand, le meilleur premier ministre ?

	Jacques Chaban-Delmas	Jacques Chirac	Valéry Giscard d'Estaing	François Léotard	Simone Veil	Une autre personnalité	Sans opinion
TOTAL : 100 %	18	18	9	15	12	9	19
SEXE 5							
— Homme 100 %	22	18	8	15	9	12	16
— Femme 100 %	14	17	10	15	11	7	23
AGE							
— 18 à 24 ans 100 %	5	23	8	24	12	9	21
— 25 à 34 ans 100 %	11	19	8	23	12	9	18
— 35 à 49 ans 100 %	21	13	10	12	13	12	19
— 50 à 64 ans 100 %	26	17	9	12	12	6	18
— 65 ans et plus 100 %	23	19	10	6	9	9	24
PROFESSION DU CHEF DE FAMILLE (nouvelle nomenclature P.C.S.)							
— Agriculteur 100 %	11	36	9	9	15	7	13
— Artisan, commerçant, chef d'entreprise 100 %	15	22	15	19	12	3	14
— Cadre, profession intellectuelle supérieure 100 %	23	17	5	15	20	9	11
— Profession intermédiaire et employé 100 %	16	15	6	19	13	9	22
dont : — Profession intermédiaire 100 %	17	15	7	17	13	11	20
— Employé 100 %	14	14	6	22	13	7	24
— Ouvrier 100 %	17	16	11	18	9	8	21
— Inactif, retraité 100 %	22	17	10	13	10	11	20
PRÉFÉRENCE PARTISANE							
— Parti communiste ... 100 %	12	3	5	14	9	20	37
— Parti socialiste 100 %	28	7	5	14	17	12	17
— U.D.F. 100 %	16	19	20	19	8	4	15
— R.P.R. 100 %	13	43	7	17	9	3	8
— Front national (*) ... 100 %	12	42	8	6	4	11	15

(*) En raison de la faiblesse des effectifs, les résultats sont à interpréter avec prudence

1. XI. PRIME MINISTER: CHIRAC OR CHABAN-DELMAS
2. QUESTION.—In the event of an opposition victory in March 1986, knowing that Barre does not wish to be prime minister, who, in your opinion, would be the best prime minister vis-a-vis Mitterrand?
3. Another personality
4. No opinion
5. SEX
 - Men
 - Women

[Key continued from previous page]

AGE

- 18 to 24
- 25 to 34
- 35 to 49
- 50 to 64
- 65 and over

PROFESSION OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD
(New PCS nomenclature)

- Farmer
- Craftsman, merchant, company head
- Manager, higher intellectual profession
- Intermediate profession and employee, including:
 - Intermediate profession
 - Employee
- Worker
- Unemployed, retired

PARTY PREFERENCE

- Communist Party
- Socialist Party
- UDF
- RPR
- National Front (*)

6. Because of the small number of persons polled, the results should be interpreted with discretion.

SOFRES Technical Information

- Poll conducted for: LE FIGARO
- Date conducted: 5 to 11 December 1985
- National sample of 1,000 persons representative of the French population as a whole 18 years of age and older.
- Poll categories (sex, age, profession of head of household-PCS) and breakdown by region and party preference.

8143/9738

CSO: 3519/90

POLITICAL

FRANCE

MITTERRAND SUPPORT FOR AFRICAN DEBT CONFERENCE QUESTIONED

Paris LIBERATION in French 18 Oct 85 p 6

[Article by Dominique Nora: "Mitterrand, 'The African', Is Upsetting to the Rue de Rivoli"]

[Text] Surprise! The Treasury's leadership learned from the newspapers that Francois Mitterrand had agreed to the African request for an international conference on the African continent's debt. This eminently political position could prove expensive to France and would set a historical precedent in the dialogues between debtors and lenders.

Is it a period of euphoria before the election campaign? Or is it his desire to show his authority in his own hunting preserve? In any case, Francois Mitterrand, all smiles, is becoming more and more unpredictable on foreign policy. For instance, Mitterrand answered "yes," last Friday, to the African request for a conference on the African continent's debts. Was this a concession arrived at after mature deliberation or was it blundering? The Treasury's leadership, from top to bottom, has not hidden its surprise. As a matter of fact, during the past weeks, the Treasury's experts have been declaring publicly the possibility of "political slippage" in such a gathering. The banks and the French are in Africa up to their necks.

On Friday, 13 December, Francois Mitterrand closed the 12th Franco-African Summit Conference by holding a lively press conference. In answer to a question of the conference on debts, Mitterrand stated, "I have already given my consent to President Abdu Diouf...France has become the attorney for a project adapted to African indebtedness...therefore, I am answering you with a yes." Diouf, the President of Senegal, elected in July to the chairmanship of the UAO (United African Organization), has been trying since last summer to convince the international organizations and the governments of those countries to which money is owing, of the urgent need for such a conference (see the interview below). Indeed, we want to pay off our debts, the UAO declared in substance; however, our creditors must understand that we have a rope around our necks, that they must renew their loans and make arrangements for repayment.

The Effect of a Bomb

Up to now, Paris has been supporting the African request for a special meeting of the UN General Assembly on Africa's economic problems (the external debt is included among them). All the government officials questioned, however, underscored the inopportuneness of a "special debt" show. Their argument is that the mechanics used by the creditor governments within the Paris club to spread out the payments, country by country, would be jeopardized. "Besides, the African debt will be the subject discussed specifically next April in the World Bank's Committee for Development," Treasury leadership frequently pointed out.

On Monday morning, the President's "yes," therefore, had the effect of a bomb within the stronghold of French financial orthodoxy. Had Francois Mitterrand really let one go? Yesterday morning, uncertainty still reigned on the Rue de Rivoli. "The President need only check with the experts," a high official stated. "As far as I know, the French position has not changed," he added warily. At the Elysee Palace, on the other hand, it was formal. "It is written in black and white in the record of the press conference," dryly stated Jean Christophe Mitterrand, the President's son and deputy adviser for African affairs. The record, incidentally, was still not available yesterday evening. Most peculiar. Is this, however, a change in the French position? "Since the President said it, it is now the official position," so said Jean Christophe. "It is not the Treasury experts who make French policy. Besides which, Francois Mitterrand has already given his consent to President Diouf. That is not new." Oh? Then the Elysee Palace must have forgotten to speak to the responsible services in the ministries involved. Hence, their concern.

Besides, every day Mitterrand sets aside a surprise in foreign policy. As one of his aides said, "At the FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization] we have to run down the record of the record of the meeting so as to adjust (downwards) the fanciful figures for French aid in foodstuffs announced by Mitterrand."

If Paris really support this idea of an ad hoc conference on the African debt, it could be expensive. "French national and private claims amount to 60 to 90 percent of the foreign debt of some black African countries." Outstanding French bank loans represent a quarter of the total of bank loans of the developed countries on the continent and one half of the franc area. It is the same for government claims. Now, more than one expert dares only hope that Africa will really repay the capital. "From one year to the next, we arrange it so that they will be able, at least, to pay the interest," one banker explained. "But even that is becoming very difficult." Overdue payments are looming and involve such institutions as the International Monetary Fund. Yesterday, during a symposium in Paris, the chairman of the African Bank for Development, Babacar N'Diaye, made it clear that "by the end of 1984, the African continent debt reached 158 billion dollars; it will have gone beyond 170 billion by the end of 1985." And the situation visibly gets worse, for the flow of new money is diminishing, the rate of loans is rising, deadlines are being shortened, and the share of national capital is diminishing in relation to commercial loans.... "The rate a debt increases

most often exceeds the rate of increase in national income, which to the south of the Sahara is negative," N'Diaye emphasized.

Some Commitments That Will Perhaps Be Diluted

We hear on every side that the situation is "alarming, disconcerting, worrisome." The World Bank is preparing its own report on the African debt. A working paper describes Africa's "perilous financial situation" and points up the "ineffectiveness" ways presently being used to deal with the problem. In spite of special efforts made by the World Bank and the IMF, "more comprehensive solutions on the longest terms possible are required," the paper states. There then follows possibilities for a "partial cancellation" of debts and for a "rephrasing of more spread-out payments...."

In this context, it is not clear how France, creditor and number one friend of the continent, could participate in an ad hoc international conference without making some kind of gesture. Unless the United States and other leaders, believing such a conference sets a dangerous precedence for Latin America, are opposed to its being held. At the Treasury, preparations are undoubtedly being made to move in this direction, in order to dilute commitments made by "Mitterrand the African."

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POLITICAL

GREECE

DETAILS, COMMENTS ON KYP REORGANIZATION BILL

Athens PONDIKI in Greek 10 Jan 86 p 24

/Text/ "A lot of hot air: the KYP /Central Intelligence Service/ that is today luckily 36 years old (....) cannot be saved by anything regardless of how many personnel changes are made (....). The only solution is to have it dismantled and to have something altogether new established (ranging from name to personnel, mentality, etc.) since we are unable to live without such a service....."

We have written and rewritten that the time has come for the dismantling of the KYP but Andreas insists (here too!) on half-measures!

Finally, what is happening with the KYP?

After a gestation of months during which many various things were heard (ranging from the fact that the government does not really want a KYP reorganization because... it is afraid to the fact that Alexakis is opposed), an amendment was scheduled to be tabled in the Chamber of Deputies last evening (in the classification and ratings bill) that is concerned with KYP matters. The amendment concerns a change in Law 1415/85 on the KYP; it has only one article; and it is signed by Andreas himself. It provides for the following three major changes:

1. From a State Intelligence Service, the KYP is being renamed National Intelligence Service (EYP). In the thinking behind the name change, Andreas had somewhere or other thought of us in the introductory expose!
2. The famous KYP organizational component that will see to the reorganization of the service (as AVRIANI wrote last Tuesday, it provides for the politicization of the service and the assignment of a civilian as director) will be called "Analytical Internal Organization of the KYP" and will constitute a secret decision by Andreas that will not be published in the GOVERNMENT GAZETTE.
3. Everything dealing with the KYP structure, positions, personnel, employee issues, etc. will be handled by presidential decrees for which Andreas will be responsible since the amendment provides for KYP being a public service "coming directly under the prime minister."

In this innocent looking amendment which, according to its drafters, has a "technical" aspect since it sets the methods by which the reorganization of the service will take place, there is a "sly" provision that personally give us the impression that the overall amendment was made for that purpose alone. What does it provide for?

That the personnel of the former KYP that have become surplus through the reorganization will be transferred to other public services and will be assigned to vacant positions or to temporary positions. The transfers will be made by joint decision of Andreas and the minister concerned.

The same provision also provides for the transfer of those who are judged by the service, i.e. the EYP, as "not serving its interests."

As anyone can understand, there is a "lot to be gained by certain persons" behind this regulation.

We will begin with the simplest: the personnel transferred from the former KYP will cut every tie with the service or, simply put, the state civil services will fill up with stool pigeons and, indeed, with rightists since they are the ones being transferred. (We cannot imagine any or even one of the approximately 200 PASOK followers who have been assigned to the KYP since 1981 being among those transferred).

The originators of the specific regulation maintain that from the moment when an employee of the former KYP leaves the service and is assigned to another civil service position he immediately ceases all contact with the service. But how can anyone be certain of this after all and everything that we have seen!

Reasonable doubts are also raised by the second part of the regulation, that is the one that refers to the transfer of an employee "because he does not serve the interests of the service."

However, who will determine who is not serving the interests of the service?

And how objectively will he appraise the employee's contributions?

Of course, there is the counter-argument that any specific action taken will occur in those instances where the employee of the former KYP and present EYP does not have the necessary qualifications to carry out his mission. And yet why is a specific action needed when there exists a previous regulation that provides for the transfer of employees who are described as "excess personnel?"

We have the impression that this is yet another opportunity to clean out the service of various "cliques" that the dictatorship and New Democracy had assembled. Now, how will "democratization" come about if the proportion of Greens and...others abstain, only God (and Andreas?) know....

However, we will learn much more from the discussions in the Chamber of Deputies.

The Alexakis Affair

....And right in the middle of the confusion the government struck: it replaced (at last) the notorious Giannis Alexakis from the most sensitive KYP Security Section!

The change occurred at the end of the year and Alexakis was left (how temporary?) with the Counterespionage Directorate.

This is the apparent view of things. There is, however, also a very pretty behind-the-scenes view that demonstrates that Alexakis is something akin to... Greece: "it never dies." What kind of plot was made for him to leave and ...to return tougher? Suddenly, on a nice day in December just before Christmas, he was called in by KYP Director Giorgos Politis who graciously informed him that the government had decided to give him a break and to leave him only the Counterespionage Directorate because it had realized that "the work there had slowed down."

Alexakis, like a good patriot, accepted the government decision with heavy heart but nevertheless he steeled himself and asked to contribute to the leadership's decision: he wanted to suggest who should replace him. He suggested Army Major Sotirios Liosis who, besides his various qualifications to assume Alexakis' position, was his subordinate!

The KYP leadership appreciated Alexakis' contribution very much and recognized Liosis as his successor in the KYP Security Section. The sequel is now being played out by KYP employees who are rubbing their eyes in awe: Alexakis, instead of sitting in the office of the counterespionage director, is spending his entire day at the office of the security director, i.e. Liosis' office, where he sees and receives people, etc.

Ah, Andreas, Andreas. And to say that you do not know firsthand what the KYP is doing and what Alexakis is doing? But you do know and know full well.....

5671
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POLITICAL

GREECE

ABSENCE OF 'GAME RULES' IN NATIONAL LIFE DISCUSSED

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 26-27 Jan 86 p 8

[Article by 'E': "Games..."]

[Excerpts] There is something that bothers many of our people, especially those who occupy high positions: why is it that when Greeks live and work in foreign lands, they are good and disciplined citizens, while they are so--let us say--difficult when they live in their own country?

This phenomenon has become more pronounced in recent decades; the Greeks who have left their country to live abroad are progressing in all their professions, they are excelling in the sciences, in politics, in trade, they are amassing respectable fortunes and are almost always model citizens.

When conversely, Greeks in Greece are showing worrisome signs of indifference, inaction and even anarchy.

The subject is difficult. The explanation easy.

Even if it does not look easy at first glance. However, it is founded on reality, a reality that prevents Greeks living in Greece from being good citizens; there are no rules for them to follow, in order to discover what a "good citizen" is.

All games, in order to be played right, need stable and immutable rules that the players must learn. They must know what the right way is, so that they can differentiate it from the wrong one, they must know what is permissible, what is forbidden, what is punishable--whoever the culprit happens to be--who is the winner and who the loser, what is rewarded, and the reasons for all that.

Here, in our country, the game of the citizen is played blindly.

In our country, people believe that the dumb ones are caught and the clever ones can get away. As if they did not know, the economic ministers present at regular intervals a lot of romantic trash about self-respect and about imaginary conscientious taxpayers. Of course, these would exist, if only there were conscientiousness and self-respect on the part of the state.

In a report from Paris, Rikhardos Someritis, an internationally known reporter, mentioned that only in 1985, 1,200 million dollars left Greece illegally.

Our ministers of course read the item, and reacted to it in a purely...Greek way! There was no comment, no denial, no expression of concern, of surprise, of doubt.

"Come on, George, let's send the little money we have abroad, to Switzerland! What should we do with it here?"

"But it is forbidden! Suppose we get caught?"

"On, come on! Everybody is doing it. How do you think all these millions left the country? And did you notice anyone getting caught and punished? They are not even prosecuting them!..."

When there will be a government, some time in the future, that will play a clear game with the citizens, then it will be the citizen's turn to do so...

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

BRIEFS

CAVACO SILVA APPROVAL--A poll commissioned by the government showed that Prime Minister Cavaco Silva is considered honest by 57.3 percent of the respondents; intelligent by 69.2 percent; competent and pleasant by 54.3 percent; 54.2 percent affirm that he is stable and decisive, 52.1 percent think that he can conduct a dialogue very ably, and 55 percent believe that he possesses personal prestige. The poll, whose partial results were obtained yesterday by the NOTICIAS DE PORTUGAL news agency, also reveals that the majority of the respondents believe that this government will last 4 years. The poll was conducted by the NORMA last week on the continent, with 3,000 persons interviewed in localities with more than 10 households. [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 24 Jan 86 p 2] /9599

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MILITARY

DENMARK

PEACE RESEARCHER COMMENTS ON 'DEFENSIVE' MILITARY SCHEME

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 27 Dec 85 p 13

[Op Ed Article by Bjorn Moller of the Center for Peace and Conflict Research:
"On a Defensive Defense"]

[Text] In BERLINGSKE TIDENDE on 1 December, Defense Minister Hans Engell reacted to my contribution to the paper on 26 November wherein I tried to give a concise overview of the idea of a defensive defense. Since I have been away, the necessary response is somewhat late.

The minister has many criticisms against defensive defense. One can quite quickly be repudiated: that there are no concrete proposals from the military experts. This holds true for Denmark, as long as this remains the case, but certainly not for the Federal Republic. At random, for example, could be named the following officers, all of whom have worked out concrete models: Norbert Hannig, Eckhardt Afheldt, and Wilhelm Nolte. In other countries as well "the military experts" have taken such thoughts seriously and used their professional expertise to solidify these thoughts: the Frenchman Guy Brossollet is an example, the Austrian general E. Spannocchi is another. Moreover, Spannocchi's thoughts have appeared so attractive to the Austrian defense ministry that they have been used as the basis for the new national defense plan that was adopted in the spring of 1985. The author of this article is currently working on a book on the various models--of civil as well as military origin--a preliminary form of which in the shape of a summary overview can be obtained from the Center for Peace and Conflict Research (free). With it Engell and others can assure themselves that there are many variants.

And now to the concrete objections.

First, Engell. does not believe that Western Europe has sufficient depth to be able to carry out the kind of defense based on attrition that I suggested. Clearly the minister has a point here especially since the West German population centers lie so alarmingly close to the border. Some models, therefore, operate with a forward "belt" along the border consisting either of infantry or of "fire," that is, of artillery units positioned somewhat less far forward. When this is combined with the above mentioned "space inclusive" net defense, then supposedly the advantages to both the present defense and to

a pure net defense are gained: There is not "free entrance" to territory, but on the other hand neither is there "open house" as soon as the line of defense is broken through--as (almost) is the case with the structure now in place.

Now this whole problem must also be seen in context with the risk itself of an attack--which ought to be able to be lessened with the suggested reform: Either the Russians will attack in order to control territory--which the reform will make much more difficult since the defense now covers the entire territory. Or they will attack in order to put something out of play which they--rightly or wrongly--see as threatening. The latter motive is certainly the most likely--and it disappears completely when the defense is made defensive. There are no more military targets left that they could want to neutralize--and therefore no motive for a preemptive strike. Crisis stability should therefore be increased--supposedly the most pressing task for defense policy in the coming years.

And so to Engell's comments on NATO: both that today's strategy is already defensive and that a defensive alteration cannot be combined with the strategy. Already in this juxtaposition there is a selfcontradiction: Of course NATO's intentions are defensive. (At least I have no doubts as regards Engell himself.) And the same goes in all probability for the Warsaw pact's intentions! But both alliances believe that these /defensive/ [in italics] intentions can best be realized by keeping the potential for /offensive/ [in italics] military operations. And from this arises the mutual fear and mistrust, the arms race, the danger that crises "run away with us," and so forth. The best way to show one's defensive intentions is precisely to be satisfied with defensive forces (capabilities). Which herewith should be proposed to the two alliances who both transgress against this principle.

But would an alteration of the Danish defenses be able to be combined with the rest of the alliance, especially West Germany with whom we share the united command for the BALTAP area? Yes. First, because our neighbor to the south is also beginning to think along the same lines. If the SDP should come to power again--that is, in 1987 or 1991--then they will begin to realize these thoughts. And then suddenly it could be we who must pull out of the united command. Second, all things considered, there are broader limits to what NATO membership demands of its members than our decisionmakers usually are told to impute. NATO is no "monopolistic" block. Just to name a couple of examples that illustrate the breadth of the spectrum: Iceland has no military whatsoever; France and Spain do not take part in the integrated military cooperation; Greece wants to do away with the American bases, etc. Naturally, we should not copy their example slavishly, because such steps would naturally have consequences, among other things. But also the Nordic countries have previously shown (with reservations about bases and nuclear weapons in 1949 and 1957) that there actually are possibilities for "exceptional cases." One exception could be to introduce a limited Danish rearmament in the hopes of hereby starting a similar process in the other NATO countries.

With this, we are brought to the last point I would like to raise. It is also possible to start developments "on the other side." Hans Engell is surely too pessimistic when he judges the Soviet Union as totally static and inflexible. Certainly they have an enormous "materiel inheritance" to drag along in the

form of tanks and so forth, many of which, by the way, notably date all the way back to the "Great Patriotic War"--as they are afflicted with a large group of "Methuselahs," i.e. veterans from the Second World War, who naturally are not the best exponents for a new way of thinking. But there actually are changes occurring in the general staff--and the Soviet Union has economic problems that require fundamental reflections about expensive weapons systems. Moreover, they are almost as sensitive about their international reputation as we are.

All of these factors should make it possible to exercise influence. Not with rhetoric or good advice. But by procuring weapons that invite "copying" on their side. What NATO is currently setting the stage for can have fatal consequences: Increased weight on "penetrating attacks," etc, with high technology weapons systems--which with the inevitability of a natural law will get WAPA to acquire counterparts to them. After which we will be faced with a threat of a deep attack against Jutland, Copenhagen, etc, without the enemy needing to overstep the magic nuclear threshold and thereby call down "hellfire" on themselves.

On the other hand, if NATO altered the strategy in an unequivocally defensive direction, WAPA could be faced with the choice of keeping in step with less offensive forces and doctrines--or of revealing itself as a power with aggressive intentions. Naturally such a readjustment could not happen with one stroke--and it would not necessarily be "symmetrical" with our own steps. But presumably, it would nevertheless contribute to a more stable situation in Europe.

12819
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MILITARY

DENMARK

BRIEFS

NAVY ORDERS DOMESTIC ELECTRONICS--Terma Elektronik of Aarhus has received an order for 125 million kroner from the Navy's materiel command. Command, control and communications systems will be delivered for the Navy's new ships of the type Standard Flex 300. The order will be executed in cooperation with Philips Elektronikindustrier of Sweden, Plessey Displays Ltd of England, and with a number of Danish electronics manufacturers as subcontractors, namely, NEA-Lindberg, Disa Elektronik, Standard Electric Kirk, and Jorgen Andersen Ingeniorfirma. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 27 Dec 85 Sect III p 2] 12819

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MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

NATO'S 'DEFIANT SAXONS' COMBINED ARMS EXERCISE REVIEWED

Close Inter-Allied Cooperation

Bonn BUNDESWEHR AKTUELL in German 12 Sep 85 pp 1, 4

[Unattributed article: "Cold Fire Over Defiant Saxons/Allied Air and Ground Forces in Common Exercises in North Germany"; first paragraph published in boldface]

[Text] Bonn--This year's army exercise "Defiant Saxons" begins today. The maneuvers were planned and prepared by I Corps; they are being executed under leadership of the commanding general, Lieutenant General Gerhard Wachter. The exercise, which is to last until 1 September and in which 60,000 German, American, British and Dutch soldiers are taking part, stretches over a large part of Lower Saxony as well as over smaller areas of Sleswig-Holstein and North Rhine-Westphalia. "Defiant Saxons" is a component part of the NATO exercise series AUTUMN FORGE and is closely linked to "Cold Fire," the NATO air-forces exercise which is taking place from 9 to 20 September over southwestern Sleswig-Holstein, northeastern Lower Saxony, and the Siegerland and Sauerland.

Allied air forces are thus providing close air support for the German I Corps and the Belgian 16th Division in the course of "Defiant Saxons" and of the Belgian "Clever Centurion" maneuvers.

"Cold Fire" serves to improve cooperation between allied air and ground forces as well as to further the coordination of sorties by participating American, Belgian, Dutch and German air units.

Among the announced goals of this year's "Defiant Saxons" army exercise, besides the close cooperation of the army units with allied air forces, is the exercising of cooperation between regular and reserve units, between ground forces of the German and allied armies, as well as (and this especially in planning and preparation of the maneuvers) between armed forces and civil authorities.

Special tasks fall to the Territorial Army, as well, which is sending 9,000 soldiers, predominantly reservists, into action under the direction of Defense Area II, using 200 tracked vehicles and 2,200 wheeled vehicles.

Altogether 3,300 tracked vehicles, 18,000 wheeled vehicles and 250 helicopters are to be deployed in the course of the large-scale maneuvers. If weather permits, the participating air forces will fly some 150 sorties a day over the battlefield. As usual with military maneuvers, the exercise antagonists Blue and Red stand opposed this time as well. On the Blue side, the German 1st Armored Division, with the 1st Armored Infantry Brigade and the 2d Armored Brigade, the British 4th Armored Brigade, and - attached only at a later point in time - the 27th Airborne Brigade, together with the 52d Home Defense Brigade, will try to hold "shoulder to shoulder" against the Red forces' attack. To the latter belong the German 3d Armored Division, with the 8th Armored Brigade and the 9th Armored Training Brigade, the United States 3d Brigade, and the Dutch 43rd Armored Battalion. In the course of the exercise, the German 17th Armored reinforce the ranks of the "Reds." The 7th Armored Division and the 11th Armored Infantry Division are serving in control and umpire capacities.

By the day after tomorrow the participating units will have closed into their starting positions. On the weekend Red and Blue will prepare for battle before the "hot phase" of the exercise begins this coming Monday.

Although the exercise players have relatively great leeway in their decisions and measures, and thus the course of the maneuvers cannot be predicted in every detail, the action will not deviate from the proven pattern of past exercises: Red attacks, Blue holds up the attack, defends, and finally goes over to a counterattack. Herewith, some spectacular engagements will come about - place and time cannot of course as yet be predicted: a night jump by a parachute battalion, an airborne attack by an airborne brigade, passage of various bodies of water by several large formations.

Army maneuvers of this order of magnitude are simultaneously training exercises for leadership and troops and also a demonstration for civilian and military visitors of the German army's capabilities. In this regard, individual specially important aspects of the exercise will be presented as examples, on a smaller scale and compressed in time. This year the army's air and water mobility, the operation of a major dressing station, the airborne supply of mass-consumption items, combined-arms action of an armored infantry brigade with live ammunition, the army's night-fighting capabilities, and a defensive action by a motorized infantry battalion of the home-defense force will be demonstrated on exercise grounds.

Lively Warsaw Pact Interest

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 27 Sep 85 p 11

[Article by Hans Schueler: "Secrecy Not Desired/Before the Eyes of Soviet Observers, the Bundeswehr Shows What It Has Learned"]

[Text] Major General Konstantin Cheryomukhin was, at least during the first half-week, the star of the maneuvers. Wherever he went, the cameramen's shutters snapped continuously, the TV people's cameras whirled, dozens of

journalists pressed around him. The Soviet Union had, for the first time in 3 years, again sent its military attache from the Bonn embassy to the maneuver grounds in Lower Saxony for the large-scale fall maneuvers of the Bundeswehr and allied units from Great Britain, the Netherlands and the United States.

The red general enjoyed the attention, and most certainly also the extraordinary tact of the organizers: they had indeed, as in Kaiser Wilhelm's time, attached the color red to the attackers, and blue to the defenders. But the evil "Redland" from which the attack proceeded lay not in the east, but rather north of an exercise national boundary running from Bremerhaven to Luenenburg, and belonged to an imaginary "North Pact," which had been seeking conflict with "Blueland," belonging to the "West Pact," since the beginning of 1985, and had now started its attack from its own large-scale maneuvers. The "East Pact," not imaginary, had - according to the Bundeswehr's further maneuver assumptions - "continuously stressed its neutrality in this conflict and had offered itself as mediator."

Nothing came of the mediation. The Reds, in the form of the 17th Armored Infantry Brigade from Hamburg, crossed the Elbe with ferries near Wedel and, elsewhere as well, pushed to the south on a broad front. Two days later they had already reached the area west of the Weser near Minden, which in turn gave the Blue engineers an opportunity to give a sample of their abilities before the Soviet general and 26 other observers from members of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (KSZE): at a permanent Bundeswehr water-exercise grounds on a Weser bend free of shipping, they demonstrated a counterattack across water with immediate creation of a bridgehead on the further bank.

This undertaking, presented in pouring rain, must have impressed the Russian, at least with regard to the troops' technical capabilities. First a parachute reconnaissance patrol, landing with guidable chutes, reconnoitered the terrain. Night was assumed for this. At once, CH53 helicopters of the army air command, at radar-proof minimum altitudes - 3 to at most 5 meters above the ground - flew further airborne troops to the further bank to cover an engineer reconnaissance unit that was crossing with amphibious armored carriers and began at once to detect and break up minefields laid by the enemy. Meanwhile divers were searching the Weser bottom for a ford over which battle tanks could pass the river by fording. Two "Leopards" demonstrated the passage at top speed - with interiors sealed and diving tubes in place on the turrets. The preparations for turning the tanks into submersible vehicles lasted only minutes. And the building of a footbridge composed of floats over the river - which is some 80 meters wide at the crossing point - could also be measured in a few minutes: the first infantrymen arrived on the enemy shore on their own dry feet. Throwing a heavy combat bridge across with the help of amphibious bridging equipment - which is thus also mobile on land - concluded the demonstration. This bridge will even bear heavy equipment transporters loaded with tanks - total weight, 100 tons.

During the bridgehead exercises, and later as well, barges were sighted on the Mittelland Canal near Minden, which were said to be Soviet spy ships which were listening in on the "Defiant Saxons" exercise and the continuous radio traffic it entailed. There was also talk of moving vans from the German Democratic Republic which turned up in the middle of the exercise area and stopped there with simulated problems. The drivers were said to have "taken as many pictures as they could" from under the loading platforms. The CDU defense expert Willy Wimmer, also an observer of the water-crossing exercise, got very excited about this and about the ships: this procedure of the Warsaw Pact, he felt, was a "monstrous provocation;" the Soviet ships should be towed out of lower Saxon waters at once. This was rather embarrassing for the security officers of the "military counter-intelligence service." They are very happy to see the east bloc's interest in large-scale maneuvers on West German soil, not only through official military observers, but also through hidden scouts: "Just let them see and hear what the Bundeswehr can do. It's part of deterrence."

In fact, real secrets can hardly be discovered by a potential adversary during an exercise. He sees and hears essentially only what he is definitely supposed to note for a realistic estimate of the combat effectiveness of the Bundeswehr and its allies. What thoughts can have gone through Major General Cheryomukhin's head as he observed the splendid cooperation of the American 3d Armored Brigade from Garlstedt near Bremen with the German 32d Brigade? The Americans had their "adoptive" teams detailed with the Germans down to the battalion and company level; they insisted on German umpires for judging their maneuver performance, and at times even went hand-to-hand in noble competition with their Anglo-Saxon cousins of the British 5th Armored Brigade, so that parts of the units had to be withdrawn from combat. Does it go so well in the east bloc maneuvers between the Red Army and its Polish comrades-in-arms?

Three innovations in planning and execution gave this year's fall maneuvers of the Bundeswehr and its allies a special character: the exercise ran essentially "free." All commanders down to the company level could make their own decisions within the given overall framework, could adjust to the changing combat situations, and thus themselves largely determine the outcome of the maneuvers. In fact, the Red attackers, by clever use of terrain and massing of forces in unexpected places, won more ground in the course of the first 4 days of battle than had actually been planned for them.

Reservists of the Territorial Army had a very prominent share in this - and this is the second special aspect of these maneuvers. Among the total of 60,000 soldiers who were in action in the exercise - with 3,300 tracked vehicles, 18,000 wheeled vehicles and 250 helicopters - there were 12,000 reservists, who were also led by reserve officers down to the battalion-commander level. Many of these soldiers had not taken part in any exercises for years and had to be instructed in the use of new equipment in a short time. They nonetheless handled their task with dash, according to the unanimous opinion of the exercise leadership.

Protection of the environment was a third emphasis: landscape-protection areas, orchards and seed-corn patches remained untouched by the maneuvers; camouflage material was carried along, so that trees and bushes also remained unclipped. Each soldier carried a pocket-sized card with 10 rules for the avoidance of accidents and damage. Key paragraph: "You are training in an area whose population will treat you in a friendly and open way. Do not betray the confidence placed in you by inconsiderate behaviour." The troops apparently took this to heart. It is already certain that maneuver damages are under the estimated amount of 5 and a half million marks.

Paratroops in Antitank Role

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 21 Sep 85 p 10

[Article by Kurt Kister: "The Great Search/Despite Planning and Organization, Improvisation Plays a Decisive Role in the Army Exercises"]

[Text] Kettenburg, 20 Sep--The hamlet of Neu-Wehnsen has hitherto played no role in either the civil or the military life of Staff Sergeant Kurt Schiller. The little road from Nindorf to Kettenburg was just as meaningless for the paratroop sergeant. With the sudden appearance of a tank on that very Lower Saxon country road at the edge of Neu-Wehnsen, however, these houses and these roads move into the center of his attention, at least for half a minute. The staff sergeant tells Private First Class Micelli, who has a Milan tank-defense rocket, "Micelli, there's another one coming out of Neu-Wehnsen - he's got to go!" The private thereupon aims at the tank, some 1 and a half kilometers away, and fires off an illuminating round simulating the Milan rocket. Staff Sergeant Schiller transmits the engagement with the tank to the rear by radio and comments, "That was the sixth."

Major Heinz Georg Kerrl, sitting at the telephone 8 kilometers away in the clubhouse in Nordkampen, draws a conclusion from the repeated he's-got-to-go's; "The 272d Parachute Battalion is still holding against the attacking 81st Armored Battalion." Thus Kerrl reports the results of the Neu-Wehnsen action a little later to his commanding officer. Since the tip of the red arrow containing the number 81 on the map leaning on a big board on the wall is already touching the blue dotted line beneath which the number 272 can be read, not even the situation map needs changing. All the same, the six destroyed tanks contribute to the fact that the red arrows extend no further than they already do.

These red or blue arrows, lines and circles on the situation map, embodied by tanks and soldiers, were last week determining the lives of around 60,000 soldiers and a goodly number of civilians in the area of Minden, Soltau and Bremervoerde in the Lower Saxon farm country. As every year in September, the Bundeswehr and certain allied units had taken up their positions for the large-scale army maneuvers. The I Corps had taken "Defiant Saxons" into its head for a designation, and, for a motto "Wat mutt, dat mutt" (or, in standard speech: "What must be, must be").

The Role of the Umpires

Such maneuvers look simple. There's a Red side that always attacks and a Blue side that always defends. The whole thing serves, at least according to the federal Defense Minister at a so-called field press conference in Suedkampen, first to keep the troops in training, but also to show, on the other hand, that NATO is strong enough to ward off an attack. That's why Blue has to stop Red's attack sometime in the middle of the single week of exercise war, and then go over to the offense itself.

Because, however, this is not quite so simple in reality and with several tens of thousands of vehicles, soldiers and aircraft as it is on the map, there is yet a third side, which is supposed to be neutral: the umpires, who, uniformed and with white armbands, also populate the battlefields by the thousands. An umpire unit is attached to every exercise unit (Red or Blue), and its members must ensure that Red and Blue behave as realistically as possible. The umpires must in addition inject into the exercise everything that happens in war but, for good reasons, not in maneuvers: for example, the effect of artillery fire, the determination of losses, the decision as to who was hit by whom on which side and how, and more of the same sort. This not only sounds complicated, it is - so that the average battlefield tourist can soon realize why Carl von Clausewitz was of the opinion that everything is simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult.

Major Peter Haupt of the umpires support office - the length [in German] of the title indicates the importance of the establishment - explains the umpires' activities with an example. "Let's say, a Red artillery unit fires at a Blue 'batallion,'" begins the Major, "then first, the umpire with the Red artillery reports to his staff umpire that there has been firing." This information then arrives at the umpire support office, where it is again reported back and forth internally. In the course of this process it is ascertained by map coordinates "where the shells actually landed." This in turn goes from the support office to the staff umpire with the Blue batallion under fire [untranslatable word play here affects only tone]. The staff umpire passes this on to the company-level umpires. They read in their manuals that a particular kind of shell in a particular terrain produces this or that percentage of losses among troops dug in a particular way. No - Major Haupt dispels our doubts - this by no means takes as long as it sounds.

Simply "Shooting" at Night

However this may be: artillery fire simply announced by an umpire can be explained only with extraordinary difficulty to the soldiers, Red or Blue. But naturally this is not the only artificiality they find themselves confronted with in such a *mise en scène*. A Red armored unit, for example, that adroitly tagged along behind withdrawing Blue Troops, slipped in amongst the 27th Airborne, a major formation to which the tank-annihilating Staff Sergeant Schiller is also assigned as a small cog. If the responsible umpires had let the Reds drive on unhindered, the entire Brigade might possibly have

started to give way, which would have somewhat confused the whole exercise, at least on this wing. Thus the infiltrating unit was thereupon "neutralized," that is, stopped. Particularly to the advancing troops, something like this is impossible to explain. Thus the umpire Lieutenant Colonel Frank Gerber had to convince a specially dashing shock-troop leader, who was impressed neither by assumed minefields nor by the Blues' firing, almost hand-to-hand that the reconnaissance patrol had to turn back at the crossroads.

Indeed, it is at times hard to tell who is actually friend or foe, and not just for the umpires. Even by day the red recognition crosses on the attacking vehicles fade in the distance - at night, identification is practically impossible. "Since no one wants to let the enemy break through in his sector," says Lieutenant Colonel Hartmuth Digutsch, who is assigned as umpire to the 271st Paratroop Battalion, "at night anything that moves is fired at." Here the "Red or Blue" question just has no meaning, since many of the citizen soldiers know nothing of the overall situation anyway. "Information on the situation of one's own unit is spotty among the men," is the word on this at the commander's briefing for the staff of the 25th Airborne Brigade, that is umpiring the 27th Airborne Brigade.

For the paratroopers of Captain Hans Monauni's 2d Company, to which Staff Sergeant Schiller's platoon belongs, the large-scale maneuvers just didn't really turn out to be such a tremendous experience: after the battalion had waited two and a half days far behind the exercise front in the so-called assembly area, came the order on the third night for deployment by helicopter. The troopers were helicoptered through the night for half an hour, to be landed on a harvested field in pitch-black night. The company assembled in the nearby wood, sent out alert sentries, and began construction of a position. For a further 24 hours little happened - if you call digging foxholes, sending patrols forward, and having very little time to sleep, "little." Only on the next-to-last day of the exercise did the "enemy" show up before the paratroopers' position, something the troopers had actually been waiting for since the beginning of the grand maneuvers. The actual flight, however, lasted no longer than 4 hours.

The movement activity of the troop units varies a great deal, of course, in such maneuvers. The days during which the paratroopers of the Monauni company were waiting in foxholes or barns, were spent in their vehicles by their comrades in the armored units. They covered very considerable distances, as the usual maneuver damages prove. Even with the armored infantry and the battle tanks, however, contact with the exercise enemy was restricted as a rule to half or three quarters of an hour. "In large-scale maneuvers, soldiers are challenged not so much by continuous battle as by all that is needed for preparing oneself to understand the battle," said Colonel Godehard Schell, Commanding Officer of the 25th Airborne Brigade.

Longing for a Shower

In a densely populated and in itself very peaceful country like Lower Saxony, it really isn't so much the orders that come too late, the breakthroughs, or the insufficient information on the situation that occupies the many

ordinary soldiers. Rather it is the so-called little things in life: while the colonel is going crazy trying to interpret this or that piece of guidance, the private is looking with at least as much intensity for a telephone booth to give the girlfriend at home a quick call. Since telephone booths are rare in the lower Saxon countryside, whilst puzzling guidance is a familiar occurrence in large-scale maneuvers, both commander and private are under considerable pressure in these circumstances.

For a person accustomed to civilization, it is not by any means so easy to sit around the command post till unchristian hours of the night for several days, then sleep a couple of hours on the floor of a gymnasium and thereupon share the only toilet and washbowl with a good 80 clearly smellable fellow men. But - and here we rely again on the defense Minister at the field press conference - a simulated-battle exercise simply demands personal sacrifices from all. A sentence whose degree of truth cannot be doubted, by the way, even when we see Manfred Woerner sitting before us in suit and fresh shirt, and are ourselves just then reflecting on when and where we would at least get to see a shower.

In fact, the search for just about everything claims an amazingly great share of all the soldiers' time in such an exercise. The Blues are looking for the Reds and vice versa, the great heaps of invading guests - the European Security and Cooperation Conference observers, journalists, retired and active-duty generals - are looking for the front and the troop movements, the major is looking for a driver, who in turn has been looking for (and has found) a little sleep in some corner or other. At least as rare as telephone booths and open grocery stores are items of daily military consumption: vehicles, that day's head-covering of the day, maps. Volker von Faer, Lieutenant Colonel and umpire, has a way of bringing this last lack out graphically: "Up there a reconnaissance patrol is stumbling around while its leader is orienting himself on an Aral map from the gas station": this isn't exactly according to regs, of course, but it does at least give evidence of a talent for improvisation.

Without a willingness to improvise, as any observer can readily recognize, the whole maneuver activity would collapse relatively quickly. Precisely the umpires must on occasion show themselves very inventive, in order to keep the exercise war more or less underway. The extent of this improvisation contributes to the increasing prominence of planning and organization (but also of what is only afterward represented as such) in maneuvers of this size. The military leaders, which means primarily the staff officers, are burdened almost to capacity with the production of an immense flood of paper. This indeed has the effect that majors, lieutenant colonels and colonels manage to work up to a. astounding degree of bureaucratic routine in leading the peacetime exercise war, whilst training that really simulates combat ends up in the background in such army maneuvers.

For the civilian, in turn, this development also has something reassuring: since a considerable mass of organizational and paperwork confusion is absorbing the working capacity of military leadership, not only in NATO but

also in the Warsaw Pact, probably in the long run there will be no time left for making war. Thus what can in fact be learned from the "Defiant Saxon" [sic] has something to do with the strengthening of reciprocal self-limitation: "Imagine there was a war, and it had to be organized...."

Heavy Territorial Participation

Bonn BUNDESWEHR AKTUELL in German 9 Sep 85 p 2

[Unattributed report: "For the Territorials, Too, a Tough Fitness Test - 9,000 'Home Defenders' Also Take Part in 'Defiant Saxons' Exercise - Reservists Challenged": first paragraph published in boldface]

[Text] Hannover-As in years past, so also in this year's army exercise, the Territorial Army is participating with a large force. Under the leadership of Defense Area command II, in whose territory the total of 60,000 soldiers is to take on "Defiant Saxons," around 9,000 "Home Defenders," with 2,200 wheeled and 200 tracked vehicles, will for a week in mid-September also be subjected to a tough military fitness test.

The individual missions and exercise goals of the Territorial Army result again this time from its mission in the overall defense framework: the Territorial Army ensures the operational freedom of the NATO forces in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. Concretely, the Home Defense Force protects areas and important points, secures rear areas and important traffic and supply installations against airborne and frontal attacks, and is also deployed to strengthen the field army in the forward defense area.

Besides the 52nd Home Defense Brigade, whose 524th Armored Battalion will be fully activated for the first time, from commanding officer to gunner and for the duration of the exercise, the 22nd and 25th Defense Commands, with 3 home-defense companies, the 800th Engineer Command, the 822nd Motorized Infantry Battalion, security platoons, medical troops, and an ABC defense company, Defense Area Command II is deploying the 720th Military Police Battalion, with reinforcements from Defense Area Command III and the Schleswig-Holstein Territorial Command. A motorized infantry company of the 53rd Home Defense Brigade, the 800th Engineer Headquarters and Service Battalion and, with the military police, a topographic battery are acting as "troops in executive service," that is, sometimes on the "Red" side, sometimes on the "Blue." All the deployed formations and units of the Territorial Army have a distinguishing characteristic: they consist in considerable proportions (at times up to 98 percent) of reservists.

Besides securing the assembly of the participating forces and the cooperation of two Territorial Commands (Northern Territorial Command and the Schleswig-Holstein Territorial Command), "Defiant Saxons" has the following exercise emphases for the Territorial Army: crossing of the lower Elbe by a brigade with military and civilian ferries; deployment of the 52nd Home Defense Brigade against airborne opponents and in area defense; defense on the Aller

with the 52nd Home defense Brigade; operation of reserve hospitals and other medical installations; operation of a hospital train of the German Federal Railways; decontamination of contaminated soldiers at an ABC-intake medical unit and a major decontamination center.

Most of the deployed territorial units only grow to their full deployment strength after a somewhat lengthy mobilization process. The reservist concept is thereby tested and the tactical training of reservists exercised. Further exercise goals of the Territorial Army are cooperation with the air forces and the NATO forces (Bundeswehr and allies). In short: "Defiant Saxons" gives the territorial forces once again the opportunity to exercise overall defense realistically with participation by all forces and in combined-arms combat.

Reservists' Readiness Rated High

Bonn BUNDESWEHR AKTUELL in German 23 Sep 85 pp 1, 4

[Unattributed report: "Saxons' Defiance Was Worthwhile: Army Exercise '85 Ends - Defense Minister Praises Reservists and Helpfulness of Population": first paragraph published in boldface]

[Text] Rethem/Aller-This year's army exercise "Defiant Saxons" ended last Friday. Sixty thousand soldiers, among them 12,000 reservists and 9,000 allies, took part in the one-week maneuvers prepared and executed by I Corps. At a press conference last Thursday at the command post of the 27th Airborne Brigade near Bethem on the aller, Defense Minister Dr. Manfred Woerner, in the presence of the Lower Saxony minister-president Ernst Albrecht, thanked the people in the exercise area for the "helpfulness and open-mindedness" with which they greeted the soldiers. He also thanked the Lower Saxony state government and the authorities who did all in their power to make the exercise a success.

As the Defense Minister pointed out, "Defiant Saxons" fully fulfilled its goal, namely to exercise and demonstrate the army units' operational readiness and to highlight alliance solidarity. American, British and Dutch units took part in the exercise. The Minister underlined the necessity for exercises with the words: "The better the forces can fight, the less the danger of their having to." The Minister showed himself especially pleased with the fact that, for the first time, an exercise of this size ran freely - that is, not according to a plan already laid down by the leadership. Room was thereby created for improvisational talent and for spontaneous decisions by commanders, the Minister emphasized. His special thanks therefore went to the Commanding General of I Corps, Lieutenant General Dr. Gerhard Wachter, for the courage he showed in carrying out an exercise of this kind. In the further course of the press conference, Dr. Woerner expressed his great satisfaction that an extraordinarily high fraction of the reservists, namely 80 to 90 percent, responded to the call-up for the exercise. The reservists' readiness to preform is very high, said the Minister further, and in no way falls behind that of those fulfilling their military-service obligation. All this shows, concluded Dr. Woerner, that the Bundeswehr is on the right path with its concept of better utilizing reservist potential.

Minister-President Albrecht reminded the press that, because of its geographical situation, Lower Saxony experiences large-scale maneuvers "almost every year." Despite these burdens, the people's attitude toward the soldiers has always been, and remains, extraordinarily positive. "People in our state know whom they have to thank for living in peace and freedom for 40 years now," said the Minister-President, who at the same time thanked all the soldiers for their consideration toward the population.

Individual Reservists' Experiences Vary

Hamburg ZEIT MAGAZIN in German 1 Nov 85 pp 11-20

[Article by Wolfram Runkel: "To the Rear, March!": first paragraph published in large type]

[Text] The Bundeswehr is 30 years old in November. The anniversary finds it in good shape. Shrinking service-age contingents, however, forebode a dangerous personnel shortage. Reservists are therefore being called up for training more often. Hans-Hermann Piening, a Lower Saxon township manager, got caught after an interval of 21 years.

Mobilization. Township Manager Piening snaps the last file closed and takes the whole folder - "Property Surveys for the Sewer Construction Project" - over to his duty's office.

The manager, the last to leave the town hall of Geestequelle township this evening, drives the 10 kilometers home to Bremervoerde. Wife Margrit and the children Dagmar and Gunnar receive him in his single-family house. A kind of hearty last meal. The township manager is not going to the town meeting, he's going to war.

Luckily, it's a false alarm, a simulated war: one of the Bundeswehr's so-called Mob-Exercises.

Hans-Hermann Piening is one of this year's 200,000 "reserve trainees," and one of the 12,000 reservists among the 60,000 soldiers ordered into the army's large-scale fall maneuvers, "Defiant Saxons."

The 44-year old NCO Piening got caught after 21 years of "peace in the reserve." Piening, who performed his obligatory active duty in 1962-1963 and did his last exercise in 1964, belongs to the first generation that was obligated to serve in the Bundeswehr, and is one of the reservists with longest service among the "Defiant Saxons."

Tomorrow's soldier climbs up to the attic to rummage out his costume for this second role. He slides a dusty duffelbag down.

"Are you looking forward to the exercise?" He rejects the question: "That's not the point! I'm just doing it." Certainly, Piening, who lived through the bombing death of his mother in 1944, is anything but a warrior. He is what he wanted to be from his schooldays: a government economist. His tool

is not the gun but the ballpoint, organizing a new sewer system suits him better than digging trenches: "This exercise doesn't fit my schedule. A lot of things in the township are going to have to wait...." And: "If I'd wanted to, I could have put in an appeal," as around 30 percent of all those called up do. But Piening didn't want to. He is not just a government employee, but also, as a civil servant, a loyal servant of the state. Smiling bravely, he shows us the Bundeswehr's current maneuver poster: "Wat mutt, dat mutt" [in "Platt," "What must be, must be"]. Even the most defiant Saxon has no defense against the trivial logic of this twaddle. Only Ms. Margrit has objections: "Of course he should have refused, especially as we have the workmen in the house."

But wat mutt, dat mutt. The next morning, Hans-Hermann Piening, 1.83 meters, 77 kilos, appears punctually as ordered, with bag and papers, at his muster post in Buxtehude, where he last saw service 21 years before as a private first class in an office of the Headquarters Company of the 3d Armored Division. This time he is supposed to serve as an interpreter in contacts with the Americans. Although "I don't know a word of English. But maybe they understand Platt!"

Now Piening must go through the "intake" mill. Like around 100 other reservists, some of whom have been dropped off by wife and child, he reports to the "Mob Report Start." From there onward from counter to counter - questionnaire issue: Profession? Rank? Illnesses? Gasmask issue, ID photo issue, chow, pay. One hundred eighty marks. That's something, anyhow.

But the more he's "in-taken," the more the confident township manager's self-assurance fades from his face. At the clothing-issue room, this specialist in organization gets his first big blow. Here the contents of his dufflebag, his equipment, is checked, completed and exchanged. But just now the manager must push himself and his "Geroedl" (Bundeswehr jargon for absolutely everything) forward for over an hour in a line of reservists. "What a waste of time! This could be taken care of much faster in a bigger room with a bigger counter and several people," groans Piening irritably.

"Maybe they have to kill the time until orders come out at 1600," speculates another reservist. But with the Bundeswehr everything goes at a well-regulated pace. Even the people on the post move slower than those on Moenckeberg Street.

Finally it's Piening's turn. The private behind the counter calls out in order the list of required clothing articles. But Piening rummages out of his bag nothing but things the private has never seen before - wrong shoes, socks, trousers. Even the infamous "crab" [untranslatable play on the German for "felt"], a felt suit done away with years ago, makes an appearance. The helpless private calls for a sergeant's aid. But even he is amazed at the stripes on Piening's parka sleeve. "One stripe slanted, one straight; what is that supposed to represent, my dear sir?" Once it meant NCO candidate. Piening was promoted to NCO only after his last exercise, in absentia. The sergeant passes on this one: Go to "admin." At the post administration offices Piening gets new clothing from head to foot. The impossible stripes are removed from the old parka.

In the corridor of Wing C, in which Piening shares a room with 4 other reservists, the sergeant on duty tells Piening he's "nobody without stripes." Back to the clothing room for issue of the valid shoulder pieces. His roommates, long since wise to the drill, give the baggy-trousered township manager supporting fire, when he quietly asks: "How do I buckle the belt? Is my cap straight?" While Piening is starting to get homesick for the town hall, his buddies are looking forward to an "adventure vacation" on which they will enjoy a certain amount of "idiot's leeway."

Unlike many reservists, the Bundeswehr "by no means" regards active duty for training "as an adventure vacation," says the former commander of I Corps, Major General Gottfried Ewert; "Rather it's tailored to the reservist's function in the event of mobilization, deriving its meaning only from its being designed around the real thing." Reservists are on-call soldiers, who might better regard their civilian life as an always-interruptable adventure vacation. In the future this vacation is going to be interrupted more and more often. Because of the "pill dip," the future personnel shortage, the number on active duty for training will be tripled in the next 10 years. By this year, the number had already risen to 200,000 from 180,000 in 1984, while it was only 127,000 in 1982.

In order not to harm the unruly economy too badly, future exercises are to be shorter but more frequent, and take place primarily on extended weekends. Nonetheless, the economy will also be called upon for more discipline. The number of "essential employees" in industry is to be reduced from 25 percent to 15 percent.

The Bundeswehr has fewest problems with reservists who are not yet in the work force: only sickness saves them from exercises. The literature student Christoph Nitsche from Essen, for example, whom we visited the day before the big operation at his muster post in Lueneburg, is still laboring under the shock of the unexpected call-up. The private first class, a signalman and driver, who had finished his obligatory military service only 9 months before, "simply can't understand" it. The 21-year-old absolutely personifies the stereotypical sensitive, vulnerable young man who, with Wolfgang Borchert in his head, ends up in the military. "After high school I was even recognized as a conscientious objector," but the recognition was revoked on an appeal. "They just didn't believe the grounds I put forward, and yet even today, after 15 months of life in the military, I would still shoot over the enemy's head in the real thing." "Probably," we say, "you were a good soldier in your signalman and driver assignments all the same." He throws up his hands in desperation. This time he'll be chauffering the supply officer, a lieutenant colonel, Mercedes director and stud-farm owner, around the countryside.

High-ranking reserve officers like to go on exercises. Reserve Lieutenant Colonel Roland Geistbeck, who did a hitch in the regulars from 1962 to 1968, sees his yearly assumption of duties with the staff of the air defense battalion in Fischbek as an agreeable change of pace. But also as "my duty as a citizen, to make myself available for the security of the country and its citizens." Some of his battalion comrades mockingly call him, with his

16 exercises, "runner-up exercise world-master." (In "Defiant Saxons," according to the MANEUVERS COURRIER, a man with 71 exercises holds the record.) In civilian life, the 43-year-old Geistbeck, a Bavarian by birth, is a teacher at a Hamburg business high school; he is married to a Hamburg woman and has two daughters, 12 and 4.

In the "Defiant Saxons" exercise, during which we want to visit him and his comrades Piening, Nitsche and an armored infantryman, Geistbeck will run the night shift at the battalion CO's command post. As we talk with him at the barracks, he is studying the secret attack plans of the "Red" armored units, which he is to protect from Blue air attacks with his flak guns.

Take armored-infantry private Juergen Mittmann for example. He is among the 20 reservists in the 2nd Company of the 81st Armored Battalion. The company commander introduces his reservists to us in rank and file. "Pick someone out." These people make no secret of their chagrin over the call-up, even in the captain's presence. They are especially sour over the loss of money: the Bundeswehr replaces only 70 percent of the loss of earnings. "But you do get free food and lodging." Whose the loss is.... Answer: "Kiss my ass." Most also complain of boredom, the ban on alcohol, the personal restrictions in general. "If I don't do something I'm supposed to here, I go right to the cooler. That's no life."

In the first rank stands a small man with dark eyes, his face masked by a black beard. He says nothing. "Are you looking forward to the exercise?" we ask, "Do I look like it?" he asks fiercely in reply. Juergen Mittmann has been picked 4 times now, "every year since my active service." Last time he had to get through 14 days, "although my right arm was in a splint due to a tendon-lining injury." The 25-year-old journeyman butcher at an Uelzen wurst factory was taken away from his girlfriend and his fellow workers, "who have to do my work as well now. The government should really call up the unemployed!"

But the government needs armored infantryman Mittmann. Friday night, after the civilian evening traffic is over, things finally get started. The "Reds" move into their assembly areas. Monday afternoon we find Juergen Mittmann with his camouflaged tank in a small wood near Harsefeld. He is waiting for the 8th Brigade's marching orders, while the "9th" has already penetrated deep into the enemy "Blueland" during the past night. Tired? "Friday night we had no sleep at all. Now we can nap here. But the worst is the boredom." Cookie brings chow, a sort of goulash with carrots, potatoes, little meat. Good? "Hunger helps it down." Then the move-out orders arrive. Mittmann - frustrated with hunger, but happy that things are finally moving - throws his half-full mess kit into the "marten." He doesn't suspect that this was his last hot meal for 50 hours.

Assault Through a Breast-Deep Stream

We're rattling through Lower Saxony with the 81st Battalion in an umpire tank. When Red and Blue clash, the "umps" negotiate among themselves as to who knocked out whom. Just now, however, our tank goes out of action. Engine trouble.

Juergen Mittmann and his comrades "roedel" on southward without us. We find them again only the next morning, in stand-by position deep inside Blueland. They have thundered through the region all night in pouring rain, have victoriously completed an assault, and are alive. Though not very. They are dead tired, abosolutely starving (there was no breakfast or supper), and wet to the skin. Luckily the sun is shining at last and the beat-up clothing the infantrymen will never change during the week-long exercise is slowly drying.

The 2nd Company is now near a stream, on the opposite bank of which the Blues are preparing a hedgehog defensive position. How does Juergen Mittmann like playing war? "Better than the real thing, at least. Even then I wouldn't aim at the enemy." Enemy aircraft hiss by overhead. Mittmann aims. What are his feelings when he keeps reading about better and better anti-tank weapons like the remote-controlled Milan rocket? "If it ever really gets serious, I'll take off. It's really all nonsense, with such weapons. If disputes were settled with cudgels again, as earlier, I'd be there." Shortly thereafter, things almost do get serious. The platoon leader wants to make an assault through the breast-deep stream with his people. "Count me out, I can't report sick to my boss Monday. He'll say, 'Just stay with the tanks permanently.'" Luckily, the attack is called off before it had to come to a refusal to obey orders.

Early in the afternoon the chow wagon finally showed up, bringing the belated breakfast. There was no hot food. Weight-loss as an exercise objective? Or was the meat bad?

Township Manager Piening didn't have to complain of hunger or dampness. We find him in a farmer's barn converted into a divisional command post; gigantic maps hang on the walls. Piening sits at the table, exhausted, bowed, harassed. Circles under his eyes. He had indeed been freed from the nonsensical interpreter assignment, but has received instead a responsible job at the command post of the "Red" commanding general. He is constantly shoving pieces of paper into runners' hands and receiving others, noting each step in a book. He is as it were the post office, sending all the commander's orders to the right addresses, and logging and forwarding the incoming reports. He is on the night shift: since the command post is manned around the clock, however, he hardly gets any sleep during the day either - "maybe in some animal pen" - and, contrary to strict orders, he doesn't do it embracing his rifle. The leveling effect of the uniform irritates this civilian even yet. Once he runs after a soldier he takes for a certain runner, looks him in the face and says, "Oh - you're somebody else."

His superiors are happy with him, he does everything to perfection, "hardly the slightest problem." "Hey, hand over a chair," demands an officer. As a city editor shows surprise at the docility of the township manager, the latter simply answers: "Today I'm a soldier." That tomorrow or the day after he will once again be a township manager, is the joy that helps him go on living. "I can only stand this because I know it's going to end soon." How is all this supposed to work in the real thing?

The brave Lieutenant Colonel Geistbeck is more drained than Piening. He moves like a sleepwalker around the farm where his AA command post is set up. His eyes twitch convulsively. He has not slept in 5 nights. "Nights I'm on duty, days I can't sleep. Biorhythm." He's deeply frustrated besides. "Just give me a call in Hamburg after the exercise," he says.

Twelve Hours of Sleep in Seven Days

The next day in a little village along the front lines we unexpectedly run into driver Christoph Nitsche, the unsuccessful conscientious objector, who is calmly strolling along the road. "So what's going on with you?" "Shot down!" His boss, the supply officer, had by an oversight ordered the jeep into BlueLand, where both got "snapped off" (Bundeswehr expression) by a patrol. The umpires have "neutralized" the fallen for one hour. "I'm dead," says Nitsche gaily. "Now I can enjoy life for an hour."

Juergen Mittmann, the armored infantryman, is also dead, up in flames in his "snapped off" tank. Luckily, he is really just drunk as he returns to his girlfriend in Uelzen. A different kind of desertion. Before his release from active duty, "when everything was taken care of," he simply took off from the barracks.

Lieutenant Colonel Geistbeck, on the other hand, can't go back to school. His body protests against the over-exertion, "12 hours of sleep in 7 days." His spirit protests against the "pedagogically insufficient treatment of the trainees by the regular soldiers." Geistbeck: "The new officers have gone up the ranks too fast. They don't take the reservists seriously. Treat them haughtily."

Township Manager Piening, two kilos lighter, who has slept almost the entire weekend, is at his desk again on Monday with the survey records: "Everything OK. Sewer construction can begin."

He will participate in no more exercises. What needn't be, needn't be.

Reserve Officers Criticize "Bureaucracy"

Bonn LOYAL in German Oct 85 p 28

[Article by Hans-Joachim Linck: "Maneuvers Critique"]

[Text] Over 20 percent of the soldiers who took part in the "Defiant Saxons" exercise were reservists. One of them was SPD Deputy Captain (Res.) Klaus-Dieter Kuehbacher from Braunschweig. He exercised with the 2d Armored Brigade, and found not only "splendid comradeship" but also a few "itchy places" which he is soon going to discuss with experts in the responsible offices.

Klaus-Dieter Kuehbacher, 1941 age-class, is married and has 3 children. From 1974 to 1976 he was a member of the Lower Saxony state legislature; since 1976 he has been a member of the Bundestag. Since 1983 he has been on

the "Services Budget" committee. He is intensely concerned with the Bundeswehr and with everything having to do with reservists. In his two years of active duty with armor he rose to reserve officer candidate. In the following years he exercised several times with 11th Armored Battalion. In 1975 he became a reserve lieutenant.

On the next-to-last day of the "Defiant Saxons" exercise he was promoted to reserve captain. Kuehbacher was impressed above all in this fall exercise by the performance of regulars and reservists, not least because, in his opinion, the 2nd Armored Brigade was unduly tasked. "The soldiers had the feeling they are needed and not, 'well, let's exercise a little again'," was his opinion.

Negative experiences in the exercises for Reserve Captain Kuehbacher were that "orders were given by the leadership without regard for the soldiers' health, especially those belonging to clean-up companies. I felt a very great distance between soldiers and staffs, and I think it's questionable whether that 3 to 1 soldiers-to-vehicles ratio is correct. I was able to observe any number of double taskings. The chow upset me the most. There was plenty of bread and spread but, because the unit supply people could no longer freely purchase, there was in fact nothing else. The soldiers were 'right out in the country,' in an excellent farming area. It would have been easy to buy potatoes, apples and other things here. This must change. The food service units within the companies must get back more independence."

After a 32-hour mission without sleep, the reserve captain showed himself pleasantly surprised when the brigade CO, Colonel Rueckbrodt, refused a further mission for his soldiers on the ground that he didn't want to carry out this exercise any further if the soldiers didn't get 6 hours of sleep at once. "Defiant Saxons," says Kuehbacher, "was very valuable to me as a learning experience. In particular, I found that the cooperation between the active-duty troops and the reservists was an outstanding success, naturally taking account of the degree of training. I experienced some things that need further discussion. Someone's going to have to tell me why the massive volume of bureaucracy practiced here - and often experienced as a negative impression - has to be handled just this way and not otherwise."

In this, the newly promoted captain by no means stood alone. The SPD Bundestag delegate Lothar Loeffler, from Berlin, also exercised with him as a reserve first lieutenant. The 50-year-old member of the Bundestag did his orientation exercise in July of this year, and then took part in the fall exercise. Loeffler found the large-scale maneuvers impressive in all their phases, praised the great commitment of soldiers of all ranks, and perceived as the most negative element, throughout the entire week of the exercise, the extremely active bureaucracy, which often came across as a drag.

On the next-to-last day of the exercise Defense Minister Dr. Manfred Woerner and Lower Saxony Minister-President Dr. Ernst Albrecht visited the 2d Armored

Brigade in the vicinity of Sulingen, where Farmers President Konstantin Freiherr von Heeremann was exercising as a reserve captain. Minister Woerner emphasized to LOYAL that he had heard very positive judgments above all on the attitude of the reservists, their bearing, their willingness, and their ability to perform. In every evaluation, said the Minister, the varying degrees of training must naturally be taken into consideration, depending on how far back the last active duty was. That is only natural. "But I am very optimistic for the future, since we do want to push reserve training harder, in order to apply this potential more intensively in the Bundeswehr," as he summed it up.

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MILITARY

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LEOPARD 1'S TO UNDERGO FOURTH COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS UPGRADING

Herford KAMPFTRUPPEN/KAMPFUNTERSTUETZUNGSTRUPPEN in German Sep 85 pp 219-255

[Article by Gern-Rainer Geist]

[Text] The Leopard 1 battle tank, one of the main weapon systems of the German army, is about to undergo its fourth combat effectiveness upgrading. In its 20th year of use and since it was introduced it has always been adapted, in the context of several combat effectiveness upgradings, to the threat of the moment and to the newest level of technology.

In these combat effectiveness upgradings basically the following sectors underwent improvement:

Turret

- installation of a weapon stabilization system,
- equipping with a deep-fording system.

Weapon System:

- Retrofitting the main gun with thermal insulation covers.

Ballistic Armor:

- Retrofitting the side track gun shields,
- retrofitting auxiliary turret armor for the Leopard 1 A1A1,
- reinforcing the cast turrets in the Leopard 1 A2,
- welded turret with bulkhead armor in the Leopard 1 A3/A4.

Fire Control System:

New integrated fire control system in the Leopard 1A4 consisting of:

- computer-assisted rangefinder (EMES 12A1),
- fire control computer,
- compartment-stabilized commander's panoramic periscope (PERI R12),

- improved control units,
- internal computer-assisted test system.

With the new fire control system in the Leopard 1A4 in an armored division it was possible for the armor branch to gather experiences which could be utilized later in the further development of the Leopard 1 and new tanks.

Necessity and Extent of the Fourth Combat Effectiveness Upgrading

The need for another combat effectiveness upgrading of the Leopard 1 came as a result of the following predeterminations:

- necessary adaptation of the weapon system to the emerging threat,
- decision about extending the utilization phase beyond the year 2000,
- utilization of technological progress, for example, the rapid development in electronics and optronics and
- experiences from "operational test on a divisional scale" of the Leopard 1A4 as well as additional status reports from the armor branch.

The following aspects of the threat which must be anticipated influence the further development of the Leopard 1's weapon system:

- further quantitative superiority of the enemy,
- increasing quality in technology; in subareas technological equality must be assumed,
- focal point in the further development of the armored combat troops,
- attacks by massed armored units in echelons with support of artillery, attack helicopters, and the like, to achieve rapid and deep penetrations and breakthroughs and
- uninterrupted operations by day and night.

In order to be able to withstand this future threat in the planned utilization phase the combat effectiveness of the Leopard 1 must be improved as follows:

- enhancing first-round hit probability,
- shortening reaction times,
- effectiveness by day, night and under limited visibility,
- improved ammunition effect on the target,
- enhancing the ballistic armor and passive protection, and
- enhancing the crew's chances for survival.

These requirements can be met by the following measures:

- installation of a new fire control system while retaining existing optics,
- improvements in the undercarriage and turret areas,
- introduction and application of a new mottled camouflage,
- converting the communication facility to the new SEM 80/90 radio equipment generation,
- developing and introducing improved and new ammunition,
- introduction of new high-speed smoke grenades (SNWK),
- development and installation of an electrooptically covering smoke and deception system,
- if necessary, mounting additional new turret armor,
- if necessary, installation of the 120-mm weapon system of the Leopard 2 and
- if necessary, reoutfitting with a fire suppression system.

Combat effectiveness upgrading of the Leopard 1 requires high-level financial outlays which could also be used to purchase a small number of additional Leopard 2 tanks. However, such a measure would not take into consideration the aspect of the threat of quantitative superiority on the part of the enemy. In order to be able to cover the combat zones in the context of our forward defense there must be a minimum number of weapon systems which are commensurate with the threat. A smaller additional number of Leopard 2 tanks cannot begin to make up for the loss in combat effectiveness which would result from not upgrading the combat effectiveness of the Leopard 1.

Measures to Upgrade the Combat Effectiveness of the Leopard 1

Installing a New Fire Control System

Installing the new fire control system with the most modern components of today's technology is the nucleus of the fourth combat effectiveness upgrading. The requirements of a new fire control system were set forth in 1981 in a "Tactical Needs Document." On the basis of this phase document three German companies each developed a fire control system which was evaluated in 1983 in comparative testing. At the end of 1983 the EMES 18 fire control system from the Krupp Atlas Electronics Co, Bremen, was selected for the Leopard 1 combat effectiveness upgrading. The firm of Wegman and Co, Kassel, will install the fire control system in the Leopard 1. Delivery of the first Leopard 1A5 tanks whose combat effectiveness has been upgraded is planned for the end of 1986.

Among others, the following requirements, which the EMES 18 meets, were placed on the new fire control system:

- high first-round hit probability,
- shortened reaction times until opening fire,

- directing firing by the gunner or the commander,
- expending six kinds of ammunition with the main sighting telescope,
- passive observation, identification and sighting by day, night and under limited visibility,
- rangefinding, sighting and firing while moving,
- simple and speedy operability of the fire control system,
- simple and rapid boresighting,
- high degree of precision and stability in boresighting,
- high degree of stability under load for the fire control system and thus greater availability of the battle tanks and
- internal capability to test the fire control system for function by the crew.

The EMES 18 fire control system was developed on the basis of the EMES 15 fire control system in the Leopard 2. For the most part it consists of EMES 15 components which in part were adapted to the Leopard 1. This then produced a high degree of logistic uniformity with the Leopard 2.

In the following the Leopard 1's new fire control system is presented. Figure 2 shows the design of the EMES 18 fire control system and the location of the components. The main sighting telescope with an integrated thermal imager is the main aiming device in the Leopard 1A5. It helps the gunner and the commander, respectively, with observing, identifying targets, rangefinding and aiming by day, night and under limited visibility. The compact arrangement of the components [pictured in Figure 3, not included], guarantees a very high level of boresighting stability.

The fire control computer serves to determine the elevation and lead angle values and to stabilize the line of sight in the main sighting telescope. The elevation and lead angle values are determined by the computer with consideration of the following input variables: different kinds of ammunition for the main gun, weapon choice, machine gun, laser rangefinder, manually inputted distance, TRP [turret panoramic zoom optical system] distance, outside temperature, air pressure, powder temperature, crosswind velocity, system error correction, barrel wear, vehicle canting, point and field adjustment, synchronism. The fire control computer is fitted with a digital ballistics core.

The sensors provide input variables for the fire control computer.

The computer control unit serves to input the input variables and correction values into the fire control computer.

The TRP panoramic periscope is the gunner's second observation device and gun sight. It is also being taken over, in modified form, from the old fire control system.

The new gunner's control unit serves to switch the different operating stages of the fire control unit, to operate the HZF [main sighting telescope] and thermal imager (WBG), to adjust the HZF and WBG electrically, to operate the central testing electronics and to control the operational condition of the fire control system.

Figure 4 [not included] shows the operational status of the gunner with his sighting and operating equipment.

The new loader control unit serves the loader in choosing ammunition, in preparing the main weapon for firing, in switching on the turret hydraulics and operating the crew compartment ventilator.

With the auxiliary WBG control unit the commander can operate the WBG in the HZF.

The WBG electronics are the central power supply for all WBG components.

The laser electronics serve to supply the laser rangefinder with power and to evaluate the incoming laser impulses. The values determined are further processed in the fire control computer.

The monoblock electronics replace all traditional electric components in the weapon stabilization system. In addition, they have a tracking controller and coincidence switching which permits firing only after the main gun is in the position, in respect to height and side, as determined by the fire control computer.

The adapter, test and logic module (APL) is the link between the Leopard 1 and Leopard 2 components and must fulfill various electronic tasks.

The internal test system monitors the functional readiness of the fire control system. Defective components can be identified with this system. In the gunner's control unit it is connected in the "operation monitoring" or "technical examination" operating stages.

The EMES/TRP angle drive module serves to relay the elevation angle of the main gun to the fire control computer, the HZF and the TRP.

The field adjusting systems (FJA) consists of the field adjusting collimator on the muzzle of the main gun and of the part which is integrated in the other components of the fire control system. It makes it possible for the gunner to quickly check the adjustment of the HZF to the main gun without having to leave the tank.

Operation of the Fire Control System

The EMES 18 fire control system can be connected in four operating stages. The full efficiency of the system is achieved in the "stabilization EIN"

operating stage. A uniformly high first-round hit probability and short reaction times to opening fire are achieved by the following decisive performance characteristics:

- same HZF/WBG field of view for gunner and commander,
- smooth field of view even when moving through difficult terrain. The compartment-stabilized lines of sight point continuously in the same direction independent of the yawing and pitching movements of the tank,
- smooth field of view when moving on streets and concrete roads. Special design features of the HZF suppress vibrations,
- automatic lead angle computation with moving targets and/or when the tank is moving. A shift in point of aim is not necessary since the weapon automatically adjusts by the amount of target movement and/or the amount of movement of the tank,
- automatic correction of the day vision/weapon and WBG/weapon parallax values,
- high aiming speed of the HZF and
- simple operation of the laser rangefinder.

Evaluation of the EMES 18 Fire Control System

With the conversion to the EMES 18 fire control system the Leopard 1 has unrestricted combat capability by day, night and under limited visibility. The system has the performance level of the EMES 15 in the Leopard 2. The future certainty of the EMES 18 is confirmed by the following characteristics:

- possible use of other varieties of laser, for example CO₂-laser,
- possibility of connecting additional sensors, for example, for crosswind, powder temperature, the type of ammunition loaded and
- possibility of connecting duel simulator, camera for television monitoring system, field of fire defining system.

An additional decisive advantage of the EMES 18 is the great logistical uniformity with the Leopard 2 fire control system. Approximately 80 percent of the Leopard 2 components are used in the EMES 18. This results in a reduction of the logistical expense, a simplification of training and the transfer capability of a large part of the basic material data from the Leopard 2.

Improvements in the Undercarriage and Turret Sectors

Prior to conversion to the new fire control system the battle tanks undergo depot maintenance and emergency repair. In the context of these repair measures a number of improvements are introduced in the Leopard 1 in the form of "technical changes" which in part must be evaluated as combat effectiveness upgrading and in part as improving material maintainability. By improving material maintainability the availability of the battle tanks is increased and with it the combat effectiveness of the weapon system is likewise improved.

In the undercarriage sector, among other things, the following changes are being introduced:

- installation of a jet water cleaning system for the periscope of the tank driver,
- installation of maintenancefree batteries,
- improving the shock absorber mount in the running gear,
- reinforcing the suspension arm mounting in the running gear,
- mounting hoist rigs on the hull, for example, to simplify loading for ocean transport and
- improving the nuclear, biological and chemical protection system.

In the turret sector the following changes are being made:

- laser protection for all optical devices and components,
- installation of an optical hinge in the TZF [turret sighting telescope],
- improvements in the ammunition storage holder sector,
- installation of new trunnion bearings and
- improved mounting of the elevation cylinder.

Application of New Camouflage Paint

Enhancing passive protection by applying a new camouflage paint must be seen as another measure to upgrade combat effectiveness. This paint consists of tricolored types of spots in green, brown and black. The new camouflage paint decreases the detectability of the Leopard 1 substantially and thus increases its survivability and combat effectiveness.

Conversion of the Communication System to the New Generation of Radio Equipment

In the context of the second army radio conversion the Leopard 1 tanks are also being equipped with the new SEM 80/90 A/VFH radio equipment. The new equipment is modular in design. It is smaller and has only about one-third the weight of the old generation. The following must be addressed as additional essential innovations:

- automatic channel selection with 16 channels combined in one channel group,
- digital transmission of the radio signals between the radios,
- extensive use of integrated highly integrated semiconductor circuits,
- protection from NEMP and
- self-testing device for the radio equipment. By pushing a button the operator can check the operational readiness of his radio equipment.

The new generation of radio equipment includes the following improvements which also contribute to enhancing the combat effectiveness of the weapon system of the Leopard 1 and the armor branch:

- improving the quality of radio circuits, with them the armored units and formations can be commanded with greater certainty in combat,
- enemy detection, jamming and monitoring of our radio circuits is made difficult,
- protection from NEMP, and
- self-testing device for radio equipment, the modular design and the exchange of components which is provided for result in substantially higher availability of the radio equipment of the Leopard 1.

Development and Introduction of Improved and New Ammunition

The effective firepower factor of the Leopard 1 is improved by the development and introduction of improved and new ammunition. The APFSDS type of ammunition was introduced as a successor to the current APDS(KE) ammunition. In contrast to the traditional APDS a higher ballistic coefficient was achieved in the case of APFSDS (DM23) and a different penetration material was used. A higher penetration performance of the projectile results from these changes in the projectile.

The HEAT and HEP types of ammunition which are used at present will be replaced by an HE ammunition which must still be developed. This will reduce the 105-mm caliber tank ammunition to two kinds.

Introduction of New High-Speed Smoke Grenades (SNWK)

Since the introduction of the current smoke grenades the threat has changed. Among other things, shorter reaction times have become essential which have resulted in the new development of high-speed smoke grenades. The SNWK can definitely lay the artificial smokescreen faster than has been the case. The first SNWK model has been introduced, other models are in the development stage.

The new SNWK will result in enhancing the passive protection of the Leopard 1.

Other Possible Measures to Enhance the Combat Effectiveness of the Leopard 1

Development of an Electrooptically Covering Smoke and Decoy System

Armored vehicles today are threatened by a large palette of weapon systems from which they must be protected, for example, by enemy battle tanks, helicopters with main guns and missiles, terminally guided artillery shells and antitank guided missiles. Beyond that, reconnaissance resources in the area of target acquisition, identification and target tracking are also substantially improved.

In order to meet the threat through new weapon systems and reconnaissance resources developmental work is also in progress in the camouflage and deception sector. The Federal Office of Military Technology and Procurement and the industry are currently developing a smoke which covers the following sectors:

- the visible,
- IR,
- radar and
- laser.

These individual components can be located in a smoke grenade and be fired from a launcher. But other smoke delivery systems, for example smoke generators, are also conceivable.

In order to be able to neutralize the effect of new kinds of reconnaissance resources and target equipment and protect oneself from the effect of new weapon systems, it must be possible for the new system

- to lay in front of our own battle tanks a sufficiently large smokescreen with electrooptically covering smoke in an extremely short time,
- to produce over our battle tanks a smoke cloud with electrooptically covering smoke and
- to set out decoys which can attract homing ammunition.

With such a smoke and deception system it is possible to achieve a cost-favorable combat effectiveness upgrading of all armored vehicles. In the event of defense such a system can more than pay for itself after the first successful use.

Studies for New Additional Turret Armor

Change in the threat, for example through new enemy ammunition developments, had required enhancement of the ballistic protection of the Leopard 1 weapon system. The Federal Office of Military Technology and Procurement and the industry have implemented first studies on new additional turret armor for the Leopard 1. Thought is being given to a new turret gun shield and to protective packets with shock absorber mounts. Development of a new TZP is continuing.

Possibility of Installing the Leopard 2 120-mm Smooth Bore Gun

The effective firepower factor can if needed be raised in the Leopard 1 to the level of the Leopard 2. This possibility is primarily of interest to Leopard user countries which do not intend to introduce the Leopard 2 and want to extend further the utilization phase of the Leopard 1. Several countries have

announced interest in a combat effectiveness upgrading with the 120-mm BK [main gun]. Thereupon, the Rheinmetall Co started a conversion development. The first prototype, a Leopard 1 which was loaned from the German army, has been equipped with the 120-mm weapon system of the Leopard 2 and the new EMES 18 fire control system. Factory testing was successfully carried out with this battle tank. Possible use in the German army will presumably not be decided upon until after thorough testing of all possibilities for increasing performance in the 105-mm caliber.

Installation Studies on a Fire Suppression System

The capability of the Leopard 1 crew to survive can be decisively improved by the installation of a fire suppression system. Studies by the industries concerned showed that a high percentage of the hits to be expected can result in setting the fuel and hydraulic oil on fire and thus would trigger explosion-like fires. These fires would have devastating consequences for the crew from internal injuries, severe burns, suffocation and poisoning.

Tests run by the industry showed that a lightning reaction and suppression of these fires is possible and thus offers the battle tank crew given such hits an excellent chance of surviving. One such fire suppression system is ready for series manufacture for the Leopard 2. Additional installation studies are planned for the Leopard 1.

Concluding Observations

The measures which were described in this article on upgrading combat effectiveness will enable the Leopard 1 weapon system to cope with the future threat beyond the year 2000 for specific operational uses.

In like manner, other weapon systems of the German army are also being rapidly and in a cost-favorable way adapted to the emerging threat through combat effectiveness upgrading. Some examples of this are cited in the following:

--Marder armored personnel carrier:

- +improvements in the undercarriage and turret sectors,
- +installing a jet water cleaning system for the tank driver's periscope and
- +installing the new A/VHF generation of radio equipment.

Beyond that a part of the Marder armored personnel carrier is equipped with thermal imagers.

--Jaguar 1 tank destroyer, combat effectiveness upgrading by

- +retrofitting a noise suppression system which the detection equipment of the HOT guided missile makes nonjammable,

- +development and introduction of an improved HOT 2 guided missile and
- +retrofitting a thermal imager.

--Combat effectiveness upgrading of the gun-equipped tank destroyer to the Jaguar 2 tank destroyer by

- +modifying the undercarriage of the gun-equipped tank destroyer,
- +equipping the US TOW antitank weapon with the AN/TAS-4 US thermal imager and a newly developed installation kit and
- +installing an external and substitute power supply.

Further combat effectiveness upgrading of the TOW antitank weapon of the Jaguar 2 tank destroyer by

- +introducing the new more efficient TOW 2 guided missile,
- +enhancing jamming resistance,
- +enhancing hit probability under limited visibility and
- +increasing the range

--Combat effectiveness upgrading of the Luchs armored reconnaissance vehicle by

- +installing a thermal imager,
- +modifying the vehicle hull which among other things will result in improved flotation capability.

--Combat effectiveness upgrading of the M 109G PzH [armored howitzer] to the M 109A3G PzH by

- +installing a German barrel (modified FH 155-1), thus able to expend all kinds of 155-mm ammunition and increasing the range of the PzH to 24 km and with extended-range projectiles to 30 km, respectively,

- +installation of a metric hydraulic system (Leopard 1) for the azimuth transmission of the turret. This increases the reliability and availability of the PzH and

- +installation of a US refitting kit in the undercarriage and turret, in this way the supportability of the PzH from the US supply is guaranteed for the future.

--Combat effectiveness upgrading of the M110SF/M107SF gun howitzer to the M110A2SF howitzer by

- +installing a new 203-mm barrel with greater loading space, thus with the capability to expend all kinds of 203-mm ammunition, including the one under


development with the strengthened ninth charge, increasing the range to 22.7 km and with extended-range projectiles to 30 km, respectively, enhancing the effect on the target and increasing barrel lifetime,

+addition of a new muzzle brake in order not to exceed the maximum barrel recoil when using the strengthened ninth charge,

+improving the undercarriage, hydraulics and the weapon system, thus increasing the stability under load and the availability of the howitzers and guaranteeing further supportability,

+retrofitting with German weather protection for the normally open crew compartment, thus making operation of the weapon system in bad weather more endurable.

Figure 2: Design of the EMES 18 Fire Control System and Component Location in the Turret



Key:

- | | |
|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1. Gun positioner | 10. Adapter, test and logic module |
| 2. Main sighting telescope | 11. Field adjustment collimator |
| 3. Computer control unit | 12. Gunner's control unit |
| 4. HZF eyepiece, commandant | 13. Pulse washing system |
| 5. WBG auxiliary control unit | 14. Vertical sensor |
| 6. Periscope accessory, commandant | 15. Fire control computer |
| 7. Monoblock electronics | 16. Loader control unit |
| 8. Gunner's control handle | 17. Laser electronics |
| 9. WBG electronics | 18. Laser pushbutton, commandant |

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MILITARY

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PACK MULES, MOUNTAINEERING SKILLS MARK ELITE ALPINE UNIT

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 19 Oct 85 p 3

[Article by Kurt Kister: An Elite Corps That Rides Mules: Mountain Infantry: Deterrent Under the Sign of the Edelweiss--Why This Tradition-Rich Division Still Plays an Important Role in the National Defense in an Age of Remote-Controlled Rockets]

[Text] Bad Reichenhall, in October

Lots of things in life are fun--but does climbing around at 7:45 in the morning in the pouring rain count as one of them? For want of an alternative, my right foot is standing in a waterfall about as thick as my arm, the left one is feeling around for a hole in the rock, and the rock slide helmet and chest strap are binding like crazy, while I exert painstaking effort to work my way up just a little bit higher in this slippery rock slide on the Untersberg. It's good to have troop leader Staff Sergeant Dieter Pietta there, when he urges us on with an encouraging, "we're getting there!" In moments like that, one is briefly inclined to forget one's baser instincts for a moment.

For the soldiers who are climbing the Untersberg today with Staff Sergeant Pietta, their deputy platoon leader, this doesn't seem to be a problem. To be sure, they are also soaked to the skin and freezing, as they have to stop because the guy ahead of them can't make any progress. Nevertheless they obviously are having fun with this jaunt, even if they "don't have to work too hard," as one private put it. In truth, for the route chosen, the Untersberg climb reaches about a degree of II on the Alpine difficulty scale and is actually part of the standard repertoire of the 231st Alpine platoon of the Reichenhall Mountain Infantry Battalion. It doesn't even begin to get tricky, and therefore interesting, for most of these guys until it reaches a III+. With unmistakable pride, Colonel Winfried Dunkel, Chief of Staff for the Mountain Division, declares that, "The Alpine platoons are the elite of the Mountain Infantry Battalion."

Protection against Armored Attacks?

For the not quite 200 members of the four Alpine platoons in the Mountain Division (and hence in the entire Bundeswehr), the General Staffer's statement is certainly a nice complement. Who wouldn't want to belong to an elite corps whose characteristics are also admired by civilians--namely, the capability of

accomplishing maximum athletic performance? On the other hand, climbing dizzying heights is not necessarily part of the original assignment of the Bundeswehr. That, as everyone knows, is supposed to consist of producing security by providing a deterrent to a "potential aggressor" by virtue of their defense capability. Yet, as long ago as February 1975, then Defense Minister Georg Leber, much to the distress of the mountain soldiers, observed that "we can't keep off armored attacks from the East with mules and mountain-climbing boots." Nevertheless, 10 years after this basic revelation, there is still a Mountain Infantry Division. And, so far as technology and equipment are concerned, it is even stronger than ever. What's the explanation for this, since the Federal Republic hasn't gotten very much more mountainous in the last few years and our Alpine neighbor Austria hasn't evolved into a potential aggressor?

Anyone who takes more than a cursory look at the organization of the 1st Mountain Infantry Division can quickly determine that the overwhelming number of its units and soldiers are only externally connected with the mountains by virtue of the Edelweiss that they wear on their arm patches and berets. A "normal" army armored division, for instance, is equipped with an average of 300 battle tanks and more than 170 armored personnel carriers, which are organized into two armored brigades and one armored infantry brigade. In contrast, the 1st Mountain Infantry Division in its present structure has 20 percent more battle tanks and nearly as many armored personnel carriers. Although Chief of Staff Dunkel won't discuss numbers, he does definitely confirm that "most of the division is oriented toward mechanized and mobile conduct of operations."

At the beginning of this year the Mountain Infantry Division even received significant, official reinforcement. The 56th Home Defense Brigade was assigned to the division, which contributed considerably to its armored strength. With this brigade, the Mountain Division includes an armored brigade and an armored infantry brigade, both of standard strength, as well as the Home Defense major mechanized formation. If things were to get serious, these three brigades are supposed to defend East Bavaria, a portion of which can be readily traversed with tanks. Their strength corresponds more or less to that of other Bundeswehr divisions.

The 23rd Mountain Infantry Brigade provides the fine distinction that sets the division off from the rest of the army; it is not just the only mountain infantry brigade in the Bundeswehr, it actually constitutes the only justification for calling this the Mountain Infantry Division. "Without us," says one officer in the brigade, "the 1st Mountain Infantry Division would have become the 8th Armored Division."

The results of this plan were impressive: A deluge of Bavarian traditionalists engulfed the numbers game in Bonn: veterans organizations, soldiers on active duty, citizens and even Franz Josef Strauss bombarded the Hardthoehe with the demand that they distance themselves from a course of action that "shows they have no sense of history." The Ministry agreed to compromise by maintaining the division in the future as the 1st (8th) Mountain Division. Soldiers and officers knew at that point that they had won the battle and simply ignored the interjected parentheses. Finally, in 1982 the then army inspector cancelled the whole renumbering procedure: Since then they are again quite officially the 1st Mountain Division.

The mountain soldiers are embroiled in a very similar conflict again today, one that is difficult to reconstruct rationally. The anonymous defense bureaucracy wants to tell them what they should wear. For only the Bavarian Division wears knee breeches and ski pants, a short uniform jacket ("mountain jacket"), spats, and a mountain-style cap. Hardly any of these articles of clothing--with the possible exception of the spats--makes any sense in daily service. Colonel Dunkel surmises that someone in Bonn must have asked himself whether it wouldn't be possible to get the soldiers in the Mountain Division, who still have access to this special equipment, to conform their appearance to that of the rest of the army. Then the testing order went out--and "troop tests" have already been conducted by individual units in the Mountain Infantry Brigade. What this means is that the infantry are testing out whether they can climb just as well in long pants as in knee breeches and whether they really need spats with long pants or perhaps only with the knee breeches or maybe not at all. For the outsider, this is all a bit confusing, but the passion which characterizes the barracks discussions in Berchtesgaden, Reichenhall and Mittenwald is an indication that we must be dealing with an existential question here.

What makes the matter even more complicated is the fact that they are also contesting with Bonn how much of the special uniform issue is going to be given to the 56th Home Defense Brigade. At Division Staff in Garmisch, they would like to see the Brigade get as much as possible, "because, after all, they belong to us now." The Hardthoehe, on the other hand, is more on the mulish side, so it looks as if plenty of telexes will be going back and forth between the Rhine and the edge of the Alps. To be sure--as evidenced by my military history since 1915--mountain infantry men are enormously tough and steadfast. That, and the fact that the mountain infantrymen are also very proud of themselves (Colonel Dunkel: "We are an elite troop based on performance, spirit, inner attitude, and external appearance."), will make the uniform battle drastically more difficult for the progressives in Bonn.

Tradition in the Mountain Troop includes not only their caps with the Edelweiss emblem, but above all and most especially their pack animals. Fifty-four pack animals, among them 33 mules, 18 Haflinger horses, and 2 Norwegian fjord horses, have survived the transformation to "Army Classification 4." They are all together now in the 230th Mountain Pack Animal Company in Bad Reichenhall, and, in the age of remote-controlled rockets and tornadoes they are at least as exotic as sailing ships in the navy. Veterinarian Staff Sergeant Major Wolfram Noreisch, the company commander of this unit, likes to call his company the "Gorch Fock of the army." The four-legged soldiers are an extremely popular object of visits from all kinds of prominent people. The spectrum ranges from Ex-Federal President Carstens to all Defense Ministers to the great-granddaddy of all mountain fanatics, Luis Trenker, who wished a "heartfelt, mulish greeting" to "the good old mule-skinners" in the guest book at Reichenhall.

If you doubt the military rationale for the pack animals, the mountain infantrymen are just as passionate [on this topic] as they were regarding the division number and the uniform questions. "What the animals carry," says Colonel Werner, commander of the Mountain Infantry Brigade, would otherwise have to be carried on the backs of soldiers." Frequently enough, there are situations in the

mountains where a helicopter is no help, and vehicles are damned to immobility for lack of roads. Even in Bonn, where they would have gladly demobilized the pack animals 7 years ago, there has been a change in the direction the wind is blowing. "The pack animal," says army spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Rudiger Drews, "is a safe and proven means of transportation." Besides that, we can't deny the four-legged creatures a certain cost effectiveness: At a purchase price of 500 marks each mule serves for an average of 20 years. Service contracts with two lodges alone in the Reichenhall area earn at least 15,000 marks a year. Where else is there a Bundeswehr unit that is bringing money into the treasury?

Their Thoughts are of an After-Ski Toddy

If, however, the tone is set for the Mountain Division by its three mechanized brigades, which differ neither in their assignment nor in their equipment from any other army division--where then is the rationale for maintaining four Mountain Infantry Battalions, with their Alpine platoons and a company of pack animals? The reason, according to Brigade Commander Werner, is obvious, "it is the military-geographical location of the Federal Republic: In the Bavarian region we have borders which are "moderately mountainous and Alpine in character": "In this region we need specially trained troops." Especially on the east border of Bavaria, that is, in the Bavarian Forest, an infantry brigade with armored defense capability could hold off the enemy "in difficult terrain and unfavorable weather," explained the colonel. Hence we can't just abandon the "know-how of mountain combat." Besides this, indeed we have to consider the fact that priority is given to securing the eastern border, although an enemy attack from the south, that is in the Alps, cannot be entirely ruled out. However, in large parts of the Bavarian Forest, as well as in the Alps, "you can't get anywhere in vehicles," according to Garmisch Chief of Staff Dunkel: "In conducting indigenous operations of this kind, we need special people, specifically, our Mountain Infantry Battalion.

As it goes in the army, the guys who are the center of the controversy aren't wracking their brains overly much over these kinds of operative problems and threat scenarios. Staff Sergeant Pietta of the 231st Alpine Platoon is dealing with concrete problems among the crags of the Untersberg. Right now he is calling the attention of his men to watch out for the countless mountain salamanders, which the damp weather drives from their hiding places. "Look out and don't tromp on the critters." Nor are the thoughts of his climbing soldiers, loaded down with knapsacks and rifles, drenched and on their feet since four in the morning, on the east border of the Federal Republic, but rather an hour's climb further on up in the bar of the Stoehr House, where they can purchase an especially comforting, hot after-ski toddy. This drink is really one of those things that are fun in life, and after a few glasses, you ask yourself whether there isn't some shorter way through the slippery, muddy, wet untersberg wall.

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MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

EIMLER: OBSOLETE MUNITIONS REMAIN PROBLEM FOR AIR FORCE

Bonn GENERAL-ANZEIGER in German 29 Nov 85 p 3

[Article by Karl-Heinz Hahslach: "Luftwaffe Chief of Staff Complains About Obsolescent Munitions: 'Equipped With WW I Flying Arrows'"]

[Text] Bonn--The Luftwaffe has the most modern types of aircraft; however, their armament leaves a lot to be desired. Luftwaffe Chief of Staff Eberhard Eimler complains that the effectiveness of his branch of the service is impaired by obsolescent munitions.

As Eimler puts it, the pilots are flying excellent weapons carriers like the Tornado, but these are, to use an exaggerated phrase, "equipped with World War I flying arrows."

Falling Behind

"We need modern munitions," the general emphasized. However, he continued, the production of new "third generation" bombs and missiles, which have been developed since the early 1980s as standoff weapons, have fallen behind the construction of up to date modern combat aircraft.

Faced with additional missions, brought about by such tasks as attacking the second echelon of enemy forces in the depth of enemy territory (FOFA), he claims to be quite worried as to whether "the things will need tomorrow are available on today's market."

He made a point of noting that the FOFA concept, repeatedly touted by NATO Commander-in-Chief Bernard Rogers, is nothing new for the German Air Force.

The Tornado, says Eimler, was specifically developed to provide more effective interdiction in the depth of enemy territory. But, he continues, the effectiveness of the most penetrating carrier system is impaired if it is forced to use weapons of the second, or even the first, generation (iron bombs from the 1940s).

Eimler believes that his service is getting the necessary funds from the defense budget to procure modern ammunition, to the extent available on the

market. A "considerable share" of it is provided with the DM 15 billion in Luftwaffe plans extending "deep into the 1990s."

Beyond that, funds for improving reconnaissance capabilities are provided also; these capabilities are presently considered deficient in the Bundeswehr plan.

The chief of staff regrets that the requirement of reconnaissance aircraft, proposed by his service and fully agreed to in the ministry of defense, has never been met.

However, he says, this deficiency could be eliminated if the Luftwaffe were able to add to its 80 RF-4E Phantom reconnaissance aircraft some specially equipped Tornados which are intended for reconnaissance and electronic warfare.

These ECR Tornados, he says, are urgently needed because in electronic warfare too there is a "tremendous need for catching up." The ECR Tornado, 40 of which should be procured at a cost of more than DM 3 billion as far as the Luftwaffe is concerned, is "conceptually well thought out" and by asking for them he is not "shooting from the hip," says Eimler.

Asked whether the Luftwaffe has sufficient numbers of aircraft to fulfill its mission, the general said: "The bottom threshold is where we are today." He refused to comment on the fact that the total number of aircraft, compared with the inventory of the early 1960s, has been cut in half, as is evident from reading the White Books.

Decision of the Planning Group

Eimler called attention to the fact however that the air defense is becoming more conventional as a result of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group's decision to cut the number of nuclear battlefield weapons drastically.

Without commenting in greater detail on the worry indicated in the Bundeswehr plan that too many Tornados might be used as nuclear weapons carriers, he said: "All the flying carriers which we set aside for nuclear purposes are of course subtracted from the conventional combat effectiveness."

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MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

NAVY'S EXPERIENCE WITH SHIP-BASED HELICOPTERS REVIEWED

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Nov 85 pp 36-39

[Article by Juergen Ehle: "Use of Helicopters from Onboard the Frigate 122"]

[Text] Since 1981 The Sea Lynx MK 88 weapon system has been integrated into the Federal Germany Navy. This was the first ship-based airplane to be introduced into the navy. Some 12 Sea Lynx helicopters have been added to the "Count Zeppelin" 3rd naval air group in Nordholz. Two others will be delivered by the British company Westland by the end of 1986. Lt Capt Juergen Ehle, Sea Lynx pilot and training officer for the onboard helicopter crews headquartered with the MFG [naval air group] 3 airborne group points out that the use of the onboard helicopter from a land base and from onboard a frigate requires meticulous organization in respect to personnel and logistics. After 4 years of onboard flight operation the helicopter crews have demonstrated their value in numerous short and long-term operations and need not fear international comparison.

Onboard Helicopter Components: 18 Soldiers

Thorough coordination and planning of helicopter operations is important to the extent that the onboard helicopters (BHS) are stationed in Nordholz and the frigates are homeported in Wilhelmshaven. The plan calls for shifting the helicopter components from Nordholz to Wilhelmshaven; nonetheless, this cannot be expected before the beginning of the 1990's. The flight personnel of the onboard helicopters belongs to the 3rd squadron in the MFG.

The onboard helicopter squadron which is assigned to the airborne group of the MFG 3 is a very young unit which was established in 1981 with the addition of the first Sea Lynx.

The maximum manning of the BHS squadron consists at present of 30 helicopter commanding officers (HFO) and 18 helicopter position finding masters (HOM) with the rank the chief petty officers.

The technical group of the MFG 3 provides the technical personnel for servicing and repairing the onboard helicopters.

If the helicopters are not onboard, then operations are mostly flown from the Nordholz land base in the North Sea/German Bay operations sector.

Normally 5 pilots, 3 HOM and 10 BHS technicians, thus a total of 18 soldiers of the MFG 3 are used to embark on 1 or the 6 class F-122 frigates. The 10 BHS technicians comprise the onboard maintenance group.

Material, replacements parts and tools for operations at sea which are independent of the land base are transported from Nordholz to Wilhelmshaven prior to embarkation.

As a rule two BHS should embark. For reasons of the operational mission on the one hand and technical availability on the other only one BHS is also put on board or made available, respectively, of course with appropriate reduction in the number of flight and technical personnel.

The BHS crew consists of two pilots and one HOM.

Onboard the frigate the helicopter personnel of the MFG 3 comprises the main section (HA) 500 which is commanded by the helicopter operations officer (HEO), the most senior and also most experienced pilot.

The HA 500 consists of sections 510 and 520. While the flight personnel belongs to section 510, the onboard maintenance group comprises section 520 which is led by the technical flight officer (LTO). During embarkation the personnel of the MFG 3 is under the ship's commanding officer.

Hard Training for Helicopter Crews

Flight operations from floating platforms assume intensive flight training, especially to guarantee safe flight operations during night operations.

Flight training to become an onboard helicopter pilot consists of the following main areas:

After English language courses and selective flight schooling the approximately 7-month long basic flight training begins at Fort Rucker, a training site for U.S. army helicopter pilots in southern Alabama. Training is done in the TH-55 and Bell UH-1H airplane models.

Basic training is followed by the Europeanizing phase in the Bell UH-1D with the 64th helicopter transport squadron of the Luftwaffe in Ahlhorn. Here mainly flying in the special geophysical conditions of Germany is learned.

Upon completion of this course, which lasts about 8 months, the young pilot in the blue uniform returns to the arms of the navy. Now flight retraining to the naval helicopter begins in the MFG 3 in Nordholz. After technical-theoretical courses practical handling of the Sea Lynx MK 88 is next taught, from exact flying of the traffic circuit to practicing emergency procedures. Following instrument flight training the young navy pilot is confronted for the first time with flying at sea. The flight operations ("procedures") for submarine chasing and fundamentals of the tactical operation, which include safe handling of the onboard radar and TANS (Tactical Air Navigation System)-computer, then comprise the main areas of the practical part of the retraining.

However, the high point of the practical retraining is the training for deck landings. After deck landing training on land on a simulated flight deck ("dummy deck") with the Dutch Navy in De Kooy, deck landing training at sea begins on a 122 frigate.

At least 60 landings, which are practiced in different wind directions and velocities, are required before the helicopter commanding officer is qualified for daytime deck landings (DLQ day). Now for the first time he can be included as a replacement pilot in onboard flight service. Then he is primarily supposed to gain experience with deck landings in different weather situations and various kinds of seas. If he masters safe landings during the day, then deck-landing at night is begun during which at least 40 landings are practiced.

The crowning conclusion is then the first "solo flight" (that is, a flight with a copilot, but without a flight instructor) at night during which the frigate is approached a number of times for deck landings. After achieving qualification for nighttime deck landings (DLQ night) the helicopter commanding officer is fully operational.

In order to maintain his operational status and level of training the pilot must annually complete a broadly based flying program in the context of the Tactical Combat Training Program (TCTP). After a theoretical beginning the HOM receive practical training at the MFG 3 in Nordholz and during operations on the frigates.

The training of the onboard helicopter crews is always focused on the diverse operational spectrum of the Sea Lynx.

Tasks of the Onboard Helicopter

The onboard helicopter is used to carry out three primary and two secondary tasks. The primary tasks include:

--Submarine chasing and antisubmarine warfare

In this role the onboard helicopter can discover, localize, classify and attack underwater targets. He has use of dunking sonar which so far has produced excellent results. As armament, among others, two torpedoes can be carried.

--Target data transmission

The BHS, with the help of its radar broadens the radar horizon of the ship or the unit. In this connection the TANS navigation computer plays a decisive role in the storage, processing and relaying of radar contacts.

--Reconnaissance

The speed, maneuverability and the operational radius of the helicopter make it possible for the crew to quickly reconnoiter a specific area or object.

The secondary tasks include:

--Sea rescue service

For this operational role a rescue winch is installed which can handle loads up to 272 kg.

--Transport

To implement transport tasks the helicopter is equipped with a load hook with which loads up to 1,360 kg, the weight of a medium size car, can be lifted.

An essential characteristic of the operational philosophy of the navy for the BHS is the double design of the controls. In other navies the Sea Lynx is flown with controls of single design. The cockpit crew consists then of a pilot and an observer who is responsible for the tactical operation of the BHS.

In the German design on the other hand, the cockpit crew consists of two pilots who can fly from both sides of the BHS. They are trained to the point that they can be used alternately at the flying and tactical position in the cockpit.

Typical Operation from Onboard the Frigate

A typical onboard flight operation is to be described using the example of a rather long maneuver in the context of a Standing Naval Force Atlantic Operation (STANAVFORLANT) in which the frigate "Rheinland-Pfalz" with two onboard helicopters participated from April to August of this year. Participation in the STANAVFORLANT meant the first long-term use of the helicopter personnel in an international unit.

After waking up at 0430 the operation briefing begins at 0500. Parallel with the briefing the onboard maintenance group carries out the preflight checks on the helicopter. At 0545: the helicopter crew once again checks the condition of the BHS. Shortly after that the turbines, which put out 1,120 hp each, are started. Essential information such as, for example, the coordinates of the present position and of the HRP (helicopter reference point), to which all transmitted target data refer in terms of direction-finding bearing and distance, as well as course and travel of ship are fed into the TANS computer.

At 0600 sharp the BHS starts. The fly co (flight coordinator) in the BHS control station, a minitower located next to the hangar with a view of the flight deck, monitors the orderly course of the starting process. The mission of the operation consists in searching for submarines in an 8 to 10 nautical mile sector ahead of the unit. After 2 hours in the air the BHS lands. It is equipped with a harpoon for decklandings. This hydraulically activated "grabber" hooks onto the matched landing grid onboard the frigate and thus keeps the helicopter on deck.

A flight deck master (FDM) gives the pilot precisely established marshaling signals for starting and landing. This proves to be a great help essentially in the landing process in order to "hit" the landing grid exactly!

immediately after landing the refueling hose is hooked up and the BHS is refueled with the rotor running. This procedure is called in airman's jargon "RRR" (= rotor running refueling). At the same time the pilots receive important information about the situation via teletype (internal communication like between ship and helicopter) the operations center. Some 5 minutes later the BHS starts again in order to continue the mission. One hour before the planned landing of the BHS the second helicopter crew is briefed in the operations center on the current situation and the weather.

After 1 and 1/2 hours in the air the BHS is recalled from its sector in order to support a Canadian helicopter during the rest of its flight time in the search for a submarine since the latter has reported sonar contact. Some 30 minutes later the BHS is back on deck. It is refueled and serviced. In the Caribbean Sea the outside temperatures are now over 30°C. Men and material are exposed to high climatic stresses.

The second BHS crew is used for the next 4 hours of antisubmarine warfare. The helicopter lands in the late afternoon for the last time this day, is again refueled, serviced, washed and given maintenance and finally put into the hangar. If no repair has to be made the service hours in the hangar end at 2000.

Experiences with Onboard Helicopters

After the first 4 years of flight operations with the Sea Lynx MK 88, after years of building up the BHS squadron and intensive training of the crews it is possible today to set forth a positive performance balance sheet which holds its own in international comparisons. Good performances were achieved during maneuvers such as, for example, British Basic Open Sea Training (BOST), but also during 4 to 5-month long-term missions. In 1984 personnel and helicopters of the MFG 3 participated in the INDIK foreign training cruise of the frigate Niedersachsen. From April to the end of the year there were and continue to be onboard helicopters on the frigates Rheinland-Pfalz and Bremen in the context of the STANAVFORLANT.

Today the MFG 3 is proud of the fact that in the case of the importance of the performance which has been shown to date in onboard flight operations the primary goal of having flown without accident has been achieved.

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MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

THIRD GENERATION ANTITANK MISSILE ENTERS DEFINITION PHASE

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Nov 85 p 72

[Text] On the basis of an appropriate agreement by the governments of Great Britain, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany, the Euromissile Dynamics Group (EMDG) has developed two antitank missile systems of the third generation which are supposed to be able to combat effectively even the armored vehicles expected in the nineties. Besides the long-range missile system PARS 3LR for armored vehicles and helicopters, an infantry weapon system for medium range, PARS 3MR, is also being developed to combat targets up to 2,000 m. This weapon system should be introduced by the NATO partners at the beginning of the next decade.

PARS 3MR is currently in the definition phase, in which an optimal design of the weapon system is being worked out as a basis for impending development. The work is essentially being performed by the parent companies of the EMDG, that is Aerospatiale, British Aerospace, and MBB. In study teams, they are working out solutions for the munition and the weapons systems.

Munition

The missile is used in direct attack, like previous antitank guided missiles. The missiles are equipped with a tandem hollow-charge combat head, which is supposed to penetrate all passive and active armored targets of the nineties. The missile is guided to the target by guide-beam steering. For this purpose it has a suitable receiver which uses the coding of the guide beam to determine the coordinates of the missile in the guide beam.

The trajectory of the missile is corrected with two control jets. As with MILAN and HOT, the missile is mounted in a firing tube and thus has a munitions character.

Weapons Systems

PARS 3MR is supposed to be deployable from the ground and from vehicles. The portable weapon system - it is transported and stored in two carrying

loads - consists of a sight, a guide-beam projector, a ramp, a directional unit, as well as a tripod. For its use from a vehicle, the tripod is removed and the weapon system is set on a special vehicle adapter, in an easy manual operation. This adapter has available the same interfaces as the tripod.

If the weapon system is to be deployed under tank protection, the sighting and guide-beam units are integrated into a compact turret.

One objective of the development is to make the weapon system as small and light as possible; furthermore, its handling should be simple. Thus the weapon system has many easily replaceable units which are connected together by means of fast-action interlocks and simple screw connections.

Portable Weapon System

The portable weapon system consists of several subassemblies which partly are also used in other weapon systems.

Guide-Beam Projector

The missile is steered through an optical guide beam. This guide beam takes care that a spatial optical modulation is produced in a direction of the desired trajectory of the missile. This modulation is received by the receiver in the missile. Together with the optical sight, the guide-beam projector is integrated in one housing.

Since a guide-beam steering system has previously already been investigated, two additional methods are currently being investigated by the infrared specialty firms of the two conglomerates (SAT, Eltro, BAe, and TRT, Zeiss, GEC Avioniks).

Sighting Units

By means of the optical sight, the gunner sets an aiming point on the target. If the view is restricted, a heat-image unit is also used. This unit is set on the weapons systems. The visible image generated by the heat-image unit is mirrored into the optical sight.

Ramp

The ramp is used to take up the munition and to fire the missile. For this purpose it contains a device to guide and seal the munition tube, an ignition generator, as well as a precise mechanical interface to secure the harmonization of the munition axis and the sighting axis. When installed in vehicles, the ramp is designed so as to permit carrying along the ammunition during the entire run.

Aiming Unit

As regards the aiming unit, a manual control was chosen for lateral aiming and a servocontrol was chosen for altitude aiming. Both were optimized with a view to minimal sighting noise. Aircraft targets can also be pursued with the aiming unit.

Tripod

A tripod is provided to set up the weapon system in the terrain reliably and stably. At this time, a tripod is being investigated which is adjustable in height, as well as a smaller tripod which also permits fastening on masonry and the like.

Integrated Weapon System

In the turret version, the sighting and guide-beam units are installed in an external mount. The optical connection to the gunner is here established by means of a periscope. The operating section for the weapon system is affixed below the periscope within arm's reach of the gunner. The compact tower has four launches which are disposed symmetrically to the sighting units and the guide-beam projector. The turret is protected with armored plates against shrapnel and hand-weapons ammunition. The altitudinal lateral drive of the turret is effected by digitally controlled electric motors. The sighting and steering units can be installed into and removed from the turret very quickly; thus alternative use of these devices in the portable and integrated weapon system is possible.

Loading of the launches and the armor or ABC protection is included within the study.

Only Small Numbers of Units for the German Army?

The PARS 3LR is supposed to be used in rather large numbers in the German army on the tank-pursuit-helicopter defense car and on the PAH-2. By contrast, according to present plans, the PARS 3MR, as a decided infantry weapon, is to be deployed only in limited number by special units. For antitank combat at ranges up to 2,000 m, the German army has decided for the antitank car that is equipped with the "fire-and-forget" 120 mm onboard gun. Nevertheless, it should be considered whether the PARS 3 MR could not be introduced in larger numbers as an effective flexible antitank weapon.

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MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

HIGH ENERGY LASER POTENTIAL FOR AIR DEFENSE DEMONSTRATED

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Dec 85 pp 77-80

[Article by Erhard Heckmann: "Air Defense by High Energy Laser, Demonstration by MBB and Diehl"]

[Text] It is really unusual when industry and government inform the public concerning a technical development which is still in the laboratory phase - or more precisely in the component phase but which, on the other hand, promises many applications in conventional defense. In a time when participation in the American SDI program is being discussed controversially, the mention of the word high-energy laser immediately calls forth associations with its strategic application as a missile defense weapon. In contrast to this, the researches of the firms MBB and Diehl, supported by the BMVg (Defense Department) with about 25 million DM, in addition to inhouse expenditures on the part of industry, aim for tactical use of the high-energy laser. Consequently, this report will discuss the work that has been done, will indicate examples of military applications, will, by way of examples, answer the question how German research compares internationally, and will indicate the steps that must be taken in order to convert scientific and engineering results into military hardware.


Rarely has a discovery from physics been converted more rapidly into products than the laser. In 1960, T.H. Maiman from Hughes Aircraft presented the ruby laser to the public. Today, the laser has replaced the stereoscopic range finder in military application. Since the end of the seventies, we have the laser target illuminator, laser-guided weapons, laser as a welding and cutting means in human medicine, lasers in production for the alignment of workpieces and machinery, as well as for cutting. The laser beam is used as a data medium, in holography for materials testing, for picture improvement, and for pattern recognition. And thus it is natural that enterprises with high-tech claims cannot overlook the laser.

At MBB two developmental directions appeared quite early: on the one hand the low-energy laser for medical technology - this field is being operated

in an independent subsidiary - and the high-energy laser, which is the concern of a working team since the beginning of the seventies. This working team is part of the business group on defense technology. Quite early, a decision was made here in favor of the carbon dioxide laser. Dr. G. Born, manager of the working team, today points proudly to the correctness of this decision. The objective of the research and technology is to obtain a secure technical base for the evaluation of future high-energy laser weapons.

Already now, the importance of the high-energy laser as a tactical defense weapon against aircraft and to blind the sensors of tank vehicles is becoming important. The land-bound "laser gun" is a purely defensive weapon. The linear propagation of its laser beam makes it possible only to fight targets which enter into one's own territory.


The action principle of all beam weapons, among which the high-energy laser is one, is simple. High power must be created locally so as to transfer it in a tight bundle through the atmosphere to the target. There it acts destructively through heat.



HEL: Gas Dynamic CO₂ Laser: Basic Structure

Key:

1. Fuel
2. Oxidizer
3. Burner
4. Laser beam
5. Jets
6. Resonator mirrors
7. Diffuser
8. Exhaust



HEL: High Energy Laser Weapon System on a Land Vehicle: Basic Structure

Key:

- | | |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1. Focusing optics and tracker | 7. Elevator arm |
| 2. Platform | 8. Range finding system |
| 3. HEL-beam | 9. Reflection from the target |
| 4. Laser | 10. Reflection from the target |
| 5. Exhaust gas/exhaust heat | 11. Transmission telescope |
| 6. Supply tank | 12. HEL-beam |

The Gas Dynamic Carbon Dioxide Laser

Component studies precede every development of a new weapon system. The most important components of the "laser gun" are the high energy laser (HEL) itself and its associated optics. The fuel for the CO₂ laser is a hydrocarbon which, together with a nitrogen-containing oxygen carrier, is atomized in a nozzle and is burned. Then the gas flows through a comb of very fine Laval jets. Here it decompresses and is put into an inversion state necessary for the laser action. Stimulated emission and the coupling out of the laser beams take place in a resonator. The laser beam emerges perpendicular to the direction of the gas flow. In brief, the laser is a rectangular rocket propulsion system with a series-connected resonator. The used-up gas mixture is exhausted into the atmosphere by means of a diffuser. With the CO₂ laser, the exhaust gas is nontoxic, a most important point for its tactical deployment. However, the high exhaust gas temperature is a disadvantage.

The wavelength of the CO₂ laser beam is in the range of heat picture units, around 10.6 μm . The CO₂ laser is a product of rocket technology and optics. The newly coined word "synergy" suggests itself here. And thus, the business area of space travel also has its share in the HEL.

An important feature of the gas dynamic laser generator is its delivered power, which is proportional to the amount of fuel utilized. This affords the capability of very easily enlarging the system without using complicated and not fully realistic model equations. The present demonstration laser has a power of a few hundred kilowatts. Its jet comb has a width of about 1 meter. The size required for a weapons application will be discussed later.

Laser Optics

The laser generator as such is only one component within a total system. Just as important is the corresponding optics to couple out the laser beam, to focus it on the target, and to maintain the target. A concave mirror with a diameter of 1 meter can be calculated as the transmitter output (laser power in the MW range) to transmit and focus the required power. At a range of 10 km, this power is able to burn through the skin of an aircraft within 1 second. In order to compensate for atmospheric turbulences, blooming (heating up of air molecules which cause the beam to spread), as well as other deformations of the laser beam within and without the system, its wave front must constantly be optimized in a closed control loop by utilizing the speed of light of the laser beam. This means that the optical components must be constantly matched to the given conditions. It should be mentioned here that no lenses are used in high energy laser technology. They would be destroyed by the laser beam. Instead, mirrors are used, in our case mirrors whose surface can be changed. Since the required change can be calculated from the influence of the interfering factors, one speaks of adaptive optics or of an active mirror. This is achieved by disposing a large number of piezoelectric positioning elements on the back side of the mirror, which is traversed by fine cooling channels. These positioning elements are inductively activated. Among the examples demonstrated were mirrors with 19 such positioning elements, i.e. a central positioning element surrounded by 2 rings with 6 and 12 tappets each. Compared to rigid optics, adaptive optics doubles the range by compensating interferences. In many tests, various materials were tried out.

With other applications, too, it is to be expected that adaptive optics will represent an economical solution where the production of large precision-ground mirrors is too expensive or where a weight saving is necessary. When tracking a target by a laser beam, the laser beam itself is used as a sensor element in a closed control loop. Here one uses the reflection differences at the target or one uses difference methods where the deviations of the laser beam center from the target marks is used as the control signal. Such a process was demonstrated by Diehl with a run-about aircraft model, where the laser beam was set fixed on a target mark as a light point. Only when the target mark vanished by turning the model, did the laser jump over to the next point of maximum reflection.

Studies have also been performed concerning its effect on the target. With the present laboratory model, it was possible to burn through centimeter-thick titanium and aluminum sheets at several meters range within 1 second. In order to simulate the action on a flying target as realistically as possible, an air jet corresponding to Mach 1 was here generated perpendicular to the laser direction. It here appeared that the metal was ablated in oval form by the air jet. The actual burn-through spot, however, was circular.

Sheet metal naturally represents the hardest targets. The materials of which sensors are composed have proven much more sensitive to laser radiation. Even destroying the surface of the window material general is sufficient to make the sensor inoperative.

The HEL Air Defense Weapon

MBB and Diehl are not only concerned with component studies but in parallel to this also with application studies. According to the work division, MBB is responsible for the laser part and Diehl for the beam guidance.

As an air defense weapon, a HEL system offers the following advantages compared to conventional gun and missile systems:

- the HEL air defense weapon works without inertia;

- the liberated power is transmitted directly to the target and only to the target. One thus obtains a narrowly selected target attack;

- the target is attacked with the speed of light, aiming calculations and the associated inaccuracies and delays are obviated;

- rapid target change;

- cheap ammunition; the fuel (hydrocarbon and oxygen carrier) is the ammunition;

- simple remunitioning = tank filling;

- no minimum firing range;

- no different ammunition is required for various types of targets;

- action on the target depends only on the irradiation time;

- deployment also against unmanned objects, against which one possibly would not use expensive guided missiles without taking into account the consequences;

- the procurement of a war supply of ammunition is obviated. This point is decisive for the costs of the weapon system.

MBB and Diehl Companies propose a tank chassis with an elevatable platform for air defense. The platform carries a focusing mirror of 1 meter diameter and the tracker, i.e. the swivel mechanics and electronics. Below this is a transverse arm which holds the passive target location system which makes possible the simultaneous tracking of many targets. By using an elevatable platform, the action range can be increased. Due to the quick reaction time from target acquisition until the action at the target with the laser weapon, targets which appear only briefly and then vanish into the ground shadow can also be attacked. A LEOPARD 2 frame is proposed as the vehicle. In place of the turret, the supply container for the fuel, the oxygen carrier and water (for cooling) as well as the laser itself are disposed thereon. To create the laser power in the megawatt range, the jet comb of the gas generator would be about 2 meters long and 40 cm high. The mass of the total system (without chassis) is about 20 tons. A two-man crew is regarded as adequate.

Naturally, a HEL air defense system will not replace gun and missile systems but only will be able to supplement them. The reason for this principally is the main disadvantage of the laser, its impairment by fog and humidity. Although a low-lying cloud cover cannot be penetrated, its suspected presence will still force the opponent to fly at greater altitudes, because: there are interference measures against missiles that are guided by radar and by IR, but not against lasers. Other conceivable applications of the HEL weapon system would be close-range protection of ships against sea-target missiles and target location RPVs as well as the protection of radar installations against antiradar missiles.

International Comparison

Naturally, in the development of a defense technology, the question arises again and again: Where do we stand on an international comparison? As was explained by Bernd Wilz, correspondent for the artillery in the defense committee, and one of the strongest proponents of HEL development, the Soviets have also been busy not only with many decades of developments for strategic applications but also with tactical HEL applications. It is expected that corresponding weapon systems may be deployable within a few years.

At the beginning of the seventies, the Americans concerned themselves with the CO₂ laser and have also installed such a laser in their airborne laser laboratory, a Boeing NKC-135. However, the U.S. Army apparently made a transition to halogen lasers, for example the deuterium-fluoride laser and the iodine-oxygen laser. These do indeed deliver a higher energy density than the CO₂ laser, but their exhaust gases are diabolically toxic. In March 1985, the American HEL research was subsumed within the SDI program. Taking into account all freely accessible sources, one can say that the researches of MBB and Diehl represent the world peak. In France, several companies and the state air-travel research agency ONERA are concerning themselves with similar developments. Apparently there already exists close contact at least on the official side. Collaboration in a German-French

context thus lies close at hand. On the other hand, the high energy laser could become the centerpiece of a conventional defense in a transatlantic cooperation.

Future Tasks

Due to its distinctively high defensive power, the question now arises how such a task can be pushed as rapidly as possible from armaments research to a systems contract. Although the expenditure for development, production, and maintenance of a deployable system cannot yet be estimated, the next step must be taken soon, namely the integration of the components in an HEL demonstrator. Only in this way will reliable cost-effectiveness estimates for a future weapon system become possible. The objective also must be to include these researches within the federal defense planning.

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MILITARY

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STATUS OF COMBAT ROBOT DEVELOPMENT, APPLICATION SURVEYED

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Dec 1985 pp 82-87

[Article by Col Friedrich Egger: "Robot Deployment in the Army"]

[Excerpt] Although the idea of having machines perform human activities is not new, it has recently become more and more permanent, even in the area of defense. The reasons for this attitude are the opportunities which have been opened up in this area, especially by the electronics industry. The motives are ideas ranging from the protection of people against dangerous activities, and supplementing the work force with machines, as personnel shortages become more conspicuous, to the total replacement of human workers, with the result that eventually they may even become superfluous. Certainly an uneasy prospect. If these ideas generally apply to many areas, e.g., to automatic assembly line techniques in industry, which would in turn expect more precise execution in its production processes and would at the same time become more independent of human pressures, defense technology presently offers an especially interesting experimental field for this type of automation. Precisely in this area, all the factors coalesce which favor the deployment of robots, namely, the opportunity to compensate for the population decline, i.e., for the reduction in manpower requirements; compensation for the lack of human intelligence, which is mentioned again and again--where the justifiable question arises, whether people are becoming more stupid; protection against frequently senseless hazardous situations, which is actually the most sympathetic factor. The following paper expresses the opinions of Col Friedrich Egger, general staff, engineer, as the section chief, Command and Control VI 5, chairman of the army study group, which generates tactical requirements.

Definition and History

The major wars of this century also move robots into armaments technology and implement them as remotely activated explosive charges.

Besides many experimental models, the "Goliath" became famous, especially in the Warsaw uprising of 1944, where both the attackers and defenders used this robot successfully and reached a peak with it in the battle around the stock exchange. After the Second World War industrial robots became more and more important because of the shortage of personnel, but at first scarcely any activities could be observed in the armaments sector.

Only beginning with the seventies, interest again appeared because of new technological possibilities. Now, in the middle of the eighties, almost euphoric ideas have been let loose.

Activities

Occasioned by this situation, many committees have now concerned themselves with this material, either because of their own initiative or under contract. Impressive researches have become public. As far as armaments technology is concerned, the bulk of these proposals surely reach the committee that is responsible for army armaments planning within the Federal Department of Defense.

Their content is now contained in the following application possibilities for robot deployment in the army. The most important activities will here be listed once again:

NATO, in one of its working teams, is concerned with "robots in the battlefield" and is working out a study on this point.

FINABEL, the European armaments committee, likewise intends to perform a study.

The subdepartment Rue VI is concerned on a national level with pioneering ideas. It became a special armaments element in the research and technology concept.

Hamburg Bw University presented creative ideas to the secretary of state.

The Office for Studies and Training of the Federal Defense Department and the IABG produced initial brief studies for robot deployment in the army.

The following companies: Eng. Office Abels, Munster; DFVLR, Oberpfaffenhofen; Dornier, Friedrichshafen, EFGAN (Research Institute for Patent Recognition) Ettlingen; ESG, Munich; GIT (Society for Engineering Technology), Essen; GST (Society for Systems Engineering mbH); IITB (Fraunhofer Institute), Karlsruhe; MBB, Munich-Ottobrunn; Pietsch (IBP),

Ettlingen; Siemens, Munich; Wegmann, Kassel; AEG, Ulm; Diehl, Nuremberg; SEL, Stuttgart, made valuable contributions. This listing makes no claim for completeness.

Now, to be able to treat the opportunities of "robot deployment in the army" without euphoria, one must specify what is understood thereby. A sharp separation between already customary industrial robots and future military automats cannot be made on a technical basis.

Differences arise only in terms of purpose. If one side tries to achieve higher production, the objective of the other side is to protect people and, perhaps as a further consequence, to replace them. The army also is raising the question concerning the integral area, that is the limits from-to, within which robots should be used. It has decided the following:

- as the lower limit, every automatic process as remote control or as automatic weapons release,

- as the upper limit, to include within robot technology all technological possibilities that may appear, right up to intelligent systems of experts.

According to this definition, the army is already deep in robotization, and evidence for this will be presented below. The broad integral span will also be subdivided as indeed has already been done in the study groups, where this subject was treated as a component proper to the army, namely:

- reconnaissance with the component areas of reconnaissance and electronic warfare

- command with the component areas of command systems and FmVdDst (not further identified)

- combat with the component areas of armored combat troops, light combat troops, and territorial army

- combat support with the component areas of fire support and land and water mobility

- deployment support with the component areas of ABC defense, camouflage and concealment, and logistics.

In terms of these systematics, the ideas of the army regarding "robot deployment" will now be considered in more detail. Every project will be evaluated according to its idea, degree of fulfillment of tactical requirements, and a technical implementation criterion.

Application Possibilities

Reconnaissance

The most comprehensive possible and in-depth information gathering process and its immediate transmission are the most important criteria of the troop commander for directing the combat.

Reconnaissance means, therefore, have special significance since they must penetrate the enemy space and at the same time must be exposed to as little risk as possible. The idea of using reconnaissance robots for this purpose has now already been transformed into reality and continues to occupy a broad space in the tactical requirements for future systems. The reconnaissance drones CL 89, CL 289, and KZO (mini-aircraft for target location) are unmanned, automatically controlled monitoring organs and, to an adequate extent, they already fulfill the requirements imposed on them.

They can be used economically only for specific location-finding purposes - the army here speaks of secondary reconnaissance. This implies a further requirement for primary reconnaissance means, which are not yet available. Two possibilities appear for closing this gap:

Is there a robot eye which can permanently visualize the enemy battlefield from a great height? The ideas for implementation have already matured technically to considerable extent with the ARGUS system, where an unmanned helicopter platform, controlled with a laser beam rider and equipped with radar eyes, could fulfill this requirement up to a height of 3,000 meters. A problem here is the vulnerability of this system since it must work actively and thus can easily be acquired by the enemy. At this time, this vulnerability is being investigated more closely in studies.

This vulnerability would not exist with the second possibility, a system that is diametrically opposite to ARGUS. It has a remote espionage robot, also known under the designation of ground sensor. The espionage units are well camouflaged and are introduced in the terrain. They work with a passive sensor combination. Their capabilities include:

- distinguishing real and caterpillar vehicles by means of seismic measurements,
- distinguishing engine noises by means of acoustic measurements,
- distinguishing wheel and roller spacings by means of infrared measurements.

In this way, they can even identify precisely the enemy units and can transmit instantly the movement of columns. However, a critical point with these robots is their placement in the enemy space.

In a further sense, "electronic warfar (EloKa)" is also part of reconnaissance. The HELAS system (Siemens Company) is a first step towards the automated rapid acquisition and evaluation of electromagnetic radiations from the enemy.

The system comprises the following components:

- telecommunications and electronic reconnaissance (FmEloAufkl),
- electronic support measures (EloUM),
- electronic countermeasures (EloGM).

It would certainly be the precursor for a future EloKa system of similar form.

Command

Information processing and the presentation of the decision of the troop commander as visible elements of the command process will be highly automated in the near future by the command system HEROS (army command information system for computer-supported operational command in the staffs). With its components - computer, printer, memory, data input and output unit, as well as position display unit - in individual command posts and their radio or optical waveguide linkage, they will

- improve the preconditions for commanding one's own forces and for using the means of the reconnaissance unit and

- secure a more rapid information flow than previously between the command posts of different command levels (Brig-Div-Corps) and equivalent command levels (Main and Rear).

The army will procure a planning simulation system for command training. In this connection one will fall back on experience that was already gained in the early seventies with the OR plan-game models. The question here arises whether this does not already involve an entry into the "expert systems" which recently have been conjured up so frequently.

A revealing glance into this material, which is still felt to be a black box, shall attempt to clarify this statement.

The OR plan games with computer assistance already now are able to simulate combat of the associated weapons in correspondence with the war picture. The application of probability calculations (Lancaster equation, Monte Carlo method) help to make decisions in terms of comparing the fighting power of weapons systems. Corresponding to the scenario chosen and to the command level, the game elements (weapon system - component unit - unit - formation - large formation - are controlled with updated and conditional instructions according to their deployment principles. The digitalized terrain, subdivided into grids, is introduced in accord with accessibility and obstacle value.

The elements of combat support, such as artillery, pioneers, and air defense, are considered factorially. Reconnaissance and logistics are subsumed harmonically into the entire event by means of supplementary models. Restricted visual conditions (day/night, dirty battlefield), weather, and seasonal conditions are likewise imaged together with their effects. The interplay of all these components finds its representation and evaluation in the loss developments of the two parties (RED and BLUE) as well as in changes of space domination.

Simulations of this type have already for some time been used for decision making. The results are also becoming more and more valuable through constant improvements of the models. But they cannot make the actual decision and will always remain only decision aids. Even if one could answer the disputed question, how far one can go in automation for certain investigations.

For training, it certainly makes more sense to let the battle run in the computer only with a time limit. By means of short-term changes of position, the command officer is forced to make new decisions as often as possible. One should therefore have an "open" game. This is the point of view of the soldiers. Many scientists, however, prefer a complete simulation, which runs automatically until a battle has been decided, and without the possibility of intervention by command elements. Here one thinks of a "closed system." Surely, such an uninfluencible simulation could be used meaningfully for investigations of defense planning (e.g. GDP plans), but it requires a level of intelligence on the part of the computer system which at this time is still a Utopia.

Combat

In the combat area, there still exists at this time the greatest gap with respect to the utilization of automats or even robots. Apart from considerations and test models for automatic weapons loading for tank guns, robot technology has up to now hardly initiated any activities in the armored combat troops, which now as before dominate the army equipment. This may be disappointing, but it is understandably based on the medium-term emphasis of army equipment, the combat car of the nineties with its interconnection to the conventional war picture, to which the enemy also still feels committed.

Regardless of this, a thinking process has begun for the years after 2000, which tries to break out from the concatenation of conventional ideas. The return of the future combat tank into the preliminary phase, and the instruction to the secretary of state for armaments, to impose new requirements on this armored combat car of 2000 with the tactical most modern technologies, surely is a first step towards including combat automats in their considerations.

Wegmann Company, besides many other institutions, has concerned itself with possibilities whose content concerns a combat automat. In rough form, some solution possibilities will be indicated;

The concept of a remotely controlled combat tank with little protection, controlled by a highly protected crew transport car, puts protection of the human person into the center.

A string of tanks with three remotely controlled combat tanks and one controlling MTW (crew transport car) principally emphasizes the saving of personnel.

A two-man combat tank with remotely controlled munition transport as satellite tries to solve logistical problems.

A string of tanks with four combat tanks and four remotely controlled munition transports increases the protection, savings, and logistics effect.

These rough examples clearly show that the field here has not yet been covered. Precisely from the areas of the relevant industries, the army is expecting further stimulus and would be happy to include this in the work of its study teams.

Combat Support

The implementation status of robot technology in combat support can be evaluated more positively.

First as regards firing support: The end-phase controlled artillery munition (SADARM) is already in the introduction stage. Besides this, a tactical requirement for a combat drone system is currently being worked on with high priority. This unmanned mini-aircraft is equipped with an effective combat head and is to be used in squadrons to combat marching columns of armored units of the second level up to a level of 70 km in the enemy terrain from the VRV (forward edge of the battle area). The technical flight requirements and the equipment with an effective combat head already now can be achieved without any problem. But the necessary sensor apparatus is still lagging behind and harbors unsolved problems as regards target acquisition, resistance, and vulnerability. Nevertheless, this project is standing at the center point of army planning.

Pioneer Support

Mine combat by robot technology has acquired great significance. Here finally are some possibilities for overcoming nearly 100 years of stagnation.

The jump from the static mine to the dynamic mine (directional mines) guarantees an upwards evaluation of defensive mine combat. Tank and helicopter defensive mines are no longer waiting for contact to be triggered. But they use sophisticated sensors, with an acoustic and infrared basis, (ZIRA of Honeywell Company) operating over larger distances and equipped with selective capacity, to search out their targets autonomously.

Connected with spatially active explosive liquids, the dynamic mines are to be used for a spatial blockage system which likewise automatically compacts the isochrones and causes enemy movements to suffocate in viscosity.

The actual entry into robot technology, however, is sought by the army in terms of a remotely controlled mine-sweeping automat. A LEOPARD chassis, which already can be remotely controlled forms the basis for this. The introduction of a special element "robot technology" in the research and technology concept should provide the preconditions for implementation.

Deployment Support/Logistics

The components of deployment support suggest themselves especially favorably for robotization.

In ABC defense, it certainly is in accord with the times to use "remotely controlled automats" for staying in irradiated terrain, whether it be for measurement purposes or for decontamination. Atomic research has already set a mark in this connection, and has done a first step towards implementation with a robot fire department.

The smoke-screen tactics of the Warsaw Pact and our own studies confirm again and again that a lag exists in the area of "camouflage and concealment," in which the German army at one time occupied a leading position. Remotely controlled smoke pots could outrun enemy fire during counterattack operations and could conceal the vulnerable approach phase. The result of the study yielded a 50 percent reduction of losses under such preconditions as compared to an open approach.

In this connection, one must also think about dummies. These are designed as the cheapest deception robots and are pyrotechnically manipulated. Equipped with the best visual means, they provide no means to differentiate them from a true combat vehicle.

In logistics, one wishes to implement assembly line-like supply operations with robot columns, in similar fashion as was already described under the combat chapter.

The repair is very closely connected with industry and already now is using the automation that is applicable there.

The Research and Technology Concept (R and T Concept)

The most important instrument for all preliminary phase activities is the newly introduced research and technology concept of the main armaments department in the BMVg. Last year, a test run was performed with this and, beginning this year, it is supposed to guide all research activities. The state secretary for armaments intends to increase the means for research if this guarantees that utilization costs can be saved. Seven hundred million DM have been provided for 1986. Since "robot deployment in the army" on

a large scale is still in a preliminary phase, it is only from the R and T barrel that means can be furnished for further research in this area.

The procedure of the R and T concept accords an important influence to the user. The persons of the component fighting forces who are charged with the guiding concepts can specify the central points by correlating measures and can force these points on the committee for guiding concepts in the main armaments department. The means will then be distributed by the latter within its technical working team, which consists of so-called element reporters. For robot technology, this specification of central points in the guiding concept was implemented as "inhibition and promotion of mobility". It was introduced into the R and T management in collaboration with the responsible committee.

International Collaboration

International collaboration in the robot area is still in its very beginnings. Great Britain and France have announced great interest in an exchange of ideas. Initial discussions on this point will take place during the next bilateral negotiations. The United States has begun intensively with development in all areas, and they are already pressing for specific collaboration. As a first step in this connection, instruction was provided in the U.S. projects, among which the following are to be mentioned as the most important:

- a reconnaissance robot vehicle,
- a training device with artificial intelligence,
- a tactical robot vehicle (weapons carrier),
- an ABC reconnaissance robot,
- a battlefield smoke-screening system,
- an automatic munitions supply point.

Independently of one another, the United States and GE have developed similar ideas.

No details are known about the opposite side. But one must start from the idea that activities of the same type are in progress there also.

Summary

If the definition for "robot technology in the army" is accepted, the activities are already in the middle of this material, in terms of the examples we have cited. A further penetration, deepening, and expansion are being attempted within the framework of the R and T concept. International collaboration, especially with the allies, is apparent.

As a guideline we propose:

Personnel savings must be taken into account for demographic reasons.

The main motive for robotization, however, remains protection of the soldier.

MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

AIRBORNE INFANTRY FOCUSES ON LIGHT INFANTRY, ANTITANK ROLES

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Aug 85 pp 26-31

[Article by Inge Dose-Krohn: "Special Task Applications: The Airborne Division"]

[Text] It is an elite unit in the Army, the 1st airborne division--the only division of this kind in the Bundeswehr's largest military service. Yet its commander, Maj Gen Christoph-Adolf Fuerus, accepts the concept of elite for his men only if it is used by soldiers of other units in recognition of the performance of the paratroopers. On the other hand, anyone who characterizes himself that way is in deep trouble with the commander. He does not like self-praise.

The recruit who wants to join the 8,000-man airborne division is investigated at the district selective service offices against high standards in respect to his suitability as a paratrooper. But mainly this guarantees the division that only soldiers who are really suitable for the infantry will be admitted. For this large unit is the only division in the Bundeswehr that is in fact infantry-heavy. And all operations require the highest level of physical performance. Thus, only soldiers who meet the criteria are useful here.

The men with the diving eagle on the bordeaux-red baret appear--or rather, drop in where "the fire is." They reinforce antitank defense in threatened sectors, block the enemy who has broken through, hold key positions, close gaps which the attacker has torn in their defensive forces, or protect open flanks. They liberate occupied villages, retake airports or harbors which have fallen into enemy hands. Since the paratrooper forces--as the Bundeswehr in general--are also defensive forces, raid-type operations behind enemy lines are also possible if these should have advanced into FRG territory.

The official definition of mission and character reads as follows: The units of the division are organized, equipped and trained so that they are especially suited to airborne operations with air landings, also units in jump operations. Their use makes it possible for the command to quickly impact the course of a battle, even at great distances, and thus to gain or maintain freedom of action. With airborne operation airborne units in the advanced combat organization with command units and combat units are landed or dropped

by parachute in the deployment area in such a way that they can begin fighting without delay.

The brigades are the airmobile combat support force of the three German corps. As large units--organized and motorized primarily as infantry--they are deployed within a limited time by air transport, or in special situations by land march. Thus, the corps can rapidly deploy combat forces over average and great distances, natural obstacles, destroyed or contaminated terrain, and adjust their own operations to every unexpectedly changing situation.

Even for the fast attack force, the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (AMF), which in times of tension is suppose to contribute to credible deterrence along the "weak flanks" of NATO, the 1st airborne division, with a reinforced paratrooper battalion and other units, provides the largest share of the German contingent for whose planning and peacetime training it is also responsible.

The mission of being able to begin fighting without delay at the point of deployment means that in airborne operations the soldier himself carries all the heavy equipment, that the TOW weapon systems and 20-mm automatic gun on motor trucks (KRAKA) are landed at the same time from C-160 TRANSALL transport planes and CH-53 or UH-1D helicopters. In jump operations the soldier must depend solely on his personal equipment. Of course, in a national defense emergency this kind of operation is resorted to only in a limited way. The jumper hanging on his parachute quickly becomes a target par excellence.

In general, paratroopers in combat are unprotected in a way that scarcely any other soldier is. There is no armor anywhere. Their KRAKA which they brought along in their transport planes are only open vehicles and quasi fully exposed until they can disappear in covered terrain. No matter how operationally strong such a unit is, this vulnerability has coined for it such terms as "soft target" or "one-way weapon."

Yet these times will soon be over. The WIESEL, a light armored weapons carrier which can be transported by air and which, on tracks, carries the chief weapon systems of the division--TOW and 20-mm automatic gun--is suppose to undergo operational testing starting in 1986 at the airborne and air transport school in Albstadt/Schongau. After vacillating for years the decision has now been made in favor of the vehicle developed by Porsche. It must still be equipped with a diesel engine like all Bundeswehr vehicles, primarily for environmental considerations. Effective 1989 the WIESEL is to become a part of the division and replace 312 KRAKA.

Next year the decision will be made about a new wheeled vehicle which is likewise transportable by air and will replace the remaining 484 motor trucks in the large unit. For only until 1988/1989 is the supply of replacement parts for the KRAKA certain. Completion of outfitting with both new vehicles is planned for 1993. But the supply gap which will occur starting in 1988 for the existing motor trucks will be closed this way: the vehicles which have been taken out of service will be scavenged to maintain the others.

Priority will also be given to the airborne soldiers' night vision equipment. Yet this year a start is to be made on equipping the TOW antitank guided missile systems with modern efficient night vision equipment. And better times, that is, safer times, are dawning for the jumpers. In the FRG a three-canopy parachute was developed which consists of 3 individual parachutes which are each 36 m² in size. In a national defense emergency this can decrease the jump height to 80 meters and substantially reduce the jumpers' period of vulnerability in the air. In peacetime, for safety reasons the jump height is about 250 meters. In any event these are 150 meters less than is required at present for a jump using the old type T 10 parachute. Introduction of the three-canopy parachute should be started this year.

All this will even further increase the combat capability of the 1st airborne division. With the introduction of army structure 4 even in this large unit it had almost doubled because it was possible to increase the operational paratrooper battalions from six to nine on the one hand, and on the other the number of antitank guided missile systems increased substantially.

WEHRTECHNIK discussed with division commander Maj Gen Christoph-Adolf Fuerus the reorganization of the division, its deployment, task, and combat readiness.

[Question] The airborne division and its brigades were organized in 1982 according to army structure 4. What have been your experiences with that?

[Answer] Our experience of almost 3 years now has shown that this organization is optimal in the brigades. We now mix paratrooper and antitank units in the same battalion just as we then normally deploy them together. Previously they were in separate battalions. I consider the organization that we currently have better than previously. It has proven its worth. When we receive new weapon systems such as the WIESEL or new wheeled vehicles, then we will have to review the organization once again. We have long since been involved in rationally determining things. But so far I have not yet been given any valid argument that necessarily requires a new organization for us. And in this I am proceeding only on the basis of very thorough testing and review because every reorganization causes considerably uneasiness among the troops and keeps us from the very necessary training.

The question of the threat was the basis of the considerations on the new structure of the airborne unit. We still believe that the enemy will attack with battle tanks and accompanying infantry. Furthermore, we naturally also proceeded on the basis of our predominant types of terrain. Thus, the mix of antitank units and foot infantry--which in a defensive battle must dig in because of the limited protection that it has--is the one which seems to us to be the most purposeful at the battalion level. Basically we have antitank strength because of the MILAN, but mainly because of the TOW. But these antitank guided missiles will be only very rarely used alone without infantry protection. Thus, there is better cooperation when both are in one battalion.

[Question] What are the tasks of the division staff in peacetime and in a national defense emergency?

[Answer] The staff here in Bruchsal commands the entire airborne division, basically consisting of the three brigades, brigade 25 in the Black Forest--headquarters in Calw und Nagold--brigade 26 in the Saarland with its headquarters in Saarlouis as well as in Merzig and Lebach, and then brigade 27 with headquarters in Lippstadt and garrison cities Wildeshausen and Iserlohn. In addition, there are engineer units in Passau, Coblenz, and Minden. This deployment from Passau to Wildeshausen covers therefore about 800 km. The engineer companies are of course under my command only in a national defense emergency. But we share them in our exercises. Naturally, for my assisting command supervision it is often awkward when the units are so widely dispersed in the FRG. Yet this stationing from north to south is naturally connected to deployment in a national defense emergency.

[Question] How are the airborne brigades deployed in a national defense emergency, in battalions or self-contained?

[Answer] Deployment by brigade--of course within a limited time, this is a part of the structure of our logistics--is basically possible, conceivable and also a goal. I think nothing of introducing battalions for reinforcement anywhere. For the brigade, primarily the paratrooper forces, cannot fully develop its combat capability. Of course, this brigade, if it takes over a separate combat sector, must be reinforced by combat support troops. That is a condition sine qua non. Here I am thinking of artillery, antitank helicopters as well as of air defense and engineers.

[Question] How do these brigades get to their deployment location?

[Answer] If appropriate helicopter transport space is available quickly and in adequate quantity, then we also strive for an airborne operation, either with CH-53's or UN-1D's, but in the case of large-scale operations we also think of the Luftwaffe's C-160 TRANSALL. But an airborne operation makes sense only with distances of more than 120 km. Of course, a really separate combat sector will be the exception for the brigade. For we naturally strive to deploy the airborne brigades in a deployment division's sector with the primary goal of freeing up mechanized units in order to have them available at another location where they are more urgently needed.

[Question] Do you have adequate transport space for such an airborne operation?

[Answer] We can fly a brigade in with the most important and most combat-capable units in two waves. Additional forces, especially from the logistics sector, follow as the ground echelon.

[Question] As replacement for the KRAKA the airborne division will receive two different types of vehicles, the armored tracked vehicle WIESEL on the one hand, and a wheeled vehicle which is yet to be developed on the other. Why?

[Answer] At the time the KRAKA was developed exclusively as a transport vehicle, not as a carrier vehicle for weapon systems. In retrospect, because

there was still no new one developed the KRAKA was overburdened more and more and this transport vehicle was even "pushed up" to being a weapons carrier. Today it carries not only mortars, but also the 20-mm gun and the TWO weapon system. This overburdens the vehicle. Porsche developed the WIESEL. But then Chief of Staff Glanz "put into motion" for us a very new system, a different wheeled vehicle, the Mercedes terrain vehicle. Thus, there were two competing systems. Last year we in this division itself carried out the comparison operational test for cross country capability between the WIESEL and the wheeled vehicle. This produced some results. Even if experts today claim that wheeled vehicles, with all-wheel drive and differential lock, have the same cross country capability as tracked vehicles, it simply is not true. After the capability of being transported by air--our most important requirement--had also been tested and firing trials relative to the vibration effect of the vehicle had been made, it turned out that this wheeled vehicle did not satisfy the important military-tactical requirements. The decision was definitively in favor of the WIESEL. The funds have been released for Porsche so that the company can now finish developing the prototypes. But we are clear about the fact that it is a weapons carrier with armor which can only be so strong, so that we remain within the 3-ton weight limit for air transportability. But we are still better protected against enemy weapons with it than with a wheeled vehicle. But I must add that the WIESEL alone does not yet satisfy the desires and needs of the paratroopers because we have the KRAKA in all companies. Thus at the moment there is intensive consideration of which wheeled vehicle can replace the other KRAKA. The tactical requirements will be fully developed yet this year and the funds for this KRAKA replacement have been taken into consideration in the budget plans.


[Question] Do the airborne forces occasionally have recruiting worries?

[Answer] Not at all. Actually there are always more individuals liable for military service who will also accept induction far from home, something that otherwise is not at all so popular among our young soldiers if they can only become paratroopers. Although the jump operation in a national defense emergency remains the exception, jump training does have some importance for the unit. With this training it develops noticeably high motivation and comparable will to perform. Of course, that is not the only factor, but the training which is carried out overall under combatlike conditions naturally does weld together. But the paratrooper course, which as a rule is completed unit by unit separately between the 4th and 6th month of training, is certainly a large motivation factor. The paratrooper does not like to be sent home while his six group comrades endure the demands.

Of course, motivation is not a criterion for this training. It is driven from necessity in combat.

The course itself is naturally a very great experience for all soldiers. For each has to first summon up his courage for the first "live" jump and for the most part also in all other jumps to throw his heart out first and then follow with his body.

Figure: Organization of an Airborne (LL) Brigade; (▲ = staffed)
The 4th paratrooper battalion is staffed in peacetime.



Key:

1. Airborne headquarters company
2. Airborne mortar company, 16 mortars
3. Airborne engineer company
4. Airborne medical company
5. Airborne supply company
6. Paratrooper battalion, 20 TOW, 8 MILAN, 12 field guns
7. Headquarters and service company
8. Paratrooper company
9. Antitank paratrooper company

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MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

OFFICER TRAINING FOR ARMY HELICOPTER FORCE REVIEWED

Flight Officer Course

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German Aug 85 p 482

[Article by Capt Wolfgang Melon: "Pilot Training"]

[Text] The noncommissioned officer candidate's training course begins with "preflight training" which requires improving English skills (achieving performance level B) and in which the fundamentals of flying theory are to be taught. As a rule officers/officer candidates traditionally achieved these goals during their training course (university, army officer's school).

In the future, in view of the reorganization of training to become an officer (effective upon entering the service on 1 July 1985) officer candidates will start flying earlier because training takes place in the third service year instead of after completing university study. Only after basic schooling does the (then) officer start study at one of the Bundeswehr's universities.

The start into the flying specialty is done either in the Alouette II helicopter type at the army aviation combat training school or--on a lesser scale--in the UH-1D in the United States.

The flight student completes about 100 hours flying time before he has earned the military pilot's license for helicopters after passing a "check flight." He is now in a position to fly a helicopter independently and according to regulations. In the subsequent flight-tactical training flying is taught in operation. After completion of this training the "Combat Training Program" (CTP) is completed in the unit/squadron, a program which contains specific flight maneuvers and the entire operational spectrum for the type of helicopter in question. After an additional check flight "CR" (combat ready) status is awarded. The pilot has become an operations pilot in an army aviation squadron.

However, as a rule, that still does not mean completion of the training phase. The army aviation squadrons of the divisions and corps changed over to the new BO-105M liaison helicopter. Today BO-105M's are in operation in the corps squadrons of all three corps, the division squadrons of the 2nd corps and in the 6th army aviation regiment.

Pilots who had had flight experience can receive additional training in the BO-105P antitank helicopter. After special tactical training coupled with HOT marksmanship training they are fully combat-ready as PAH [antitank helicopter] pilots in one of the PAH regiments.

Transport helicopter pilots undergo the longest training course. After completing Alouette training and further school in the LTH UH-1D instrument flight training takes place with the object of flying a helicopter exclusively by instruments under almost any weather conditions. Helicopter pilots who completed their basic education in the United States must get accustomed to the different weather conditions in Germany through followup training at the army aviation combat training school (HFlgWaS) and also earn IFR [instrument flight rules] certification there (so-called Europeanizing).


In the flight-tactical training in the UH-1D it is then a question of mastering the weapon system on the battlefield under almost all kinds of weather conditions by visual flight. Only especially experienced helicopter pilots, who have completed all training in the UH-1D helicopter type are given the opportunity to fly the CH-53, the largest helicopter in army aviation.

However, the training possibilities for flight personnel in army aviation are still not exhausted; for every type of helicopter it is possible to earn flight instruction certification (FLB) which permits the holder to train flight students.

Since every helicopter pilot must annually demonstrate his abilities in a test flight, officers who have pilot testing certification are needed to do this (LUeB). Following repair, technically defective helicopters are tested by an NB [flight checking certified] pilot for faultless operation.

For reasons of air safety all these authorizations apply only for one type of helicopter.

Training Course for Army Aviation Pilots



Key:

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| 1. Flight-tactical training CH-53 | 10. Basic helicopter training Alouette II |
| 2. Additional training MTH CH-53 | 11. Follow-up training at army aviation combat training school |
| 3. Flight-tactical training BO-105P | 12. Basic helicopter training in the United States (ENT) |
| 4. Instrument flying training | 13. Preflight training; length of training in weeks |
| 5. Flight-tactical training LTH | |
| 6. Additional training BO-105M | |
| 7. Additional training PAH BO-105P | |
| 8. Additional training LTH UH-1D | |
| 9. Flight-tactical training II | |

Technical Officer Training

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German Aug 85 p 483

[Article by Maj Dieter Hahne: "Training Technical Flight Personnel"]

[Text] The task of training army aviation technical flight personnel--achieving as high a level as possible of combat readiness for the flying equipment-- requires technically highly qualified soldiers of all specialties. This training must be done in the most diverse technical areas of aircraft technology and must be achieved in concert with general military training because the military tasks of the commander, trainer and teacher must also be performed by the long-term army aviation soldier. Figure 1 shows the large variety of technical areas in aircraft technology.

Training series are required in accordance with the technical areas. At the same time consideration must be given for the various specialties to the fact that on the one hand the specialist is supposed to achieve the necessary depth of expert knowledge in his training and on the other hand the future commander must be trained sufficiently comprehensively.

These requirements for technical training are met by a training system which is developed on ATN [military occupation certification] stages; this system is borne primarily by the Luftwaffe's technical schools. This system is supplemented by the training areas which must be performed in army aviation:

--ATN 8 training in the context of basic training,

--ATN 8 and ATN 7 training in the Alouette II helicopter (engine, airframe and equipment),

--training at the work site (AAP) and

--training in the type of helicopter.

Figure 2 gives a clear picture of the time relationship and rank/specialty structure.

Technical flight officers in the military service receive additional training to become certified technicians (2 years).

Technical flight officers in field service complete study at the Bundeswehr's advanced school (3 years). This study is supplemented by technical training in the officer's training course B, practical training in the unit and type training at the Luftwaffe's technical schools.

The most important problems in technical flight training can likewise be seen in Figure 2. These are the modest technical training of persons liable to military service and the long training periods for key technical flight personnel in the specialty of noncommissioned officers.

The fact that in the future, aircraft (for example PAH-2) which are assigned to the field forces will, because of self-testing devices, improved materials, modular construction, certainly be easier to service and repair than existing equipment also influences training. It will perhaps be possible to shape it more simply for the maintenance personnel. In the repair sector, however, even higher demands will have to be placed on expert knowledge. Thus, the length of training for this personnel will increase even more and as a result the field troops will be even more burdened than has been the case. A workable path to a solution is to distinguish between technical and military training, between commander, trainer and teacher and the skilled specialist.

Bild 1 Fachgebiete der Luftfahrzeugtechnik




Figure 1. Technical Areas in Aircraft Technology

Key:

- | | |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 1. Airframe | 8. Aircraft equipment Aircraft |
| 2. Engine | Eli/-Instruments |
| 3. Hydraulics | 9. Flight equipment |
| 4. Aircraft metalworker | 10. Aircraft replacement parts supply |
| 5. Aircraft painter/upholsterer | 11. Aircraft radio |
| 6. Ground service equipment | 12. Aircraft navigation |
| 7. Aircraft technology | 13. Flight control systems |
| | 14. Weapon systems |




Figure 2. Training System Established on ATN Stages

Key:

1. Training time in weeks
2. Length of training in the ATN stage depends on technical area
3. +tester training without auxiliary tester Time (26 weeks)
4. +additional ATN's
5. Individuals liable to military service
6. Noncommissioned officers/subcontractors in the technical areas
7. Staff sergeant-master sergeant in the technical areas
8. Staff sergeant-master sergeant, lieutenant/captain (FD) [field services], accompanying flight personnel
9. Staff sergeant-master sergeant, lieutenant/lieutenant colonel (FD), tester

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MILITARY

FRANCE

DEBATE CONTINUES ON STATE OF FRENCH ARMY

Dissatisfaction Expressed in Public

Bordeaux SUD-OUEST in French 23 Dec 85 p 2

[Article by Germain Chambost]

[Text] It would be dishonest to maintain that harmony currently reigns in the relationship between the government and the military. But it would be just as tendentious to contend that a conflict is brewing.

A general denounces the decrepit state of the combat tanks assigned to him. An active-duty Air Force colonel publishes a highly critical book on the Manta operation in Chad under a pseudonym (Spartacus). (1) (It was announced that a book denouncing the lack of preparedness of our armed forces and written by Air Force General Andre Dubroca is scheduled for release in the near future. However, General Dubroca left the military service 2 years ago.) French officers are implicated in a shady operation, the sabotage of a ship belonging to the environmental group Greenpeace. They now find themselves behind the bars of a New Zealand jail.

Three events in 1985 that, among others, have left their special mark on relations between the armed forces and the political administration to which they are subordinated, and which could imply that dissatisfaction--the ever-present "malaise"--exists today in the army. Or, more accurately, that it exists within the armed forces, because the military do not constitute a homogeneous community. But to deduce from this that these military men contest the political powers in office, therefore the Socialist party...

Of course, it would be rash to assume that the most complete harmony currently reigns between the government and the military. But it would also be dishonest to state that a conflict is brewing. Either that or the men in uniform whom we interviewed--in the Navy, the Army, the Air Force, the police, stationed both in Paris and especially in the Southwest, from Bordeaux to Pau, from Toulouse to Cognac--are masters of deceit. Understandably, all of the active duty military personnel whom we interviewed asked to remain anonymous. Nothing unusual about this. Their duty is to maintain silence, they know the consequences of speaking to a reporter, even if it is only to confirm that, in the final analysis, they are not particularly unhappy about the conditions under which they serve.

In fact, this comes as no surprise to them. For example, none of the individuals we interviewed protested against the sanctions imposed on Air Force Colonel Gerard Arnaubec for criticizing his direct superiors while hiding behind the pseudonym of Spartacus.

The opinions on General Arnold and the tank issue reflect more variation. The fact that his allegations were construed by the public as a revelation is a subject of vast amusement in the military, particularly among members of the tank corps. "Everyone knows that our AMX 30s are obsolete. We have been saying it for 10 years, this dates back to before the current administration. But it was not up to him to make these statements. His superiors were there to relay the information to the minister..." maintains a commandant in the Pau region. Asked to comment on this statement, an adjutant replied that he understood the general: "I agree that the people need to be told."

As usual, the military community presents a unanimous front only when facing a particular issue. In the Greenpeace affair, the military all faced an issue. Even though Commandant Mafart and Captain Prieur may wear stripes, they hardly belong to the military community anymore, except maybe from afar. Yet they may be the perfect symbols of the "virtues" the military recognizes as its own: a sense of duty, discretion. Mafart and Prieur were acting on orders, they were more or less sent to ride for a fall, and nevertheless they "shut up." On the other hand, admittedly, the military have trouble understanding why the new Defense minister, Paul Quiles, requested television coverage of his telephone conversation with Dominique Prieur. The people we interviewed were unanimous in their expression of astonishment, if not outrage: "A clumsy move on the part of a politician..." commented a paratrooper from Mont-de-Marsan, a lover of combat (and proud of it), a "man of action" who sees his own reflection in the Turenge due in terms of motivation. "Discretion is the only thing..."

Charles Hernu did not contradict this statement during his appearance on the television program "Face the Nation" aired on France Inter on 25 November 1985.

Ah, Hernu! Francois Mitterrand is rumored to have told friends that the former Defense minister was "limited, but the military like Charles..." The second part of this sentence reflects an undisputable fact. Hernu's departure left all military employees in a more or less orphaned state. And it is not due to chance alone that more outbreaks of dissatisfaction occurred following the minister's resignation in the wake of the Greenpeace incident. Opinions range from "a simple, uncomplicated guy like us..." according a Navy officer to this heartfelt praise from a Toulouse policewoman: "I don't think Mr Quiles knows much. But Charles Hernu, what a great minister, what a competent man..." through this somewhat astonishing confession from an Army staff colonel in the Southwest: "True, he didn't get us a penny more. But he liked us..." If even colonels want to be liked, nowadays, where are we headed?

"His greatest achievement?" queried an officer. "You want me to tell you what was his greatest achievement?..." After some thought: "He dispelled fears about the armed forces' ability to survive with the Socialists, side by side with those dudes. He kept it from degenerating into chaos..." Then, after giving the question a great deal of thought: "The Army is not anti-Socialist."

It is anti-disorganization. It needs clear directions. Look at what happened in New Caledonia. The only time the police openly protested was because they spent all of their time waiting for orders that never came. But that wasn't Hernu's fault. It was Pisani..."

The current outbreaks could therefore also be explained by a feeling of confusion, of an absence of government which is perceived or assumed to be in a suspended state until the legislative elections. The administration is no longer governing with as firm a hand. It should also be recalled that certain military men never let slip an opportunity to make their mark when a political event is so near. They clamor for more funds, hoping that the candidates will take this bait. It is a fact that, in the words of our officer, the military faces a problem of not enough "bread." Like many other sectors of the French community.

Defense Allocations Questioned

Bordeaux SUD-OUEST in French 24 Dec 85 p 2

[Article by Germain Chambost]

[Text] France cannot continue to support all of its forces at the existing levels.

On 2 December, in commemoration of the Saint Cyr festival, a hundred or so officers gathered for the traditional feast at Nield Palace, headquarters of the 11th Paratroop Division in Toulouse. The "Spartacus" affair (see yesterday's edition of SUD-OUEST) was given the floor, or rather laid on the table. This affair is of direct concern to the paratroopers--they are all familiar with Chad. "There were a few snickers," related a witness. "That's it..." No virulent criticism of the administration; the officers in attendance kept their opinions to themselves. The traditional role played by these "paras" has suffered a blow. Many Leftists still consider them as so many participants in a potential coup, but they strictly want to remain Republican. The slogan "You are the nation's soldiers..." is drummed into interns at the Pau school for airborne troops.

Not that a soldier doesn't experience some unhappy moments during his career. These are an accepted fact. One does not pass judgment. Even in front of friends. "During a meeting of the reserves at the camp in Souges in 1984," reminisced Jacques Lafond, a commandant who left the Army last summer, "the officers of the paratroop cavalry lecturing at the seminars refused to address the political side of the subject. They limited their comments strictly to business matters..." (1) (Jacques Lafond is working to organize in Bordeaux a study group on defense problems. This phrase should be construed in its broadest sense since it does not exclude any position, even that of the "civil dissuasion" so dear to some movements with few militaristic sympathies.) In fact, the critical opinions voiced in recent months have emanated from military personnel who have experienced problems in the field.

The Air Force believes it is at a disadvantage from a budget standpoint, relative to the Navy ("The Navy played their cards right, the minister swears only

by them..." commented a young general). And it is true that deliveries of its combat planes have been significantly delayed during the past 4 years.

The infantry and tank corps are asking questions, as evidenced in the case of General Arnold. Or by the criticism which accompanied the establishment of the FAR (Rapid Action Force) for which helicopters were taken from certain regiments, "borrowing from Peter to pay Paul." Because both could not be equipped due to lack of funds. "In the past," reported a staff officer, "the active regiments stored their out-of-date equipment for use by the reserves. Today, we take this equipment out of storage and re-issue it to the active forces..." The crisis has come to that.

"It is true that this has obliged us to better manage our allocations. And it is normal that we should participate in the national effort," admits the same staff officer. "We have reduced our staff in addition to making equipment cutbacks. But today, we no longer know what to do. They cannot continue to ask us to accomplish the same tasks as before without giving us the means..."

Perhaps this is one of the causes of any potential dissatisfaction. The Rapid Action Force, the brainchild and the major achievement of the current administration, is not likely to want for the basics. Designed to be prepared for action in the European theater and overseas (even if some argue that it is not likely to properly accomplish two missions that are so different), the FAR will be equipped with men, supplies and the latest weapons. But alongside the FAR? "We run the risk of creating an Army, an Armed Forces that works at two different speeds," warns a colonel. "Therein lies the greatest risk at present."

From a paratroop officer: "It is true that in the FAR, we are somewhat spoiled, from the mission and equipment standpoint, even if it has nothing to do with the aviators. Go visit an Air Force base, tell me something new! But although our needs are met in terms of the missions assigned to us, this does not mean that we have become blind to the truth. Because of inadequate means (in general--equipment, training facilities) supplied in inadequate quantities, segregation will develop within the constituent elements of the armed forces. This will result in a sort of segregation among the men. It is very serious..."

Mery, the former chief of staff of the Armed Forces rumored to be close to Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, denounced this risk himself during a seminar held at the Senate on 18 November 1985. He mentioned a possible break "in the cohesion of our military machine." According to a commandant, "Basically, Mery is right. However, he forgets to mention that the process in question is not a new phenomenon, that it dates back to before the Socialists' rise to power. It started a long time ago. When the general was the chief of staff of the Armed Forces..."

The debate can therefore not be reduced to a controversy between the current opposition and majority in which one side is very quick to promise to correct the errors allegedly committed by the other. In any event, the economic situation will not permit it. Military equipment is becoming increasingly expensive; its inflation rates are unrelated to current inflation rates. It is therefore ridiculous and even dishonest to summarily argue that yearly increases in the defense budget always outpace inflation. As if a tank or a combat aircraft could be compared to a household's market basket.

Decisions and choices must be made. All the aviators, paratroopers and sailors we interviewed were quick to recognize this. But are they ready to bear the consequences? That is less certain. They are made in the image of representatives of other social groups, protesting in good faith when they are deprived of what they perceive as necessities.

The country is still living on the tail end of an era when expansion blurred errors of choice, erased differences between such and such a branch of the armed forces, and allowed nearly every need to be met. This is no longer the case today.

Today, we have the right to ask for answers to some questions: Can France afford 2 nuclear aircraft carriers (and why), 450 combat planes (for what missions), 1,000 or 2,000 tanks (what for)? Should France continue to maintain a strategic nuclear force, a tactical nuclear force even if it is called a pre-strategic force, overseas forces, the military draft, etc.?

Faced with the facts, the answer is no. Not all at the same time. But who will dare cut into it? And, first of all, who will dare raise the issue? Unfortunately, this problem may degenerate into a mere electoral campaign theme during the months to come, thus eluding the in-depth scrutiny it merits.

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MILITARY

FRANCE

BRIEFS

IRAQ ORDERS MIRAGE F-1'S--The Iraqi Air Force has ordered a further delivery from Dassault of 24 Mirage F-1's, which will be delivered in the next 18 months. At the same time, Iraq has returned to France the five Super Etendard's that were leased from the French Navy for 2 years in mid-1983. This is the third consecutive order from Iraq for the F-1; two previous lots were ordered in 1980 [60 aircraft] and in 1982 [29 aircraft]. These 89 aircraft of the first two lots already have been delivered and presently represent the cutting edge of the Iraqi Air Force. The five Super Etendard's that had been rented to attack the Iranian oil terminal in Kharq with AM.39 EXOCET missiles have been returned following the completion of the conversion program for the 89 F-1's to make them suitable for arms transport. The 24 F-1's of the current order will be delivered ready to use the Exocet. [Text] [Chiavari RIVISTA ITALIANA DIFESA in Italian No 1, Jan 86 p 14] /8309

CSO: 3528/59

MILITARY

ITALY

BRIEFS

UNDERWATER COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM--Telesub Lanterna of La Spezia, which specializes in underwater telephone and radio transmitting systems, has produced an ultrasound underwater intercommunications system which allows divers to contact surface units. The equipment is composed of two units, a surface transmitter-receiver with a transmission range of up to 2 miles and supplied with rechargeable batteries that can operate for approximately 40 hours, and an underwater transmitter consisting of a holster, transducer, earphone, and microphone. The system is designed to withstand depth pressures up to 100 m, can operate within a range of approximately 1 mile, and is supplied with rechargeable batteries with an endurance of about 30 hours. Both units work in single sideband [SSB] and have automatic volume control. The acoustic frequency transducer also is produced by Telesub Lanterna and, in effect, is an underwater loudspeaker, already adopted by the Italian Navy. It permits the monitoring of sounds in water with the naked ear with high fidelity and intelligibility up to approximately 50 m from the installation point. [Text] [Chiavari RIVISTA ITALIANA DIFESA in Italian No 1, Jan 86 p 10] /8309

CSO: 3528/59

MILITARY

SWITZERLAND

BRIEFS

ADVANCED TRAINER FINALISTS SELECTED--The Swiss Air Force has selected the Hawk of BAE and the Alpha Jet of Dassault/Dornier as finalists in its competition for a new advanced trainer which is destined to replace the present Venom aircraft at the beginning of the 1990's. The Aermacchi MB-399 and Casa C-101, which were also competing, therefore have been eliminated. The final selection of a winner is expected in the second half of 1987. [Text] [Chiavari RIVISTA ITALIANA DIFESA in Italian No 1, Jan 86 p 14] /8309

CSO: 3528/59

ECONOMIC

AUSTRIA

POSITION, VIEWS OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH INSTITUTES

Role of Economic Institutes

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 10 Dec 85 p 11

/Article by Matthaus Kattinger: "International Economic Trend Institutes. II Austria. In Vienna the Economic Researchers Are Only Supposed to Analyze, but Not Criticize"/

/Text/ Vienna. Austria's province of economic research institutes, which also regularly make economic forecasts, is very small. Two institutes in all, the Institute for Economic Research (WiFo) and the Institute for Higher Studies (IHS) make forecasts about the future development of the Austrian economy. Certainly there are many common interests and ties, but in terms of conception the institutes are very different.

Unlike the five German institutes, which have moved out of the federal capital, the center of economic policy, the two Austrian institutes have their headquarters in Vienna, the Austrian center of all political activity. A further difference from the German institutes is that the WiFo institute in particular has a much stronger connection with economic policy and with those who carry out policy, although it strives for independence in statements and methods.

The peculiarities of both institutes can best be shown by comparing them. The IHS emerged from the American Ford Foundation. It is conceived as an institute for post-graduate studies. The main emphasis is therefore on the training of students, so-called scholars, who after two years of studies, are trained and employed in applied research. Participation in research projects during tenure as a scholar is an unalterable requirement.

The IHS houses five departments in all: economics, political science, sociology, industrial management as well as mathematics and computer science. In principle the institute is accustomed to temporary employment only. The assistants receive two-year contracts which, just as those of the department heads, can be but do not have to be extended.

The work at the IHS is part of a preparation for a career which continues usually with the Austrian National Bank, in the competing WiFo institute or in a professorship. The IHS then is rather a theoretically oriented institute of basic research which also carries on applied research (and conducts contract projects), whereas the WiFo institute, for all practical purposes, is almost exclusively active in applied research.

The emphases of the WiFo institute's work traditionally reside in the analysis and forecasting of economic trends. More and more in the past decade and a half fundamental studies in the area of structural and monetary policy have been carried out. A further WiFo emphasis which has come about in the past five years is the analysis of economic policy instruments, as most recently, for example, in exhaustive studies of the system of encouraging investments.

Close ties between the institutes exist most of all in the personnel area. Thus the present chief of the IHS, Professor Hans Seidel, was active in a leading post in the WiFo institute for practically 20 years. Starting in 1961, Seidel was the second WiFo chief after Dr Franz Nemschak, and from 1972 to 1980, Seidel was in charge of WiFo. Then at the end of 1980, Seidel, who was considered politically neutral, received and accepted the socialist government's offer to join the Ministry of Finance as State Secretary to fill the economic policy vacuum left by the departure of Hannes Androsch--whom Federal Chancellor Bruno Kreisky had forced out--and by the relative inexperience in these matters of the new chief Herbert Salcher.

His deputy, Helmut Kramer, a Voralberg native, has been managing the affairs of WiFo since then. When Seidel's political career was nearing its end, Anatol Rapoport, who had been called to Vienna from his North American teaching post, was simply relieved of his duties with not entirely elegant tricks and with typically Viennese gradeur ("Your desk is needed"). Since 1 January 1984, Seidel has been managing "the competition."

Clear dependencies and spheres are also apparent in the financing of both institutes, WiFo, which has existed since 1927 and was constituted as a private association, has about 90 collaborators at its disposal (of those a few active only part-time, but there are no free lance collaborators) and a budget of 60 million Austrian schillings (DM 8.6 million) for 1985. Of that about 20 million schillings are provided by the main financier, the Federal Government. Other important "payers" are the Austrian National Bank, the social partners (that is the Federation of Labor Unions, the Workers Association, the Federal Chamber, the Agricultural Association), the federal states and several large associations such as industrial federations, bank and savings and loan federations or the holding company of nationalized industries. Two thirds of the budget are met by these contributions, and the remaining third comes from contracts and published reports.

The experts of the institute are expected to analyze and predict, but not to criticize or hand out grades.

Since the departure of the Ford Foundation at the end of the sixties, the IHS has been maintained by three large underwriters. With a total budget of a little less than 35 million schillings (DM 5 million), the largest portion comes from the Ministry of Science. In addition, the Austrian National Bank and the municipality of Vienna are welcome backers. Between 20 and 25 percent of the budget has to be financed through contract work.

The president of the institute is National Bank President Stephen Koren; the vice-president is Science Minister Heinz Fischer.

With regard to financing, according to institute expert Seidel, "the WiFo chief has much more freedom, because the board of trustees does not importune him and wishes to be convened only once a year for a board meeting or general meeting, whereas in the IHS the board of trustees has conceded, under its statutes, fundamentally greater powers, and they also include, however, worries about financing."

For all the competition in prognoses and the competition of experts between both institutes, there have not been any "body locks" as of yet. The prognoses resemble each other more and more (not last of all because exemplary achievements of the other institute are referred to, as in the WiFo investment test). And the two institutes have finally been persuaded not to hold their respective quarterly revisions of prognoses in press conferences which follow right after the other (at the WiFo institute, by the way), but rather to put together a joint press conference on their prognoses.

One can only hope that the institutes will be spared a long period of austerity as in 1981 and 1982, and in 1983 as well, when for virtually three-quarters the press conferences on prognoses were overshadowed by the question crucial to everything, "Is it coming now, the recovery, or is it not coming?" And, from the viewpoint of the institutes, the motto of one industrialist continues to be applicable: "If only economic policy were as good as the prognoses..."

(Cf. also the first part, "France," in the HANDELSBLATT of 2930 November 1985)

Economic Prognoses

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 10 Dec 85 p 11

(Unattributed report: "Austria/Economic Researchers Remain Optimistic. Investments Are Going To Be the Impetus to Growth")

/Text/ Vienna. Austria's economic data are looking hopeful. Economic growth stands at 3 percent--combined with a clear reduction in the rate of inflation to 3.2 percent, a notable growth in business activity and an even balance of trade.

These cheerful prognoses for the current year, which both economic research institutes presented with only slight differences, are supposed to be continued in 1986 as well. Austria is in the fourth year of an admittedly moderate but generally solid recovery.

The predictions for 1986 are: a growth of at least 2.5 percent, an inflation rate of about 3 percent and an unemployment rate climbing slightly to 4.9 percent (after 4.7 percent this year, although the 5 percent mark had been feared for 1985).

Investments to be financed almost exclusively from cash flow will become the mainstay of the economic trend. The most eager of all to invest is industry, which intends to invest 15 to 20 percent more in 1986 than in 1985. And that comes after two years, 1984 and 1985 that is, in which two-digit growth rates had already been registered. Well-founded optimism was expressed in all the surveys of industrialists.

With a real growth of 2 percent, private consumption will make a somewhat less important contribution to growth. The export economy's prospects are no longer quite as favorable as in the years 1984 and 1985 (with real increases of 10 and 11 percent in the export of goods), but they are still expected to come to 7 percent in 1986 as well. In light of a predicted value for the dollar of 17 Austrian schillings (DM 2.43) for the coming year, Austria's US export business will decline and be compensated for with increased deliveries to Western Europe and especially here to the Federal Republic.

Structural problems will continue to exist even though there were increases in the share of markets in 1985, whereby in this regard it certainly became evident in the most recent past that these market successes had to be bought largely with price reductions. Seen from the perspective of labor costs, Austria is being put under pressure because of German wage policy. For that reason, labor costs might rise at a faster rate in Austria in 1986 than in the Federal Republic.

The development in unemployment during the winter months is being watched with definite concern. If a seasonal peak was reached in 1985 with 198,000 unemployed in January, then during the winter of 1986 it might climb in any event to more than 200,000, probably even 210,000 unemployed (7.5 percent).

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ECONOMIC

ITALY

FIRMS EXPLOIT OPENINGS IN YUGOSLAV MARKET

Milan ESPANSIONE in Italian No 188, Jan 86 pp 149, 152

[Article by Luigi Orescano: "Yugoslavia: A More Aligned Import"]

[Text] The skis on which Ingmar Stenmark won his last world slalom title were made in Yugoslavia. They are made by Elan, a technologically advanced company, and are exported to half the world. But such competition is not born in Belgrade. Behind Elan is a joint venture with an Austrian industrial group which has invested in Yugoslavia to unite its technology with the low production costs of the Serbo-Croatian industries, and above all to enter without "clearing" into all the CEMA countries [the cooperation organization of socialist countries] where skiing is not only a hobby or sport, but also an ancient tradition and where they can find markets even for skis unsalable in the West.

In 1986 even an Italian company, Simod of Legnaro [Padua], is present in Yugoslav with a large industrial joint venture. "And we will also produce sports footwear," emphasizes Vittorio Morandin, Simod technical director. "Who knows, we may also win a world championship." Simod is a footwear manufacturer with four factories between Padua and Pescara, 330 employees, and gross sales of more than 100 billion lire. For more than 20 years, virtually since it was established, Simod has sold to CEMA and particularly to Belgrade, thanks also to the profound and direct knowledge of that marketplace which businessman Paolo Sinigaglia possesses. The joint venture [for 32 percent] with Kostana of Vranie in Macedonia will give life to three factories producing sports footwear and boots, with employment for some 600 workers. The financial commitment, which officially is "top secret," nevertheless will be substantial, at least 30 billion lire. "To invest in Yugoslavia today is less risky than at one time," says Aldo Romoli, president of the Italian-Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce. "Belgrade has passed an important reform of the legislation on joint ventures which gives preferential treatment to foreign investors. It is not a comprehensive reform because the innovations still place too many ties on the decision-making autonomy of the foreign entrepreneur, but it is already a good step forward."

A reform that has the taste of an economic SOS was launched by Belgrade toward the EEC precisely during the negotiations--which should be concluded before June--on the renewal of the general agreement with the Community. The Yugoslav trade deficit at the end of August 1985 reached 2 trillion lire, foreign debts were almost 35 trillion, and the inflation rate was 79 percent. Under these conditions, Yugoslavia cannot buy even one-tenth of the know-how from the West that would be necessary to restore its own products to competitiveness. Therefore, the only road that remains is that of opening itself to foreign investments.

And the innovations are notable. The foreign partner that produces for exportation will have to give to the state only 54 percent of the prized foreign currency that is obtained. Half of the profits, whatever they amount to, may be re-exported at any time and it is only required that the other half be reinvested or in any case spent in Yugoslavia. The new law allows negotiating of the joint venture contract, which since 1985 can be stipulated even in the language of the foreign partner other than in Serbo-Croatian, to take place in a third country. The new law also permits the foreign partner to invest in the form of production equipment and know-how without actually paying money and limiting itself to the transfer into Yugoslavia of production lines already utilized and superseded. It is also exempt from all obligations that do not directly concern the production function [military and social taxes and so on].

"We will go to produce in Macedonia because we believe in general demand in Yugoslavia," Morandin explains once again, "but also because we will reinforce our presence in the Eastern countries where the Yugoslav origin of a product constitutes an ideal visiting card." Yugoslavia, notwithstanding its deficit balance sheet, boasts of a commercial "first," the leadership in exports of manufactured goods to almost all the nonaligned nations and to many Third World countries in the Mediterranean region. "Whoever invests in Yugoslavia aiming at exports," Romoli comments, "makes no error. But neither does he who has hopes in the domestic market." Belgrade's exchanges with CEMA and with the EEC reveal the double soul of the country. Some 50 percent of Yugoslav foreign trade is concentrated in CEMA, the other half in the West and in the developing countries. Nevertheless, since prized currency to buy petroleum does not come from the East, Belgrade tries to sell more to the EEC. In Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, and Istria a powerful cultural ally of the West is growing: television. Within the limits of per capita income, Yugoslavs of the Adriatic and Central European regions are directing themselves even more toward Western products. Judging by Italian-Yugoslav trade tables, along with the greater quantity of imports controlled by the state [machinery, chemical products, semi-finished products], it appears that even other types of goods, such as meat, automobiles, and fabrics, are purchased from Italy, reflecting the spontaneous demands of the final consumer.

If trade is considered to be in an actual phase of stagnation, the reason lies essentially in the extremely negative trade balance of payments which compels Belgrade to put a brake on imports and to push for "countertrade." However, Belgrade does this without offering in exchange a sufficient variety of products and, above all, without having at its disposition a central clearing office which

could act as middleman with the West for the various exchange consignments offered or requested by local companies. Therefore, although Italy remains fourth among the countries which supply Yugoslavia, and although consumers are favorably disposed inward the "made in Italy" label, access to the market remains difficult. The two commercial channels most often used are the "autonomous accounts," that is, the local clearing agreements stipulated between companies and Italian and Yugoslav entities in the border areas [all in Friuli-Venice Giulia]; or the many Italian traders specializing in this market who act as intermediaries. This involves mostly "countertraders" or companies that represent Yugoslav trade groups and which also work as middlemen [like the Italian Centrocoop, a general trading company in Milan]. To rely on these specialized operators is very often the fastest way of sounding out the Yugoslav market for compensation exchanges or even through cash payments without first exposing oneself to the high costs of trade fairs, business trips, or direct representation [a list of some of the main traders is attached]. Finally, guidance can be very useful as can, in certain cases, using as intermediary the various Italian-Yugoslav commercial institutions active in Italy. The three offices of the Italian-Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce are in Milan [Via Cernaia 9; telephone 02-650861], Trieste [Piazza Borsa 14; telephone 040-60445], and Udine [Via Morpurgo 4; telephone 0432-206541].

<u>Name</u>	<u>Sector</u>	<u>Address</u>
Bamil	Skins-fabrics	Via Vittor Pisani 19, Milano 02-6554397
Centroproduct	Citrus fruits	Via Agnello 2, Milano, 02-8810
Chemoll	Chemicals,	
	plastics	Via Lanzone 6, Milano, 028057641
Chim-Metal	Chemicals,	
	plastics	Via Pirelli 27, Milano, 02-7601
Emi	Mechanical,	
	molds	Via Boscovich 14, Milano, 02-653158
Euroimport	Chemicals	Via Rodano 6, Milano, 02-2154741
Ferrochimetal	Chemicals,	
	mechanical	Via Vittor Pisani 26, Milano, 02-653041
Grecotex	Textiles	Foro Buonaparte 63, Milano, 02-870948
Italseit	Synthetic fibers	Via Palazzi 2/A, Milano, 02-2870101
Jakil Andrea	Food	Foro Buonaparte 68, Milano, 02-3452121
Okura & Co. Italia	Agricultural	
	machinery, food,	
	footwear	Piazza del Liberty 8, Milano, 02-798262
Onmia Nuova	Industrial	
	machinery	Piazza Repubblica 9, Milano, 02-650421
Oropa Trade	Yarns, clothing	Via Boscovich 61, Milano 02-270193
Pellitalia	Skins	Via Merlo 1, Pandino [CR], 0371-90012
Proital	Textiles,	
	metallurgical	Via Vittor Pisani 28, Milano, 02-6557537
Samita	Plastics, rubber	Via Maniago 11, Milano, 02-2154967
Tolma	Chemicals,	
	plastics	Piazza Duca D'Aosta 12, Milano, 02-6703441
RiRi	Steel products,	
	mechanics, elec-	
	tronics, wood,	
	tobacco,	
	accessories	Via Rotondi 6, Milano, 02-4983441
Sochital	Chemicals, ferti-	
	lizers, insecti-	
	cides, plastics,	
	fodder	Via Roentgen 18, Milano, 02-8353952
Vatta	General trading	Largo Domodossola 1, Milano, 02-344465;
		Via San Nicolo 4, Milano, 02-64393
Magis International	General trading	Via Boccaccio 19, Milano, 02-4696672
Metalka	Nonferrous	
	metals	Via Vittor Pisani 22, Milano, 02-6595637

The table lists some of the main trading firms operating in Italy for Yugoslavia. Most are firms that specialize in countertrade contracts, or companies that represent Yugoslav trading groups and that also work as middlemen.

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ECONOMIC

ITALY

OBSTACLES TO TRADE WITH BALKAN COUNTRIES

Milan ESPANSIONE in Italian No 188, Jan 86 pp 152-153

[Article by Sergio Luciano: "The Balkans Are Beautiful When You Manage To Sell"]

[Text] Each week the Romanian soccer coupon includes six A Series games of the Italian championship. The actions of Juventus decide the destination of the meager premiums offered as prizes by the Bucharest Government. In short, the "made in Italy" label, even in sports, is well liked in Romania as it is also in Bulgaria where, without being such great fans, they appreciate other offerings such as the cuisine [negotiations are under way for the opening of a chain of Italian restaurants in Sofia], and the hospitality [a pool of Italian companies are restructuring the great Pliska Hotel in the capital].

In short, Bulgaria and Romania, the two CEMA countries [the economic cooperation organization of socialist countries] ostensibly farthest away from the Mediterranean in terms of culture and economic relations, are united by a growing interest in Italian products. This is increased, in the Romanian case, by the affinity of language which facilitates direct contacts and, in the case of Bulgaria, by a long tradition of commercial exchanges. "But be aware that this interest in Italy and in its products does not make access to the two Balkan markets easier for our exporters," observes Sergio Padova, president of Francescato of Milan, a trading company specializing in the chemicals sector and in trade with the East. "Secondly, Bulgaria and Romania have only superficial affinities. In reality they are two completely different markets in mentality, organization, and channels of commercial access." For example, Bulgaria is considered a difficult country to conquer commercially, but trustworthy and regular in its demand. It was not by chance that until 4 years ago Italy was in first place, after the Soviet Union, in the list of countries commercially most active with Sofia. On the other hand, Romania traditionally is considered one of the least reliable countries, not to be trusted in the formality and times of payment, delivery of goods, and quality of product. However, for some time relations with Bucharest have been improving for the few Italian companies which operate there [in 1984 the Italian Exchange Control Office registered exports for just 122 billion lire] thanks to a law which forbids the banks from opening lines of credit for imports for state entities which do not demonstrate their solvency. In Bulgaria, problems of this kind have never occurred due to a strict regulation which discharges onto the banks, and indirectly onto the state coffers, the settling of any foreign debt

contracted by a commercial organization which ultimately does not pay. Trade relations between Italy and Bulgaria have suffered from the diplomatic crises linked to the Farsetti case [the trade unionist tried in Sofia for espionage] and then to the Antonov case, that is, to the suspected implication of the Bulgarian secret service in the attempt on the Pope's life by the Turk, Ali Agca. Only this year has this trend in trade been reversed and begun to recover, increasing by 40 percent in the first 9 months. This was emphasized by Petr Russev, the Bulgarian deputy minister for industry, in a business trip to Milan at the beginning of last December. Russev promised the broadest disclosure through the Italian-Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce of the investment programs that will be passed with the next 5-year plan [1986-1990] now being discussed by the legislature in Sofia. "Knowing the 5-year plans," confirms Lacesar Kostadinov, director of Conor Italiana, an Italian-Bulgarian mixed [50-50] company which carries out general trading in Milan, "it is easier for the Italian exporters to present themselves in Bulgaria with the right offer at the right moment." But through which channels is commercial penetration more rapid and certain? "The majority of Italian companies which have stable business relations with Sofia," Kostadinov explains, "have direct agencies in Bulgarian territory. Then there are the mixed trading companies, like Conor which I direct, always created through mutual willingness and therefore very well accredited among the Bulgarian state organisms. Then there are the trade fairs: to succeed in taking part in these fairs means a 50-percent chance of getting the business. Finally, there are the Italian trading companies." Therefore, the mere middlemen are not the owners of the field in Bulgaria. Even in Sofia, as in all the Eastern capitals, personal friendships with the bureaucrats who decide on foreign purchases count very much, but it is difficult to find and keep them. Above all, with exports from Italy to Bulgaria amounting to only 243 billion [in 1984], traders do not feel very attracted to the Bulgarian marketplace. "Even in Moscow it is difficult to establish and maintain important direct business relations," explains Padova [Francescato], "but at least there the volumes of trade are very great and therefore interesting. In Bulgaria or Romania the difficulties are numerous and the results are in any case modest." At this moment Sofia is interested in creating joint ventures with Italian companies and in increasing civil construction, goods which are in big demand. "In order to reactivate this exchange we are willing to collaborate with the trading companies but we are aiming, above all, at the trade fairs and the activity of the Italian-Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce," reveals Anghel Anghelov, head of the Bulgarian Trade Office in Milan. "In May, at the National Trade Fair in Plovdiv," he explains, "we are organizing with ICE of Sofia a pavilion that will be called 'Italy Produces' or otherwise 'Agro Italia,' for which we have already chosen almost all the companies." The organization of the Italian delegation at Plovdiv is managed by Randine, a transport company from Milan. It is better for the exhibitors to transport materials and samples in abundance down there because the trade fair often is the center where the principal contracts for public supplies are actually concluded. "There is at least a good reason for coming to Bulgaria to sell: Our imports from Italy are destined to increase, if for no other reason than to return to traditional volumes. However, there is space in the market," Anghelov adds. And the payment for the supplies: "Almost always cash, and in lire; the countertrade is diminishing because Sofia has currency problems like many other CEMA countries, and not of liquidity. Of the socialist countries it has the highest private savings index."

The economic situation in Romania is more difficult. The country is undergoing a big energy crisis and consequently, a monetary one. Compensation exchanges are not specifically imposed, at least for the products which Bucharest considers indispensable, but they are much more preferred. In this market those who operate with confidence are principally the specialized "countertraders," and three mixed Italian-Romanian companies formed in the last few years to consolidate exchanges of some products: Dalpex [petroleum and derivatives], Romital [chemicals], and Sorimpex [construction]. "Romania buys a lot of carbon coke, refractory materials, and abrasive materials in Italy. They are by now standard imports and therefore certain," explains Dan George Mocanu, director of Sorimpex of Milan. "On the other hand, Italy buys primarily petroleum products, followed by textiles, lumber, and furniture. The possibilities of developing Italian exports are not enormous, but they exist. The current 5-year plan anticipates the restructuring of a large part of Romanian industry and, therefore, the importation of machinery and technology. That could be the most promising sector for Italian industry." Mocanu was born in Bucharest, where he graduated and worked for a long time as a Ministry of Foreign Trade official. He moved with his family to Milan some 2 1/2 years ago in order to direct Sorimpex as Romanian representative; he has learned Italian very well. "Romania does not enjoy a good reputation in the commercial world but the truth is that it is an easy market to penetrate; it is enough to propose oneself. Moreover, the Italians start off with an advantage; they are seen everywhere with extreme favor." For Mocanu the shortest way to propose a business affair to Bucharest is to actually go through one of the mixed companies or through a Romanian trade office in Italy. The trading companies count, but they are not very active or well connected. "Write nice things about Romania," he concludes, "we are very often unjustly and badly described. For example, the direct dialing system. It is true that this is not possible for everyone, but it is enough to ask SIP for a connection to the Fonex network and the telephone connection become direct. The dialing code: 004000."

Name	Country		Product	Address
	Bulgaria	Romania		
Assi	X	X	Footwear, vehicles	Via Leonardo 6, Vigevano [Pavia]; 031-82592
Borowetz Italiana	X	X	General trading	Via Gianturco 5, Roma; 3602859
Conor Italiana	X		General trading	Piazza Duca d'Aosta 8, Milano; 02-2716046
Dalpex		X	Petroleum, related products	Via Leonardo 10/A, Livorno; 0586-21194
D.B. Fibres	X		Paper, related products	Via Durini 26, Milano; 02-700782
Ferro e acciaio	X	X	Iron metallurgy	Via Saldini 35, Milano; 7385341
Francescato	X	X	Chemicals, related products	Via Morgagni 22, Milano; 02-200725
Goelner		X	General trading	Banhaofstrasse 63, 4125 Riehen [Switzerland]; 004161-675800
Magis International	X	X	Chemical, related products	Via Boccaccio 10, Milano; 02-469672
Mineraria	X	X	Chemicals, amianthus	Via Morgagni 22, Milano; 02-271727
Neolab		X	Scientific equipment	Sala Longobardi 2, Milano; 02-872410
Nicomac	X		Pharmaceutical machinery	Via Pascoli 60, Milano; 02-2360043
Oropa trade		X	Yarns, clothing	Via Boscovich 61, Milano; 02-270193
Romital		X	Chemicals, related products	Via Fara 28, Milano; 02-6702403
Sorimpex		X	Refractive construction materials	Viale Majno 38, Milano; 02-270691
Swissital	X		General trading	Piazza dei Martiri 5-2, Bologna; 051-522753
Comagital	X		Tooling machinery	Via Manzoni 31, Milano; 02-65377

Here are some of the principal commercial intermediary companies which operate with Bulgaria and Romania. Notwithstanding the overcoming of diplomatic difficulties with Sofia and the increase in trade with Bucharest, notable difficulties still persist in business relations.

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20 February 1986

West Europe Report

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POLITICAL

DENMARK

JORGENSEN: SDP WOULD SEEK TIES ACROSS CENTER AFTER ELECTION

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 6 Jan 86 p 3

[Article by Ole Dall]

[Text] Cooperation across the center--even if there is "another majority." This is what a new Social Democratic government will aim at. This statement was made by the chairman of the Social Democratic Party during a heated political debate yesterday.

On the same day that the Gallup Institute showed a 'red majority,' the chairman of the Social Democratic Party, Anker Jørgensen, if anything, discountenanced the idea of using the said majority, during a heated political debate at Nyborg with Minister of Finance Palle Simonsen (Conservative Party) and Niels Helveg Petersen (Radical Liberal Party).

"When we again come into power, we shall endeavor to establish a cooperation across the center in Danish politics--even if 'another majority' would develop. The Social Democratic Party does not forget its point of departure, but we realize that it is expedient to establish a cooperation across the center," Anker Jørgensen said.

On the agreement across the center--the tax reform--the chairman of the Social Democratic Party stated, incidentally, that "the decisive basic principles will have to apply for some years." He admitted that "some years" was a broad term.

The debate among the three politicians concerned not only the present economic situation but also the more long-term objectives. Below, we shall discuss a few of the items dealt with during the heated debate at Nyborg Strand.

Social Democratic Party Has Decided to Keep Out of It

Palle Simonsen: "The political confrontation takes place in the shaping of the economic policy. It is most deplorable that the Social Democratic Party has decided to keep out of it. It would benefit the debate to ascertain that major advances have been made. The truth is that it is Anker Jørgensen's policy that collapsed in 1982--and this had to be put right."

Anker Jørgensen: "We do not hear much anymore about the co-operating representative government. The Social Democratic Party has not kept out of things. The truth is that the government has not attempted to include us in any actual negotiations. I admit that things go better in a number of areas, but the present economic climate is also better. From 1972 until 1982 the entire world experienced a crisis."

Tone Has Become Better

Niels Helveg Petersen: "Anker Jørgensen said that there is no longer any co-operation across the center. This, of course, applied especially during the first, hysterical phase of the period in which the Social Democratic Party was in opposition. Subsequently, the tone has become better, and it culminated in connection with the tax reform."

"Where the government and the Social Democratic Party reach agreements that do not include the Radical Liberal Party, things easily get bungled. This applies to the nationwide communications network for transmission of telecommunications, the real-interest tax agreement and the refugee agreement."

Palle Simonsen: "We have 140,000 more jobs in 1986 than we had in 1982. The rate of inflation is one fourth of that in 1982. The deficit of the state has dropped from 80 billion kroner to 14.5 billion kroner. This is most exceptional. The balance of payments deficit is not a problem that the government is able to escape, but it has not got out of hand."

Anker Jørgensen: "There is reason to take the balance of payments question more seriously than the Minister of Finance does."

"A new Social Democratic government will not present any unreasonable demands. We also find that a strict economic policy will have to be pursued, but there must be a solidary objective."

Social Democratic Party: Perhaps Election This Year

Niels Helveg Petersen: "It is easier for us to see the problems of the future once we have got our head above water. The society will have to be arranged in such a way that man will be able to keep up with things. That will mean increased self-government, certain forms of citizens' pay, and our future possibilities are entirely dependent on our learning to educate and reeducate ourselves."

Anker Jørgensen: "I do not want to rule out the possibility of an election in 1986."

Palle Simonsen: "Regardless of any dream that Anker Jørgensen may have, there is no argument in favor of an election in 1986. The value of political stability should not be underestimated."

Niels Helveg Petersen: "Premature elections were a bad habit, if anything, at some point of time. About 18 months to 2 years after the election, the government went into a tantrum. Should an election take place now, it would serve no purpose."

POLITICAL

DENMARK

SOCIAL DEMOCRATS SEEN INCREASINGLY FRUSTRATING GOVERNMENT

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 11 Jan 86 p 6

[Commentary by Carl Otto Brix: "Social Democratic Party Paralyzing Danish Political Actions"]

[Text] Groups within the large opposition party now see an opportunity to drive the government into a corner.

What is happening to the Social Democratic Party?

That question has been raised on numerous occasions since September of 1982, when the government of the country's largest party resigned.

For a short time--the party and many others felt, but things did not go that way. The nonsocialist government had come to stay. Contrary to many of its predecessors, it made it through one election and is deliberately aiming at becoming more than a brief interlude in political life.

However, it is obvious to everybody that the Social Democratic Party is making things too difficult for the government, and the situation with regard to the EC package has become critical.

It is, altogether, remarkable that it is in areas where the four government parties and the Social Democratic Party have jointly created the broad majority that things have come to a head.

The security policy has hitherto been the most conspicuous issue. Despite all attempts at a rapprochement, the distance between the government and the Social Democratic Party has become increasingly larger, which has greatly embittered the government, which claims that it is merely continuing the policy pursued by its Social Democratic predecessor. The government, however, remains in power, irrespective of all scientific prognoses.

Social Democratic Party at an Advantage in Tug-of-War

The Social Democratic Party is at an advantage in security policy matters, and the same thing applies, as far as the EC policy is concerned. It is not possible for the Radical Liberal Party to act as the rescuer, as it does in general economic policy matters. For the Radical Liberal Party is in the same situation as the Social Democratic Party: Approximately half of its regular voters are EC opponents.

As long as the Social Democratic Party is in government, things go fairly well. It is then that party which is in power and which gets the credit, and everything is then easier to accept for those elected as well as for the voters.

However, when the party is in opposition, the situation becomes entirely different.

The large party then loses control of things. It is difficult for it to maintain the internal discipline, which, when the party is in power, causes opponents to control their criticism. There is much more scope for rash actions; after all, why should Social Democrats support a government that it would gladly see the last of?

The balancing act is nearly impossible because the idea that it is, actually, not a question of cementing the government, but of bringing about its downfall, is bound to underlie most of the actions of the opposition.

Missing the Sweets of Power

This is particularly characteristic of the Social Democratic Party, which not only has a group of impatient former ministers who miss the sweets of power, but which also has a wing which will not make compromises but demands that a strictly Social Democratic line be followed and which believes that this is best done in cooperation with the Socialist People's Party rather than with the nonsocialists.

Things were difficult for Hans Hedtoft (in opposition from 1950 to 1953) and for Jens Otto Krag (in opposition from 1968 to 1971), but things have been especially difficult for Anker Jørgensen (in opposition from 1973 to 1975 and now from 1982 till ?). There are various reasons for this.

Anker Jørgensen does not possess the authority of his predecessors, nor does he wish to have it. He is every inch a democrat and is ready to yield loyally to the opinion of the majority. This commendable property, however, causes a lot of confusion, as a result of which the voters, in the end, have difficulty figuring out the position of the Social Democratic Party. As well as who it is who is speaking on behalf of the party.

Pari passu with the growing uncertainty about the position of the party, the party loses its credibility as an alternative government possibility. And Anker Jørgensen loses his credibility as an alternative government chief.

Party members such as Karl Hjortnæs and Jens Risgaard Knudsen have contributed to this state of affairs through their naive statements to the effect that they were unable to remain silent and were unable to agree to the actions that were about to be taken.

This applied to the tax reform, and the criticism that was voiced released one of the few instances of anger on the part of the party chairman. After all, it is possible to carry on frank and heated debates, but once a decision has been made, one has got to keep silent, even though one does not agree.

Once more, the impression was created that the party chairman did not have his support in order, and the same thing applies in connection with the EC issue. And he cannot, nor does he want to, use threats to get it in order.

Something apparently irreparable happened when, before the Christmas holidays, Anker Jørgensen went to South America to study democracy. He was not in sufficiently close contact with domestic events to keep entirely up to date.

Even if this is not the entire explanation, it, nevertheless, is one of the reasons why the situation today is unclear and the government and the Folkeeting have become paralyzed and are unable to take action.

Hard Work

The Social Democratic Party got Denmark into NATO, but developments are now such that the Social Democratic Party cannot support the defense cooperation the way it develops. The Social Democratic Party got Denmark into the EC, but developments now take such a course that the Social Democratic Party cannot support the EC the way it develops. Under a different government.

At any rate, not yet, despite suggestions from its stabilizing cooperation partner, the Danish Federation of Trade Unions. First, an endless number of questions will have to be answered satisfactorily, and the Social Democratic Party feels such contempt for the government that it will not be content with solemn statements from the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Indeed, they want for the EC Council of Ministers to confirm the statements made by the government.

I wonder if anybody has imagined how a nonsocialist opposition might use this against a Social Democratic government.

Anker Jørgensen yesterday told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE that the position of the party is not due to any desire to overturn the government, and he, probably, would not have that in mind either. However, I wonder if this is not the reason underlying some of the many critical statements made at the group meeting last Wednesday.

According to the opinion polls, the government parties will lose an election at this point, and this has probably encouraged the forces within parties which feel rootless without cabinet seats and which would welcome, or would not mind, for the Socialist People's Party to set the pace for a Social Democratic government.

Those who have lost their patience now see an opportunity, and it will be hard work persuading them to wait. The question is whether Anker Jørgensen, the positive European, has got the strength for it.

POLITICAL

FINLAND

USSR DEPUTY JUSTICE MINISTER CITES UNEASE OVER RELATIONS

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 6 Dec 85 p 21

[Article by FNB's correspondent in Moscow: "Friendship Forces Weakening: Soviet Concern Now Even in Minister's Talk"]

[Text] The Soviet Union expressed on Thursday officially its concern in regard to the Finnish forces that are responsible for the weakening of the friendship with the Soviet Union.

In a talk at the traditional friendship festival in Moscow preceeding the Independence Day of Finland Deputy Minister of Justice Nikolai Osetrov said Thursday night that "we cannot avoid mentioning that the Soviet Union shares the concern of the Finnish democratic and political circles that there are attempts to weaken and damage the unity of the Finnish democratic forces that form the basis of the foreign policy line, the goal of which is friendship with the Soviet Union.

Before that Osetrov had emphasized that in the Soviet Union the Finnish foreign policies are greatly appreciated and that President Mauno Koivisto has also emphasized their continuity.

Osetrov also stated that the Finnish-Soviet collaboration has often served as a model also for the international relations of other countries and their relations to the Soviet Union.

Osetrov did not write his speech himself. It probably originates from the Scandinavian Division of the Soviet Foreign Ministry or maybe even from the Central Committee.

The democratic forces that Osetrov is talking about are Finland's Communist Party, and the attempts to weaken and damage the party concerns the way the majority leadership has dealt with the party minority. The way this passage was formulated in Osetrov's speech, which otherwise was very friendly and followed the traditional course where traditionally the good sides of the relationship are emphasized, shows that the Soviet Union has carefully defined the borderline between the Finnish party and the leadership of Finland.

In the beginning of the now radical conflict within the Finnish Communist Party there was less specific talk about the fact that the development is having harmful effects on the foreign policies of Finland and the relations with the Soviet Union.

Now the foreign policy leadership of Finland is no longer held responsible, even indirectly, for the situation within the Communist Party.

Osetrov's speech is the first official reaction to the entire matter - it had earlier been commented on in the party organ PRAVDA, but now it has been expressed on a ministerial level that the development is considered alarming.

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POLITICAL

FINLAND

UN DELEGATION CONTINUES ABSTAINING IN AFGHANISTAN VOTES

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 6 Dec 85 p 21

[Text] "Finland will continue to abstain in votes concerning Afghanistan," said Ambassador Erkki Kivimaki in Finland's presentation at the UN on Wednesday.

The ambassador who spoke at the Third Committee of the General Assembly stated that the situation in Afghanistan is one of the problems that affect the relations between the super powers. The issue on human rights in Afghanistan can be solved only within the framework of more extensive political and military solutions," emphasized Kivimaki.

In the UN the handling of the problem has all the time involved political disputes between the super powers and Finland has traditionally stayed outside disputes of this kind.

"We continue along this line and therefore Finland will abstain in Afghanistan votes," said Ambassador Kivimaki.

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POLITICAL

FINLAND

EDITOR COMPARES KEKKONEN, KOIVISTO AS PRESIDENTS

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 8 Dec 85 p 9

[Text] Jansson: "Koivisto Not as Full of Ideas as UKK".

[Text] President Koivisto has not delivered new ideas and topics for the public debate the way President Kekkonen did. This statement was made by Chief Editor Jan-Magnus Jansson in an interview for ILTALEHTI yesterday. Jansson also wonders how certain it is that Koivisto will run in the 1988 election. Jansson himself definitely declines his candidacy.

In the interview, which was made by Editor Jalmari Torkka, Jansson praises parts of Koivisto's work that he considers "highly meritorious." "He has restored the parliamentary part of the governmental organization," says Jansson and adds that Koivisto has tried to keep away from the active leadership of the national politics.

UKK Presented Ideas

The criticism of Koivisto is more indirect. Jansson emphasizes that Kekkonen often in his talks brought up new ideas and thus kept the public debate going. "I have missed that with Koivisto."

"Several of our presidents have been spiritual leaders," says Jansson and mentions as examples Stahlberg, Kekkonen and Paasikivi. "Koivisto has not produced any topics for debate. Unless you consider the debate regarding the press, which has not been especially constructive," says Jansson.

In regard to how Koivisto would have managed as president if he would have had to experience a general strike, a government crisis and a parliament dissolution, Jansson replies: "The answer could be that he in such an atmosphere would not at all have been elected. The election of Koivisto is a product of the concensus politics. Therefore such a large part of the conservatives voted for a socialist".

Will Koivisto Run Again for Presidency?

Jan-Magnus Jansson believes in the interview that Koivisto's sense of duty will make him run again for presidency in 1988.

"But since Koivisto's way of thinking is hard for other people to follow, I am not at all sure that he will run for candidacy," adds Jansson, who thus refers also to "Koivisto's psychology."

"In such a situation the nonsocialists will hardly find a joint candidate," predicts Jansson, who thus emphasizes that he himself "absolutely not" will make himself available as a candidate.

Government Base

The government base is also discussed. Jansson believes that the Social Democrats especially in the event of a party leader change would be likely to place themselves in opposition. For the sake of parliamentarism a nonsocialist government would be good as an experiment, but Jansson indicates that a long-term nonsocialist government would not be anything to strive for.

"If concensus ceases, the Center Party will continue to hold the keys in its hands," says Jansson to ILTALEHTI.

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POLITICAL

ITALY

NATTA HOLDS 'VERY USEFUL' MOSCOW TALKS

PM310955 Milan L'UNITA in Italian 29 Jan 86 pp 2, 17

[Giulietto Chiesa dispatch: "PCI-CPSU Summit Ends: Natta-Gorbachev--'Very Useful Talks'"]

[Text] Moscow--There were a further 4 hours of talks between [PCI Secretary General] Alessandro Natta and Mikhail Gorbachev. The second meeting, which began at 1100--again the presence of a group of Italian journalists admitted to the CPSU general secretary's "conference room" in the Kremlin--took place in a cordial atmosphere and, as expected, broached virtually all the most important aspects of the international situation, from the "post-Geneva phase" and the positive expectations which the Reagan-Gorbachev summit created throughout the work to the problems of disarmament and the world's "hot spots," the areas of tension. The two interlocutors (on the Italian side Natta was accompanied by Gian Carlo Pajetta, Antonio Rubbi, and Renato Sandri, while Gorbachev was again accompanied by Vadim Zagladin and Andrey Aleksandrov) referred to the "great usefulness" of contacts such as those of the past 2 days, agreeing on the need for them to be more frequent.

In the evening there was an official dinner in honor of the Italian guests at the Kremlin, attended by, apart from the CPSU general secretary, Andrey Gromyko, Yegor Ligachev, Geydar Aliyev, Mikhail Solomentsev, Vitaliy Vorotnikov, Vikto Chebrikov, Barois Ponomarev, Vadim Zagladin, and Andrey Aleksandro. In other words, virtually the entire current Politburo, with the sole exceptions of Premier Rzhkhov, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, and Viktor Grishin.

The official speeches delivered on this occasion (another very significant procedural innovation, apart from the "exceptional" duration of the political conversations) are published on another page, but the one and atmosphere in which they were delivered, as well as their substance, bear witness to a particularly favorable climate and to the results of the conversations which were clearly mutually satisfactory overall. Alessandro Natta later confirmed this assessment when he met with Italian journalists again after the official dinner at the Kremlin.

"We believe," the PCI secretary general said, "that both yesterday's meeting and today's were very important. Today we discussed, on the basis of both

sides' assessments and opinions, the major issues facing mankind--peace, co-existence, detente, disarmament. We live in a world that is increasingly interdependent, in which stances may differ and conflict but in which there are issues that affect everyone.

"We examined at length the issues of disarmament," Natta continued, "with a positive reference to the USSR's latest proposals and with an examination of the stances of other international interlocutors. Of course, we did not go into elaborate technical details partly because--and I say this with a smile--we have no weapons. But we did reassert our support for every effort leading to a complete dismantling of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe and for the prospect of balanced and total disarmament." With regard to star wars, Natta said that "it is well known that on this issue there is a convergence of assessments between the two sides, which we reasserted," and went on immediately to add that Italian Communists "vigorously urge that resources and research be resolutely channeled into directions other than that of creating new weapons of destruction."

"Regional crises" were discussed at length during yesterday's conversation. Attention centered on two in particular, Natta said, "We illustrated and confirmed our well-known stances with regard to both the substance and the principles at stake." First, with regard to the Middle East, which is considered--there is a specific reference to it in Gorbachev's speech too--"one of the situations most fraught with dangers." There was discussion here of "ways and means of combating terrorism" and of the "need to find a solution to the underlying causes of the crisis by giving the Palestinian people a land and guaranteeing the Israeli state's security." Pajetta pointed out in this connection that during the conversation Gorbachev left no doubts about Soviet intentions in this regard, explicitly referring to the role played by the USSR at the time Israel was created ("We were among those who contributed to its creation").

But, of course, Natta explained, it is not our intention to summarize the entire conversation now. For one thing, "we took for granted what was already known about our mutual positions and proceeded further with their elaboration." Another of the key topics was Afghanistan. "Here," Natta said, "we reasserted our stances. We believe--and we said so--that neither revolution nor counter-revolution must be exported. We support the principles of every country's independence and sovereignty and its right to choose the forms of its own development. We believe that the 1979 intervention decision was a political error and, for our part, we urged a quest for political solutions." Somebody asked how Gorbachev reacted and Pajetta replied with a quip: "They did not seem surprised." Next Natta added that Gorbachev "set out the known Soviet stances," though "the need to find a political solution to the situation did emerge in the points made by the Soviet side" within the context of recent developments both in Kabul and in international forums.

Gian Carlo Pajetta returned to the subject of disarmament: "We said that while it is true that there is a military-industrial complex in the United States pressing for rearmament, it is also true that there are forces in Europe and the United States pressing in the opposite direction and that in the United

States too there are forces which understand that it is impossible to continue indefinitely along a line of rearmament." Gorbachev's reply, Pajetta said, was characterized by realism, when he said that "it is not a matter of optimism or pessimism," adding that "we would not have made such far-reaching proposals if we had believed that nobody would heed them."

Considerable prominence was also given to the topics of detente in Europe, linked with those of the expansion of economic cooperation between countries belonging to the two communities and to the two politicomilitary alliances. Some very significant convergences were noted in this regard.

Considerable coverage and prominence has been granted by the Soviet media to the PCI delegation's presence in Moscow. Yesterday morning PRAVDA published a large front-page photograph of the two delegations at the conference table. The "Vremya" newscast opened its evening programs yesterday and the day before with pictures of the Natta-Gorbachev meetings. "Friendship and frankness" seem to be the characteristics traits of this truly exceptional summit between the PCI secretary general and the CPSU general secretary, which has demonstrated the possibility and usefulness of a dialogue even when positions are different and even conflicting. This morning PRAVDA will publish the texts of the two speeches, while the PCI delegation will leave for Italy.

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POLITICAL

ITALY

GUERRA ON HISTORY OF PCI-USSR TIES

PM271940 Milan L'UNITA in Italian 26 Jan 86 (Special supplement) pp 24-25

[Adriano Guerra article: "USSR: Our Analysis in Its Impact With Reality"]

[Text] People often talk about Italian Communists' attitude toward the USSR as though for years and years, until the wrench made at the 16th congress, they simply repeated the same things. The fact is, however, that even though certain fundamental elements--recognition of the watershed role played by the October Revolution, first and foremost--are present as early as 1945 and remained in the PCI's documents almost in the same terms, there has been a succession of assessments and deliberations on an entire range of issues that cannot be dismissed along with the bureaucratic formulations that still dominated even in the fifties.

Nor were these assessments of secondary aspects of Soviet experience because they concerned matters of definite substantial importance, such as whether the Soviet model of socialism was valid for our country. In any case there is no doubt that the "blurring of the assertion of our autonomy," as Berlinguer called it, which occurred between the sixth congress of 1948 and the eighth congress of 1956 certainly stemmed partly, if not primarily, from the uncritical way in which the USSR was regarded for so many years. The identification here proposed of the sixth congress as the start of the phase of "blurring" of Italian Communists' political and theoretical formulations raises a both difficult and fascinating problem with which we must come to terms, namely, our assessment at the fifth congress of 1946 or, rather, of the phase from the Salerno turning point through the birth of Cominform.

It was a time when the cold war was not only still to break out but not even considered inevitable and Europe--despite the presence of the British-U.S. armies in the West and the Soviet armies in the East--still seemed basically "a single whole" (as stated in the so often forgotten final document of the Yalta conference). Of course, the factors behind the rupture and the split that would later prevail were already there but it is significant that in his report to the fifth congress Togliatti adopted a stance against the "mistaken belief" that "in order to reassert itself as an independent nation" Italy should "speculate on the disagreements between the major allied powers." What was being proposed, in other words, was to work to prevent the breakup

of the antifascist coalitions from actually creating opposing political and ideological blocs. This is one of the roots of an entirely individual way of talking about the Soviet Union.

The report states that it is necessary to combat "preconceived hostility toward the USSR" and in fact to seek friendship and cooperation with the USSR. Nevertheless, Togliatti went on, "we believe that Italy should pursue a policy of friendship toward the USSR not for ideological but for national reasons."

Some very important statements about the USSR are also to be found in speeches at the fifth congress devoted to the issue of the relationship between democracy and socialism. "We want Italy too, like almost all the European countries, to march toward socialism" and we look toward the Soviet Union "as toward the start of a new kind of civilization." But marching toward socialism did not mean "doing the same as Russia": The Italian way to socialism (the formulation originated at the Florence organization's conference a few months later) proceeds from the assumption that there neither is or can be any conflict between democracy and socialism since "we are democrats inasmuch as we are not only antifascist but socialists and communists."

At the time these stances--which were not merely theoretical, since during the same period communists were participating in the coalition government and preparing to become joint authors of the constitution--coexisted with the exaltation not only--and justifiably--of the role which the USSR had earned through its crucial contribution to the victory against fascism but of every aspect of Soviet reality. So should the "Italian way" whereby it was intended to reach socialism via a gradual enlargement of democracy have led to an organization of society no different from the Soviet Union's? The fifth congress did not--and could not--give satisfactory answers to these and other questions.

It did, however, lay the foundations for an entirely new quest and approach. But then the cold war fell over Europe, and not only Europe, with the successive breakdown of the antifascist coalitions, Europe's division, and the creation of opposing "camps."

According to Togliatti's report to the sixth congress (January 1948) Italy's building of a system based on a new kind of democracy was hindered partly because "it would have prevented our country from being turned into the foothold for the criminal activity being conducted against the countries where a system of new democracy had been created and against the major country of socialism, the Soviet Union." These words marked another turning point, appearing as they did in the final "crescendo" and on account of the emphasis placed on the USSR.

Cominform was born in September 1947 and the Soviets and Yugoslavs leveled criticisms at the PCI and the PCF. These two parties were accused basically of having failed promptly to realize that the task was no longer to fight to keep the antifascist alliance standing but to acknowledge the reality of the cold war and of the need to align with the USSR to face up to the threat constituted by U.S. imperialism.

At the Cominform meeting Luigi Longo defended the PCI line (though this was not known at the time) and at the sixth congress Togliatti again reasserted that "the paths of development of the democratic movement in individual European countries cannot be the same." In fact (and this was also the case at the seventh congress in 1951) there was no longer any mention of "national paths" and the USSR and Stalin--these were the years of their most fervent cult--were spoken of with more and more repetitive and rhetorical formulas. The contradictions between the reality of the struggles of Italian Communists (who were during those same years strengthening their roots and representation in the country and fighting for democracy against the Centralist governments' threats of restoration) and their uncritical adherence to the USSR's stances--for instance, against Tito, against "revisionism," and against cosmopolitanism--certainly helped to explain the uncertainties and what Togliatti called the "duplicities" of that period.

When looking back over those years, however, it must be borne in mind that the threat of war was very real and that the USSR was not only a guarantee of peace for millions of people but also a bulwark of the liberation struggles at a time when the colonial empires were crumbling. It was in 1956 that, seizing the unique opportunity provided by the 20th [CPSU] congress, Italian Communists resumed an explicit discourse on the new, democratic, paths to socialism and adapted a new viewpoint on the USSR. The shock caused by Khrushchev's revelations was great. But within the PCI, primarily thanks to Togliatti, the issue of Stalin and his "cult" immediately became a broader issue concerning the USSR, the starting point for an analysis of the underlying reasons why it had been possible for such a serious process of decline to emerge from the democracy of the Soviets.

To the questions raised by Khrushchev, then by the Polish October [1956], and finally by the Hungarian crisis, the eighth congress gave answers which in many respects are still very valuable and relevant. The experiment in building set in motion by October was not viewed either as an uninterrupted chain of successes or as a terrifying series of mistakes and tragedies. But it was seen as a complex and new process which had its own rationality in the practical circumstances in which it took place.

In so doing we went beyond the limits of the "secret report" even if we acted out of a conviction that however serious and intolerable Stalin's mistakes and crimes were they did not cancel out the "enormous positive record" of the Soviet experiment. The 20th congress was then seen as proof of the fact that in any case the USSR had the ability and strength to remedy its own mistakes.

Togliatti himself, in the Yalta memorandum in 1964, admitted that the line of the 20th congress was encountering resistance and moving with inexplicable slowness. Nor was it just a matter of lagging behind as was noted at the 9th congress (1960) and above all at the 10th congress of December 1962 (the congress at which Togliatti and Pajetta argued against the Chinese position). What then came to be called the "international communist movement" then seemed to be dominated by disagreements and conflicts which were difficult to overcome. Togliatti tackled the problem by proposing, without success, a new view of internationalism with the formulas of "unity in diversity and autonomy"

and "polycentrism," and at the 11th congress (1966)--the first congress without Togliatti--Longo revived the proposal. But a new crisis was developing. The year 1968 exploded with the Czechoslovak events, raising increasingly worrying questions after the Soviet intervention.

The PCI's positions supporting the "Prague spring" and criticizing the Soviet intervention were clearly confirmed at the 12th congress (February 1969) in the speeches by Longo, Berlinguer, and Galluzzi. The PCI's independent positions were then reiterated at the 13th congress (1972) and the 14th congress (1975). But it was necessary to wait another few years until it was stated that "progress has not been made along the path laid down by the 20th congress." The firm statement dates from the 15th congress in March 1979 (thesis No 42) and marks a major change in the development of the PCI's positions. This is because it ended the phase of expectations and hopes opened by the 20th congress.

From that time--even if not everybody was aware of it--it became inevitable to raise the question of the inevitably regressive nature of the new phase in Soviet society at a time when the thrust toward reforms was halted. At the end of 1970 the warning bell was rung by the strikes in the Baltic which led to the ousting of Gomulka. In the USSR things grew worse from 1975 when, to face an increasingly difficult situation, the path of closed doors and ultra-conservatism was chosen with Brezhnev.

On the domestic front the phenomenon of dissidence exploded, but in Poland dissidence was represented by the majority of the population who gathered around Solidarity to call for radical reforms in the relationship between government and society. The reply was the proclamation of martial law, with Soviet support. In foreign policy ultraconservatism was reflected in a real crisis of political initiative. The result of this was the intervention in Afghanistan, the decision to deploy the SS-20 missiles, and in general resorting to "power politics." And yet just a few years previously the USSR had played a decisive role in supporting Vietnam's liberation struggle until victory was achieved.

What had happened? It was no longer possible to talk of "lagging behind" and "mistakes." "On the whole--it was stated in the chapter devoted to the countries following Soviet socialism in the document approved by the 16th congress (1983), the chapter on the fading of the propulsive thrust--it became clear that an authoritarian and rigid political and ideological model and concept of power not only damaged democracy and stifled social and ideological needs but ultimately hindered productive development. It was therefore a crisis of not just a question of lagging behind. A knot of contradictions was created which could either be unraveled, paving the way for real radical reforms of the system, or could produce decline and traumatic and even tragic splits."

Have these "dated" positions been overcome now that the USSR under Gorbachev has abandoned ultraconservatism, as everybody maintains? Positive changes have certainly already taken place and it is right to pay close attention to them. But is not the extraordinary validity of this diagnosis confirmed--while Gorbachev is overturning Brezhnev's SS-20 strategy, trying to find a political solution to the Afghan crisis, and talking of the need for great

reforms in the USSR's domestic life--by words which are reminiscent of those spoken at the 16th PCI Congress appearing today in PRAVDA in addition to evidence of the strong resistance which the very idea of changes is encountering?

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CSO: 3528/66

POLITICAL

NETHERLANDS

POLL SHOWS KOK PREFERRED OVER DEN UYL BY LABOR VOTERS

The Hague ANP NEWS BULLETIN in English 9 Jan 86 pp 3-4

[Text] The Hague, January 8--Dutch voters both inside and outside the Labour Party prefer former trade union leader Wim Kok to veteran party leader Joop den Uyl to lead the socialists into the elections, an opinion poll published today shows.

The poll, commissioned by the socialist VARA broadcasting association, revealed that 46 percent of Dutch voters felt Labour would book the best results if led by Kok while 18 percent favoured Den Uyl.

Twenty-nine percent of the respondents felt the leadership would make no difference. Among Labour voters 53 percent preferred Kok while 23 percent backed Den Uyl, the poll showed.

The poll also showed that the Christian Democrats are regaining ground earlier lost to Labour.

In an election the poll results would have given the Christian Democrats 50 seats in the 150-member second chamber, a gain of five since the September 1982 elections, while the Labour Party would win 56 seats, a gain of nine since 1982.

Majority Support

The Liberal Party, the junior partner of the Christian Democrats in the Lubbers administration, stands to win 27 seats, a loss of nine since the last elections, while the Democrats '66 Party would gain five seats, a loss of one since 1982.

The poll indicates that the Lubbers government could gain enough support in May's general elections to retain its majority in parliament.

Asked which politicians were the most trustworthy, 53 percent of those polled favoured Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers (CDA) followed by Kok, 46 percent.

Some way behind were Den Uyl, D'66's Hans van Mierlo, who caused a brief upsurge in his party's popularity with his decision to lead it into the elections, and Liberal leader Ed Nijpels, who scored 31, 25, and 20 percent, respectively.

High Turnout

The Interview Bureau which conducted the poll noted that Lubbers was more trusted amongst Liberal voters, gaining 75 percent against Nijpels' 45 percent.

Most CDA and Liberal voters favoured an ongoing centre-right coalition, with 64 percent of CDA voters and 75 percent of Liberal voters in support.

Interview said the elections were already a lively topic amongst voters, with some 90 percent of those polled pledging to cast their votes in May.

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CSO: 3600/24

POLITICAL

NORWAY

COUNTRY TO JOIN NORDIC PROGRAM AIDING 'FRONT LINE STATES'

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 13 Jan 86 p 4

[Article: "Expanded Cooperation With 'Front Line States'"]

[Text] Together with the other Nordic countries, Norway will participate in a far-reaching trade and aid agreement with the black states in southern Africa. The aim is to help the so-called "front line states" make themselves more independent of trade with South Africa.

One element in the new program is urging Nordic firms to decrease trade with South Africa and to engage in more trade with the 9 black front line states in the vicinity of South Africa. But first and foremost the program is about stimulating economic cooperation among the front line states so that they can tear themselves loose from the strong bonds of trade they currently have with South Africa.

Currently final details are being worked out for an agreement between Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Iceland. Plans call for a joint policy statement to be signed in Harare, the capital of Zimbabwe, at the end of January at a meeting with SADCC, the economic cooperative organization for southern Africa. Reidun Brusletten, the Minister for Development Cooperation, will take part together with representatives from other Nordic governments.

This statement will form the policy basis for a specific trade program which will extend beyond traditional aid cooperation, Undersecretary Odd Jostein Saether of the Ministry for Development Cooperation said.

In the next few years SADCC will become a big recipient of Norwegian aid. This year a Norwegian allocation of 150 million kroner has been earmarked for support of regional cooperative ventures within the SADCC group, with a view towards strengthening their economies and making them less dependent on trade with South Africa. It is from this allocation that funds for the new support ventures will be taken.

However this makes up only a small part of Norway's overall assistance to the front line states. This year it will amount to approximately one billion kroner, Undersecretary Saether stated.

Today Norway's imports from the front line states comprise only about one one-thousandth of total imports. Realistically speaking, prospects for expanded trade will be rather limited, in the short run, at least. What must first be done is better surveying prospects for specific cooperative ventures. In addition to sectors at which assistance is currently aimed, such as communications, telecommunications and energy expansion, it may be possible to bring in Norwegian and Nordic expertise from banks and business firms, for example, the undersecretary said.

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POLITICAL

NORWAY

ODD EINAR DORUM STEPPING DOWN FROM LIBERAL PARTY CHAIRMANSHIP

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 13 Jan 86 p 4

[Article by Egil Wettre-Johnsen: "Made Decision a Few Days After Election: Dorum Retiring as Liberal Party Chairman"]

[Text] Odd Einar Dorum will retire as chairman of the Liberal Party at the party's national convention in Haugesund in April. On Friday the elections committee was formally informed that he did not wish to accept re-election, and over the weekend the Liberal Party's executive board was given information about the party chairman's position. Dorum has told AFTENPOSTEN that he decided to withdraw as far back as a few days after the party's defeat in the fall parliamentary election. However, Dorum's retirement was first known officially on Sunday, even if, according to Berit Nafstad Lyftingsmo, the chairman of the elections committee, Dorum's position has been clear for some time.

As far as AFTENPOSTEN can ascertain, Arne Fjortoft, the former Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation program secretary, is the leading candidate for the Liberal Party chairmanship. Lyftingsmo told AFTENPOSTEN that Fjortoft was named a leading candidate by members of the elections committee but that other candidates are also being reviewed.

The entire 11-member Liberal Party national executive board is up for election in Haugesund, and this means as well that vice chairman Dominikus Jordal and Eldbjorg Lower can be replaced. Furthermore Lower has said that she is not a candidate to succeed Dorum in the chairman's post.

Lyftingsmo has informed AFTENPOSTEN that the work of the elections committee will really get underway after the Liberal Party's reconstruction commission has made its presentation. This is expected some time this week.

"The new party leadership should be seen in relation to how the party addresses itself to reconstruction," she said.

As far as AFTENPOSTEN can ascertain, this means that in its personnel recommendations the elections committee will stress the fact that a majority in the party still wants to cooperate with the Labor Party or return to a non-socialist cooperative strategy.

Lyftingsmo did not wish to give an opinion as to whether there may be major changes in the party leadership but stressed that in earlier elections emphasis was placed on maintaining continuity.

Dorum told AFTENPOSTEN that he has no wish to be consulted in the election of the new party leadership. As far as cooperation with the Labor Party is concerned, he emphasized that this cooperation has been chosen after due consideration but that voters spoke in such a way that the party did not gain representation in Parliament.

Dorum has acted as the Liberal Party chairman for 4 years and was a member of Parliament for South Trondelag from 1977 to 1981.

As for future duties, Dorum told AFTENPOSTEN that from now until summer he wants to concentrate on his work as a social work professor at the Diakonhjem in Oslo.

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POLITICAL

NORWAY

MIDDLE PARTY LEADERS IN COALITION WOOED BY LABOR PARTY

Paper Cites Leader's 'Disappointment'

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 2 Jan 86 p 4

[Editorial: "Disillusioned Synnes"]

[Text] A new Christian People's Party politician feels "disappointed and disillusioned." This time it is Harald Synnes, the party's parliamentary leader. In several comments recently he has approached the opposition, particularly the Labor Party. He has expressed his disappointment that the Labor Party has not rapidly and willingly become an aid in crisis to the three party government.

During the many years of the minority governments under the Labor Party there was a watchword in the Christian People's Party that one should act in such a way that the government would not become unilaterally dependent upon a party of the left, Synnes claims. Therefore he has also wished for a more constructive position from the Labor Party than he has seen up to now. The Labor Party should do something else than stand on its main proposals and put forward its alternative budget, Synnes thinks.

At first there will certainly be some who will fall for Synnes' argument. Even if his statements seem to be more a sign of wanting to talk about something else than his own problems, it may seem that Synnes honestly and truly wants a greater degree of cooperation with the largest opposition party.

But his argument is built upon two incorrect conclusions. When it was possible to reach a broad agreement on many important matters under the Labor Party's minority governments, this was primarily because great emphasis was placed in these governments on finding solutions that would gather wide political support. In other words -- the Labor Party's minority governments drew the necessary conclusion from the fact that they did not have an independent majority behind them in the Storting. It was this conscious will to meet the Storting's majority that made possible broad political decisions, much more than that which may have come from internal watchwords of the Christian People's Party.

The Willoch governments have followed a very different practice. To be sure, it does speak like a minority government, but it acts as if it controlled an obedient majority in the Storting. In this way the government and its leader, Prime Minister Kare Willoch, have steered themselves into one crisis situation

after another. The example of the lottery is enough to demonstrate this. We can hardly see any reasonable explanation why this should become a question of to be or not to be for the government. But it did become so. And it was no less than the head of the government who wanted it so.

Nor is it correct, as the Christian People's Party's parliamentary leaders claim, that the Labor Party has stood stock-still on its main positions. Quite the contrary, time after time the Labor Party's leader, Gro Harlem Brundtland, has invited cooperation on the problems of the fall, among other things in connection with the budget. For the Labor Party it has been an important point that sufficient resources be found to meet the acute problems in the health and social sectors. Earlier statements by Harald Synnes have shown us that there is a common interest between the Labor Party and the Christian People's Party. But -- and for cooperative relationships in the Storting this is paramount -- there are parts of the government that have very different priorities.

Loyalty to Coalition Pledged

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 7 Jan 85 p 3

[Article by Morten Malmo]

[Text] The parliamentary leaders of the Christian People's Party and the Center Party, Harald Synnes and Johan Buttedahl, indicated yesterday to VG that cooperation between the Labor Party and the two middle parties could become a reality if the "Storting chaos" continues in such a way that the coalition breaks apart. This move received great attention yesterday in political circles, not the least within the coalition. At the same time, however, the two told AFTENPOSTEN: "We want the present government to continue. We must fight for it and make a maximum effort to see that the cooperation is a success."

In political circles, however, doubt has been raised on the significance of the declarations of cooperation by the parliamentary leaders. It has been pointed out to AFTENPOSTEN that the two have continually rejected every form of closer **cooperation** with the Progressive Party, in the form of definite agreements and routine. "If they don't reach an agreement of a relationship to the Progressive Party, the political base will be torn away from the non-socialist government," it was maintained.

In yesterday's VERDENS GANG one could read this: "If the Storting's chaos of last fall continues over a longer period, it could tear apart the cooperation of the three parties and open the door to closer cooperation between the Labor Party and the two middle parties. The parliamentary leaders of the Christian People's Party and the Center Party have indicated this to VG."

Yesterday AFTENPOSTEN asked the Center Party's parliamentary leader, Johan Buttedahl, "It is at all possible today to discuss the possibilities of a governmental constellation other than the one we have today?"

"No. We wish the present government to continue, and we will fight for it. If this government is felled by the Labor Party, the Socialist Left Party, and the Progressive Party, the only alternative is a purely Labor Party government."

Two Points of View?

The Christian People's Party's parliamentary leader, Harald Synnes, answered this way to the same question: "I intend to refrain from planning other constellations as long as we are involved in binding cooperation. Our task is to make every effort to see that this cooperation is successful."

Buttedahl also added, "Let me also remind you of what I said about the Labor Party's wocers in the debate on balancing the budget, namely that one can get chills up one's spine from the criticism by some of the Labor Party speakers of the Center Party. I also want to take exception to the idea that there was chaos in the Storting last fall. There was a difficult parliamentary situation. That is correct. But 'chaos' is what the media call it."

The statements Buttedahl made to AFTENPOSTEN on this question agree very well with the viewpoints that Center Party chairman, Johan J. Jakobsen, the minister of transport and communications, said earlier.

Attracted Attention

Yesterday's article in VG attracted considerable attention in the political arena, not the least in government circles. It is worth noting that what the two parliamentary leaders "indicate to VG" was not confirmed by the two to AFTENPOSTEN.

If "indications" of closer cooperation with the Labor Party, which the two gave to VG, attracted interest in government circles, it is because those in the government have the best idea of the cooperation between the three governmental partners during last fall's budget negotiations. The greatest surprise is that the parliamentary leaders of two of the government parties apparently have suggested another governmental constellation than the present one they say they will fight for. Some question whether they could have said what VG attributes to them. It is said that it is not at all clear what Buttedahl and Synnes really mean.

Concerning the Progressive Party

The Christmas vacations have changed nothing in the attitude of the Christian People's Party and the Center Party toward closer cooperation in the Storting with the Progressive Party through definite agreements and routine.

"Such contact with the Progressive Party would be destructive for the middle parties. We must act in such a way that the Labor Party will also be challenged to cooperation and brought into the political process in the Storting. This requires flexibility, from the Conservative Party as well, in order to find solutions. A good indication that this is possible is the solution that the "freeze affair" received. What everyone thought would become a matter of conflict was solved when one showed flexibility," Synnes said.

Buttedahl said that if AFTENPOSTEN's wish in its editorial for a closer, routine cooperation in the Storting with the Progressive Party should be accepted in the Conservative Party, this could make daily cooperation more difficult. "We in the Center Party want a continued issue-to-issue cooperation with other parties in the Storting, and we do not want to give individual parties special treatment," Buttedahl said. He points out that the three government parties stood together behind the various agreements entered into with other parties during the fall session of the Storting.

Christian Party Rejects Courting

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 10 Jan 86 p 5

[Text] The Christian People's Party's chairman, Kjell Magne Bondevik, has also rejected the latest political courting from the Labor Party. He says that such moves from that quarter to the middle parties are nothing new. Bondevik points out that The Christian People's Party has decided that it will profit best within the cooperation it now stands. He stresses that "Everyone must now hold to the constellation we have today."

In a commentary to the party's press service, the chairman of the Christian People's Party said, among other things, about the invitation from the Labor Party leader, Gro Harlem Brundtland, "There is nothing new in invitations from the Labor Party to the middle parties for cooperation. It has happened at regular intervals under various party leaders. The new element is that they choose to do this while we are sitting in governmental cooperation.

"The Christian People's Party has evaluated the situation and believes it profits best from its present cooperation. This was our message to our supporters before the Storting elections, and we obviously are not going to run away from this afterwards.

"The most interesting thing in the statements of the Labor Party's leader is that they indicate a softening of a solid, political block way of thinking. But nothing has been said this time either about the political factors behind this. Probably not even the Liberal Party, which reacted positively to the Labor Party's earlier invitations to cooperation, received an answer on this," Bondevik said.

Bondevik stressed:

"Everyone must remain in the constellation we have today.

"We are involved in a broad cooperation in the Storting on important and difficult issues. The Labor Party will have the opportunity here to show in practice whether the open, cooperative attitude it now is presenting contains a more constructive attitude toward work with difficult matters, or whether it is rather out to sow discord among the government parties."

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POLITICAL

SPAIN

SPECULATION ABOUNDS ON CASE OF 'MISSING' SOVIET SCIENTIST

Madrid TIEMPO in Spanish 9 Dec 85 pp 95-101

[Article by Ahmad Rafat: "The Missing Russian Scientist Was a Double Spy"]

[Text] He disappeared without a trace in Madrid on 31 March, but his country's authorities did not report him missing until 17 July. TIEMPO's investigations into alleged Soviet scientist and mathematician Vladimir Alexandrov suggest that he could be a spy.

The rush of events that have thrown the world of espionage and secret services into turmoil in recent months began in Madrid. Particularly hard hit have been the FRG, the United Kingdom, France, Switzerland and the United States, in addition, of course, to the USSR and other Eastern bloc countries. Many important agents, low- and middle-level informers, secretaries who were the mistresses of spies, and colleagues of major political figures defected or escaped from their countries during the summer of 1985.

In a few months' time Eastern and Western secret services saw many of their men and women have their covers blown, including more than a few top-level figures such as the West German Hans Joachim Tiedge, a high-level Bonn counterespionage officer, or Vitaly Yurchenko, the number five man in the KGB.

Until now many thought that the spy capers began with the mysterious disappearance of Yurchenko. Arriving in Rome on 24 July on a regular Aeroflot flight from Moscow, Yurchenko was officially supposed to take care of some security details at the Abamalek villa, the site of his country's embassy in Italy. According to sources in Italian military security (SISMI), however, Yurchenko had actually arrived in Rome to investigate the case of Soviet mathematician Vladimir Alexandrov, who had vanished mysteriously in Madrid. Yurchenko disappeared himself, however, no less mysteriously, on 1 August in the Vatican museums. According to the account that Yurchenko himself later gave at a lively press conference in the Soviet Embassy in Washington on 1 November, he took a taxi at 0900 hours on 1 August to the Vatican museums for an innocent tourist visit. There, again according to his account, which the aforementioned sources in the Italian secret services partly confirmed, he was approached by CIA agents, who hustled him into a car with diplomatic license plates that was waiting in Saint Damaso Square just below the papal apartments. According to the same account, Yurchenko left Rome the following

day on an American passport, in the company of three CIA agents, on a nonstop TWA flight to Virginia.

With regard to the difficult mission that Vitaly Yurchenko was supposed to perform, namely, clarifying the disappearance of mathematician Vladimir Alexandrov, two hypotheses have been formulated so far: he either fled to the West or was kidnapped by a NATO intelligence service. After lengthy investigations this magazine has established a series of facts that paint a new picture of the young Soviet scientist who vanished into thin air in Madrid on the night of 31 March-1 April and whose disappearance was not reported by Soviet consular authorities until 17 July, in other words, almost 6 weeks later.

A Far From Responsible Scientist

The story of Alexandrov's supposed flight and disappearance began in Cordoba. He had gone there on an invitation from the Cordoba city hall to take part in the second conference on nonnuclear cities and zones. Several Soviet scientists had been invited to attend, but Moscow sent only Vladimir Alexandrov, who in fact arrived late. "The conference began just fine," the communist deputy mayor of Cordoba, Herminio Trigo, relates. "The only person who did not perform was Alexandrov. He showed his face very seldom; he seemed to be a very secretive fellow. He did not even hang around with some of his scientist friends, like Mike Pentz from England or Ronald Santoni from the United States. He submitted a very interesting written paper but did not take part in any discussions. He said that he was a scientist and that discussions were for politicians."

The paper that Alexandrov submitted in Cordoba was in English and dealt with nuclear winter. The alleged scientist spent most of his time in the Andalusian city drinking. "One night," Herminio Trigo goes on to say, "some municipal guardsmen who had found him in the most disreputable part of the city took him back to his lodgings." For two straight nights Alexandrov failed to return to the building in which the conference organizers had set up dormitories for the participants. "His conduct worried us," the deputy mayor says in conclusion, "so much so that we phoned the Soviet Embassy in Madrid to ask for an explanation and advice."

The conference closed early on the evening of 31 March, and Alexandrov was immediately driven to Madrid in a city hall vehicle. From the embassy he was accompanied to the Habana Apartments at 73 Habana Boulevard, where he took room 614. His passport, his return plane ticket and some personal effects were found here later. "He wasn't with us for long," says the concierge at the apartment building. "He arrived and went right up to his room, and then he left a little later and never came back. They called him several times from the Soviet Embassy the next day. We got worried after a few days and we notified the embassy, which sent people to remove his things. A lot of Soviets have been sent to stay here from the embassy, but nothing like this ever happened before."

After leaving his room at the Habana Apartments, Alexandrov initially walked over to a local bingo parlor but was not allowed in. The doorman there still remembers him clearly. He says that they asked the Soviet to leave because he was "completely bombed." Vladimir Alexandrov then walked several hundred meters to the El Yate Bar on Martinez Campos Street. There he was seen for the last time before vanishing for good.

Neither the Spanish police nor Soviet Embassy officials in Madrid have made any inquiries at El Yate. "I can't even explain it to myself," says Eduardo, the manager there, "because the first person who came and asked me questions was an Italian on 13 September. No one was here before him to ask about the drunk Russian."

The Last Few Hours in Madrid

Alexandrov walked into El Yate at around 7 in the evening and downed three whiskies, one after the other. "After the whiskies," Eduardo relates, "we gave him two strong cups of coffee, because he couldn't stand up, and then we called a taxi to take him to his hotel."

The waiter who served Vladimir Alexandrov at El Yate remembers him as an already drunk, somewhat sloppily dressed man who was constantly talking with everyone, including the other customers. We came across a customer in the bar who spends all of his evenings there and who remembers having seen Alexandrov walk down Miguel Angel Street and talk in English with some shopkeepers. This witness, who has declined to reveal his name, then says that he entered a cafe on the corner of Martinez Campos Street and ordered "Spanish wine." Since that time, around 10 in the evening on 31 March, no one has seen Vladimir Alexandrov again.

There are some very odd circumstances surrounding the Alexandrov affair, circumstances that had until now remained unknown to both the public and the police, which for some reason chose not to conduct a step-by-step investigation into Alexandrov's last hours in Madrid.

To begin with, the Soviet scientist was carrying a second Soviet passport in his pocket. Although a passport was, in fact, found in his room at the Habana Apartments, it is also true that several people, including the manager at El Yate, saw a Soviet passport in his pocket. It is not normal for a Soviet citizen to travel with two Soviet passports. This would not be a mystery if Vladimir Alexandrov were something other than a mathematician, a secret agent for example. According to the Italian consular service in Moscow, it turns out that Vladimir Alexandrov, unlike normal Soviet citizens and, in particular, unlike the other scientists, did not have a "closed" passport that was valid for only one trip overseas; he had an "open" passport that enabled him to travel abroad without any restrictions. Usually, only CPSU and State officials and KGB agents carry this kind of passport.

False Identification

Another interesting piece of information is that the famous "mathematician" was carrying not just pesetas in his pockets but also other foreign currencies such as dollars, Swedish krona and Dutch guilders. And it was Alexandrov himself who showed them to the waiters at El Yate. The impression is that Alexandrov wanted to drop clues all over Madrid, like in a bad spy novel.

Vladimir Alexandrov made his debut in international scientific circles in 1983 as the head of the Soviet scientific delegation to the first international conference on nuclear war in Erice, Sicily. He was supposed to have returned there this past summer, but in the interim he vanished into thin air. In Erice he was introduced by Soviet Embassy officials in Rome as the young director of the laboratory that the Soviet Academy of Sciences used for its computer simulation programs. Alexandrov's name does not appear in the latest edition of the directory of Soviet scientists, which is published every 2 years.

Leonid Plikhusk is undoubtedly one of the most famous Soviet mathematicians. For some years now he has been living in exile after having spent several years in a camp in Siberia. Today, he keeps in touch with Soviet scientists through dissident channels. This magazine asked Plikhusk about his "colleague" Alexandrov. After consulting with some of his sources inside the Soviet Union, he confirmed that until 1983 no one had heard of Alexandrov and that he was not in charge of any Academy of Sciences research center. "Precisely for this reason," Plikhusk says, "on his last trip to Cordoba all of the other members of the delegation withdrew at the last minute, refusing to be part of a delegation led by an official whom the Soviet Government wanted to pass off as a world famous mathematician."

Recognition in the United States

It is odd that the only scientists who were quite familiar with Vladimir Alexandrov and accepted his credentials as a renowned scientist are Americans. One of his main supporters, who says he is also a friend of the "young Soviet researcher," is Professor John Wallace, who teaches at the University of Seattle. After locating him in the United States, TIEMPO asked him over the phone what he thought of the theory that Alexandrov was a KGB spy. "Anything is possible, of course," Wallace replied. "But I remember him as a likable young scientist."

The oddest thing of all, however, is that on 17 July of this year, the day that the Soviet authorities asked the Spanish police to search for Vladimir Alexandrov, 3 months after his disappearance, a short article signed by Ted Agres appeared in THE WASHINGTON TIMES about the missing member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Aside from Alexandrov's false credentials as a member of the academy, the Americans have not yet explained how they learned of his disappearance before Soviet officials reported it. The answer could be that the mathematician-spy has moved over from the KGB to the CIA. Otherwise, none of the mysteries can be explained. Nor is there an explanation as to why the Spanish police and secret services have devoted so little attention to a baffling disappearance that has so many far from reassuring overtones.

POLITICAL

SPAIN

RADICALIZATION OF MELILLA MUSLIMS RECOUNTED

Madrid TIEMPO in Spanish 2 Dec 85 pp 38-42

[Article by Juan Enrique Gomez: "Melilla Experiencing the Tension of Racism and the Moroccan Threat"]

[Text] More than 20,000 Melilla Muslims, who are not Moroccan but are not regarded as Spaniards either, have mobilized to protest the Aliens Act, which if passed will trigger an unprecedented exodus. If their political rights are recognized, the Party of Melilla Democrats will become the arbiter of local politics.

Melilla is a 12,000 square kilometer jail housing more than 20,000 people who cannot leave either for Morocco or the Peninsula. They are stateless Muslims, neither Moroccan nor Spanish; more than half are undocumented, though some have statistics cards. According to Terra Omnium (land of all), the association that defends the rights of Muslims, there are close to 30,000 people who ought to be recognized as Spanish citizens with full rights and duties.

"This is how it ought to be, just as the constitution states," says Aomar Muhamed Dudu, the association's founder and leader, the only Melilla Muslim with a college education and a member of the Provincial Executive Committee of the PSOE until he was expelled for demanding Muslim rights.

This grievance apparently clashes, however, with the new Aliens Act, which will take effect as of this February and which, according to the government delegate in Melilla, Andres Moreno Aguilar, "will solve the problems of the Muslim people."

As far as the Spanish Government is concerned, according to Andres Moreno, there are 6,200 Muslims in Melilla with statistical cards. This Spanish legal document exists only for Ceuta and Melilla and allows the holder to live only in these cities; they cannot travel to the rest of Spain. Another 6,000 persons, underage children, are covered by their parents' cards. Some 2,000 Muslims have identification cards like any other Spaniard. And there are 4,000 undocumented individuals whom the government delegate prefers to describe as having "other statuses."

These figures, especially the last one, increase considerably if we add in the 8,000 Moroccans who cross the border every day to do business in Melilla. The Aliens Act will have to deal with this large number of people.

"The problem has arisen," says Andres Moreno, "because certain self-proclaimed leaders of the Muslim community would like to distort the real intentions of the government and claim that we want to expel them under this law. The only thing that we're going to ask them to do is comply with the requirements that the law establishes." In this regard, the government delegate sent a note to the news media in which he explained to Muslims why they should avail themselves of the new law as a first step towards obtaining citizenship.

Negative Reaction

The reaction of the Muslim community was not long in coming. Their leader, Aomar Dudu, asserts that "the government delegation is not showing good will, and proof of this is that nothing has been done to reestablish the territorial law [ley de suelo], which the UCD abolished just months before the Socialist victory. Moreover, the city government has refused to issue residency papers to Muslims since the appearance of the Aliens Act, and the mayor is following these orders because he wants to obey."

Gonzalo Hernandez, the mayor of Melilla, feels that the law should have been enacted long ago, "specifically in 1956," he says, "when Spain abandoned its protectorate. This way we would not have all the regrettable situations that are arising today among the Muslim population." Gonzalo Hernandez feels that it is more important to document these individuals than to nationalize them.

Other organizations, such as APROME [Pro-Melilla Association], which the Muslims regard as highly racist, feel that the Aliens Act will be a valid means of solving the problems of the Muslim community. "Even though a great many people will have to be expelled from Melilla," says Juan Diaz de la Cortina, the organization's secretary general, "we can assert that there are 3,000 Muslims in Melilla with national ID cards, but many of them are listed as being born in both Melilla and Nador. This is why an investigation is needed." APROME and the Melilla Nationalist Party, which the association founded, have both supported the government delegate's positions so far.

On 9 November, 500 members of the Muslim community held an assembly, which the government delegation had banned, to discuss the Aliens Act and the promise that Melilla Muslims could become naturalized citizens if they met the requirements in the Civil Code. The National Police surrounded the building where the rally was scheduled to be staged and, according to its organizers, Hossein Mohamed Mimum, Hasan Al-lal Mohamed and Ismail Mustafad Mohamed, prevented several thousand Muslims from taking part. "The police acted as it would in South Africa," says Aomar Dudu. "It was just like martial law, and if I hadn't managed to step in, there would have been real trouble." In the wake of the abortive rally Aomar Dudu filed a complaint against the government delegate "on charges of coercion to prevent exercise of the legitimate, constitutional right of assembly."

A series of rumors have begun to surface about this assembly, however. Among those attending it were a number of hooded men ready to step in if necessary. "Only one person was wearing a hood," says Aomar Dudu, "and it was as a joke, although the sun might have bothered him or he might have had some sort of skin disease. What I can say for sure, however, is that the only weapons were the ones that the representatives of the administration were carrying to crack down on us." "There were a lot of things at the assembly," says the government delegate for his part, "things that are best mentioned parenthetically. The night before the rally a police car was stoned, and a few days before that a national policeman was attacked." The fact is that there were people wearing hoods at the assembly, as several photographs attest, and according to sources that prefer to remain anonymous, several knives were confiscated.

The March of the Tortoise

There is apprehensive, low-voiced talk in Melilla about possible intervention by Morocco in the crisis between Muslims and Christians. "The Spanish character of Melilla is in jeopardy as long as Moroccans keep on streaming in and women from Nador continue to give birth in our city's hospitals," says APROME leader Juan Diaz de la Cortina.

The residents of the city have a name for this slow invasion: the march of the tortoise, a takeoff on the Moroccan "green march," and there are those who feel that Hassan II's intelligence services are behind the pro-Muslim activities. The government delegate, Andres Moreno, claims to have information that a Moroccan senator was present at the abortive Muslim assembly in Melilla, "though I cannot say for sure until I can cross-check sources."

Nevertheless, the Hassan government has said nothing about its territorial claims on Ceuta and Melilla in recent days. The initiative has been taken up by his ally, Libyan leader Qadhafi, who has again spoken up about the African character of the two spots. The Muslim representatives in Melilla would rather not broach the subject. "We do not want to be Moroccan; we want to have the nationality that belongs to our land," the community's representatives say. Other Muslims, almost all of them older than 50, say that they want to be Spaniards. The fact is that the exodus across the Moroccan border is nonstop, and families continue to build homes in the Hidum Ravine, which is also known as the ravine of death, thus adding to a population living in Third World socioeconomic conditions.

The lack of education, the exploitation of labor and unemployment are conducive to the social disenfranchisement of Melilla Muslims. "Out and out racism still exists here," says Aomar Dudu, "and the government is encouraging it." Aomar is regarded as a persona non grata in racist circles and has even received threats that his defense of the Muslim community "is going to cost you dearly." "There are groups in Melilla like the Ku Klux Klan in the United States," Aomar Dudu says. "The proof is all the graffiti in the city like 'No Moors,' 'Moors go home' and 'Melilla is in danger.'"

The charges of racism have even been leveled at specific individuals, such as Andres Moreno or Gonzalo Hernandez. "The self-proclaimed leaders are using this charge to try and destabilize. I can say that since I arrived as delegate, all children, Muslim or not, have had to attend schools together. About 9 million pesetas is spent every month on hospital care for undocumented Muslims, with a total of 948 stays in the Red Cross Hospital alone. Is this racism?" Mayor Gonzalo Hernandez cites the same argument, adding that "city hall is trying to provide a minimum of infrastructure for the disadvantaged neighborhoods." Hossein Mohamed Mimun and his companions in the ravine of death do not see things the same way, however. "You cannot talk about infrastructure," they say, "when there is no indoor plumbing and the city hall has provided one shower for more than 3,000 persons."

Mohamed Amed Ali, a young undocumented street vendor whom the authorities have expelled several times, claims that "I've been beaten I don't know how many times at the police station, and because of these beatings I have constant kidney pains and trouble breathing." "We are constantly persecuted," says Aomar Dudu. "There has been a lot of coercion to prevent Muslims from attending the second rally."

The most recent case of what the Melilla Muslims call racism involved a police inspector named "Jimmy" who assaulted an elderly Muslim at a city bank, hospitalizing him. The government delegation opened an inquiry, and the inspector is now under investigation.

"Racism does not exist in Melilla as it does in other countries," says Amador Segura, the assistant secretary general of APROME, the organization that is most often accused of racism. "We Christians are endeavoring to help the Muslims and to end their disadvantaged status. It is absurd to accuse us of being racists when other communities in the city, such as the Jewish community, are much more locked out of the dialogue."

While the controversy centers on the Aliens Act, a new political party is taking shape in Melilla in a bid to garner the thousands of votes of the Muslim community: the Party of Melilla Democrats, which is led by the same Aomar Mohamed Dudu. It has not yet registered with the Interior Ministry because the drafting of its bylaws has not been completed.

"The PSOE is afraid," says Aomar Dudu, "but we believe that everyone has a right to express their views with their votes, and if the people one day decide to place their trust in us, there will be no reason for fear or outrage." The mayor and the government delegate agree with Aomar on this point: "The people hold power with their votes. It will be the ballot box that decides who holds positions of responsibility in the city. His creed or ideology should not matter, only the votes he gets." Aomar Mohamed Dudu could become the first Muslim mayor of a Spanish city that is under pressure both within and outside its borders.

8743

CSO: 3548/26

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

CENTER PARTY DEFECTOR DESCRIBES 'CRISIS' IN LEADERSHIP, RANKS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 7 Jan 86 p 5

[Op Ed Article by Robert Backeus: "Center Party Could Break Up"; first paragraph is DAGENS NYHETER introduction]

[Text] The differences of opinion in the Center Party leadership are so fundamental in nature that they threaten to break up the party. Thus the party presidium is at odds with the party council, the party's youth group [CUF] is at odds with the party's women's group [CKF], the Riksdag group is at odds with county council representatives and so on in an almost endless chain of disputes that cannot be debated for the simple reason that the party could not tolerate the pressure this would create. So writes Robert Backeus, former municipal council chairman in Mullsjo, who is now officially leaving the party.

Gosta Hakansson, former editor in chief of the Center Party newspaper, SKANSKA DAGBLADET, made an almost grotesque attack on former Center Party leader Thorbjorn Falldin in his article in DAGENS NYHETER on 29 December.

The moral and intellectual level of Hakansson's contribution to the debate is so very low that it does not merit refutation. But in spite of that his article was the drop that made my cup run over. I am--or was--a member of the Center Party myself. I have been a party member since 1973 and held a "prominent position" on the municipal level (as they say). I now renounce my Center Party membership.

Gosta Hakansson's verbal attack on the politician who broke a 40-year Social Democratic government monopoly contains one interesting passage: "Four election losses and a 10-percent support level are the results members and sympathizers had to work with when the postelection debate began. What party or popular movement would have shirked a debate of this kind? The fact that this occurred in the Center Party is real proof that this is a popular movement, one that has the courage to discuss its problems, including the party leadership issue."

Hakansson's article is the best example so far that the Center Party was not able to debate its problems but concentrated instead on the single question

of who should lead the party. And the fact that there was no debate either before or after the 1982 and 1985 elections is the fundamental reason for the party's decline and disintegration.

At the time when the Center Party had its highest election results and Swedish Institute for Public Opinion Polls [SIFO] ratings the party was made up of three fundamentally different groups of sympathizers:

Group A consisted of old Farmers' Union people--those who saw and still see the party as a political offshoot of the Federation of Swedish Farmers [LRF]. The group is conservative and solidly middle-class.

Group B consisted of the "Green Wave" people--who found in the Center Party (or perhaps more accurately in Thorbjorn Falldin himself) leadership in the areas of environmental protection, nuclear power opposition, etc. that were so dear to their hearts. The group is radical and often has vague socialist sympathies.

Group C was a fairly large group of politically aware voters, many of whom lived in big cities, who saw the Center Party as a more appealing choice than their other natural alternative, the Liberal Party. They knew where the Center Party stood. The Liberal Party standpoints--between Ohlin and Westerberg--were totally unpredictable. The Liberal Party took first one stand and then another. These sympathizers were--and are--quite radical non-socialists. "Liberal" is the label that seems most natural to apply to them.

These three groups of sympathizers--with their different major interests--could come together and be united in Thorbjorn Falldin's Center Party in the 1970's.

But later there were rifts, mostly because the party's sympathizers, in other words groups A, B and C, were one thing and the party's organizations and representatives (what people in the Center Party love to call the "movement") were quite another. These people were to a very large extent recruited from group A and they did not spare much understanding, interest and political leeway on groups B and C.

Those who drew the consequences of the situation first were the members of group B--the Green Wave people--who left the Center Party more or less en masse following the activation of the Barseback reactor (the "treachery" issue). They have now turned to the Environment Party, the Left-Communist Party [VPK] or an extremist left-wing faction or regard themselves as politically unaffiliated.

Group C sympathizers--the urban liberals--took a little longer to react. There was some transferring to the Conservatives in the spirit of the time, but most of the group did not see any real alternative to the Center Party. As nonsocialists they could not turn to the left. In spite of its new name the Conservative Party remained too conservative for them and that ruled out this alternative. The Liberal Party under Ahlmark and Ullsten was still suspect. Westerberg became their political deliverance.

Group A--the Farmers' Union people--can still be found in the party. The problem with them is that they are dying out at a rate that cannot be offset by the birth rate in rural areas. The "movement" also still exists in fairly good shape. But within it differences of opinion have arisen that are so fundamental in nature that they threaten to break up the party--whether they are discussed internally or in public. Thus the party presidium is at odds with the party council, CUF is at odds with CKF, the Riksdag group is at odds with county council representatives, and so forth--in an almost endless chain of disputes that cannot be debated for the simple reason that the party could not tolerate the pressure this would create.

Therefore no one knows today what policy the Center Party stands for. That is why the party is down in the 6-percent support range. That is why there is a risk that in the 1988 election the party will fall below the 4-percent cutoff point, with or without the Christian Democratic Party [KDS].

What is creating the convulsions just now in the so-called postelection debate in the Center Party is the party leadership question. The first person in the party's line of succession, 1st vice chairman Karin Soder happens to have resigned her presidium job before Thorbjorn Falldin resigned from his position.

The next in line, 2nd vice chairman Olof Johansson, does not have enough support in sympathizer group A to get the unanimous vote of the national congress. He knows that and he knows that he needs it and that is why he is lying low. There is no other obviously unifying figure to be seen anywhere on the horizon. Hornlund, Dahlgren, Asling, Daleus, etc. will not do either--because of factional disputes within the "movement." The least compromised person in the present party leadership is Karin Soder. She has enough experience to be able to soothe the party, she is a woman--which would disarm CKF--she is married to Gunnar Soder--which the farmers' cooperative movement would regard as a guarantee--and she is not--as far as I know--in open disagreement with CUF. She could therefore be talked into serving as interim chairman. If no one succeeds in straightening out this mess before the middle of the summer, she is also the natural compromise candidate for the party congress to be held in Uppsala in June. That she would not have the chance of a snowball in hell in a subsequent debate among party leaders is quite another matter.

I will not express my personal opinion about Thorbjorn Falldin's abilities as party leader and prime minister--I do not regard myself as competent to do so. But for those of us who have had the privilege of meeting Thorbjorn Falldin the politician in person and know that he does not come across the way he does on TV his departure is a great loss. Not just for the Center Party but also for Swedish politics and for the nation.

But I would like to say that there are many people who stopped voting for the Center Party in Riksdag elections, as I did, because we did not know what or who we were really voting for. Is the Center Party for or against TV advertising? Is the party for or against censorship of video tapes? Is

a vote for the Center Party also a vote for KDS? Does the party still adhere to its decentralization policy--and if so is the farmers' cooperative society included in the party's many ambitions?

As Thorbjorn Falldin and others have rightly pointed out, it is absurd to discuss who should head the party before one is able to decide party policy. And with people like Gosta Hakansson conducting the debate in the party, it is very difficult to be a party member. I am therefore announcing my resignation from the party as I raise these questions. But it does not feel as if I am leaving the party. It feels as if the party is leaving me.

6578

CSO: 3650/110

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

SOURCE CLOSE TO SOVIET GOVERNMENT ON SUB ISSUE, JOINT VENTURES

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 7 Jan 86 p 5

[Op Ed Article by 'Yuriy Denisov': "Soviet Offer of Industrial Cooperation"; first paragraph is DAGENS NYHETER introduction]

[Text] Yuriy Denisov is considered to be very close to the Soviet government. The name is a pseudonym.

Relations with the Nordic countries have always been an important factor in the Soviet Union's European policy. In this whole complex of international relations, good friendly contacts with Sweden occupy a prominent place.

For several years the so-called submarine issue has been persistently pushed into the foreground in political considerations of relations with the USSR. For many Swedish politicians this speculative issue has actually obscured the prospect of developing these relations that are so vital to Sweden. Vociferous campaigns about the unintentional intrusion by a Soviet submarine into Swedish territorial waters in October 1981, for which the Soviet government apologized to the Swedish government, and later alleged Soviet violations of Sweden's borders have been used to limit contacts with the USSR, especially in the political and military spheres.

The disruption of Soviet-Swedish relations continued even after the Social Democratic government under the leadership of Olof Palme came to power in 1982. The right-wing opposition has continued to strongly oppose all contacts and exchanges of a political nature with the USSR.

As expected the untenability of the idea of adopting "sanctions" against the USSR by limiting political and other contacts (as if only the Soviet Union was interested in such contacts) quickly became obvious. The Swedish public responded positively to Olof Palme's statement at the Social Democratic congress in September 1984 that it was necessary to maintain contacts and exchange visits between Sweden and the Soviet Union "at various levels under all circumstances." After the Riksdag election in September 1985, Prime Minister Palme declared his intention of visiting the Soviet Union.

It is no less important to have advantageous economic cooperation and to tighten the material fabric of peaceful coexistence. Such contacts can be

based not only on the needs of the present and the near future but also on the more long-range view that the Soviet Union and Sweden should complement each other economically in a more complete way.

In the future too the Soviet Union should be able to continue to help meet Sweden's long-term needs in the way of energy, equipment and raw materials. Soviet economic organizations could take Swedish industrial possibilities into account more often when preparing short-term and long-term national economic plans. It would be pertinent to broaden the scope of such progressive forms of cooperation as joint ventures, specialization and big long-term contracts.

An expansion of contacts between the USSR and Sweden in cultural and educational areas, more extensive information and broader contacts between people, in short the kind of cooperation envisioned in the final document from the Helsinki conference, should play an important part in strengthening good neighborly relations between these countries. As the final Helsinki document says, such cooperation must be based on the condition that the nations involved do not interfere in each other's affairs and that they recognize each other's right to determine their own laws and regulations.

The Swedish neutrality policy undoubtedly makes a substantial contribution to the possibility of further consolidating the course of neighborly harmony and productive cooperation between the USSR and Sweden in the area of international affairs. The Soviet Union has great respect for this Swedish policy. In a situation where three Nordic lands are NATO members this realistic and tested course is one of the factors that undeniably contribute to preserving peaceful and stable conditions in this region and to preventing our area from being involved in the sphere of international conflicts. Sweden's policy is an important factor in maintaining peace and security in all of Europe.

When it comes to ending the nuclear arms race Sweden has always taken a noteworthy stand. Sweden proposed the creation of a zone in Europe that is free of "nuclear combat weapons" and supports the Nordic nuclear-free zone proposal. The Swedish position plays a prominent role in the question of global nuclear armaments as well. The work done by the independent committee on arms reduction and security issues under the leadership of Olof Palme has been an important contribution to the international discussion of war and peace. The Swedish government is working to halt the arms race on earth and is aware of the catastrophe it would be if this race is extended to space.

No one can fail to see that Sweden's adherence to the neutrality course (and there are forces in the country and across the Atlantic who want the course abandoned) and the increasingly active and constructive trend of that course are helping to increase the authority of the "Swedish line" and to serve the cause of peace in Europe and around the world.

6578

CSO: 3650/110

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

COMMUNIST VPK PARTY TO BRING UP JEWISH RIGHTS IN MOSCOW VISIT

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 17 Jan 86 p 9

[Article by Magdalena Ribbing]

[Text] Russian Jews who want to emigrate to Israel should have the right to do so, Left Party Communist (VPK) group leader Bertil Mabrink told DAGENS NYHETER.

He believes that the VPK delegation traveling to the Soviet party congress in the near future should take up this problem with the Soviet leadership.

Eight well-known Soviet Jews have signed an appeal to the "leaders of the Western worker and communist parties." The appeal refers to the 27th Soviet Party Congress, which will take place this February in Moscow. The eight Jews pointed out that speeches would be delivered that would describe the Soviet Union as a democratic society in which everyone has the right to work and study.

"We do not have the right to go out on the street and demonstrate openly that we are living proof that the opposite is true. But we are here. We are Soviet Jews who have asked to leave the Soviet Union, in accordance with existing laws and international documents signed by the Soviet Union. We are not permitted to emigrate, because we have 'insufficient reason' to do so. Many people who write about us and want to fight for us are sentenced to prisons, work camps, or mental hospitals," the eight Jews wrote.

Two VPK members of parliament have been invited to attend the Soviet party congress. Today, Friday, the party's Executive Committee will decide who will go. Party leader Lars Werner probably will be one of them. He and parliamentary group leader Bertil Mabrink have received the appeal of the Soviet Jews from the Swedish Parliamentary Action Committee for Soviet Jews.

"It is reasonable and proper for VPK to take this matter up with the Soviet leadership."

9336
CSO: 3650/114

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

BRIEFS

SOUTH AFRICA TRADE DECLINES--Swedish exports to South Africa dropped by 37 percent from January to October 1985, according to the Central Bureau of Statistics (SCB). South Africa is now Sweden's 31st largest export market, compared to 21st in 1984. The reduction in exports is believed to be linked to the Swedish government's call for limitations on trade with South Africa. Most categories of goods are showing a clear decline, according to SCB. Exceptions are deliveries of printing and bookbinding machines, office machines, and carbon and graphite goods. Swedish imports from South Africa have increased, however. The latest figures, for January through September, show a 29-percent increase. [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 16 Jan 86 p 10] 9336

VIETNAM AID PACKAGE APPROVED--Sweden will give Vietnam a total of 5 million kronor to repair the severe hurricane damage the country suffered last fall. The money will be used primarily to improve dams and retaining walls in the affected areas. Foreign Aid Minister Lena Hjelm-Wallen made this announcement on Thursday in answer to a question from member of parliament Hans Goran Franck. [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 17 Jan 86 p 9] 9336

CSO: 3650/114

MILITARY

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

FRANCO-FRG JOINT AIR DEFENSE PLAN REPORTED

PM160945 Paris LE MONDE in French 15 Jan 86 p 4

[Article by Jacques Isnard: "France and FRG Try To Devise Air Defense System Designed To Provide ABM Capability"]

[Text] The West Germans and the French are examining the conditions in which they could design a so-called "extended" air defense system against aircraft and missiles which is not the European equivalent or counterpart of the American strategic defense initiative [SDI] but which, for instance, enables France to more effectively guarantee the survival of its nuclear response capability in the face of an act of aggression.

For some months both in Bonn and Paris the idea of extending what already exists in the two countries in the sphere of anti-aircraft missiles and ABMs has been making cautious progress without any final option on the characteristics and performances of the system envisaged being chosen. The subject is connected with the desire expressed by Helmut Kohl and Francois Mitterrand, with a view to their meeting at the headquarters of the French forces in Germany in Baden-Baden on Thursday, 16 January, to further increase the sphere of military cooperation between France and the FRG.

Officially the plan for an extended air defense has little or no relationship with the fear of some Europeans that American space defense against Soviet intercontinental missiles might not take sufficient account of the European continent's security interests. In its present state, the SDI program does not directly concern the protection of the U.S. European allies against bombers, cruise missiles, or tactical missiles.

General Bernard Rogers, supreme commander of the allied forces in Europe, echoed the concern of his European partners in the Atlantic Alliance on 19 November. The SDI plan, he explained in substance, is a potential source of division within the alliance. The NATO "boss" sided with those in Europe who support a European defense initiative [EDI] which may be a conventional defense system against the USSR's non-strategic nuclear weapons targeted on Western Europe.

Unlike the SDI, which calls for a huge construction in space intended to neutralize intercontinental missiles at launch, during their trajectory, or as they approach their targets, the EDI is a conventional surface air defense against bombers or missiles in the terminal phase of their flight toward "sensitive" points on the territory.

An Integrated Command

American industrialists say they have the solution to this specific European need for a limited defense system which is not a space shield. It is the Tactical Antiballistic Missile [TABM] program for an anti-aircraft and anti-missile missile derived from the surface-to-air Patriot missile already in service in air defense units. The TABM program is ambitious at the technological level just as it is costly from the strictly financial viewpoint. Its introduction into European arsenals would have no connection with the SDI program if the latter had military outlets.

In Europe, companies like Aerospatiale or Matra in France or Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Bloehm in the FRG have not remained inactive. The French see this prospect of an extended air defense system as a means of consolidating military cooperation between the two countries and, at the same time, as a tool for protecting their nuclear bases against the enemy first strike intended to put them out of action. The Germans think that this gives them the opportunity to choose between a European program and the American TABM, which does not call into question the participation of their industrialists--without any state aid--in the space defense program.

Although the Germans were the first to raise the possibility of an EDI, Paris is taking care not to give the feeling of wishing to rush things, since an expanded air defense system would be interpreted in Washington as a military construction intended to act as a counterpart to the SDI.

Nonetheless, by agreeing to discuss such a plan, France is giving its main European partner assurances of its desire for intensive military cooperation between France and Germany. Indeed the very concept of an air defense system in Europe, designed to provide an ABM capability, in other words to intercept objects flying at a very rapid approach speed, presupposes the organization of a fairly highly integrated command if it is to respond as rapidly as possible. In different times this European "integration" would have raised a political storm.

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MILITARY

DENMARK

AIR FORCE HELICOPTER PILOTS NEAR AGREEMENT ON JOB CONDITIONS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 11 Jan 85 p 7

[Article by Nils Eric Boesgaard]

[Text] The joint representative of the Air Force helicopter squadron is satisfied with the new draft agreement. The Defense Command denies charges of frequent violations of the rules governing helicopter inspections.

During negotiations with the Ministry of Defense yesterday, the helicopter pilots of the Air Force yesterday reached a draft agreement on the working hours and the payments on the basis of which the salvage service will be operating.

"Squadron 722 has very special tasks and special periods of duty. We are in continuous negotiations to arrange these things in a good and efficient manner for the benefit of all parties," says Lieutenant-Colonel Ole Buch, department chief in the Ministry of Defense.

"I have received a draft agreement which I personally find promising," First Lieutenant Birger Kagan, joint representative of Squadron 722, tells BERLINGSKE TIDENDE.

The pilots of the salvage squadron have long been dissatisfied with their working hours, especially the unpleasant 48-hour duty periods, which have been necessary in order to keep three helicopters ready for turn-out all round the clock--one at the Værløse air base and two at Skrydstrup and Ålborg, respectively.

"We now have to study the draft agreement. It does not, of course, completely cover the demands made by the pilots, but, then, one seldom gets all of one's wishes fulfilled," he adds. "There are certain things in the draft agreement that we may use, and, in my opinion, we have got to give it a chance."

In connection with the problems of duty hours, it has been rumored that, due to the shortage of personnel in the technical field, salvage helicopters too often have been operating on the basis of exemptions from inspection permits.

This was denied yesterday by the Defense Command, which states that, according to the regulations, their S-61 helicopters have to be inspected every 300 hours of flight, but that a certain percentage of transgressions are bound to occur due to operative requirements or shortages of workshop capacity.

Within the last 3 years, exemptions have been granted for approximately 50 percent of the helicopters due for inspection but to such a limited extent that the average operating hours at times of inspection have been 306 hours, the Defense Command states, adding that, together with other users of this type of helicopter, the Air Force considers expanding the hours of flight between inspections to 350 hours.

7262

CSO: 3613/57

NORWAY

MILITARY

DEFENSE MINISTER CONFIRMS COMMITMENT TO NATO EXERCISES

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 7 Jan 86 p 3

[Text] "We should be the first to be glad that several NATO countries are now making greater efforts to meet the Soviet challenge at sea. Excellent exercises will reduce the need, which would otherwise be present, for a more permanent stationing of allied naval forces in our part of the world. The NATO connection gives our defense support at sea. During the past 10-15 years we have done our best to correct previous weaknesses."

This is what Defense Minister Anders C. Sjaastad said in his yearly address to the Oslo Military Union yesterday. He urged more realism in our defense and security policy debate. He definitely took exception to the idea that the Western alliance has developed a new offensive strategy in the northern areas.

"The same circles seem to be little interested in the Soviet naval buildup: it is toned down and sometimes passed over in silence. The desire to 'understand' the Soviet Union's 'naval defense interests' is also very well developed -- even if these 'defensive' interests are demonstrated and exercised right off our beaches," Sjaastad said. He pointed especially to the Soviet Union's most recent exercise in 1985 -- Summerex 85 -- which showed the level in quality and quantity the Soviet Union has reached in outward bound operations.

On this occasion the defense minister's lecture dealt mainly with the strength relationships between the East and the West, particularly in our area. He pointed out that throughout the period in which the Soviet Union strongly expanded its navy, we saw a reduction in the Western navies, particularly in the number of units. Fifteen years ago we saw that we could find ourselves behind the advancing Soviet lines of operation. We were in danger of being isolated from our allies.

Allied participation in exercises and routine visits in our waters declined. Visits by American aircraft carriers declined. "Until 1985, when the USS America took part in the exercise, Ocean Safari, aircraft carriers had only operated a total of 33 days in this part of the world," Sjaastad said.

"There is no doubt that Norwegian authorities and security policy circles with their foresight laid the basis for the renewed interest in NATO in the naval dimension in the relationship between East and West, particularly in the vital role Norwegian territory and the surrounding waters play in this connection. It was these initiatives, with direct contact and support, together with the Americans, which led to the advanced storage in Trondelag," Sjaastad said. He said that the concern in the West today is not just a question of NATO's guarantee to Norway!

"The problem has a larger dimension in that it concerns the vital connections over the seas between north America and western Europe."

The defense minister concluded by saying that the countermeasures taken against the Soviet Union's strength buildup have just strengthened the basis for a continuance of the traditional low spending profile on our part in the North. "We have made our best efforts to correct some of the weaknesses that were about to develop. Our security position is improved, and at the same time we can say that we have a good and correct neighborly relationship to the Soviet Union," Sjaastad said.

9124

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MILITARY

NORWAY

TRAINING OF F-16 PILOTS IN CANADA, U.S. PROPOSED

Air Force's Credibility Threatened

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 7 Dec 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Pilot Crisis"]

[Text] The pilot crisis in the Air Force is getting worse. Four out of five squadron leaders have been offered civilian jobs and only one squadron has its full complement of jet pilots. The other four squadrons currently have twice as many F-16 planes as they have pilots to fly them. That in a nutshell is the disturbing situation outlined for AFTENPOSTEN yesterday by the leader of Squadron 331 in Bodo.

When the commander of air combat forces in North Norway, Major General Odd Swang-Rasmussen, says that the "Air Force is waiting to see what the Defense Ministry intends to do about the pilot crisis," it is a major understatement. The pilot crisis is undermining the credibility of our defense system.

The basic position is poor. Even in peacetime the Air Force is unable to keep the number of F-16 planes in the air that are needed to guarantee adequate readiness. The situation could quickly become even worse. If all the pilots who are able to leave after their mandatory tour of duty, the Air Force will be left in the course of the year with 45 pilots operative for service on our 69 fighter planes. As a basis for comparison NATO has a minimum standard of 1.2 pilots per plane.

Last November Undersecretary Oddmund H. Hammerstad expressed the hope that the crisis could be largely solved by means of a kind of bonus system. Originally the Defense Ministry planned to offer a total of 20 pilots a bonus of 1.2 million kroner if they promised to remain in the service for 15 years. At that time Colonel Jens P. Andersen, Air Force inspector, said he did not see any solution to the problem unless the number of bonus contracts increased.

Defense Minister Anders C. Sjaastad has our full support when he now suggests the possibility of offering more pilots less restrictive bonus agreements. The key words here are more contracts, fewer years of service and lower bonuses. The agreement with SAS to allow fighter pilots to continue

to fly for the Air Force too for a period of 3 years after they move over into civil aviation is another positive step. But now the situation is urgent.

The present situation is impossible. Our preparedness cannot be based on the ability of the defense system to recall civilian pilots and instructors who happen to be in the United States. To put it briefly we need an air defense in order to prevent the necessity for mobilization. As long as we do not have enough pilots to get our advanced fighter planes off the ground, we lack a credible national defense. We must ask the Defense Ministry to accelerate its work on the measures for solving the pilot crisis that have been announced.

Southern Forces Commander Comments

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 10 Jan 86 p 9

[Article by Olav Trygge Storvik: "Statements about Pilot Crisis Misleading"]

[Text] There is a danger that the public has been given a slanted and misleading impression of conditions in the Air Force following a press conference and interview in DAGSREVIEN on the same day with Lieutenant General Ulf Berg, the supreme commander in North Norway (OKN). This comment was made by the supreme commander in Southern Norway, Lieutenant General Eyvind Schibbye, in a conversation with AFTENPOSTEN.

According to several media sources Lt Gen Berg (OKN) said that "the pilot shortage is not so serious that it weakens preparedness." It is this statement in particular that led the Southern Norwegian commander, Lt Gen Schibbye, to react.

As that statement has been presented, without any in-depth clarification, it gives a distorted and misleading impression of conditions in the Air Force, said Schibbye, who is a pilot himself.

"Outsiders with no background in the field could easily get the impression that conditions in this branch of the service are fine. But that is not the case and it was undoubtedly not Lt Gen Berg's intention to give that impression. This is a question of the emphasis given to the words that are used. If by 'preparedness' Berg means the ability to get some stand-by airplanes off the ground within the prescribed time, he is correct. And he is probably also correct as far as North Norway is concerned if by 'preparedness' he means the ability to get all the planes in the air.

"But Lt Gen Berg is not correct if he uses the word to indicate the ability to get all planes in the air in the certainty that the pilots will carry out their main assignments as well and efficiently as one should be able to expect and demand when one thinks of the high cost of the weapons system they are assigned to operate. It is this meaning of 'preparedness' that it is most appropriate to use. It is not enough to get airplanes in the air. Those

who man the cockpits should also be capable of performing their jobs as efficiently as possible," said Lt Gen Schibbye.

Effectiveness Could Double

"The problem is that even if we had enough pilots for our fighter planes, the fighter arm's overall effectiveness depends to a dramatic extent on the average level of experience in operative squadrons. If the pilot drain is halted the level will gradually build up to the point where the arm's effectiveness could be twice the present level. If we could achieve this it would probably mean much more than a doubling of our combat results. Against sea and ground targets the results might prove to be in proportion to the level of experience. For example this would mean that we could get along with six flights to a target that would require 12 today. In aerial combat the results might be even better.

"Doubling the effectiveness of even our small air force would have a substantial deterrent effect on a potential attacker. He would be aware that we could concentrate our entire fighter plane potential on any invasion route--even in areas where there are no other defenses in place. And we could do so the very first day, perhaps even the very first hour.

"This increased deterrence could be achieved without a net increase in the defense budget because the money spent on halting the pilot drain would be more than offset by the savings on the constant training of new pilots that we have to provide now," Schibbye said.

He also said that there is nothing wrong in publicly discussing this kind of gap in preparedness, although ordinarily one does not reveal one's weaknesses. But the problems that afflict the Norwegian Air Force today are so obvious to people who deal with this kind of thing on an international level that Schibbye says only the uninitiated Norwegians who see pilots flying around overhead think that everything is all right.

Solution Seen Training Abroad

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 11 Jan 86 p 8

[Article by Liv Hegna: "United States Might Provide F-16 Training"]

[Text] The Air Force feels it is fighting with its back to the wall in the mounting pilot crisis. The inspector general of the Air Force, Major General Olav Aamodt told AFTENPOSTEN that they are currently considering whether the United States or Canada could take over the training of Norwegian F-16 pilots because so many top pilots have gone into civil aviation lately. The alternative is to hire foreign instructors to work in Norway. "But that would be very expensive," said Aamodt. The Air Force will soon have lost all its F-16 instructors.

Today it costs 8 million kroner to train a military pilot to fly the F-16. The cost is the same whether the training is received in Norway or in some

other country. However the entire leadership apparatus is established at Squadron 336 in Rygge, so some of the costs are already covered here at home. If special training takes place in the United States Aamodt said we would probably have to pay for the American investment in addition to the F-16 training itself. He told AFTENPOSTEN that attempts have been made to look into how we can compensate for the departure of our most experienced pilots. "We must evaluate many measures that could solve the problem."

Cheaper in United States

It will probably be cheaper if our pilots get their F-16 training in the United States rather than hiring instructors here who would have to be trained to fly in Norway before they could start training Norwegian pilots, said Maj Gen Aamodt, who pointed out that snow, icing and runway conditions in Norway are quite different from those the instructors in question are used to. Aamodt thought it would take up to a year of training in Norway before foreign instructors would be qualified.

"Finding a solution to the training problem would give the Air Force some leeway so that we can find a solution to the fundamental problem of the lack of qualified personnel to take over leadership functions in the Air Force," said Maj Gen Olav Aamodt.

Question of Capacity

The operative chief of air combat forces in Southern Norway, Major General Eyvind Schibbye, told AFTENPOSTEN that the whole thing might bog down on the question of capacity, even abroad. Schibbye said it would probably not solve the problem to expand the arrangement of sending a so-called "development officer" for further training in Great Britain. "That just means losing more operative pilots in Norway. We can't afford that," said Maj Gen Schibbye.

A decision about whether the Air Force will purchase instructor services from the United States or pay for further training of trained Norwegian pilots in the United States will be made soon. However the Air Force staff has not yet found any solution to the crisis affecting Air Force technicians.

6578

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MILITARY

SWEDEN

NAVAL OFFICER: USSR ELITE UNIT FOR NORDIC SABOTAGE

PM301357 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 20 Jan 86 p 5

[Commodore Hans von Hofsten "Debate" article: "Do the Swedish People Know About This?"]

[Text] Suddenly and without a declaration of war Nazi Germany attacked and occupied Denmark and Norway in 1940. When the war broke out in 1939 both countries had declared themselves neutral, and in addition Denmark had earlier signed a nonaggression pact with Germany. Thus, the actual test of strength between the two superpower blocs began when our two closest neighbors, peaceful countries with friendly relations with everyone, were the target of an attack that was as unwarranted as it was dispicable. Nor was there any enmity between these nations' peoples!

No, in actual fact this was strategic logic. During World War I Germany learned that its Navy with its trump card, its submarines, with whose help it would starve out Britain, could not be used with sufficient effect if they were based in the home country. This was noted as early as 1929 by Admiral Wegner in a published work. He believed that in the next test of strength between continental Germany and British sea power, naval bases and Air Force bases in Norway must be secured as soon as possible.

How then was it possible for the continental power of Germany to win a firm foothold in Norway across the sea, right under the noses of the superior British fleet? Former Army Corporal Hitler did not know what everyone else "knew," namely that prior to a coastal invasion you have to fight to achieve naval superiority in the region in question. As a result, through a total surprise operation--coordinated land, sea, and air operations--he was able to achieve his goal. The operation had additional support through the fact that the Nazis had created a fifth column, the Quislings, in Norway.

These historical events are of the greatest interest for us today, since the strategic situation has many striking similarities with that which prevailed 45 years ago.

Today the Warsaw Pact has its shipyards and exercise areas locked up in the Baltic, while the northern fleet has its operational base--undoubtedly the

world's largest--at Murmansk on the Arctic Ocean. In addition to the fact that the climate up there, 260 miles north of the Arctic Circle, makes it difficult to keep materiel and personnel in condition, the landscape is flat and open, and this provides little possibility of cover. If in addition you add the fact that the distance from NATO's umbilical cord across the Atlantic is almost twice that which the Germans had from their home bases, it is easy to see the military necessity of acquiring more forward bases for both the Navy and the supporting Air Force. Can this be the reason why the Soviet Union with so much diplomatic rumbling has attempted and succeeded in persuading Norway to renounce stationing allied soldiers on its territory in peacetime?

Often it is not that pleasant to look the truth in the eye. But our neighbors' experiences ought to have taught us that it is necessary to do so if one is concerned about one's own welfare. Visions and pious hopes are not much to cling to in the crazy world of violence in which we do after all live. The truth which I see before me is briefly as follows:

On the continent well-equipped, Hydra-headed military powers stand on either side of the Iron Curtain. A forward thrust there, even if success were won, would involve the price of enormous losses in lives and materiel and bring with it unmanageable risks of the nuclear war feared by both sides. On the Scandinavian peninsula, there are in Norway what are in this context pathetically small standing forces. In Sweden there are the Army units, manned by the year's conscript intake and trained to whatever level of combat readiness there has been time to achieve. Only in the Navy and the Air Force, which are now half the size they once were, is there a constant level of superior combat readiness, thanks to the large proportion of permanent staff in their ranks.

A surprise gambit by the Warsaw Pact on the Scandinavian peninsula would therefore have a good chance of success. However, an attack after a point at which Sweden had mobilized would be both difficult and time-consuming. It is true that even then our defenses would be fairly thin, but of such high quality that a sufficiently long period of preparation and preliminary fighting would be needed and this would give NATO time to reinforce not only Norway but also the rest of Europe.

Thus, Sweden, as the Defense Committee has stated, would run an increased risk of being drawn into a major war at an early stage. Indeed, there is much to suggest that this major war would begin with us. Neutrality, weakness, and general peacefulness would help us just as little as they did Finland in 1939 and Denmark and Norway in 1940.

Achieving rapid successes against an unmobilized and unsuspecting Sweden could thus seem simple and inexpensive. But could the attacker be completely sure that the Swedes really "are asleep" at the moment the attack is launched?

A single Swedish submarine or missile ship [robotmaat] alone has the capacity to sink up to around 10 poorly protected vessels in less than half an hour, and sections of an attack division are able to do as much. One of the coastal artillery's rapid deployment blocking units can totally block off

a sea approach route in a few hours. The Army's small but numerous coup defense units [kuppfoersvarsfoerband] can rapidly and for a lengthy period destroy the airfields and harbors which are a prerequisite for an attacker to be able to follow up the attack with larger units. Civil defense units can have a five-figure number of men in place at sensitive local installations.

In his attack on Norway Hitler primarily had to deal with the British fleet. However, he had a temperament which made him inclined to take major risk and consequently German losses were great. Even though it is difficult to talk about national characters there is sufficient evidence provided by history to indicate that in military operation the Russians prefer certainty to risk-taking.

Against his background the Soviet Union would not be inclined to take major risks in a coup-like attack on Sweden. But nothing is impossible in this world. The risks can be reduced or totally removed. How could this be achieved?

On two occasions the Swedish police have arrested groups of Poles selling pictures. Together these groups had 66 different maps showing airfield, new roads and bridges, mobilization stockpiles, and areas suitable for landing airborne troops. The armed forces commander in chief has reported that the personnel of all of Sweden's Air Force units have been visited by such "picture sellers." Prior to the summer of 1984 60 percent of pilots in the Jamtland squadron had received such visits....

The Soviet Union has almost 4,000 elite soldiers specially trained for sabotage and murder in Sweden. They are trained using prisoners under the death sentence in order to eradicate all scruples. Knowing this is enough to understand the ruthless toughness with which these units would set to work in the idyllic home of our social democratic society. They are trained over a period of 2 years, after which they are transferred to the reserves, which now numbers 150,000 men, 15,000 of whom are intended for Sweden. According to SVENSKA DAGBLADET, these figures come from the Swedish security police and were published in the summer of 1985.

If the Soviet Union is to produce such quantities of sabotage groups ever 2 years it is hardly surprising that the training requires frequent operations for those who are to operate from submarines in Swedish waters.

An attacker knows to "the last penny" how many submarines and missile ships Sweden has, what they are called, where they are stationed, and whether they are armed. He knows exactly how many Air Force divisions we have of different types and where they are based. He knows what every last officer on every boat and in every Air Force unit is called. He also knows where all these officers live and in many cases even knows which room is his bedroom; there are only several hundred of them who have key posts in the event of a national emergency. He knows all this and much more through open and reliable sources.

In addition, through on the spot espionage the Soviet Union has made sure of exactly where the coastal artillery's barriers of mines, laid in peacetime, are located and where its artillery is, how to safely find its way under water into harbors and base areas at different times of the year, in daylight and in darkness, where there are suitable docking places for minisubmarines and where these can find crevices in which to hide, and so on, and so on.

A ship can be put out of action for a few days with a well-placed explosive charge, of a size such that an attacking diver can carry several. All the navy's bases have had visits from foreign underwater vessels. A coastal artillery mine can be rendered harmless simply by cutting its anchor cable or the cable with which it is controlled. In recent years three mines have disappeared in circumstances that do not admit a natural explanation. The Air Force would be completely paralyzed without pilots. For professionally trained and well-equipped sabotage units, dressed in Swedish uniforms, it would not be difficult to murder the majority of our few hundred pilots.

If the attacker wants to increase the certainty that ships will be unusable, he can lengthen his death list with the names of a few key men on their crews. If you want to put a monkey wrench in the mobilization machine during the phase in which a war is beginning you can blow up a number of telephone exchanges and electricity switching stations. You can make a very long list of the chaos which can be caused in our modern society by a well-informed attacker using very few weapons.

But surely this is too much like painting things worse than they are! The expression is exactly the same as that used in anger by [former Prime Minister] Per Albin Hansson when Foreign Ministry Under Secretary of State Erik Boheman briefed him in the thirties on the Foreign Ministry's view of the prevailing security situation. Boheman replied rapidly: I am not painting things worse than they are; they are already like that." Here too the parallel from history is striking. Things are bad already!

Between 1930 and 1982 alone tens of violations by Soviet submarines were detected in Swedish waters. The submarine commission concluded that on one of these occasions, in October 1982, no less than six submarines took part in a "concerted operation." We do not know, nor has anything been made public about how many may have been involved on the other occasions. Since 1983 a large number of additional violations have been discovered, as well as violations in the 18 years leading up to 1980, with an unknown number of submarines taking part on each occasion. It is easy to understand the former Navy chief when he said that he had "difficulty sleeping at night."

This picture of a foreign power that is eagerly engaged in sabotage preparations against Sweden through espionage, the planning of murders, and submarine operations which provide a reliable routine for planned attacks regardless of season or time of day, is produced by putting two and two together from published sources and coordinating the information with professional insights. The description of military policy given here is also simply a popularized representation of views put forward by the 1984 Defense Committee and the public documents on which these were based.

When someone notices something upsetting you sometimes hear the jocular phrase, "Do the authorities know about this?" I would like to turn this on its head and ask, "Do the Swedish people know about this?"

The Defense Committee's report has been given a very positive reception for two reasons; first, because all the democratic parties are fully agreed on its contents. But how many people have an opportunity to read it and to satisfy the report's final sentence: "It is therefore the committee's hope that with this report it has made a contribution to a wider and deeper security policy debate prior to the 1987 Defense Bill."

This article is an attempt by an officer from the ranks to satisfy the committee's hopes. I admit without any evasion that I myself am frightened by the picture I have painted, even though I have been aware of it for a long time.

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MILITARY

SWEDEN

PAPER REPLIES TO FINNISH, NORWEGIAN CONCERNS REGARDING SWEDEN

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 7 Jan 86 p 2

[Editorial: "Our Security--and the Security of Others"]

[Text] There are gaps in Sweden's defenses. We are not alone in that respect. Countries generally do not have complete military coverage for their security policy goals. There is always a need for more money. But one has to live with certain risks, as Norwegian expert Arne Olav Brundtland wrote last fall.

The question, of course, is how large the gaps and the risks can be in various areas without jeopardizing credibility. "Norway Doubts Our Neutrality" read a headline over a news article that appeared in DAGENS NYHETER a few weeks ago. "Sweden No Longer a Neutral Nation" read the pointed headline over an article by Gustaf Petren in EXPRESSEN that same week.

Of course it is uncertain whether our neighbors' interest and unrest have really increased lately or whether we in the Swedish debate are paying more attention to such reactions than we did in the past. If one looks more closely at the substance of the various reports of foreign reactions a wide range of critical viewpoints concerning Sweden's defense and Swedish security policy emerge.

A common point of departure is the submarine violation issue. According to an editorial writer in HUFVUDSTADSBLADET the violations lead to the question of whether anyone has had reason to think that Sweden might change its course under certain circumstances--"that confidence in Sweden's neutrality in the event of a conflict has diminished."

It is a widespread opinion among Finnish observers that Sweden has overreacted and behaved "somewhat hysterically," as a report from Helsinki that appeared in SVENSKA DAGBLADET put it. People in Finland talk about the Soviet need to hear repeated Swedish neutrality declarations, they think the Swedes stubbornly insist on regarding the Soviet Union as a major enemy and they feel we could handle the whole matter more discreetly.

More alarmist in tone was Gustaf Petren's Social Democratic source from a non-Nordic NATO country who said that in view of the fact that Sweden is

unable to keep Soviet submarines out of internal waters, this country cannot expect to be regarded as a neutral country by NATO!

From one point of view we are making too much of a fuss over the subs while from another we are doing nothing about them. More balanced statements have come from our western neighbor, Norway.

It is true that a Norwegian source is said to feel that "Sweden has pursued a soft line with regard to the Soviet Union and has tried to tone down what has happened" and that therefore "Swedish foreign policy is more disturbing to us than the gaps in defense." But on the whole Norwegian observers seem to be concerned that Sweden will have trouble maintaining its army and air force for financial reasons.

"Actually Sweden's conventional defenses cannot be too strong from a Norwegian point of view, but this does not mean that we are justified in making complaints," Brundtland said: "In the final analysis we will be better served if Sweden arrives at an application of the neutrality policy and a defense policy profile that the Swedes can rally around."

In common with his fellow countryman, General Tonne Huitfeldt, who spoke in the fall at a Norwegian-Swedish seminar at the Foreign Policy Institute, this security policy researcher feels that Sweden should be careful not to put so much emphasis on submarine defense that it has a detrimental effect on other defense objectives.

We have been given a lot of good advice. But despite the attention we try to pay to the Nordic pattern in general and to Finland's position in particular, Sweden must deal with the submarine violations on the basis of its own security policy needs. We cannot handle the question of submarine defense in the muted fashion many friends in Finland seem to prefer. We can hardly treat them as simply a minor nuisance, as Gen Huitfeldt recommended.

A failure to protect Swedish territory in spite of efforts to do so is certainly not a breach of neutrality. But it could be used as a pretext for further military actions against us. Sweden has a clear obligation under international law but must also live with a certain security policy risk due to the fact that defense resources have to cover many other things besides submarine defense.

It could be said somewhat presumptuously that we are trying to teach the rest of the world to respect international law. We hope that this will also benefit the security of neighboring countries.

6578

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MILITARY

SWEDEN

NONSOCIALIST MP'S PROTEST NAMING BORG TO DEFENSE PANEL POST

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 17 Jan 86 p 9

[Article: "Protest against New Chairman"]

[Text] The change in chairmen at the important Defense Committee cannot be seen as a purely internal Social Democratic matter.

Representatives of the three nonsocialist parties presented a joint protest when the Defense Committee met on Thursday at the adult education facility in Gallofsta.

Former LO (Federation of Trade Unions) chairman Gunnar Nilsson announced at a meeting on 9 January that he was stepping down as chairman of the committee, effective immediately, and that undersecretary Per Borg of the Defense Ministry had been appointed to take his place.

"It would have been reasonable to expect consultations with the other parties represented on the committee," said Carl Bildt (Conservative Party), Hans Lindblad (Liberal Party), and Gunnar Bjork (Center Party). "We regret that, with this abrupt action, the government has created the impression that it is not interested in consultations," they said.

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CSO: 3650/114

MILITARY

SWEDEN

PAPER COMMENTS ON LIBERAL PARTY DEFENSE MOTION

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 17 Jan 86 p 2

[Editorial: "More Submarines"]

[Text] More submarines, coastal defense missiles, antiaircraft missiles, and various other materiel could be included in the commander in chief's so-called plus level, according to the Liberal Party. This sounds too good to be true, even though the Liberal Party is also talking about rationalization and a shift in priorities. Shutting down some of the army's outdated brigades would free up money that could be used to procure new materiel.

Still, it is difficult to see how the figures add up. Experience has shown that both politicians and military officers are generally far too optimistic. Before each defense resolution they have attempted to fit more purchases into the proposed allocations than has actually been feasible.

Even for a party with considerations other than those of the commander in chief, the plus level is a bare minimum, if the goal is not to allow the military to be weakened even more, compared to the situation elsewhere in the world. It is somewhat contradictory that the Liberal Party, which is seeking broad agreement on the upcoming defense resolution, is supporting a defense program with no room for cuts.

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CSO: 3650/114

MILITARY

SWEDEN

LIBERAL PARTY BACKS INCREASED ANTISUB, ANTIAIR DEFENSES

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 16 Jan 86 p 8

[Article by Sven Svensson]

[Text] The telephone air-raid alarm system does not work with our modern telephone system. It seems that the Telecommunications Service believed that the Civil Defense Board would take care of the alarm system, while the Civil Defense Board thought that the Telecommunications Service was working on the problem.

This was stated by the Liberal Party in its defense motion on Wednesday, in which the party argued that the 1987 defense resolution should be based on the so-called plus level. This would mean that the military would receive an additional 500 million kronor annually for 5 years.

According to civil defense plans, about 100,000 families would be warned by telephone in case of an air attack. It is difficult for these families to hear signals from "Hoarse Fredrik" because they live too far away or, for example, have installed triple-glazed windows.

Trial runs with the telephone alarm system in a big city have demonstrated, however, that the modern telephone system cannot handle such a large-scale alarm in case of an air attack. In addition, the problem has been exacerbated by a petty "home-turf" mentality, since several different agencies are involved.

The Liberal Party emphasized the overall vulnerability of our electricity supply and telecommunications systems. If an attacking military destroys a few individual centers, then entire sections of the country would experience severe disruptions.

On the question of health care during a war, disagreements between the Association of County Councils and state authorities have also led to a fiasco, according to the Liberal Party.

According to the Defense Resolution of 1982, health care materials, including hypodermic needles, were to be purchased for 50 million kronor. Spending for the entire 5-year period was to be 250 to 300 million kronor, but because of the disagreements orders so far have been limited to about 10 million kronor.

Few Shelters

According to the Liberal Party, the future construction of air-raid shelters should be limited to areas in which the military threat is considered to be greatest. This means in the vicinity of military targets such as the staff offices in Ostermalm, the Swedish Broadcasting Corporation, and military regiments, for example.

With regard to the military defense, the Liberal Party wants the commander in chief to be given the assignment of working out a complete program based on the so-called plus level. With an additional 500 million kronor per year, the plus level means a total of 115 billion kronor, in fixed money value, for the entire 5-year period.

Within this framework, the Liberal Party wants to make certain changes by purchasing more sophisticated antiaircraft weapons, helicopters for transporting the sick and wounded, and antisplinter cover for soldiers. Army assault brigades, in particular, should receive higher allocations.

With regard to the navy, the number of submarines should increase and the mine systems should be expanded. One purpose for increasing the number of mines is to prevent foreign submarines from penetrating into Swedish military areas. Having more submarines would improve our ability to lay mines.

The ability of the air force to defend our air space should be improved steadily. It is important that Swedish industry maintain its ability to participate in the production of air-to-air missiles. Airborne radar and an improved base system are also seen as important.

Vulnerability Commission Revived

The governmental Vulnerability Commission (SARB), which was formally dismissed by the government, will be revived in a new guise.

It will receive a new name when it is moved from the Defense Ministry to the Justice Ministry, but its assignment will be the same.

According to officials at the Justice Ministry, this decision will be made by the government in the near future, perhaps as early as Thursday.

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MILITARY

SWEDEN

PAPER CHARGES ERICKSON ONLY SPREADS RUMORS ON SUB ISSUE

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 17 Jan 86 p 2

[Editorial: " Submarine Hunt and Rumor"]

[Text] The effect of a statement depends primarily on the reputation of the person who makes it.

Edinburgh professor John Erickson is well known as a Soviet and defense expert. He has also been asked about the Swedish Submarine Defense Commission. A man of this type attracts much attention when he indicates that, during the Harsfjarden incident in the fall of 1982, Sweden was close to capturing a Soviet submarine, but put an end to the affair through secret Swedish-Soviet diplomatic negotiations in Geneva.

None of the material released by the Swedish side supports such a statement. Critics have raised this possibility repeatedly, however, in connection with the remarkable occurrence during the Harsfjarden incident, when a navy spokesman seemed to confirm that something had happened after a Swedish mine was detonated.

New denials have now been issued by then Foreign Minister Ola Ullsten who was chairman of the Submarine Defense Commission, Sven Andersson, a member of that same commission, Carl Bildt, and navy chief Bengt Schuback, former defense staff chief. Some may believe that such denials are part of the game, regardless of what happened. It remains to be demonstrated, however, that these people are part of a conspiracy of silence, in which several other persons also would have to participate.

When John Erickson calls for greater Swedish openness--a demand that can be readily supported--it should be pointed out that he is a man with definite critical opinions concerning Swedish neutrality. In a DAGENS NYHETER interview during the spring of 1984, he called it "stereotyped, stylized, inflexible, and outdated."

If we listen to what Erickson has to say about the submarine question, we see that his reasoning is remarkably weak. He "believes" that the Swedish navy had more success than has been indicated and that a Soviet submarine was in

"very grave difficulty." In any event, he is "almost sure" that the Swedes were able to "track" a submarine.

Erickson says that he has nothing against the diplomatic solution that he claims occurred, but he has contributed to the international rumor mongering that, unfortunately, without the slightest bit of evidence has made Sweden appear compliant.

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CSO: 3650/114

MILITARY

SWITZERLAND

EX-GENERAL STAFF CHIEF SURVEYS CHANGING THREAT, ARMAMENTS

Basel SCHWEIZER SOLDAT + FHD in German Dec 85 pp 7-8

[Interview with retiring chief of General Staff, Corps Commandant Joerg Zumstein, conducted by Major Laurent.F. Carrel, date and place not given: "Corps Commandant Joerg Zumstein, Chief of General Staff Until 31 December 1985"]

[Text] [Question] It is the job of the chief of the general staff to assume responsibility for the material side of the army's preparedness for war. The military threat is the principal consideration in the build-up of our army. As a small country, we can exert little influence on its type and extent. What is your opinion of our war preparedness in the light of the military threat today and in the future ?

[Answer] As to the material side of our army's preparedness for war, I would consider it satisfactory. At present, there are no serious shortcomings. The system is well-balanced: we have enough equipment and supplies. The organizational structure is in keeping with our stated mission and the logistic support is secure.

The principle according to which the peacetime structure is to approximate the wartime structure, if possible, is beginning to bear fruit. Today, some elements are ready faster than they were just a few years ago. Controls and alerts carried out periodically offer proof of that.

Following a critical phase, our intelligence service has recovered once again and has consolidated itself. It is working well and ought to be capable of alerting us to possible danger in a timely fashion although the surprise element cannot ever be ruled out entirely.

Over the past few years, the reinforcement of terrain has made a lot of headway; the plans we worked out earlier are beginning to take shape. Our air defenses are quite satisfactory and the same can be said of our antitank defenses and artillery units. We have made particularly great progress in the organization, equipment and command structure of our medical corps and our civil air defense units. The army is providing valuable support in several coordinated activities of the overall defense effort.

But the material side is only one of the components of preparedness for war; another is the training and education of commanders and troops. Here, too, we have made significant progress. I am very pleased by the survival and character training courses for commanders and their subordinates which have been instituted by the chief of our training department. This will help improve war preparedness.

Nonetheless, I think that we could get a great deal more out of our troops, our equipment and other resources.

It appears that there still are some commanding officers who are more concerned about not wasting material than about training their units to deal with an emergency. Do not misunderstand me : I am not saying that we should spend lots of money on training. What I am saying is that we should get out the maximum every time. The army of a small country simply cannot afford to operate at 60 or 70 percent of capacity because in war only the highest possible performance ratings count. Nor am I proposing that we go in for waste in saying that we should beware of introducing our civilian type of insurance thinking into army operations.

[Question] In the nineties, the threat facing our country is likely to be a good deal more complex than it has been heretofore. How has the threat picture changed and what are the consequences for our small country ?

[Answer] People hardly listen to the prophet in his own land. In fact, I have no intention of making any predictions. But I am quite sure that the trends discernible in the armament sector today will widen to turn into very real threats in the future. Let me name a few:

In conjunction with improvements in transmission and the use of computers for situation display and analysis, for decision-making operations and the issuance of orders, the development of reconnaissance and target acquisition equipment will result in a significant acceleration of all processes. It could well be that our tactics which we are still inclined to view as an art because part of it is intuitive will be reduced to a kind of standardized combat technique. For the defender, camouflage and deception will assume a great deal of importance.

Accurate and guided ammunition adapted to the target medium will be in wide use and will create new types of defense and protection needs. The tactical importance of nuclear weapons is likely to decline. But it is to be expected that new kinds of area-covering weapons and/or weapons capabilities will take their place. In the forefront today are chemical and biological weapons. In the future, it will become more difficult to distinguish between them. We can also look for new terrestrial weapons systems or directed-energy weapons for use against aircraft to result from the superpowers' efforts to develop SDI and/or comparable systems.

It is conceivable that battle tanks have reached the limit of their development possibilities. Although some progress may still be made in terms of armor and weaponry, one might well ask whether it will make any sense in the foreseeable future to invest so much money into a weapons system which will never exceed certain specific performance limits. I might add that this statement should not be applied to the procurement of a new battle tank for our army. Today, we still face the fact that the battle tank dominates the battlefield and that it will continue to do so for some time. I could imagine the battle tank being replaced by a new type of fighting machine at some time in the future which can be used alternately as a ground-based vehicle and some kind of hovercraft, which will combine the advantages of a battle tank with those of an attack helicopter.

It also seems to me to be a foregone conclusion that the capability for strategic offensive operations will decline among those nations where the people participates in government responsibility through pluralistic and democratic institutions. Freedom of travel across national boundaries by individuals and goods makes the nations grow closer together and leads to peaceful resolution of problems. On the other hand, the claim to absolute rule by totalitarian regimes could determine military events in our general vicinity in the foreseeable future. The presently recognizable danger that military conflict can be induced, enhanced and lengthened as a result of actions which are part of "hidden war" is likely to endure as will the probability that military conflict will erupt quite suddenly. Finally, we may expect economic, psychological, social and political developments in the future to provide the necessary conditions for increased terrorist activities.

The consequences which may arise for our country are the following: as before, we will have to rely on effective national defense to serve as the backbone of our overall defense posture. We will have to maintain part of our defense forces at a high state of operational readiness. Under the conditions described above, the traditional right of our people to bear arms will continue to have a certain significance. It is conceivable that the role of territorial defense will increase and that the mobile elements of our fighting forces will be reduced accordingly. Throughout the entire system reaction times will have to be reduced; our intelligence-gathering operations will have to be expanded accordingly. Defense against chemical and biological attack will have to be improved and this will also include civilian events, e.g. disasters.

To the extent that we will experience a growth in subversion, sabotage and terrorism, the will to hold together, the allegiance to our national community as well as watchfulness and the willingness to accept sacrifices will undergo additional strain.

The picture I have painted is not particularly amusing. But let us not dramatize the threat and remember that things do not have to get out of hand and that even in the next century any potential adversary will still only be human.

[Question] The chief of the general staff also has responsibility for future planning. What were the most important arms projects that were carried out or initiated during your term of office ?

[Answer] We acquired a second series of the F-5 Tiger fighter. A further segment of the "Skyguard" radar system for the modernization of our 35-mm antiaircraft batteries has been ordered and delivered. Additional artillery units are in the process of converting to the m 109 self-propelled howitzer as provided for in the 1979 armament program. Improvement of the 68 tank has been accomplished; all the tanks have been reequipped with arrow ammunition. Night operations capability of the army has been improved as a result of procurement of special flares and of the "Lyran" illumination system for our armored units. Army transport has been improved through the procurement of 1,200 cross country trucks. This has enabled the army to carry out certain readiness exercises without having to requisition heavy trucks. We have initiated the procurement process for a modern battle tank--the biggest arms purchase ever for our army--and we are also preparing to buy a new automatic rifle. The resultant changeover from 7.5 to 5.6 mm is of great significance, since we will gradually be replacing the caliber which has been in use for almost 80 years in our infantry units and in non-service-related marksmanship. Our civil air defense units have received new equipment and the medical corps has received modern, cross country ambulances. For units whose duty station is stationary and who are otherwise inadequately protected we have purchased bullet-proof vests and for those who have been wearing their green training uniforms while on duty we have bought new camouflage suits. In addition to these projects, we have prepared and initiated dozens of smaller arms deals which cannot be cited here.

[Question] The procurement of arms is a difficult and complex matter. You have said that the arms business is literally being carried on in the marketplace and have spoken out against politicizing military affairs. What have your experiences been with the arms procurement process and with collaboration with parliament ?

[Answer] The establishment of the arms committee in March 1981 and the resultant control of the arms procurement process as well as the establishment of army guidelines on meeting defense needs within a given time frame corresponding to one legislative session have all worked out well. Here and there, particularly with respect to determining the cost of armaments, there is probably room for improvement; but I think one can safely say that all the major projects have been properly evaluated and readied for procurement. While we were evaluating the merits of the new battle tank the whole world was watching to see how a small copes with the question of modern arms technology. The United States,

which failed to get the contract, was fair enough to respect our decision and, in that sense, also underscored the correctness of the procedure we had followed. Over the past few years, we have not run into any real problems with respect to the arms program. There were reports of "scandals" in the media; but no proof was ever offered to substantiate the charges. All throughout, we have had good relations with the parliament--or I should say with the military committees of the government and with the parliamentary control committees and commissions. I think that the policy of openness and loyalty which we have followed has paid off. We did not embellish matters; we told the truth even when it hurt us. In the arms sector, after all, things do not always work out 100 percent. It is often very difficult even to arrive at the basis for a decision and even some of the intermediate decisions can sometimes have far-reaching implications.

[Question] You would like to see Switzerland play a more active role in peace policy. What are your reasons for this and what is your estimate of the possibilities ?

[Answer] In times past, we were a land of pioneers, known for being hard workers and as people willing to take risks. We ought not to descend to the level of a nation of shopkeepers and prosperity tourists which has taken out insurance against all eventualities. This is why I am in favor of our country making a commitment once again in foreign countries and overseas and proving by its deeds that solidarity and the willingness to help are not just empty phrases. We should be willing to take greater risks and make a stronger commitment to preserving the peace. Concretely speaking, I envisage the participation of Swiss experts in peacekeeping missions in foreign countries and also in efforts to provide aid in emergencies and natural disasters. The newly created possibility for members of the armed forces who volunteer for such missions to have service in foreign countries credited to their Swiss army service seems to me to be a first step in the right direction. Let us also not forget that those Swiss citizens who return home after taking part in such efforts will do a much better job back home both in civilian life and in the army.

9478

CSO: 3620/208

MILITARY

SWITZERLAND

AIR DEFENSE, HELICOPTERS SEEN EFFICIENT IN ALPINE CORPS

Frauenfeld ALLGEMEINE SCHWEIZERISCHE MILITAERZEITSCHRIFT in German
Jan 86 pp 11-12

[Interview with commander of 3d Alpine Army Corps, Col Corps Commandant Roberto Moccetti, conducted by Col Divisionnaire Frank A. Seethaler and Col Louis Geiger, date and place not given: "Alpine Army Corps Has Problems, Too"]

[Text] [Question] What is your view of the operational threat to the Alpine region in case of conflict in Central Europe ?

[Answer] Within the context of operations in Western Europe the Swiss Alpine region continues to be of importance. For one thing, there are major North-South arteries leading through this region which could play a role in case of fighting in Europe and particularly in case of a thrust from East to West. For another thing, this strong terrain in the heart of West Europe can play a role as an anchor or contact point for various options.

[Question] As compared to former times, e.g. the time of the French Revolution, would you say that the significance of the Alpine region has increased or decreased ?

[Answer] On the one hand, modern armies with their mechanized and/or motorized units will do their utmost not to carry out a thrust through this difficult terrain. On the other hand, the possibilities of support via the third dimension and the well developed road network (if it can be captured intact) would enable modern armed forces, too, to clear this obstacle quite handily. The significance factor, in other words, depends on the actual situation.

[Question] What role would you assign to the Alpine region in our own strategic thinking ?

[Answer] Given our own particular situation, the mountains are, in the first instance, an area which can be defended somewhat more easily and which offers us good possibilities to maintain the existence of our country. Our infrastructure, the reinforcement of the terrain and the obstacles create additional positive conditions for long-lasting defense.

[Question] Which type of adversary do you consider most dangerous: mountain troops, mechanized units, the threat from the air or a combination of all of these ?

[Answer] It is conceivable that the battle for the Alpine region would not start until after fighting in the lower-lying areas has ceased. But I could also conceive of operations starting in both areas at once. If you consider the fact that air support for our army in the lower-lying areas comes from the Alpine region and if you also take into account that this area contains reserve units and major installations which could have a decisive impact on fighting in the lowlands, an enemy might well be interested in interdicting this support at an early stage.

With regard to the threat, I would call your attention to the fact that helicopters have radically altered the mission of the defender in the Alpine region during the past 20 or 30 years.

In the Alpine region, the primary threat surely comes from the air. Airborne operations can have a decidedly adverse effect on the role of the defender. To begin with, the opponent is likely to make a mechanized advance along the roads and to commit the appropriate units to provide immediate fire support. If these efforts are blocked, he will try to attain his objectives through the air.

In either event, operations both in the Alpine region and in the Lower Alps will concentrate on the axes.

[Question] Could one say then that the combat picture in the Alpine region has changed as a result of two components: the threat from the air (in terms of fire preparation and airborne operations) and mechanized thrusts along the axes ?

What are the primary measures being taken to counter these developments ?

[Answer] To be sure, the numerous obstacles and our effective destruction network create good conditions for combat in the Alpine region; but what we need is greater mobility and firepower. The objective is to reach the enemy landing sites quickly and in superior numbers--both in terms of firepower and manpower. Generally speaking, this can only be achieved in the Alps through air mobility. Our infantry mobility, on the other hand, is limited to movements of 7 to 10 hours. For another thing, road mobility depends to some extent on the enemy's intentions. If a modern adversary wishes to interrupt movement along our roads, he can do so without destroying them by using chemical weapons.

With regard to greater firepower, what I am talking about primarily is artillery and antiaircraft weapons. We need to have strong air defenses in order to be able to intercept the enemy in time, i.e. before or during the course of landing operations. We must have an effective artillery in order to take the enemy under fire during the first few minutes after his units have landed.

[Question] But could one say that the greater firepower component at least is on its way toward being realized ? It does not look as good with regard to mobility, does it ?

[Answer] In part I would go along with you on the matter of greater firepower. We have made some progress in the artillery field. In particular, artillery support has been improved in the combat brigades which are responsible for operations in the Alpine region and the Lower Alps. In addition to the fortification artillery, we have also integrated the fortification mine launchers which are capable of providing effective support for battalions, even for regiments. We have also increased the number of our mobile howitzer batteries. This has really been a big progress. But as far as the mobile artillery pieces of the mountain divisions are concerned, we are exactly where we were 30 years ago. In my view, the biggest gaps still exist in our air defense. In this regard, too, there has been some improvement at the combat brigade level. But essentially we have been unable to keep pace with the developing threat. For this reason, there are urgent needs in this field. Both in the Alpine region and in the Lower Alps, antiaircraft cannons, supplemented by light antiaircraft missiles, can be very effective.

The limitations of infantry mobility and road movement as well as the non-existence of air mobility have resulted among other things in the fact that the combat brigade represents the higher tactical level in the Alpine army corps. The division cannot be employed as a tactical unit because the division commandant is unable to coordinate fire and movement at a specific time and place--also due to the highly compartmentalized nature of the terrain.

[Question] Has this resulted in the "brigadization" of the Alpine region ?

[Answer] It is true that we here in Switzerland have many levels of command in the area of Alpine combat.

If I compare our system to the Italian CA alpino for example, I find that the Italians do not have units at the regiment or division level--which means that they have two levels of command fewer between their battalion combat groups and the corps.

But if I take the integration into combat of stationary units into consideration as well as their collaboration with freely available units, then I must say that the present solution--cumbersome as it is--is probably appropriate at this time. "Brigadization," in terms of previous articles which have appeared in this journal, would severely restrict the freedom of action of the supreme commander and of the Alpine army corps commandant and would place additional burdens on the combat brigade commandant. This should also be avoided because we wish to take full advantage of our citizen army. In my opinion, command of the division

should be assigned to professional soldiers in the first instance but that command of the combat brigades should be in the hands of officers of the militia as much as possible.

[Question] We have a question on the subject of destruction networks and terrain reinforcement: have the unit commanders and platoon leaders been able to integrate the facilities for which they are responsible into their thinking?

[Answer] Thanks to the efforts of our commanders, the integration of demolition objects into our plans has made good progress. The commanding officers at all echelons realize the importance of these objects. We are also making good progress in the area of destruction leadership which places great responsibilities on the individual commanders. The stated objective of all commanding officers is to achieve the tactical integration and timely functioning of the destruction network.

[Question] Among other things, military training is supposed to toughen those who undergo it. In most instances, conditions in the mountains are rough and harsh. On the other hand, the platoon leaders and unit commanders are responsible for seeing to it that clothing, nourishment, etc. appropriate to the climate are provided. Doesn't this present something of a dilemma for the younger commanders with regard to stating needs and providing support?

[Answer] I don't think so. Anyone who does not take good care of his unit cannot really lead it. The commandant is the boss; he is the one who achieves an objective thanks to his own performance and that of his subordinates. If he realizes that, he will be able to find the golden mean between asking the men under him to perform and taking good care of them. Due to his position, the commanding officer is the one who will have to intervene whenever the time comes to resolve a problem. In that sense, the position of commander contains aspects of goal-oriented dedication which makes no concessions to creature comforts as well as aspects of caring for his men out of a respect for them as human beings and in recognition of the fact that good human relations serve as the basis for independence and loyalty on the part of his subordinates.

[Question] It may be assumed that the principles of antitank defense in the mountains are the same as those in lower-lying areas. Now you have said that the principal threat in the mountains comes from the air. The advent of the helicopter has made the hard-to-climb back slopes of mountains an illusory line of defense.

What does an infantry unit do which has been assigned to a back slope with antitank weapons and which has been spotted by attack helicopters?

[Answer] Your question underscores my call for improving our air defenses. Attack helicopters relativize the value of a good many obstacles--even those very good ones on back slopes. But one must also be realistic

about what helicopters can effectively do in our type of terrain. To meet this threat, we need the proper resources (e.g. antiaircraft weapons and, to some extent, also antitank weapons against helicopters) and we must also assign high priority to "antiaircraft defense of all weapons."

We failed to mention one thing in our discussion of the threat from the air. The large amount of supplies available to the 3d Alpine Army Corps enable us to mitigate the threat of airborne operations to some extent in that we are in a position to occupy key terrain in advance.

[Question] We might also mention that the actual key terrain has already been "furnished" with permanent installations, i.e. fortifications which makes it possible to occupy additional areas thanks to the abundant supplies. In practical terms therefore we can cover the entire area.

[Answer] As we look at these permanent installations, we should also keep their protective function for the men in mind--particularly in such mountainous terrain which provides for so little cover. It is these installations which guarantee the survival of our forces, thereby maintaining combat effectiveness and enabling us to commit these forces to battle.

[Question] What are the priorities today in your opinion?

[Answer] Today, air mobility is not only a need of the Alpine Army Corps; there is a need for transport helicopters throughout our armed forces. Because of the multifaceted threat today, it is becoming more and more conceivable to make use of combat groups of the Alpine Army Corps in the lower-lying areas. Providing timely transport for them depends to a large extent on air mobility.

Now that we have made a lot of progress in our antitank defenses, I am asking myself whether our armed forces do not have a greater need for transport/attack helicopters (one type of helicopter can serve both functions) than antitank helicopters. We must look into this question very carefully and try to find an answer.

Let me conclude by saying that both the officers and men of the Army Alpine Corps are committed to optimize the available resources and to make their specific contribution to the maintenance of peace and independence through goal-oriented efforts and a commitment to military preparedness.

9478

CSO: 3620/207

ECONOMIC

FINLAND

BRIEFS

MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY PACT WITH USSR--A Finnish-Soviet medical technology pact for hospital technology and pharmacology has been signed in Helsinki. The Soviet Union is the most important export country of the Finnish pharmaceutical industry. We export hospital equipment worth 8 million rubles or almost 60 million markkas per year to the Soviet Union. Altogether the pharmaceutical industry exports 30 million rubles, i.e. 210 million markkas, worth per year to the Soviet Union. [Text] [Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 6 Dec 85 p 21] 9662

CSO: 3650/94

ECONOMIC

GREECE

DRACHMA DEVALUATION NO HELP FOR EXPORTS

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 28 Jan 86 p 7

[Text] The value of Greek exports in November showed a vertical drop when compared to November and October 1985.

Specifically, our exports decreased to 377 million dollars in November, showing a significant drop of 23.7 percent compared to November 1984, and an even greater drop --30.5 percent-- when compared to October 1985.

This, in essence, shows that the benefits from the drachma devaluation were really short-lived, while at the same time the estimates made by exporters were confirmed, namely that the promotion of our goods needs more substantial measures and more restraints on domestic costs.

Between January and November 1985, overall exports amounted to 4.130 million dollars showing a drop of 7 percent compared to the corresponding period of 1984 (4.439 million dollars). This drop was greater by two percentage points (-9.1 percent) if petroleum products are not included. As described in the monthly Bulletin of the Center for Export Studies, the picture of agricultural products exported was clearly more unfavorable than that of industrial goods. As for distribution by geographic area, a bigger drop was evidenced in exports to countries of the Middle East and North Africa.

In November 1985, exports amounted to 377 million dollars, i.e. they showed a 23.7 percent drop compared to November 1984 (495 million dollars). This drop becomes slightly less (-21.8 percent) if we do not include the value of exported petroleum products. Also to be noted is the variability in the export picture that has been observed in the last 3 months of the 11-month period: From 296 million dollars in September to 543 million dollars in October (the "worst" and "best" months respectively in the 11-month period) and then to 377 million dollars in November, as mentioned above.

With regard to the decrease rate in exports, a slowdown was noted from June until October (with September being the exception). Nevertheless, during November, the decrease rate accelerated. More specifically, the decrease rates in exports was as follows: -10.3 percent, -9.3 percent, -7.8 percent, -8 percent, -4.6 percent and -7 percent during the first 6 months, 7 months, 8 months, 9 months, 10 months and 11 months of the current year respectively, compared to the same periods of last year.

5671
CSO: 3521/84

ECONOMIC

GREECE

BRIEFS

DISAPPOINTING AGREEMENT WITH LIBYA--Yesterday, the government, under pressure by the opposition, admitted the ineffectiveness of our foreign policy because of the way it is being implemented. The government indirectly but clearly admitted that no substantial progress had been noted in the "mammoth" agreement with Libya that was signed a month and a half ago during Prime Minister A. Papandreou's trip to Tripoli. In answer to a question by ND Deputy A. Andrianopoulos, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs I. Kapsis repeated the answer given by Minister of Foreign Affairs Kar. Papoulias according to whom "the full and definite development of the Greek-Libyan agreement will become possible during the convening of the joint Greek-Libyan committee on 24-27 February." Mr Kapsis, in a desperate effort to show the Chamber of Deputies a picture of progress in Greek-Libyan economic relations, mentioned reports published in some opposition newspapers according to which "an influx in the order of 200 million dollars has already come about." In a strong rebuttal, Mr Andrianopoulos asked if the government were responsibly declaring that there has really been an influx in the amount mentioned. Mr Kapsis maintained that reports on the 200 million are not being presented as information to the Chamber of Deputies because they do not constitute official data. /Excerpts/ /Athens 1 KATHIMERINI in Greek 25 Jan 86 p 17 5671

CSO: 3521/84

ECONOMIC

ICELAND

PARLIAMENT PASSES BUDGET FOR 1986

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 21 Dec 85 p 48

[Article: "Budget Bill Passed Today: Expenses Have Increased By 4.3 Billion Kronur"]

[Text] The third debate over the budget bill took place yesterday in the Althing, and it was voted on today. Quite a number of change resolutions have been presented by both the majority and the minority members of the monetary committee and by individual MPs, and it is expected that it will take some time to consider all of them.

Palmi Jonsson, the chairman of the monetary committee, introduced the bill in yesterday's debate, explaining those changes which had been made by the committee since the close of the second debate. It came out in his speech that if the bill was ratified, as the majority suggests, the final figure in the "income" column would amount to 37,853.7 million kronur, although only 33,539.5 million was shown when the bill was first proposed. The increase, then, amounts to 4.3 billion kronur.

Jonsson said that, according to these final figures, the government's income from taxes for next year would only take some 28 percent of the gross national product, which is estimated to amount to 136 billion kronur.

Expenses in the budget bill have increased since the second debate by 4,361.0 million kronur, amounting to a total of 37,670.7 million kronur. Surplus income in the working overview of the budget will then amount to 183.0 million kronur, according to the proposals approved by the majority.

The major part of the increases on the debit side of the proposed budget are the result of increases in price and salary stipulations in the budget. The salary increase stipulations in the budget proposals as of the third debate are calculated at about 12.2 percent, with some exceptions. This 12.2 percent raise was arrived at by first calculating a four percent increase in salaries between the intended proposal and that which actually was produced for the end of 1985. In addition, according to the decision of the government, a ten percent raise in salaries was calculated from the end of 1985 to the level

which has been arrived at in the budget bill. In the third place, this figure also includes a decrease of some two percent, in accordance with the government's thriftiness plan, which was announced at the time of the first debate.

Geir Gunnarsson (People's Alliance) criticized the fact that the figures on price levels did not seem to have been correctly calculated in the bill. He mentioned that instead of raising salaries some 14.58 percent as indicated in the bill, in accordance with information from the National Economic Institute on debits and credits, that salaries actually would be raised some 12.2 percent. Operating expenses, he said, had increased similarly in the budget bill, showing 15.4 percent instead of 17.5 percent, as indicated by information from the National Economic Institute on price developments for next year.

"And so, in sum, we are talking about a gap on the expenses side of the ledger, involving some 250 to 300 million kronur, which has not been explained away except by the old bromides about austerity. But promises of this kind, when you relate them to what is actually paid out in the budget, have always been meaningless, and our expenses have increased anyway," Gunnarsson said.

At the end of his speech, Gunnarsson said that our budget payments had the look of a desperate attempt to get all the ends tied up on paper, even though what we are talking about is a genuine deficit in our economy.

[Table on following page]

1986 Budget

Treasury payment summaries according to change proposals presented by the finance committee, approved after the third debate by the majority of the finance committee, the cooperative communications committee and the MPs in the cultural committees of both houses.

Operational Ledger	Million kronur	Million kronur
Income		37,854.0
Expenses:		
Operational		32,811.2
Common consumption	13,867.3	
Consumption and operational supplements	16,268.2	
-Special agency incomes	-1,131.3	
Capital expenses, interest	3,807.0	
Balancing		5,042.8
Investment		4,871.5
Foundation costs	1,857.0	
Capital supplements	3,014.5	
Income above and beyond expenses		171.3
Loan Developments:		
Payments		2,559.0
Payments on loans taken out	4,405.0	
Incoming payments on loans granted	-1,846.0	
Loans granted		960.0
To B-section of treasury	960.0	
Capital and foundation funds		100.0
Trade accounts		1,150.0
Exports over imports	1,150.0	
A-section's need of loan funds		4,597.7
Loans taken out		4,650.0
Domestic issue of money certificates	2,100.0	
Foreign loans taken out by national treasury	2,550.0	
Payment balancing, changes in treasury		52.3

9584

CS0:3626/13

ECONOMIC

ICELAND

LARGE TRADE DEFICIT FOR FIRST TEN MONTHS OF 1985

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 21 Dec 85 p 4

[Article: "Portugal, United States and Britain Our Most Favorable Trading Partners"]

[Text] Iceland's balance of trade for the first ten months of this year was in the red to the tune of almost 3,600 million kronur, using f.o.b. values on exported goods and c.i.f. values on imported goods. If f.o.b. prices are used in both instances, that is, if the shipping costs are not calculated in, the trade deficit then amounts to 447 million kronur. Trade with the United States has proven to be the most economically favorable for Icelanders, since we exported 7,685 million kronur worth of goods to that country simultaneous to our purchasing 1,862 million kronur worth of American goods.

Goods exported to the United States amounted to 28.3 percent of our total exports from January to October of this year. Our imports of American goods, on the other hand, only amounted to six percent of total imports. The major part of the goods purchased by the Americans were marine products, the value of which came to some 7,000 million kronur, or almost 35 percent of our total marine products exports. They also bought manufactured goods valued at 569 million kronur, agricultural products valued at 48 million kronur, and other goods valued at 7.5 million kronur.

Iceland's second favorable trading partner for the first ten months of the year was Portugal, with which we had a favorable balance of trade amounting to 1,047 million kronur. The Portuguese bought goods from the Icelanders amounting to 1,865 million kronur, at the same time as their exports to Iceland amounted to 818 million kronur. It was chiefly marine products, especially unprocessed salt fish, which the Portuguese bought. Our exports to Portugal amounted to 6.9 percent of our total exports.

Our trade with Britain was also favorable, just as it was with the other two nations above mentioned. Our exports amounted to 4,821 million kronur, whereas British goods imported into Iceland amounted to some 3,000 million kronur. The trade was thus in Iceland's favor, to the tune of 1,787 million kronur. The British purchased marine products amounting to 3,989 million kronur, agricultural products amounting to 48 million, manufactured goods

amounting to 753 million, and other goods amounting to approximately 30 million kronur. Our exports to Britain amounted to 17.7 percent of our total exports.

Our trade with West Germany for the first ten months of the year showed an unfavorable balance for Icelanders amounting to 1,938 million kronur. The West Germans bought Icelandic goods valued at 2,118 million kronur, while the Icelanders bought from them goods amounting to some 4,000 million kronur. Exported marine products came to 980 million kronur, manufactured goods 1,059 million kronur, and agricultural products 46 million kronur. Goods exported to West Germany amounted to some 7.8 percent of our total exports.

9584

CSO:3626/13

ECONOMIC

ICELAND

FINANCE MINISTER INTERVIEWED ON GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC POLICIES

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 19 Dec 85 p 10

[Commentary by 'Staksteinar': "Finance Minister Replies"]

[Text] Thorsteinn Palsson, chairman of the Independence Party and minister of finance, held a press conference in a TV studio last Tuesday evening. He came away whole and uninjured from his first experience in the role of a finance minister on television. It has been a long time since television audiences have had the opportunity to observe a discussion of such weighty import, relating to how government finance is managed and the policies which are followed in connection with it. Today's 'Staksteinar' talks about some of the items which came up for discussion on television.

Nothing Said About Freethinking

It was Pall Magnusson, television newscaster, Oskar Gudmundsson, editorial representative for THJODVILJINN, and Elias Snaeland Jonsson, co-editor of DAGBLADID-VISIR, who interviewed Thorsteinn Palsson. The interviewers should be praised for the fact that they stayed on the topic at hand, that they did not succumb to the temptation to interrupt the discussion in progress by asking more broadly-based political questions. On the one hand, it is clear that significant discussions of the kind that was held with Thorsteinn Palsson demand just as much of the interviewers as they do of the interviewees. People who work in the media have to have this fact uppermost in their minds when they take it upon themselves to discuss matters with politicians and other people. It is a rule that must be cultivated in interview programs of this kind that the discussants talk with each other in order to shed light on the subject, and not to cut each other down. It is patently unfair, though, to even bring this up in connection with Thorsteinn Palsson's recent appearance in the TV studio, since he did not deviate at all from the subjects under discussion, but rather maintained his position firmly and in a well-grounded fashion.

After long speeches from the governmental opposition, and not the least from the people at THJODVILJINN, saying that Thorsteinn Palsson was the most prominent exponent of freethinking here in Iceland, and every bit as hard-bitten as Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, you might expect the finance minister to come under attack based on these assumptions. But the opposite occurred. The interviewers seemed to be proceeding on the assumption that restraint was the better tactic. Too much money had been taken out in foreign

loans and it ought rather to be put to use in the management of public funds rather than to yield anything left over. Not one word was said about freethinking. On the other hand, more emphasis was placed on having it explained why Palsson had not been able to forestall the foreseeable deficit in the national treasury this year, which has exceeded two billion kronur. The minister said that 1,400 to 1,500 million of these funds could be attributed to increases in salaries and insurance benefits.

Change of Focus

It came out in what the minister said that a new policy has been followed in drawing up next year's budget. "There has been a major change of focus," the minister said. The change consists in putting greater responsibilities on the national treasury than previously, with the idea of increasing the purchasing power of salaries. It was not to be anticipated that salaried workers would have to face cutbacks in their economic well-being. Under the economic policies that were followed after the government was formed in 1983, the salaried workers suffered; now the time was more than ripe for the government to shoulder whatever it could.

We expect to find out after the third budget debates this weekend what the final budget decisions will be. Thorsteinn Palsson said that he no more than anyone else could promise that these new laws would be more substantial than what we have seen often before. Nor did he wish to mention any statistics on goals in the campaign against inflation, but did say that it would be under the 30 percent mark next year. This was reasonable of him. Too many politicians have too often fallen into the trap of making empty promises by listing the anticipated statistics for next month.

In the editorial column in day before yesterday's DAGBLADID-VISIR, it says that government agencies such as the National Economic Institute and the Central Bank are always "distributing statistics and forecasts which are favorable to the government, which come close to being childishly optimistic in matters of finance and national economy." These words demonstrate a deep-seated skepticism both of politicians and of government officials. The interview with Thorsteinn Palsson was not at all characterized by "childish optimism." It is clear that prognostications on the development of the economy do not have the same validity in the mind of the man in the street that they used to have. But it ought to be better documented than it was in the abovementioned editorial column if they are to insist that we can look upon the Central Bank and the National Economic Institute as "inefficient campaign headquarters for those in power." Media representatives can lose their credibility if they misrepresent things, just as other people can. And now we have come back to what we mentioned at the beginning, that the responsibility of media representatives is no less important than that of politicians and officials, when we are talking about the discussion of financial and economic matters. The finance minister's grasp of what was discussed on television on Tuesday night ought to be a clear reminder to the mass media that they, no less than other people, need to do their homework before they appear in front of the entire nation.

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ECONOMIC

ICELAND

INSTITUTE EXPECTS TWELVE PERCENT DROP IN INFLATION FOR 1986

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 24 Dec 85 p 34

[Article: "Twenty-Two Percent Inflation Anticipated for 1986; Similar Pricing Developments to 1984"]

[Text] The records and prognostications of the National Economic Institute concerning changes in prices, salaries, and the exchange rate for 1984, 1985 and 1986 will be taken into account when the national budget is being drawn up. Here are the pertinent figures, just as they appeared in the Institute's publication, NATIONAL ECONOMY.

Production Rates

--Average increase over the previous year: 25 percent in 1984; 32.5 percent in 1985; 28 percent anticipated for 1986.

--From the beginning to the end of each year: 22 percent in 1984; 32 percent in 1985; 22 percent anticipated for 1986.

Construction Rates

--Average increase over the previous year: 22 percent in 1984; 32 percent in 1985; 28 percent in 1986.

--From the beginning to the end of the year: 20 percent in 1984; 35 percent in 1985; 20 percent anticipated for 1986.

Loan Opportunity Rates

--Average increase over the previous year: 33.5 percent in 1984; 30.5 percent in 1985; 29.5 percent anticipated for 1986.

--From the beginning to the end of the year: 19 percent in 1984; 35.5 percent in 1985; 21.5 percent in 1986.

Sales Taxes

--Average increase over the previous year: 19.5 percent in 1984; 32.5 percent in 1985; 24.5 percent anticipated for 1986.

--From the beginning to the end of each year: 26 percent in 1984; 29 percent in 1985; 18.5 percent anticipated for 1986.

Daily Salaries, Icelandic Federation of Labor

--Average increase over the previous year: 24.5 percent in 1984; 36.5 percent in 1985; 28 percent anticipated for 1986.

--From the beginning to the end of each year: 27.5 percent in 1984; 37.5 percent in 1985; 22 percent anticipated for 1986.

Income Per Person

--Increase from one year to the next: 28 percent in 1984; 36 percent in 1985; 28 percent anticipated for 1986.

Purchasing Power of Individual Income

--Change from year to year: one percent decrease in 1984; three percent increase in 1985; no change anticipated for 1986.

Average Value of Foreign Currency

--Average increase over the previous year: 16.5 percent in 1984; 28 percent in 1985; 21.5 percent anticipated for 1986.

--Increase from the beginning to the end of each year: 26 percent in 1984; 18.5 percent in 1985; 18 percent anticipated for 1986.

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ECONOMIC

ICELAND

INSTITUTE PUBLISHES STATISTICS FOR 1981, FORECAST FOR 1986

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 21 Dec 85 p 88

[Article: "Inflation 34 Percent from Beginning to End of Year; Trade Deficit Approximately Five Billion Kronur"]

[Text] The 1985 labor market was characterized by a high demand for labor, according to the December issue of NATIONAL ECONOMY DIGEST, which is published by the National Economic Institute. Unemployment statistics for 1985 have involved under one percent of the working-age population, compared with 1.3 percent last year. Inflation, on the other hand, has been somewhat higher than was estimated in late summer, amounting to 34 percent from the beginning to the end of the year, instead of the estimated 30 percent.

Considering changed conditions in prices, the government has decided to adjust next year's budget to accommodate a 28-29 percent average price increase between 1985 and 1986.

The gross national product increased some 2.5 percent in 1985, a somewhat lower figure than in 1984. The net national product increased somewhat less, as a result of increased interest payments on foreign loans. A 2-percent increase is anticipated in the gross national product, but only a 1.5-percent increase in national income for 1986. The slow economic growth is anticipated as a result of worsening trade opportunities.

Household incomes increased some 36 percent between 1984 and 1985, during the same time period that the average change in the rate of production was calculated at 32.5 percent. This means that the purchasing power exerted by income in 1985 was some 3-4 percent higher than in the previous year. The purchasing power of combined sales taxes, on the other hand, has remained the same. The government's economic agenda anticipates very little change in the purchasing power of individual incomes in 1986.

In the prognostications for next year, a five percent increase is estimated in the fish catch and in the production of goods from the sea, involving 340-350 thousand tons of cod and 900 thousand tons of capelin.

The deficit in our balance of trade relative to the outside world will amount to approximately five billion kronur, that is, including not only goods, but services as well, which amount to some 4.5 percent of our gross national product. A 3.5-4 percent trade deficit is expected next year.

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ECONOMIC

ICELAND

SOVIETS TO BUY SLIGHTLY LESS FISH IN AGREEMENT FOR 1986

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 19 Dec 85 p 2

[Article: "Soviets Buy One and a Half Billion Kronur Worth of Fish"]

[Text] Agreements were signed last Tuesday involving the sale of 26,000 tons of frozen fish to the Soviet Union during the course of the coming year. This figure is 1,000 tons lower than last year, since the decrease in perch fishing, as well as limited production capacities, has proven prohibitive to our supplying a larger quantity.

Olafur Gudmundsson, a general secretary at Freezing Plants Sales Center, said in an interview with MORGUNBLADID that on top of the decrease in perch fishing, the market for frozen ocean perch has increased substantially in the United States, Europe and Japan. Our stock of ocean perch has been large in the past few seasons and it has been difficult to sell it. We have, therefore, requested the Soviets to increase their purchases of this fish, but such will no longer be the case.

The agreement covers the sale of 14,000 tons of ocean perch filets and 6,000 tons of pollock filets. It is further expected that the Soviets will buy 6,000 tons of fish frozen whole. The total sales value of these products comes to 37 million dollars, or about one and a half billion kronur. The average increase, in kronur, is said to be 11.6 percent, in accordance with the increase on the relevant types of fish on other markets.

The negotiations were conducted by Benedikt Gudmundsson, a general secretary at Freezing Plants Sales Center, and Olafur Jonsson, sales chief of the marine products division of the Union of Icelandic Cooperatives.

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ECONOMIC

SWEDEN

FELDT SUBMITS ANOTHER TIGHT BUDGET, WAGE PACT COULD UNDO

Municipal Aid Funds Cut

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 10 Jan 86 p 1

[Article: "Feldt's Fourth Budget Released Too Early--Living Costs Rise For All." First paragraph is DN introduction.]

[Text] Municipalities are squeezed and living costs will rise under the budget presented today by Minister of Economy and Budget Kjell-Olof Feldt. For the first time in 7 years the deficit is pressed down below 50 billion.

The total budget stands at 335 billion kronor. Interest on the national debt is the largest individual item, 71 billion.

Feldt wants the help of the labor market to push inflation down below five percent through a 3-year wage agreement. In return he promises to reduce marginal taxes in 1987 and 1988.

The budget contains only small tax changes, but it is clear that wine and spirits taxes will be raised in the spring.

As for savings, Feldt went ahead with a cheese slicer, but the municipalities lost 2.5 billion in contributions to teacher salaries, child dental care, roads and public transportation.

Minister of Housing Hans Gustafsson calculates the guaranteed interest and is saving 600 million. That means a rent increase of 50 kronor per month in multifamily houses and 150 kronor in certain small houses beginning 1 July. Housing allowances will, however, be increased.

The handicapped and the conscripts and their families are among the few groups which will get increases. Sports are protected for the third year in a row. Compensation from the unemployment fund is increased by only 20 kronor per day, which is criticized by all union leaders.

Late on Thursday the finance ministry lifted a prohibition on publication of the budget which previously was effective until today at 11 o'clock. The

reason was that the Social Democrats' own newspaper AKTUELLT I POLITIKEN broke the agreement on publication time.

VPK Leader Vows Opposition

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 10 Jan 86 p 1

[Article: "VPK Chooses to Fight--Feldt Must Seek Nonsocialist Support" First paragraph is DN introduction.]

[Text] VPK [Communist Left Party] leader Lars Werner sounded the attack against the government's budget. "It is a nonsocialist budget which VPK cannot take responsibility for in the Riksdag."

In order to get through many of its proposals then, the government must seek support from the nonsocialists. They are critical of many points, but stand together on savings in the municipalities.

"It is immoral to have promised before the election not to disturb money for the municipalities and then do just the opposite today," believe both the Liberal Party leader Bengt Westerberg and the Conservative Party leader Ulf Adelsohn.

Concern for the low economic growth rate is common in commentaries from members of the labor market. They fear that inflation will be too high and they want lower interest rates.

The head of LO [The Trade Union Confederation] Stig Malm believes that distribution policies must come more to the fore.

Wage Pact Unknown Impact

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 10 Jan 86 p 9

[Article by Sven Svensson: "Wages Are The Uncertain Card" First paragraph is DN introduction.]

[Text] The government's possibilities to bring order to Sweden's economy depends on the 1986 wage negotiations.

In the financial plan finance minister Kjell-Olof Feldt prefers a 3-year agreement without comprehensive ties to the cost of living index, but civil servants are protesting against that, especially in the national and municipal employee organizations.

Wages are the most uncertain card in the government's entire budget. It is probable that the outcome of the 1988 election will be determined by how well the government succeeds in fighting inflation.

On Monday the government will meet with representatives of organized labor to inform them of the direction of the economic policy and the tax policies for 1987 and 1988.

The point of departure for the economic policy is that inflation will be fought primarily by savings in public expenditures and by keeping the rate of increase of wages and other costs low. For 1986 Kjell-Olof Feldt estimates a real wage increase of 0.5 percent. The rise can be compared with the fact that real wages during the period 1978-83 sank by 12-13 percent.

Wage Drift

In the year's financial plan Kjell-Olof Feldt confirms that hourly wages for 1986 will rise an average of 5.5 percent without any general increases in the coming wage negotiations. The increase will result from "overhangs" from previous wage agreements and from calculated wage drifts.

The overhang for state and municipal employees in 1986 amounts to 6.5 percent, and within the private sector to 1.5 percent. Wage drift within the private sector is reported to be three or four percent and therefore the average hourly wage increase will be 5.5 percent.

Already these wage increases are too large in the light of Sweden's ability to compete, according to Kjell-Olof Feldt. Even without extra increases the rise in wages in Sweden will be greater than in competing countries, and furthermore their productivity is increasing faster than Sweden's.

In the financial plan, therefore, Feldt emphasizes that it is necessary to stabilize price and cost increases at a low level for a long time to come, since a new devaluation is totally out of the question.

It is therefore desirable to have a wage agreement which extends over a several year period. The credibility of the anti-inflation policies would be strengthened considerably if an agreement at a low level could be reached for a 3-year period, for example, wrote Kjell-Olof Feldt.

A multiyear agreement without comprehensive indexing clauses would facilitate the solution of the cost overhang which exists in certain agreement areas. Feldt is primarily critical of price increasing and wage increasing clauses, but he doubts that a multiyear agreement can be concluded without public employees getting a flexibility guarantee relative to the private sector.

New Tax Scales

Despite several labor organizations being opposed to a 3-year agreement, Feldt believes that conditions for attaining the goal are improved. The agreement ran out at the end of last year, and tax increases in the budget will be moderate. The government is also prepared to put forth proposals for new national tax scales for 1987 and 1988.

If wage developments for the coming years in the municipalities and businesses should diverge from what is desirable, the government will not hesitate to take corrective action, wrote Feldt.

The government can do nothing about too large cost increases except to try to reduce the negative effects by drawing in purchasing power through tax increases.

During recent years the GNP has increased by about 2.5 percent per year. For 1986 it is indicated to be 1.6 percent, which is 0.5 percent more than what the National Institute of Economic Research estimated.

Feldt expects that inflation will decline from 5.5 percent in 1985 to 4 percent by the end of 1986.

Automobile Business

Private consumption increased strongly during 1985 by about 3 percent. Especially strong growth was seen in automobiles, radio/TV, clothing and sport equipment. In 1986 private consumption is expected to grow by 1.5 percent. At the same time it is important to hold back the increase of municipal consumption. Feldt is intervening, therefore, in different ways to draw money from the municipalities. Industry and employees there will be urged to create order in the Swedish economy.

Swedish Economy 1983-1986--Annual percent of change unless otherwise stated:

Item	1985	1986	IER(1) 1986
Private consumption	2.8	1.5	1.2
Public consumption	0.9	1.4	1.6
State	-1.0	-0.9	-0.1
Municipal	1.7	2.2	2.2
Gross investments	6.3	0.5	-3.1
Of which industrial	19.2	5.0	0.0
Stock investment (2)	1.1	0.4	0.3
Export	2.0	4.5	4.6
Import	8.1	4.9	3.8
GNP	2.2	1.6	1.1
Employment (number of persons)	+43,000	+25,000	
Unemployment (percent)	2.9	2.9	3.1
Consumer price (Dec-Dec)	5.7	4.2	4.4
Trade balance (billions of kronor)	15.0	18.2	
Current account balance (billions of kronor)	-10.3	-5.3	-2.7
Budget balance (billions of kronor)	-55.0	-50.0	

Footnote (1). IER = Institute of Economic Research

Footnote (2). Changes of stock investment in percent of previous year's GNP.

Sources: The financial plan and the December report of the Institute of Economic Research.

Not Abroad

Every decline of the price of oil by one dollar means one billion in foreign business for Sweden.

The budget deficit, which in 1982 went up to 83 billion, is estimated to sink to 49 billion. Much of the decline results from wages increasing less than expected. By 1988 the budget deficit must decline to 40 billion.

Economists Give Assessment

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 10 Jan 86 p 9

[Article by Jan Magnus Fahlstrom: "Economists Are Positive to Financial Plan-- 'Feldt Has Rotten Luck'" First paragraph is DN introduction.]

[Text] Sweden's GNP, the total production of goods and services, is rising by 1.6 percent per year in fixed prices.

That was the finance minister's forecast of the balance of resources in the financial plan, with the key figure for the Swedish economy.

Thereby the economic growth is lower in 1986 than in the two previous years. For a long time Sweden has been below the average for the 24 members of the OECD, and is fifth from the bottom in growth.

Still Feldt expects higher growth in the Swedish economy during 1986 than what other business forecasters have done in their latest forecasts. As the table shows, even by comparison with the December report of the Institute of Economic Research.

The National Institute of Economic Research (IER) which has increased its forecast of growth for 1986 from 0.5 percent last fall, stops at 1.1 percent compared with Feldt's 1.6. Differing from IER, Feldt believes that both the total gross investments and the industrial investments will continue to grow.

According to IER, housing investments are going to decline by 11.2 percent, and according to Feldt by only 2.1. Feldt has lower figures also for inflation and unemployment, etc.

Benevolent

Does this mean that the finance minister has succumbed to "professional optimism," and will give us an unrealistically polished picture of what to expect from the Swedish economy in 1986?

DAGENS NYHETER asked this question of a number of economists who are responsible for forecasts for banks and organizations. As for their judgments of the financial plan and its balance of resources, they were overall rather benevolent in their criticism.

"A well-organized and unusually excuse-free description of the economy," said Ola Virin at the Federation of Swedish Industries. "He does not take exception to the figures in the balance of resources. 'That can very well be true,' he says. From the standpoint of industry his financial plan is very positive."

P-O Edin at LO, Roland Spant at TCO [Central Organization of Salaried Employees] and Hubert Fromlet at Sparbankernas Bank noted that Feldt's balance of resources was well in line with their own estimates. The differences were said to be within the forecasters' margin of error.

Later Figures

Ola Virin pointed out that the economists in the finance ministry concluded their calculations later than others. They had later Swedish and international figures to work with. That was also mentioned at IER as a reason for the disappointment with IER's December report.

Ulf Jakobson at SAF [Active Real Estate Brokers Association] said that Feldt's prognosis for Sweden assumed relatively favorable international developments, and he had no objection to that. Most indications are that internationally 1986 will be a rather good year.

As to the particulars of Feldt's figures, there were many question marks. Olle Djerf at PK Bank and several of his colleagues wonder how the finance minister concluded that housing investments will only decline by 2.1 percent. They believe that is excessively optimistic.

The same was said of the assumption that business investments will continue to grow. Lars Jacobsson at Handelsbanken and Olle Lindgren at S-E Bank also doubt that exports will continue to rise, in any case by as much as 4.5 percent.

Hard Braking

"It is difficult to see where the demand will come from," said Olle Lindgren, who predicts hard economic braking in the entire OECD area from 1985 to 1986.

P-O Edin and Lars Jakobsson both doubt that unemployment will be held at last year's level, 2.9 percent, by the policies mentioned in the financial plan.

Kjell-Olof Feldt confirms in his financial plan that existing wage agreements plus wage glides at the same level as last year will put wage cost increases for 1986 at 5.5 percent, highest in our part of the world.

"That is just a confirmation, not a prognosis and not a government position as to what it wants as the outcome of the 1986 wage negotiations," he stated at an advance presentation of the financial plan. The participants themselves must decide how much they want their competitive ability worsened.

"One thing we can do is to draw in purchasing power. In the budget bill we are counting on 'noninflationary wage increases.'" said Feldt.

The financial plan states "if wage developments in the municipalities, businesses and other areas should depart from what is desirable, the government will not hesitate to take corrective measures."

Wage Freeze

Several of the economists with whom DAGENS NYHETER spoke interpret this as meaning that the government assumes that there will be no new wage increases this year in the negotiations which will now take place. With a wage freeze in the offing, the rest of Feldt's prognoses can hold. Then they should also be able to bring interest rates down so that the assumptions about investment will come together.

"We assume that those responsible will firmly hold wage costs in check, and that the negotiations will be extended. But does not this require the intervention of the Riksdag and the government?" wondered Ola Virin.

"It is not realistic to expect that wage cost increases will be held down to 5.5 percent in the usual wage negotiations. Then we must legislate a wage freeze," said Lars Jakobsson.

"It can only be hoped that the wage assumption is realistic, but 5.5 percent is a very, very optimistic figure," said Hubert Fromlet. Olle Djerf did not think it was realistic either.

Does Not Go Together

"The government points out in the financial plan that there is room for increased real income," said P-O Edin. "The important thing for us is that the wages of LO members rise. We would like a low agreement to save our competitive ability.

"But if inflation gets to 5 percent, it will not do to raise real wages with an increase of 5.5 percent before taxes. It remains to be seen whether inflation will be lower or to do something about the taxes. Otherwise it will not go together."

"The financial plan is unclear on this point," also said Roland Spant. "With a 5.5 percent wage increase, 5 percent inflation, and without indexed tax scales it will not be a real wage increase, and therefore there will not be an increase in consumption as assumed by the government.

"As it looks today, the assumptions about both the 5.5 percent wage increase and the 3-year agreement are unrealistic. One should ask himself if the government has any surprises in its back pocket which it hopes to present at Rosenbad on Monday."

And finally statements by two economists who did not want to be quoted by name: "1986 will be a beastly good year for the Swedish economy." "The government has rotten luck."

Rift With Union Movement

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 12 Jan 86 p 16

[Article by Bo A. Ericsson: "Stock Market Excitement Shakes Social Democracy." First two paragraphs are DN introduction.]

[Text] Excitement and champagne on the stock market and short shrift for the wage earners--now criticism of the government is growing within the trade union movement and in the broad social democratic groups. The policies of distribution must be restored and prioritized--that is the demand.

Now the Social Democrats will try to strengthen their grip on the voters, mainly in the large cities. The party organization will undergo an extensive rearmament and expansion, both politically and organizationally, and local responsibility will be increased. The goal is, among other things, within the next 3 years to double the number of social democratic associations and clubs.

At the same time study activities will be reviewed and expanded, as will the cultural activities, local action programs will be set up, increased inputs made of information and opinion forming in housing areas and at work places, using among other things short range radio.

The opening gun for this rearming will be fired at a large ombudsman conference at the end of January, when the campaign will be outlined and discussed. The largest effort will be drawn from the worker municipalities--in every one a special working group will be established.

This offensive, which is based on a decision of the party congress, is beginning in a situation where the government has begun to run into growing criticism from broad social democratic groups and in the trade unions.

Low Wage Earners

What has happened is a change of mood. The central question is dissatisfaction with the distribution of incomes and power, the obvious growing chasms in society.

Among Social Democratic sympathizers out in the country there is a growing uncertainty about where the party stands and where it is going. Especially the low wage earners, who are not always aware of the policies of the party.

From the trade union movement within LO the tone has gradually become grim. After most of the loyalists supported the government since peace was arranged in the "War of the Roses," LO chief Stig Malm went on a sharp attack against several of the provisions of the budget when it was presented at the end of the week.

Among other things Malm, together with a number of union leaders, was very critical of the government for not raising unemployment compensation even up to the level of the social contribution. Something has gone awry in the distribution policies, and it must now be set straight, said the LO leader.

It is primarily a number of events in recent months which has led to the change of mood, at least in parts of the Social Democratic Party. Party functionaries and union representatives have gradually seen them come forth.

More Getting Contributions

The election in September--with the slogan "Sweden on the right road"--surely ended with a social democratic victory, but hardly an overwhelming one.

The party went backward in the municipalities, and experienced several severe losses, for example in Malmo.

This raised questions and wonder.

So, at the end of October, it was disclosed in these columns that the number of recipients of social contributions--despite the good times and contrary to current patterns--continued to grow during 1985, that they now reach fully 550,000 and that a new poverty, according to the judgment of social workers, is being permanently established--at the same time as the number of millionaires is growing.

At meetings out in the local social democratic clubs the question was immediately asked: "How can this be allowed to happen in a social democratic governed Sweden?"

A month later the so-called Leo affair exploded. An exclusive group director gained many millions in profits in a directed new issue of shares.

Again the question was asked in social democratic clubs and associations, "How can this take place here?"

'Lose the Election'

Now the government reacted and established an investigating commission. At the same time the head of LO, Stig Malm, came out in an interview in the social democratic newspaper AKTUELLT I POLITIKEN with the demand that the party must now start a new program and present "a vision of justice."

Malm also claimed that a new low income committee must be created. If our distribution policies can not be corrected we will lose the next election, he said.

During the past week these critical views were expressed further, not only in the social democratic clubs and LO unions but also among civil servants.

Two things happened:

First the stock exchange set new records following the swindling affair and ecstasy broke out. On a single day the total value of the stock market rose by a nearly unbelievable 85 billion kronor since October.

That is, in pure numbers, almost precisely what the Swedish social security system cost, read in terms of the appropriation for the social department (84.5 billion).

Several days after the champagne ecstasy at the stock market and the moods it created came the new budget:

Contrast

It contained neither gold nor green forests, and the contrast with the stock market was striking. The message was brief and strong: wage earners must show continued restraint and accept a very small pay raise.

Union representatives across the country say that this is not easy to explain. Their already pressed general membership finds it difficult to understand why it is forced to hold back, when there are obviously wealthy resources in other parts of society.

And from Stig Malm and a number of union leaders came, as we said, a grim criticism: The budget must be revised, with Feldt's figures our groups get no real wage increase, and we must have one now. We have stood back long enough.

There is also irritation within the civil service groups.

Sture Nordh, chairman of The National Association of Local Government Officers said:

"Today there is increased unrest over the distribution policies which cuts deeply into the membership.

"Among our members today there is an entirely different militancy than there was before the last two wage negotiations because of the tremendous redistribution which is taking place in incomes and wealth. That mood can influence the wage negotiations."

Drowned

It is against this background that the wage earner organizations--together with the employers--will meet on Monday with finance minister Kjell-Olof Feldt to discuss the wage negotiations. The opinions of the members that they will represent are complicated, irritated and provoked.

Leading Social Democrats say that the government's dilemma in this situation is that they are not able to claim a just distribution and social justice alongside the harsh economic policies that it is necessary to follow today.

Distribution and justice questions have almost drowned in crisis policies. At the same time these have achieved clear success.

In the party leadership they are not unaware that everything is not all right. Party secretary Bo Toresson said in an interview in LO-TIDNINGEN just before Christmas that the party had lost some of its popular sensitivity and was

running the risk of becoming petrified. "We don't exactly know how our voters feel," he said.

Bo Toresson now tells DAGENS NYHETER: "These shortcomings will be corrected. The answer is the rearmament that we are now beginning. It will bring distribution policies back to the center. Now we are looking to the future."

Commander's Military Request Intact

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 10 Jan 86 p 13

[Article by Sven Svensson: "Conscripts Get Increase". First two paragraphs are DN introduction]

[Text] The defense budget contains no great surprises because it is not desired to forestall the 1987 Defense Decision. The program plan of the OB [Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces] will therefore largely be approved.

Conscripts going through basic training will have their pay increased by one krona per day beginning 1 July 1986. This was recommended by Minister of Defense Roine Carlsson on the title page.

A total of 24 billion is assigned to military defense and barely 2 billion to civil defense activities.

Daily pay for conscripts beginning 1 July will be 26 kronor per day, compared with 25 kronor previously. After 230, 300 and 360 days of service there are increases of 15, 30 and 60 kronor respectively.

The separation bonus is increased on 1 January 1986 from 2,000 to 2,500 kronor.

The maximum amount of the need-proved family allowance is increased by 290 kronor per month for a wife and 370 kronor per month for children. The maximum amounts will then be 2,150 and 1,225 kronor respectively.

The current maximum amount for businessmen of 400 kronor corresponds to the needs of most businessmen, but the maximum amount should still be raised to 1,500 kronor per day. The total increase in the social costs for conscripts will increase by about 60 million per calendar year.

The defense appropriation is marked by the fact that budget year 1986/87 is the last year in the 5-year defense decision. No steps are recommended which will influence the 1987 defense decision.

OB's Plan Approved

The program plan which was presented by the OB was largely approved, but the requested ordering authorization for procurement of new material was reduced somewhat to increase freedom of negotiation.

Expansion of the antisubmarine effort will continue as planned. But for the first time in the 1987 defense decision the long range direction of the antisubmarine effort will be decided.

The JAS project will continue as planned, but certain costs have risen. In the price situation in existence in February 1985 the material costs for the project were reported at 39.9 billion, and savings are necessary. Reduction of series deliveries and delay of a new training plane are measures which must be considered in the 1990's.

The pilot question is also important, partly because of departures to civil aviation. The civilian pilot training school for commercial pilots will take in 30 students at the beginning of 1986 and the same number at mid-year. In budget year 1987 the admission of combat pilots will also increase from 35 to 40 students.

Early departures of other categories of professional officers are also troublesome. The number of reservists will increase by 200 in the higher grades and by 430 in the lower grades.

The defense minister especially emphasized that refresher training is necessary within the defense forces in order to create credibility. Fully 100,000 conscripts will be called in for such training during the year.

Within the civil defense the Central Committee for Economic Defense is the central authority, and on 1 July 1986 its name will be changed to the Central Committee for Civil Preparedness. At the same time the National Rescue Authority will become the Central Committee for Protection of the People and Rescue Service in Peace and War.

The Home Defense Organization on 1 January 1987 will consist of 8,000 home defense groups of 3 persons each and 100,000 volunteer home defense representatives. Rescue groups with dogs will also be part of the organization.

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END

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21 February 1986

West Europe Report

FBIS

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21 February 1986

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POLITICAL

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

NORWAY'S PROJECT COORDINATOR FOR EUREKA INTERVIEWED

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 23 Dec 85 p 7

[Article by Georg Parmann: "Portrait of the Week: Inge Johansen: Knowledge Is What We Have a Short Supply Of"]

[Text] We will hardly ever get to see Director Inge Johansen running naked around in the streets and shouting, "Eureka! Eureka!" His unassuming style of leadership dictates that he will use other means of marketing the new joint European research organization. When Archimedes of old sat in the bathtub and suddenly discovered the law of buoyancy, he ran out into the street and shouted his legendary "Eureka! I have found it." But Johansen will be glad to shout loudly about Eureka if it is necessary to win sympathy for the new interesting European joint research venture.

When the administrative director of the Norwegian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (NTNF) has been named Norway's project coordinator for Eureka his appointment book will become still thicker. Inge Johansen is the daily leader of the biggest research council in the country, is board chairman of Statoil, and has a board appointment at the ASEV [Business Establishment and Development, Inc.] industrial development company in Trondheim. His close staff members have a tremendous job in delivering papers around the world so that they can be discussed between two meetings or at a stop. But the last two days of the week are kept sacred.

When Inge Johansen left the presidency of the Norwegian Technical College in Trondheim nearly a year ago and became a long-distance commuter to Oslo, he promised himself and his family to keep weekends free from work. Actually, his wife says that she now sees just as much of her husband as she did when he lived and worked in Trondheim. Now he gathers new strength together with his family on weekends. Attendance at church is one fixed point.

The work week begins on the plane to Oslo on Monday morning. Eureka is among the matters which occupy him a lot these days. Here he sees an opportunity to attack tomorrow's problems in a constructive manner. But Eureka will give way to just a few selected research projects. For this reason it is necessary to work on a broad front in technological and scientific research circles here at home. The best ideas and research projects are being supported.

"I am happy about the expressed positive attitude toward research we have seen from political quarters in recent times. There is a growing understanding of the fact that innovation in Norwegian industry and business is dependent on advanced research. But I am not completely sure that it has dawned on most people what extensive changes are actually taking place."

"Look, for example, at the demand for labor. Formerly a skilled worker was a firm's most important resource. Today there are many firms which have over half of their work force consisting of people with a university and college education. For example, in the Norsk Data success firm 70 percent of the employees have been educated at universities or colleges. We find such examples in most strong-growth industries today," Inge Johansen says.

"It is degreed engineers, graduates in science, doctors and engineers who will form the labor force of the future's firms. But too little has been done here at home to increase education capacities. It does not help to send some students abroad for a few years--we have to rearm here at home. I think it is frankly a shame to see young people full of initiative, prepared to go after a higher education without getting a seat in school."

"We cannot let research go in order for industry to get more of the degreed engineers it needs. The high-technology industry does not need just degreed engineers in order to be competitive. People with research competence at a high level are also needed."

"For this reason NTNF is deliberately advocating building up the training of doctoral candidates through basic research assignments. That we have a shortage of competence at all levels in all the fields which the government has designated as venture fields for Norwegian research I do not believe has sufficiently dawned on the politicians. That knowledge is in short supply here at home we can see, among other things, from salaries. While a degreed engineer in Sweden can expect a beginning salary of 9000 kroner a month, the salary in Norway is 4000 to 500 [as published] kroner higher. It should be unnecessary to say that this also affects the country's ability to compete," the NTNF director points out.

However, Inge Johansen admits that the politicians do have a theoretical understanding of this problem. But what we are talking about is tomorrow's problems. Unfortunately, politicians all too often have difficulty enough in handling today's. He would like to caution against weakness here and uses the Netherlands as an example of how it can go when short-term prosperous growth is prioritized over long-term building up of competence. The Netherlands had money from gas production on the continental shelf but did not use it to prepare itself for a time when the gas flow diminished. One result is that the country is among those with the highest unemployment in Europe today.

Inge Johansen admits that research can seem remote to Norwegian industry and management because it is long-term and people do not feel affected by it. But the day the lack of foresight has consequences for our jobs, then it is very difficult to regain what was lost.

[Question] Then it surely must be even more difficult to convince people that we should take part in something as remote as the Eureka European research program, must it not?

[Answer] "Fortunately the politicians have been very quick to comprehend what Eureka is and are supporting it. The main objective is to shorten the path from research and development to the market, so that European industry does not fall behind in relation to its competitors--the USA and Japan. The initiative for research projects in the Eureka joint venture must come from industry and business itself. But in order to bring Norwegian industry into such a joint venture we have to have something to attract with. For this reason, if Eureka is to be successful public money must be put into it also, for loans and support. It is on this point that I am concerned about having to shout loudly in order to arouse the politicians' understanding," Johansen says.

And raising his voice in order to get attention is not one of Inge Johansen's habits. He has a softspoken style of leadership. It is firm, but not authoritarian. He is quick to come to the point and makes decisions when the arguments have been heard, and short-term ulterior motives do not influence him. This is not to say that Inge Johansen does not listen to his staff members. On the contrary, he is very open to technical arguments and knows how to call on the competence which exists around him. These qualities also come in handy in his chairmanship of Statoil's board of directors.

"The job at Statoil requires perspective and special insight more than the knowledge of details. My background in terms of research and education for this reason should not be any worse than other skills for taking an assignment in Norwegian industry."

The 57-year-old chairman of the board has a solid technical background with his electronics education from the Norwegian Technical College. He became a doctor of engineering in 1957 and a professor of electric power engineering in 1959, when he was only 31 years old. He was president of NTH [Norwegian Technical College] from 1976 to 1984. He has had the chairman of the board appointment at Statoil for nearly two years. Here he is taking part in developing the State oil company both on land and in the international market.

"Important features of the further development of Statoil will take place in part on land by the sale of refined products. It is easy enough to sell crude oil when the demand is high and prices are rising. But when it is a seller's market it is important to control all parts of the market. For this reason we are now expanding with marketing preparations for refined products in Sweden. We are also extending our financial commitment on the crude oil side. We are entering promising projects abroad. We are already involved on the Dutch shelf, we are applying for rights in Denmark, and are already partly involved in projects in China," Johansen relates.

It is not just in major industrial and research contexts that Inge Johansen is involved. There is a newly established company in Trondheim, A/S Etablering og Virksomhetsutvikling [Business Establishment and Development,

Inc.] (ASEV), where he has a board appointment. ASEV has the objective of helping new firms to be set up which have their origin in technological research circles. Since its establishment a year and a half ago, 12 to 14 new knowledge-based firms have seen the light of day with their birth aided by ASEV, and he readily talks fervently about this type of purposeful work to get new firms established.

Although Inge Johansen is glad to take part in making decisions in the contexts in which he is involved, he has no problems with being content with a position as an ordinary rank-and-file member. This is the case at the Free Church in Trondheim, for example, which he changed over to a few years ago. Before this time he was active, also in a church context, as the chairman for many years of the parish council in Heimdal.

The changeover to the Evangelical Lutheran Free Church was no big step, among other things, because his wife had grown up with it. "After long consideration I became convinced that the Church and State should separate; therefore, it was easy to take the consequences and change over to the followers of the free church. I wish the Norwegian Church all well, but it is the sheerly in-principle aspects of the national church arrangement which I do not find right. The Church must be free in its testimony towards the State," Johansen says, who himself does not believe in any speedy separation between the Church and State here at home.

In addition to deriving spiritual inspiration from his church, Inge Johansen likes to derive inspiration from nature, and first and foremost from the family's sanctuary in Kvikne. Fortunately, his area was not affected by the Orkla development; otherwise the electronic engineer could perhaps have come into conflict with himself. Although, we have no doubt that in this context too he would have managed splendidly to separate private interests from his professional involvement.

And it is precisely this solid professional involvement which has made Inge Johansen a new and important source of inspiration at his main job at NTNf. He entered the research field when it was in the middle of an extensive process of becoming independent, in which united research institutions were to be converted into independent establishments. This process is on the point of being completed, and he has his share of the credit for the fact that the slight uneasiness which characterized some institutes has now been turned into new optimism and push. It is with the same optimism that he tirelessly, day after day, is working for Norwegian business and management to get constantly better research programs in the field of science and technology.

8831

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POLITICAL

BELGIUM

MARTENS, GEENS, MONFILS, WATHELET ON REGIONAL ISSUES

Brussels LE SOIR in French 3 Jan 86 p 6

[Interview with Wilfried Martens, prime minister; Gaston Geens, president of the Flemish Executive; Philippe Monfils, president of the French Community Executive; and Melchior Wathelet, president of the Walloon Community, at the editorial offices of LE SOIR by Guy Duplat, Catherine Ferrant and Yvon Toussaint: "Martens, Geens, Monfils, Wathelet: the Quartet Who Will Dominate Belgium Practice Their Scales at LE SOIR"; date not given]

[Text] Meeting in the editorial offices of LE SOIR, these four "prime ministers" who belong to three different political formations, discussed the policies they intend to conduct within their respective spheres of power. It was an opportunity to discover through their statements, their intentions and their innuendos, the manner -- whether harmonious or not -- in which the complex structures of our national, community and regional institutions function.

1. Allegro or "the Land of Smiles"

Question: The fact that the same liberal-Christian majority exists in all the executives and in the national government evidently arouses hope... Does it promise what Mr Martens calls a "second chance" for our institutions?

Wilfried Martens: The results of the last elections and the seating of the same majority everywhere provides a new chance to reform our institutions. I have always been convinced that the beginning of regionalization in Belgium would be difficult. But I was very unhappy to see how the committee for dialogue among the executives had become a confrontation ground instead of being the place where agreements are developed. I hope and I am convinced that the fact that there is the same majority everywhere will not prevent the executives from demanding what they have a right to. But I hope that henceforth the shock of different majorities will not cloud the issues.

Question: The committee for dialogue regularly brings together the presidents of the executives and representatives of the central government. It is charged with settling conflicts of interest -- simply by consensus. Every time someone thinks that the other has trespassed on his preserve and has wronged him, he can have recourse to the committee for dialogue. But those meetings rapidly became lengthy monologues, unconnected and sterile.

Gaston Geens: I have known the committee for dialogue since its origin. It worked badly. For various reasons. Even when it developed an agreement in matters of tourism, I had to note that the national government -- Minister De Croo in this case -- did not respect it. The national ministers involved should also come to the committee meetings. As for Mr Dehousse, he sometimes came to the committee with subjects which it had nothing to do with, such as the problem of milk cows in Wallonia, which concerns Europe and not the committee for dialogue. We are willing to play the game of "federal loyalty," -- our agreement for the Flemish Executive explicitly states so -- but for that everyone must be loyal!

Philippe Monfils: For 4 years, the Walloon Region and the French Community were often at war with the national government, while an agreement could easily have been reached. And that because of the different majorities. I am thinking of the quarrel about arts education, which was widely talked about, while today we have no problem in admitting that it really is a matter of Community authority. But when different majorities oppose one another, everyone thinks he would demean himself if he were to give in one inch of his prerogatives. I will not accept having the authority of the Community gnawed at, but I think that the committee for dialogue should occupy itself solely with important things. Or else, for having endlessly cried wolf, they won't see the wolf when he appears...

Melchior Wathelet: The same majorities may be an opportunity, but I say it straight away: that does not mean that we will give up any part of our authority...

Geens and Monfils: Agreed! Agreed!

Wathelet: We must stop making conflict the objective and, on the contrary, take the resolution of conflict as the objective. And for that, I don't think that it is useful to go to the committee for dialogue all the time. The work being done there would be bad. Let us first try to solve the problems directly. I would like it if, in addition to the committee for dialogue, there were also another meeting place where the executives and the central government could tackle their relationships in a constructive manner this time.

Martens: The objective within the committee for dialogue actually was confrontation. But to function well, the federal system must include common actions. We should also use this committee to construct. That is also federal loyalty.

Monfils: While each one of us remains in his own sphere of authority, it is in all our interests to work together. I am thinking about home care, which it is beneficial to couple to action by the central government in matters of health care. I am thinking about the audiovisual field and local radio stations, for which we need decisions by the national government in matters of allocations of frequency and of advertising.

Martens (laughing): I have also become minister for the PTT [Posts, Telegraph and Telephone].

Wathelet: Federalism is not built by developing one's image at the expense of others! That is particularly important in this transition period. We sometimes have to say white to the regional council, in order to say black next to the national parliament. Let us avoid that. Besides, I wonder whether to solve certain conflicts the authority of the arbitration court should not be expanded.

2. Ma Non Troppo or "the Exportation of Conflicts"

Question: A large number of past and future difficulties among the Regions, the Communities and the central government are the result of the laws of August 1980 themselves, which have sometimes broken up intimately complementary authorities (Mr Monfils made reference to it in talking about home care and the audiovisual field), and which served to put precisely on the same footing, without any degree of subordination, decisions made by the national government and those made by the executives. Foreign relations provided a good example of the imbroglio this could produce.

The two Communities can negotiate cultural treaties with other countries, treaties which must however be signed by the king. The Regions can canvass for specific business (we have seen Walloon and Flemish missions succeed one another and oppose one another in Japan, in Quebec, and in the United States). Our national diplomats -- too often -- don't understand anything about it and sometimes refuse to play the game of regionalized Belgium.

Geens: The executives and the national government actually form independent columns working side by side without subordination. However, the national column remains the largest.

Martens: But you are slimmer!

Geens: It is true that you have more fat! As far as foreign relations are concerned, the state reform is not complete. It isn't normal that in community matters the executives are completely autonomous, except for the signing of treaties. And it is curious that we, in the Regions, have the authority to attract foreign investors, but that we are only associated with the national government's actions in this area. It is true that some ministers didn't play the game, but we are determined to work with Belgian diplomacy. There is no problem there.

Monfils: The law is the law, we repeat it. We have the right to negotiate the treaties and to be represented at UNESCO and the United Nations.

Geens: With their Regions and their Communities, the Belgian delegations are becoming impressive.

Monfils: It is true that some people laugh about them. But we consult one another and speak with one voice. The French speakers in any case want to be present at those different forums. As for our embassies, they sometimes welcome us badly. They treat us as "sub-ministers," as "false ministers." We are not at your disposal, they say. Some older diplomats seem not to have read the laws of 1980. It must be said that the postal system is sometimes slow.

Question: What are you going to do about Mr Outers in Paris?

Monfils: We will not take his salary away from him! But I was not directly involved in his nomination as ambassador.

Wathelet: We want to cooperate in the international area with the French community in order to be more effective. In everything I have done over the last 4 years in the Walloon Region, I have always found the cooperation I wanted among our diplomats. I did not appoint any ambassadors, but a few technological attaches such as in Japan. I think that it is necessary for young diplomats not to be content with a visit to the National Bank, but also pay a visit to our new institutions. But it is not in our interest to be competing abroad. We should not build our positive image on the negative of the other.

Question: Mr Martens, do you share Mr Tindemans' irritation with those parallel diplomacies?

Martens: One should not be surprised about difficult starts. The FRG experienced the same thing. And our texts are very progressive, in matters of cultural treaties for example. However, one should not create a diplomatic corps for the Regions and the Communities. The Regions and the Communities must be able to entrust tasks to our diplomatic corps. Our diplomats, our civil servants must play fair with the Regions and the Communities and respect their authority. The irritated reactions of some countries are sometimes due to their own situation. Japan and China, for example, have a hard time understanding that a country might present itself as not completely united.

3. Vivace or "To Each His Own Truth"

Question: As soon as you touch the direct interests of a region or a community you see the resurgence of antagonisms. For certain issues, Christian, liberal or socialist are only first names. The last name remains that of the community or the region.

How will you finance the Limburg mines once the national envelope has been exhausted?

Geens: That is the easiest problem... well, that is a jest. It is a serious problem. However, it is necessary that the French speakers know this: our coal mines are still financed by the national envelope, whereas they have already exhausted their rights of succession to repay the Cockerill-Sambre loans 15 years ago. We, however, will be able to borrow 37 billion francs.

Martens: The National Company of the national sectors could proceed with such a loan, but by using the succession rights in Flanders, until the year 2005!

When the enormous battle raged about Walloon steel and the five national sectors, I was conscious of the fact that there were also the coal mines. The problem was on both sides. I repeat, as I said then, that if people want to regionalize those national sectors, this can be done by ordinary royal decree approved by the regional Executives.

Question: Another apple of discord: Brussels. You, Mr Geens, have stated that it was a ripe apple ready to fall into the hands of Flanders?

Geens: Yes, that is right. A great many things have changed in the field, and in Brussels people are increasingly aware of the fact that they should have more than preferential ties with the Flemish. Flanders is in better health than the other regions, that is a fact, even though I regret it, because to maintain an economic and monetary unity implies that all regions have coherent economic policies. As for the Walloons, they have left Brussels. That has done them a great deal of harm. I was approached from everywhere to purchase the land and the deserted buildings.

Monfils: Our capital is Brussels. It is a battle for all French speakers and we are present there. I am surprised at Mr Geens' arrogance. It is that of an idol with feet of clay. Flanders Technology was a beautiful display window, but I have been told that it was in part an empty envelope. The Festival of Flanders is monolithic: in the face of that, the French speakers have nothing to blush about. We are determined to keep Brussels and to continue to subsidize the bodies established in the municipalities with language facilities and in Fourons.

Wathelet: We have decided to keep the Walloon Executive in Brussels. I am increasingly convinced that a transfer to Namur would not have been good for Wallonia. It was not at the moment when Brussels was becoming a multi-functional capital (national, European... and Flemish) that we should abandon it. And I stress that the Flemish have chosen Brussels as their capital even though it is not located on the territory of their region any more than it is located on the territory of Wallonia. Furthermore, within the framework of federal loyalty, Brussels must be a center of equilibrium. I don't agree when Mr Geens talks about a ripe fruit. I want Brussels to be the capital of everyone.

Martens: During the government negotiations I noticed for the first time that both French speaking and Flemish inhabitants of Brussels were asking for the same thing when the subject was town planning or regional development. Without input from both camps, there will never be a solution for Brussels. Because basically, in terms of political status, the solution found in the Egmont pact has failed. We have to try again. Things are beginning to ripen for finding a status for Brussels. The government will support the search for a solution, but parliament is where it will have to happen.

Question: Let us turn to the issue of government contracts. Does it bother you, Mr Geens, that the minister of national defence is a French speaker?

Geens: The national ministers must be national.

Question: Do you want regional distribution keys for government contracts?

Geens: Keys have been provided for the Ministry of National Defence. They must be implemented. But for contracts with the RTT [Telegraph and Telephone Administration], there is no key. The law must be respected on the public market places. And may the best win.

Wathelet: I don't agree with Mr Geens' principle which says that everything that is his is his, but that everything that is someone else's is negotiable. Whether it is a matter of government contracts or of other things, we have to end up with harmonious development for all the regions. All federalized countries do the same. As for the RTT issue, we believe that we can find a solution by enlarging the pie, by advocating technological advances for our country which would benefit all the regions.

Martens: I repeat that I have taken the PTT under my authority. Hence, I will concern myself with what has been called the "contract of the century." I believe that everybody is happy that I have become the arbitrator. But I won't make any earth shattering statements today. Telecommunications are too important... they are the highways of the future.

Question: Mr Monfils, you don't have the problems of the coal mines or government contracts to deal with, but rather those of the audiovisual field. What do you expect from the central government?

Monfils: We want to go very fast in matters of local television broadcasting, of pay television, of cable television, and for the RTBF [Belgian Radio Broadcasting and Television System (French Service)]. We want everything to be introduced before the council of the Community and voted on before Easter, to take advantage of the usual honeymoon period during the first months of a new administration. In terms of local radio stations, we have already made several important decisions. We are asking the government to put the bill on commercial advertising to a vote very quickly and to expand the range of frequencies available to local radio stations. We cannot go below 100 MHz today. We would also like to use the 88-100 MHz range in order to set up large regional radio stations with a power range of 30 kilometers. Our goal is to achieve peace on the waves and, in order to avoid war, the government will have to act very quickly.

Martens: I have become responsible not only for the "contract of the century," but also for the audiovisual field, as supervisory minister for the Secretariat of State for PTT! There are areas which interest me enormously. The audiovisual issue is our main priority, even when taking into account the special powers. As a matter of fact, I foresee a terrible battle in parliament, because our bill will drastically change the audiovisual scenery, as is going on in France.

4. Finale or "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall"

Question: In the understanding which exists between a couple, a great deal ultimately depends on the image each has of the other. If it is a negative one, the risks of divorce remain real.

Geens: Wallonia is dying of socialism. Those gentlemen, Wathelet and Monfils, have an historic opportunity to put an end to that process. In Wallonia, initiative has been killed. It was a question of "being red or no bread." The result of that: there are three times as many people in their city halls than in ours. And in Brussels it is even worse.

Wathelet: I don't have the same statistics.

Geens: If the differences between the economies become such that the financial transfers from one region to the other become unbearable, that will be the end of Belgium. We have already contributed to national solidarity via social security, for example, and via subsidies. Don't ask for anything more; that is all.

Monfils: Mr Geens' attitude is arrogant, I repeat. I myself, have neither fear of nor admiration for Flanders. Only great caution.

Wathelet: I will put all my efforts into further improving the image of Wallonia. And I won't do it through comparative advertising which consists of increasing one's standing by denigrating the other. I don't go along with Mr Geens talking about a two-speed Belgium or about an economic and monetary unity that is threatened, because that isn't true. I would also say that Mr Geens has put an end to solidarity rather quickly. The debate should be broadened, to look at what has been done over the last 10 to 15 years, at what will happen tomorrow.

I will have to talk about it to Flanders, because its inhabitants don't know us very well at all. I personally have a calm image of Flanders. It is neither hell nor Peru. They have other assets than we do and they use them differently, that is all. That is what regionalization is all about.

Martens: I have always been in favor of a sizable autonomy for the regions and the communities. I even said it at a time when it was hard to state such things. The autonomy of Flanders I advocated also meant the autonomy of Wallonia. The emancipation of the Flemish people also carries with it the emancipation of the Walloon people. However, I remain convinced that we can not only solve our problems but go beyond them without for all that returning to unitarism or thinking about provincial federalism. The happiness of some can never be allowed to mean the unhappiness of others. I was worried about today's exchange of views. I was aware of the risks it entailed. But at the end of this debate, the idea that a second chance is possible for our institutions seems even more well-founded to me!

8463

CSO: 3619/19

POLITICAL

DENMARK

POLL INDICATES ELECTION WOULD BRING LEFTIST MAJORITY

Big Gains for Greens

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 5 Jan 86 pp 1, 8

[Article by Ole Dall: "Gallup Poll Shows Red Majority and Green Representation in Folketing"]

[Text] The year's first Gallup poll is a grave warning to the four-party government and the party supporting it on economic policy, the Radical Liberal Party. Even without the aid of the seats for the Greenland and Faeroe Islands representatives, the Social Democrats, the Socialist People's Party [SF] and the Left-Socialist Party [VS] received a combined total of 90 seats--an absolute majority. In terms of percentages the socialist parties had the support of 50.2 percent of the respondents.

The Green Party appeared on the Gallup "score board" for the first time with a rating of 2.3 percent. That would mean four Green Folketing members and it is not known what type of government they would support. An election now would be a catastrophe for the Progressive Party which would be eliminated from Folketing. Last month's Gallup poll also put the party under the 2 percent cutoff limit.

The Conservative Party was the only one of the four government parties that registered a modest gain of a single seat. The Liberals declined almost a percentage point compared to the last survey, but the party's support is almost at the level it had in the 1984 election. The Christian People's Party is heading for the edge of the cliff with a rating of only 2.1 percent. And finally the Center-Democrats [CD] would lose three of their eight seats in an election at this time. But the CD people can console themselves with the thought that they have once more risen above the cutoff limit.

The Radical Liberals are still below their last election result. This time the Gallup poll indicates a loss of two seats for the party.

SF is the big winner on the left. SF would win six seats while the Social Democrats would get only two extra seats in Folketing.

The Gallup poll was conducted from 1 to 19 December. The government presented its "Christmas package" on 5 December and 3 days later the government parties and the Radical Liberals had negotiated an agreement.

Table 1. Distribution of Folketing Seats

<u>Party</u>	<u>Poll</u>	<u>1984 Election</u>
Social Democrats	58	56
Radical Liberals	8	10
Conservatives	43	42
Socialist People's Party	27	21
Green Party	5	0
Center-Democrats	5	8
Christian People's Party	4	5
Liberals	21	22
Left-Socialists	5	5
Progressives	0	6

Table 2. Political Index

Question: "Which party would you vote for if we had a Folketing election tomorrow?" Polling period: 1 to 19 December 1985. Answers in percentages.

<u>Party</u>	<u>10 Jan 1984</u>	<u>Aug 1985</u>	<u>Sep 1985</u>	<u>Oct 1985</u>	<u>Nov 1985</u>	<u>Dec 1985</u>
Social Democrats	31.6	31.4	33.0	30.9	33.4	32.5
Radical Liberals	5.5	4.6	4.1	4.8	4.6	4.2
Conservatives	23.4	23.7	26.2	25.2	24.8	24.0
Single-Tax Party	1.5	--	--	--	--	--
Socialist People's Party	11.5	13.4	11.9	13.2	13.8	15.1
Green Party	--	--	--	--	--	2.3
Humanist Party	--	--	--	--	--	--
International Socialist Workers' Party	0.1	--	--	--	--	--
Communist Party	0.7	--	--	--	--	--
Marxist-Leninist Party	0.0	--	--	--	--	--
Center-Democrats	4.6	4.3	4.3	3.4	--	2.7
Christian People's Party	2.7	3.2	2.4	2.7	2.4	2.1
Liberals	12.1	11.6	10.8	11.1	12.8	11.9
Left-Socialist Party	2.7	--	2.3	2.9	2.6	2.6
Progressives	3.6	2.7	2.3	2.6	--	--
Other parties*	--	5.1	2.7	3.2	5.6	2.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

*Parties with less than 2 percent of the votes.

Source: Gallup Institute and BERLINGSKE TIDENDE.

Liberals Add Folketing Seats

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 18 Jan 86 p 7

[Text] Greenland representative Otto Steenholdt, who used to be a member of the Social Democratic Folketing group, has now joined the Liberal group. This brings the Liberal group, which already included Faeroese representative Pauli Ellefsen, up to 24 members.

6578

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POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS RESIST PROPOSED JOB CLASSIFICATIONS

Bonn DIE WELT in German 6 Jan 86 p 5

[Article by Peter Phillips: "Professors Fear that 'Excessive Economy' and 'Arbitrariness' Will Drive Younger Generation Out of Universities"]

[Text] The quarrel between university professors and Federal Government is already outlined at the beginning of the new year: the bone of contention stems from the revision of the basic law on universities (HRG), more precisely from the resultant new regulation of "Federal Pay Plan C", which is to be debated and passed by the Bundestag in the coming weeks. Gerth Dorff, executive secretary of the Association of Universities, told DIE WELT: "All in all, this bill makes a mockery of the constant protestations by the federal and land governments that they wish to promote the younger scientific generation, meaning research and teaching."

From the beginning, one of the major concerns of the HRG revision had been the intention--also supported by the highest court decision--to change the personnel structure at universities: the "title of professor now applied as appropriate to the office," initiated by the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of June 1983 (Dorff) is part of it, but above all it is the elimination of university assistants and professors of pay scale C-2, who are again to be replaced by scientific assistants, senior assistants and senior engineers (each as temporary civil servants), and university lecturers (both as temporary and permanent civil servants) to be working at universities.

After some back and forth, all this was accepted in principle by the Association of Universities, representing the professors' interests, at the advisory level. The fight broke out only after the "working group of federal and land education advisors", after establishing the new job titles, had also worked out the corresponding pay scales. Dorff: "They (the civil servants) had only one goal, namely, to save."

Too Schematic?

In the opinion of the association, this "led to a solution which even falls short of the pay scale which the Laender had granted in their land pay scale H to their scientific assistants, senior assistants, senior engineers and college and university lecturers prior to the introduction

of federal pay scale C, i.e., before 1975." Furthermore, the so-called "position key," according to which the highest number of positions in the various pay groups are distributed among the Laender, is "schematic," "arbitrary", and leaves "no room for a policy of scientific considerations."

For one thing, the entire group of assistants is to be taken out of the C-pay scale created for universities and transferred to the A-pay scale established for career civil servants. Lecturers--as limited-time civil servants--are also to be shifted to the A-pay scale, while their lecturer colleagues with permanent status, although with the same qualifications and employed in the same capacity, are to be classified under the better paying C-pay scale. The president of the Association of Universities, Cologne international law expert Hartmut Schiedermaier, speaks in this context of "arbitrariness" and "contrary to the system" and states: "Acquiring tenure at an average age of 38 years, these civil servants (senior assistants, senior engineers) have qualifications which surpass by far the demands placed on mid-level career civil servants." Furthermore, they also have to prepare and give lectures on their own, so that it is "imperative" that they, like the university lecturers hired permanently, "are put in the C-2 pay scale."

At present, the university association still hopes for the understanding of those politically responsible. For this reason, Dorff stated to DIE WELT: "There is a big difference between a minister giving a public speech on promoting the younger scientific generation and the discussions and decisions made by high officials of the finance ministries on their pay scale." And Schiedermaier added: "Any university is only as good as its professors."

To Promote Competition

The inflexible position key should, therefore, be eliminated "without substitution" from the federal pay scale law, and "development of plans for positions at the universities should be given back to the Laender." "Only in this manner can competition among the Laender and the universities be promoted meaningfully." Furthermore, a "professorship at the C-3 pay scale level is not tempting for an outstanding scientist." In order to prevent his switching to industry or going abroad and keep him in university research, one must be able to react flexibly in the position plan, perhaps by creating a C-4 professorship. Schiedermaier: "Any position key in the university field carries the seal of arbitrariness."

9917
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POLITICAL

FINLAND

SORSA IN INTERVIEW RETRACTS PLEDGE TO STEP DOWN AS SDP CHIEF

Still Undecided About Parliament

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 21 Dec 85 p 13

[Report on interview with Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa by Anneli Sundberg:
"One Decision Has Taken Shape, Another Is Now Being Considered; Sorsa Is Now
Considering Leaving Parliament"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa will be available to serve as Social Democratic Party (SDP) chairman in the future as well.

On the other hand, he has not decided whether he will still run as a candidate in the next parliamentary elections. "The chairman of the SDP doesn't necessarily have to be in Parliament."

On Friday Sorsa thought that he might well stay on as a politician for the rest of his life. It is getting to be too late for a change of career.

In the gray of winter Helsinkians dash about Senaatintori during the Christmas rush unaware that a man who will evidently spend the rest of his life on the back seat of a black car is watching them a bit enviously from a corner window of the yellow Council of State building.

Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa has made a personal choice. A bunch of red roses on the prime minister's desk reminds us of this.

Sorsa will be available when the SDP elects a chairman in 1987.

The decision was announced in this morning's paper.

Sorsa described his mood as somewhat sad but thought that his sadness would disappear after taking a rest in his Christmas vacation cabin.

The Christmas of candidates to succeed him may be less calm since Sorsa is no longer specifying the duration of his leadership of the party.

"One has to learn something from one's mistakes."

He said that he has laid to rest the times for a change of career and that he is preparing himself to remain a lifelong politician, although not necessarily chairman of the SDP.

[Question] What other job could there be?

[Answer] Even in such a small country there are a few of them.

[Question] The presidency?

[Answer] We have a man who will continue to be president for yet a long time to come. I believe that it isn't wise for anyone to overly trouble himself about it. What will happen to them is what happens to those who overly trouble themselves about it.

[Question] Have you thought about getting ready to run against Paavo Vayrynen, for example, in the 1994 presidential elections?

[Answer] I say to you in all truth that I haven't troubled myself over it, nor will I trouble myself before -- when and if -- the situation begins to appear to be such that I have to seriously take a stand on it.

Nothing indicates that I should decide on my position quickly. Mauno Koivisto may be in office for a third term since nowhere is it ordained that he will be a two-term president.

"Nowhere," Sorsa was emphatic.

A Chat with Koivisto

[Question] Did you discuss the matter with the president before making your decision on the chairmanship?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] Did his opinion have any influence on you?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] Much?

[Answer] It naturally carried most weight in connection with opinions on individual matters.

Sorsa did not want to talk about the details of the discussion.

[Question] Do you keep in regular contact with the president through discussions?

[Answer] We regularly discuss matters once a week on Fridays and, in addition, occasionally, at least 6 to 10 times a month.

The news of Minister Kaarina Suonio's transfer to Tampere as assistant city manager reached him a couple of days before Sorsa officially announced that he would be available as chairman in the future too.

Suonio's departure means that a considerable number of Social Democratic votes will be released in the Helsinki election district. It has been claimed that these influenced Sorsa's decision. The number of his own votes has been declining.

Aside from being low-brow, these claims about Sorsa are also erroneous.

First, Sorsa feels that the people who make these claims' logic is elementary; there is absolutely no causal connection, even if things were to happen in succession.

Second, Sorsa pointed out that he should be in no rush [to decide] during the next elections either.

"The number of votes I command no longer moves through the clouds as it did when people were attracted by my newness, but it is not a low figure either."

Third, Sorsa pointed out that he had not yet made up his mind whether he would run as a candidate at all in the next parliamentary elections.

"The chairman does not necessarily have to be in Parliament. That matter too has to be considered separately."

[Question] Are you averse to a personal fight for votes?

[Answer] There are undesirable features in that. The long-ticket system would not impose as big a burden on relations between candidates as the present system does, nor would it persuade people to behave in a way in which they would not otherwise act, tripping others up and muzzling them.

Lasting Administration Must Be Supported

[Question] Would the post of prime minister appeal to you in the future too?

[Answer] Sure, this is a good job. You meet people in it.

It looks as though Sorsa's current administration will remain in office until the end of the election term. There has been little change of personnel. So far only one minister has left for another position.

In Sorsa's opinion, the advantages of low turnover are greater than the disadvantages.

"When an administration has a long term in which to function, it has the time to get its economic policy into such shape that results begin to show. Ministers have enough time to familiarize themselves with their duties and are able to master them and also control their officials. One's political will

is exercised better than in a short-term administration. The disadvantages are, of course, that a career minister can start looking at the job as a meal ticket, and the press has no variety."

Ministers Suonio and Ahti Pekkala will be leaving for other positions in the spring.

[Question] Will there be a bigger reshuffle in the administration?

[Answer] No.

Sorsa was of the opinion that no partner in the government has a desire for any major alterations, although the ministerial posts that are to become vacant are indeed tempting.

In his opinion, in neither of the two big government parties have they seriously tried to topple the government.

"I have full confidence in even the party secretaries."

There May Be Ministerial Material Among the Greens

Sorsa believes that the Center-Left government will continue to exist even after the next elections. He noted that it is not the only alternative, but the most likely, perhaps appropriately supplemented.

He mentioned the Rural Party and the Greens as possible additions. According to Sorsa, the Greens' chances really depend to a great extent on how it goes for them in the elections and on whether they become a party or not.

Allied with the Center Party, the Christian Leaguers too may, at least as individuals, be proposed as additional ministers, but Sorsa doubts whether they would be able to carry out a joint government platform with them.

"As I see it, the Christian Leaguers are Finland's most conservative party."

Even Kekkonen Met Them Halfway

Sorsa was hard on the Conservative Party.

"I regard an alternative whereby the Social Democrats and the Right would be part of a government coalition as neither lasting nor desirable."

Sorsa complained that the Conservative Party does not want to acknowledge that its majority is composed of city-dwelling Centrists. He supposes that the reason for this is that the party fears it will lose conservative votes.

"For as long as the Conservative Party wants to be a right-wing party, I wish them bon voyage!"

The way things look now, according to Sorsa, there will be no government deals after the elections. Nothing points to such a development.

"If the Conservatives want to form a government coalition with us, they will have to move loudly and clearly to the Center. Even Kekkonen met us halfway."

In Sorsa's opinion, a party the size of the SDP cannot resign itself to being in the opposition, even if the elections were to go badly.

"It's hard for the biggest party in any country and, since it furthermore happens to be the case that we are the president's party, that too produces its own pressures."

It has been predicted that the coming winter labor negotiations will be so difficult that the government too will be rocked. Sorsa nevertheless feels that the atmosphere has improved and that the willingness to conclude an extensive wage settlement has grown.

[Question] Do you intend to take a hand in the wage negotiations?

[Answer] I hope that it won't be necessary, but, if the need arises, I'll be ready, like a shoemaker is for war.

According to what Sorsa said, the government has nothing to give for 1986, but the distribution of funds for 1987 to stimulate recovery could already be discussed. It is futile to hope for an agreement shorter than 2 years, according to the government.

In Sorsa's opinion, there can be no question of marginal tax reform alone. He feels that it could be accomplished only as apart of a bigger tax reform.

Sorsa predicted that the fight would be intensified in the labor union movement because of the Communists' civil war.

"An unfortunate vicious cycle is developing in the Left, one which probably no one intentionally wants. Relations are worsening and clashes are becoming more frequent."

In Sorsa's opinion, once the Communists get their relations among themselves straightened out, there would be reason for them to sit down together and consider a bit what damages have been done.

Koivisto Seen Benefiting

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 21 Dec 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Sorsa's Promise Eases Koivisto's Position"]

[Text] Having almost reached the point of being ridiculous, the "will not stay on -- stay on" game Kalevi Sorsa has been playing with regard to his future as chairman of the SDP is fortunately finally over. While there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of Sorsa's original intention to resign, doing

so has long since shown itself to be politically most unlikely. This is why his public indecision and postponement from month to month of an announcement that he would stay on were rapidly developing into a shoddy political spectacle.

In moving from the overly long Kekkonen era to the Koivisto era, Prime Minister Sorsa is in part deservedly viewed as a mainstay of the consensus on domestic policy and even as a guarantor of it. Domestic policy has not produced any problems for the president either. For the first time it appears that the same government will remain in office for the entire election term.

Nevertheless, threatening clouds are building up on the horizon, clouds that may prove to be a serious challenge, especially to the government caretaker party, the SDP, and to the president who has risen from its ranks. Probably of most concern to them is the Communist Party's (SKP) definitive split and its effects on the balance of power in Parliament, collaboration with the Left, the labor union movement, the atmosphere of consensus and perhaps even the premises underlying foreign policy.

Support for the Left has been declining for a long time. The SKP split and the fact that the SKP will have to enter the 1987 parliamentary elections on two different tickets may halve the number of seats the Communists have in Parliament. Nor can a possible SDP victory compensate for such a loss either, one which will only strengthen the nonsocialist majority in Parliament.

The SKP will not get into Parliament nor will it become a coalition partner of the SDP during the next few years. The fight against the Stalinist minority is forcing the moderate leadership of the SKP to accentuate the line drawn between it and the Social Democrats. It also throws a cloud over its chances of cooperation in labor movement circles. It is precisely there that the Communists may try to rally forces and build the basis for a new ascent. The first sacrifice produced by this fight would appear to be the consensus that has existed up to now.

In the nonsocialist wing of Parliament Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen has succeeded in creating a four-party centrist alliance, bearing in mind the next elections, one which the Christian Leaguers have been pulled off the sidelines to join as an addition to the KEPU [Center Party], the Liberals and the RKP [Swedish People's Party]. If the election coalition is realized to the extent planned, the government caretaker party may clearly lose out in negotiating with the KEPU on a continuation of the Center-Left coalition.

Having a party leader's duties remain in the same hands for 15 years is hardly a purely good thing for any party whatsoever. Since Sorsa has from year to year simultaneously served as prime minister in a multiparty government, the SDP's ideological profile has of necessity been lowered. This is why more and more voices are beginning to be heard in the party in favor of moving into the opposition. This would mean a considerable overturning of Koivisto era political arrangements.

Now that Sorsa has confirmed the fact that he will continue in politics and stay on as head of the SDP after 1987 as well, above all the president has

heaved a sigh of relief. It does not pay to underestimate Sorsa's political influence, but talk of the SDP's making an effort to voluntarily enter the opposition can be forgotten.

Sorsa is known to be a firm supporter of a Center-Left coalition. Taking the SMP [Finnish Rural Party] into the government after the last elections, on the other hand, demonstrated that he may be prepared to look for a government coalition in surprising directions if need be. KEPU party secretary Seppo Kaariainen has already had occasion to express his concern over the SDP's gambling on a Conservative card.

Other Newspapers Comment

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 22 Dec 85 p 5

[Editorial roundup]

[Text] Sorsa Should Be Supported

In his column in SUOMEN SOSIALIDEMOKRAATTI columnist Aimo Kairamo (Social Democrat) gives instructions to the Social Democrats as to what they ought to do now that Kalevi Sorsa has consented to stay on as chairman of the SDP: "Since we upheld him, we should also support him."

"I don't mean anything like raising him onto a pedestal or bowing to his image. A great deal of that is generated by old organization habits and government practices without even trying," Kairamo writes.

"I don't mean that the chairman should refrain from criticism either. Both relevant and irrelevant criticism is the role of a political leader. Thanks are mostly carved on tombstones.

"What I mean most is that we ought to stop spreading the notion that this country's wage policy decisions and moderate economic policies are made for Sorsa personally and not for the nation at all. Too often explaining after the fact that it would have turned out better, but since Sorsa didn't..., is to no purpose for many other factors.

"If we don't need altars for religious services in a democratic worker party, we don't need either for one man to really be raised above the others, but on a cross, and for the rest to be hanging onto his toes to weigh him down."

Communists Are Surprised

The organ of the moderate Communist wing, KANSAN UUTISTEN VIIKKOLEHTI, cannot accept SDP chairman Kalevi Sorsa's appraisal of future relations between the Social Democrats and the Communists.

"Sorsa explains that the moderate Communists will now be increasingly attacking the SDP in the labor union movement for tactical reasons. This surprising

appraisal does not hold true. If the SDP's difficulties in the labor union movement have increased, the reason lies somewhere else than in the Communist or SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] policy lines.

"The source of the problems is probably primarily to be sought in the the SDP's own decisions relating to labor union policy, perhaps also in changes in labor union movement members' way of thinking."

Vayrynen Is Suspicious of the SDP

In Paavo's column in the party organ, SUOMENMAA, KEPU chairman Paavo Vayrynen reexamines his favorite subject, the affairs of the capital. Vayrynen reveals that he is suspicious of the coalition planned by the SDP and the Conservative Party.

"The discussion of capital district problems (in Parliament) has of necessity given rise to the suspicion that some Social Democrats are deliberately trying to put together a conservative-Left coalition instead of the present Center-Left coalition. Or how else can we explain the fact that many Social Democrats are fraternizing with Conservatives in opposition to the policy set by the capital district program approved by the government and in opposition to their own local policy lines?

"The Center Party has its own clearcut, principled position with regard to both capital district development and a government coalition. We are seeking permanent solutions to the special problems of the Helsinki district that are made on the basis of principled decisions and in cooperation with the SDP. In this way we are trying to see to it that the Center-Left coalition, which is important to Finland in terms of both foreign and domestic policy, may be preserved."

Vayrynen to the Municipal Council

Conservative Member of Parliament Eva-Riitta Siitonen writes in the nonsocialist UUSI SUOMI about discussions engaged in in the capital by KEPU chairman Paavo Vayrynen in the news media and in Parliament:

"Paavo Vayrynen's factual information shows that he is not familiar with Helsinki's problems. That is why his advisor's role appeared to be chiefly comical. There is reason to ask whether the KEPU should not look for a channel for itself to influence Helsinki affairs in the same ways as others do. It will have to gain the confidence of the residents of the district. Certainly participation in elections, up to and including the foreign minister, a faction on the municipal council and through it participation in the decision-making process. That is true local democracy -- counseling 'from outside' is merely a manifestation of interference in affairs even though there is no local political power and responsibility.

"The KEPU has indeed its potential role as a Finnish party in the cities too. But first it must be redeemed from the people as municipal council seats."

11,466
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POLITICAL

FINLAND

PAPER VIEWS IMPLICATIONS OF SORSA DECISION TO REMAIN

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 21 Dec 85 p 2

[Editorial by Jan-Magnus Jansson: "Thus Spake Sorsa"; first paragraph is HUFVUDSTADSBLADET introduction]

[Text] There may have been partly personal reasons for Kalevi Sorsa's hesitation about continuing as party chairman, but his decision is nonetheless a political decision that will have very important political results, writes Jan-Magnus Jansson. The editorial below analyzes the political consequences in various areas.

Kalevi Sorsa has finally said "yes" to continuing as party chairman, which is what most political soothsayers saw in the works right after the party council meeting in Polijarvi in November. His delayed answer and the endless suspense in which the party and the country waited for it could not fail to lend a somewhat prima donna atmosphere to the whole procedure. Despite that, there is no reason to doubt that personal hesitation on Sorsa's part as to how he should shape his existence was in fact the basic reason why he had difficulty in reaching a decision. Sorsa will be 60 years old in the same year that his coming 3-year term as party chairman expires. Many politicians have felt themselves to be worn out from politics at a considerably younger age.

It is impossible to determine the extent to which factors other than purely personal considerations played a part in Sorsa's decision. The lack of suitable retirement posts has been mentioned as a possible factor. It is also hard to believe that a politician as experienced as Sorsa would leave political factors out of account.

Whatever the facts may be, Sorsa's decision to stay on is in any case a political event with very important political effects. It is worthwhile to reflect on what the political effects of his decision are.

First of all, it postpones and partly conceals the struggle for leadership that is facing the party in any case. This has both its advantages and its disadvantages. One advantage is that the party can go into the 1987 election under tested and authoritative leadership. A disadvantage is that even though the struggle for leadership is going on in secret, it will be a long one.

Sorsa says in SUOMEN SOSIALIDEMOKRAATTI that the party stands united today. And that is true in comparison with certain periods in the past--not only the party split in the 1950's but also, for example, the years of fighting over the EC. But even so, obvious cracks are visible in the party today. This applies particularly to the leftwing, centered in Helsinki, which has clearly grown tired of the ideological watering down of consensus politics and, moreover, represents a certain regional opposition to red-green cooperation.

Sorsa created his present image as a statesman by leading a successful fight against inflation and presiding over several years of rising prosperity. In his statement to the party newspaper, he says that the word "consensus" has already served its time. And perhaps that is true, especially on the political level, where the government is working with a very narrow majority against a double opposition that is gradually growing more and more aggressive.

Despite that, there are probably still two reasons for talking at least about a lingering "miniconsensus." One is the fact that the government was formed across the dividing line between nonsocialists and the Left and that we in Finland have therefore not adopted what is known in Scandinavia as bloc politics. The other reason for talking about lingering consensus is to be found in the conciliatory agreements on the labor market.

As far as the makeup of the government is concerned, the announcement of Sorsa's willingness to stay on is no doubt significant. The knowledge that he was intending to resign has probably had a negative effect on the current government's stability. It is also possible that a new party chairman would have found it tempting to go into opposition, since that would make it easier to appeal to the voters. It is obvious that Sorsa might also change course, but it more likely that he will continue in the future to try to hold together a government coalition of the same basic hue that he has led successfully for such a long time.

It is hardly likely that any other Social Democrat will become prime minister as long as Sorsa is party chairman. On the other hand, it is not so certain that after the next election, he will be able to count automatically on being prime minister. The Center Party's impatience and Vayrynen's ambitions may lead to a competing candidate for prime minister. On the other side, it is uncertain whether a person of Sorsa's standing would be willing to accept another post in the government.

This leads to the question of the government's makeup. While the Center Party's party secretary, Seppo Kaariainen, has warmed to the idea of continued red-green cooperation, the talk of direct cooperation between the urban parties, the Social Democrats, and the Conservative Party has continued.

Sorsa says in SUOMEN SOSIALIDEMOKRAATTI that a form of cooperation between the Conservative Party and the Social Democrats is going to exist, if only because the two are "doomed to cooperate" in local politics. But, he says, cooperation between them in the government cannot exist. At least for the time being, there is no reason to doubt that Sorsa's words on that point will

hold true. Not only because he is fairly orthodox ideologically, but also because the Conservative Party may be too large a party to be a suitable companion for the Social Democrats in government. But Sorsa's lightning fast maneuver to bring the Finnish Rural Party into his government is a warning that he can produce surprises.

There is fairly wide agreement that the labor market is the place where the remains of consensus are now going to be tested. That is also where Sorsa personally has the most to gain or lose. The decision concerning the rules of the game is praised by Sorsa, who does not forget to add a flattering opinion of SAK [Finnish Confederation of Trade Unions] boss Viinanen. But considering the demands that have been made, particularly by the smaller union confederations, successful agreement in accordance with the government's anti-inflation goals seems fairly doubtful.

In his statement in the party organ, Sorsa attaches great importance to the party program of principles that is to be adopted at the next party congress. Sorsa's own interest in ideological questions is well known, and from the historical standpoint, the new program is an event: it will be the third program of principles since 1903 in Forssa. The rough drafts seen so far, with their somewhat vague attempts to combine traditional social democracy with green values, have not been very convincing.

In Sorsa's statement there are--very naturally, one can say--no references to the presidential issue. It is very probable that the division of labor between the two top figures in the party--Koivisto and Sorsa--will remain as before. Neither the presidential election in 1988 nor, especially, the election after that in 1994 can be completely ignored in Sorsa's planning for the future.

Sorsa also accompanied his agreement to continue as party chairman with the reservation that the matter must be reconsidered if "something previously totally unsuspected" should happen. Such a precautionary clause is completely natural, and among other things, it may conceivably have in view the presidential election and the results of the parliamentary election. But in the republic that has been headed by Kalevi Sorsa, the unsuspected has generally been conspicuous by its absence.

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POLITICAL

FINLAND

INEVITABILITY OF SDP-CENTER BASED COALITIONS QUESTIONED

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 29 Dec 85 p 2

[Editorial by Bjorn Mansson: "On a Foundation of Red Earth"; first paragraph is HUFVUDSTADSBLADET introduction]

[Text] "Red earth" cooperation between the Center and Social Democratic Parties has effectively taken root in Finnish political consciousness, notes Bjorn Mansson in view of the debate in recent weeks concerning the basis of government. Red earth is a problem only if it means the complete exclusion of alternatives, he writes.

The debate over the basis of government--an eternal question in our politics--has been activated just in time for the "20th anniversary" of the Conservative Party's time in opposition. One of the strongest indications of this came from Seppo Kaariainen, party secretary of the Center Party, who published a defense of and tribute to the so-called red earth basis--that is, cooperation in the government between the Social Democrats and the Center Party--in his party's favorite newspaper, SUOMENMAA, on 10 December (quoted the next day in HUFVUDSTADSBLADET).

At least part of the reason was the concern felt by the Center Party over a possible projection onto the national scene of the very widespread cooperation between the SDP and the Conservative Party on the local political level. Ilkko Suominen, boss of the National Coalition [Conservative] Party, had revealed that he had "held certain discussions" with Prime Minister Sorsa concerning agricultural and energy policies--both being typical of issues on which the Conservatives and the SDP are assumed to be very close to each other. There is naturally concern in the political middle at the prospect of being flattened by a Conservative-SDP coalition.

Kaariainen mentioned the nearly 50-year-old traditions of the red earth basis for government (it was founded in 1937 at the instigation of President Kallio) and drew attention to its impressive results: national unification, the welfare society, and foreign policy. President Kekkonen's lifework was not mentioned explicitly, but his spirit hovered over the line of reasoning presented. Kaariainen also warned against "playing the National Coalition Party card" and attempting to "get the upper hand" in cooperation.

He also propounded five theses in favor of continued cooperation--theses which undoubtedly well justify cooperation across the ideological boundary separating the Center Party and the SDP:

"Renovation" of the welfare society (through expanded democracy, among other things), joint responsibility in particular for full employment, regional policy, environment, and the defense of national culture against pressure from abroad.

Kaariainen's conclusion that the red earth basis for government should be retained includes, interestingly enough, the reservation that "there is even room for others in this framework." He concluded his discourse with a direct appeal on behalf of the "stable course" followed by the country so far and mentioned in particular the foreign policy and "social peace."

Kaariainen's appeal met with sympathy not only in his party's own ranks and the coalition itself but also in other quarters. Considering that the country's largest newspaper headlined its editorial comment "It Is Worthwhile To Defend Red Earth," one can say that on this particular point, an initiative by the Center Party has seldom been so well received. Particularly in the less developed regions, other voices in the press emphasized the importance of red earth in continuing that portion of Urho Kekkonen's lifework which might be called mutual understanding in the area of regional policy concerning what is best for sparsely populated regions.

Some shrill overtones have also appeared in the press debate. Among them one must include the comments by Kari Hokkanen, editor in chief of the Center Party newspaper ILKKA (quoted in HUFVUDSTADSBLADET on 24 December). In his plea on behalf of red earth, he used unnecessarily exaggerated arguments against the alternatives: a government made up of the National Coalition Party, the Center Party, and the SDP was rejected on the grounds of the civil war in 1918! Red earth can no doubt defend itself without recourse to such arguments from history.

It is obvious that opinion within the Center Party is unequivocally in favor of continued red earth cooperation. For his part, party leader Paavo Vayrynen has repeatedly expressed his strong support for red earth--most recently on the grounds that the controversial problems in the region of the capital should be solved on that political basis.

Prime Minister Sorsa, speaking for the Social Democrats, has also strongly stressed the value of the red earth basis for government--most recently in interviews concerned with his decision to stay on as boss of the SDP. Sorsa's imminent reelection as party leader in 1987 has also been seen as an indication of the SDP's continued policy of cooperation with the Center Party.

Also part of the debate is the fact that National Coalition Party leader Ilkka Suominen has started expressing more skepticism concerning the ability of a purely nonsocialist government to hold its own. The Right therefore now seems inclined to give priority to broad-based cooperation at least with the Social Democrats rather than cooperation in a nonsocialist government. To the extent

that the Center Party is also included in the Right's plans, one could speak of an "expanded red earth basis" with a blue (or, as the slanderers say, a black) component.

Just before Christmas, the rightwing newspaper UUSI SUOMI made a contribution to the debate in the form of a public opinion poll. As is known, Gallup results should always be interpreted with caution, but the trend was now so unambiguous that it could not be brushed aside:

Of those interviewed, 56 percent expressed definite support for the current red earth basis for government. Concerning the 36 percent who did not consider that the best basis for government, it should be remembered that their opinion is not entirely uniform, but split among several alternatives. The fact that the red earth basis has "the people's support" is not surprising in itself, since a clear majority of voters support the parties making up that basis. It is noteworthy, on the other hand, that red earth also meets with sympathy from 40 percent of those who vote for the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] and from one out of four supporters of the National Coalition Party!

A full 69 percent answered yes when asked specifically if they would support the current basis for government even after the next election, provided that "the balance of power among the parties did not change substantially" (which, if we may say so, seems very likely). It is noteworthy that here again, a majority of both the National Coalition Party's voters (52 percent) and the SKDL's supporters (57 percent) hold that view. Only one out of three members of the Conservative Party prefers a purely nonsocialist government, just as only one out of three SKDL supporters prefers a purely leftist government. So the current basis is strongly supported even within the opposition!

Equally interesting is the fact that only 11 percent of the Center Party's supporters want a purely nonsocialist government, and 6 percent of the SDP's want a purely leftist government.

The picture is rounded out, however, by the answers to the question as to "how the current basis for government could be improved." No fewer than 49 percent of those polled want the Conservative Party included. It is not surprising that that view is held by 80 percent of the Conservative Party's own supporters and 56 percent of the Center Party's supporters, but it is noteworthy that it is shared by a full 42 percent of the SDP's sympathizers. Compare that with the fact that only half as many SDP supporters want the People's Democrats included! In the Center Party, incidentally, interest in having the SKDL as a partner in government is negligible at 6 percent.

The results of that poll are therefore extremely favorable to the red earth basis for government, but with the proviso that that basis should be rounded out by adding the Conservative Party. The idea of cooperation across what would be called the bloc boundary in the other Nordic countries has therefore taken firm hold in the political thinking of the Finns. From a Nordic standpoint, that alone is unique. President Kekkonen's central idea concerning broad mutual understanding has left clear traces.

The red earth basis is a problem for Finland only if it signifies a complete lack of alternatives. In a sense, and contrary to what Sorsa and others have claimed, a functioning alternative for government would be an advantage in itself--with a view to the workability of Parliament.

So even though, from a longer perspective, our governments should preferably be based on cooperation across the boundary between nonsocialists and the Left, there ought to be a readiness to try out other alternatives if necessary. If an "excessively broad" government based on the Right, the middle, and the SDP must be regarded then as quite unrealistic, the only remaining alternative for a majority will be a purely nonsocialist government.

The reason is that a "blue-red" coalition between the National Coalition Party and the Social Democrats would be a disaster for the country. It would mean cooperation between "the great and the beautiful"--in the economic, social, and regional sense--and social peace would not be served thereby.

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POLITICAL

FINLAND

RIVAL COMMUNIST WINGS' NEWSPAPERS EXCHANGE CHARGES

'Moderates' Defend Card Exchange

Helsinki KANSAN UUTiset in Finnish 17 Dec 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Exchange of Membership Cards"]

[Text] With the exchange of membership cards, decided by the Central Committee of the SKP [Finnish Communist Party], an attempt will be made to ensure an opportunity for all party members to function within the framework of the party's normal structures and in the basic organizations belonging to the party.

This decision is a logical continuation to the preceding decisions. They dealt a blow to organized factional activity within the framework of the party. However, this was not directed against members of organizations belonging to the TIEDONANTAJA faction except for those who consider the building of a parallel organization as the only task.

Members will be faced with a choice in connection with the exchange: One cannot be a member of the SKP and at the same time build an organization for another party. This is what is now being done by the members of the so-called shadow central committee under the beautiful guise of unity.

It is hoped that the members will decide in favor of the Finnish Communist Party while appreciating its great historical tradition, its past and present struggle on behalf of the interests, rights, and democracy of the working people and on behalf of a policy of friendship between Finland and the USSR.

At the same time the Central Committee directed the attention of party organizations to the recruiting of new members and by this means the securing of a better tomorrow.

Stalinist Organ Attacks 'Liquidations'

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 17 Dec 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Liquidators"]

[Text] A decision was made in the SKP Central Committee last Sunday to exchange membership cards next spring. The reasons for making this decision

were not kept a secret: the Aalto faction, which has taken over the party leadership, wants to change the party's membership before the next parliamentary elections. The purpose is to suspend more than half of all the members from the SKP by an exchange of membership cards. Thus in the parliamentary elections the lists of the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] would include only those candidates who without protest support the forceful right-wing trend in the policies of the SKP and the whole People's Democratic movement and who permit the collapse of the influence and authority of the Communist and People's Democratic movement in this country.

The exchange of membership cards in the form outlined by the party leadership is in all its significance only a part of the many actions in a series which has only one goal: to liquidate the SKP as a communist party in Finland.

The fierceness of the measure is certainly startling even far beyond the limits of the SKP. It is not necessary to be a communist to comprehend that in the liquidation of the Communist Party it is a question of something which has long since ceased to be a so-called internal matter of the SKP.

Recently, this has been reflected in the stands taken by the Center Party and the Social Democratic Party, among others. These parties have expressed ever increasing concern about the SKP's situation. In these parties they have adopted an increasingly amazed attitude toward what exactly is the ultimate purpose of Aalto and his closest colleagues in the destruction of the SKP and where are the actual background forces for such action since no other support for it can be found from within the country except from the extreme right wing?

In fact, the fierceness of the actions of Aalto's faction speaks to this very fear of becoming isolated and its dire urgency. But this faction in a manner of speaking is caught in the impasse of its own actions: each disruptive act opens up new eyes to see the national and international consequences of the liquidation of the Communist Party, it cultivates counter-forces against division, and forces Aalto, for his part, to take new and even more dramatic and thus eye-opening actions.

Aalto's faction has no right or justification in accordance with the regulations to expel anyone. The allegation that the committee of SKP organizations is a kind of parallel organ opposed to the party is a lie. The committee's only purpose is to assemble the party's organizations and member for a struggle on behalf of the SKP's principles, chief party line, internationalism, and unity. And now it is these very circumstances which are being threatened, whether one looks at the actions of Aalto's faction or its statements on a new program draft debate.

Arvo Aalto's term has taken hundreds of thousands of voters, connections, authority, and internal unity away from the SKP. Now more than half of its membership, its main policy line, international relations, and national allies are being taken away. Finnish Communists and many other people are convinced that Finland needs the SKP. But who in the end will need this faction taken over by the deception of the SKP's leadership?

'Aalto Group' Attacked

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 17 Dec 85 p 3

[Column by Erkki Susi, Editor]

[Text] A delegation of district secretaries from the SKP's regular district organizations is finally visiting the Soviet Union. In spite of arguments to the contrary from Arvo Aalto's faction and KANSAN UUTISET, the delegation also includes district secretaries from the eight illegally suspended districts.

Some of these district secretaries have already been subjected to threefold penalties. Aalto's faction has suspended their district secretarial powers, expelled their districts, and now is threatening to suspend them for belonging to the committee of SKP organizations.

This serves as an example of the kind of inflation the disruptive actions of Aalto's faction have experienced, how negligible the faction's authority as a party leader is, and how completely the legality and validity of the faction's divisive actions are being disputed at the international level.

The situation is the same with respect to the national level and within the SKP itself. No discriminating political quarter can accept Aalto's faction as the normal party leadership. A real movement of disobedience against Aalto's faction has become stronger in the SKP.

Aalto's faction is an anti-party faction, which has illegally usurped power and is aiming at the liquidation of the SKP as a Marxist-Leninist party basing its actions on proletarian internationalism. Since the faction does not have the support of the majority of the party's membership, it has chosen the division of the party as the means of achieving its goal. This kind of action is detrimental to the working class and the national interests of our country.

The party's rank and file understands this ever more clearly. Therefore, it does not recognize the position of party leadership assumed by Aalto's faction -- does not even call it the party leadership -- nor does it recognize its suspensions and other divisive actions as legal or binding in accordance with the regulations.

Threatening demands and suspensions have come in a steady stream. But instead of recognizing the validity of the actions taken by Aalto's faction, the party organizations and members have disregarded them and have joined forces to support the SKP.

In order to facilitate disruption, Aalto's faction has labelled the unification actions of the rank and file and the establishment of a committee of SKP organizations as actions opposed to the SKP and separate from the SKP. This has been answered by an ever stronger adherence to the SKP's ideological, political, and organizational principles, regulations, and collective decisions.

"We are an inseparable part of the SKP regardless of the illegal actions which are being directed against us from whatever direction and which Aalto's faction is foisting upon the party organs it controls," declare the SKP's supporters. It is a declaration by which the representation and leadership power of Aalto's faction is disputed.

Here and there the party rank and file, whom it was imagined would turn the other cheek or submit to being thrown out, is instead raising the demand to expel the bankrupt leadership.

Naturally, disputing the validity of suspensions does not mean that the suspensions do not have any significance. Indeed, Aalto's faction can by use of force put formal suspensions into effect and exclude organizations and members from their own apparatus and benefits.

The effect of suspensions threatens to be felt more tangibly and become worse in the near future as preparations are made for the parliamentary elections.

For this reason, actions opposing dissolution must still be significantly strengthened. We must make certain that if Aalto's faction brings about a dissolution in spite of everything, it will suffer the heaviest defeats, will be disclosed and be isolated, and will remain the faction of one general and a few lieutenants without any troops.

Sinisalo Hits Card Exchange

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 20 Dec 85 p 6

[Commentary by Taisto Sinisalo]

[Text] "Aalto has deviated from the party's main line."

"The historical struggle for the SKP's line continues."

"The struggle must be waged on two fronts."

The exchange of membership cards now has the undisguised nature and purpose of breaking up the SKP, states Taisto Sinisalo, a member of the chairmanship of the committee of SKP organizations.

For example, the leadership of the SKP's Lapland District has already issued instructions according to which "a card will not be issued to members of the TIEDONANTAJA faction". General Secretary Vainionpaa, for his part, has also made reference to accomplishing the dissolution of the SKDL's election alliances by denying the right of membership for some members through the exchange of membership cards.

The exchange of membership cards is traditional in the Communist Party. However, the action now being taken in the name of the Central Committee is completely contrary to the regulations -- as are many of the actions of Aalto's faction, notes Taisto Sinisalo.

"According to the regulations, a party section accepts and suspends members. The law of association is also based on this. Now an attempt is being made to transfer this right to Aalto's faction, which is using the name of the Central Committee. Since the membership does not approve of Aalto's leadership, this leadership is now attempting to deprive it of its right of membership.

"In spite of the actions taken in the name of the Central Committee, each member accepted by a party section will retain his membership, whether or not he is issued a new membership card. General Secretary Vainio's threat of the loss of party membership if a member stays in a primary organization for which Aalto's faction will not issue membership cards is unjustified and invalid as an act contrary to the regulations.

"Also the right to participate, for example, in the nomination of candidates to the parliamentary elections and in a membership vote in accordance with the election law does not give any party leadership any grounds for limiting this right by refusing to issue membership cards to some of the party's primary organizations. Such an attempt will divide the party's primary organizations into two unequal castes, will leave approximately half of the primary organizations devoid of rights, and will be an unprecedented gross attempt to destroy all party democracy in the political life of our country."

Majority Out of The Sections

Those forces which Aalto has already declared to be "crushed" when the eight district organizations were suspended have grown larger and stronger. Aalto's faction is hastening to exchange membership cards for the very reason that it does not represent the real will of the membership.

"Party division has been answered by an intensified joint struggle of the membership," says Sinisalo. A good indication of this is the intensification of activities in the SKP district organizations which publish our newspaper and the work of the unification committees that has been enthusiastically initiated in nine districts. The committee of SKP organizations elected together with them now includes more than half of the party's primary organizations within its districts. This is indicative of the fact that the demands raised by the changed situation to prevent the dissolution of the party and to assemble forces on behalf of Marxism-Leninism are becoming ever more visible.

2,700 New Subscribers

According to Sinisalo, another encouraging indication of the strengthening of party oriented forces is the success of TIEDONANTAJA and its monthly supplement.

"Our newspaper has never before achieved the kind of results it has now achieved this fall. The number of subscribers to TIEDONANTAJA has increased this year already by 2,700 new subscribers. It has been said with justification that interest in TIEDONANTAJA is now greater than what can be accomplished by the former method of conducting circulation work. Of exceptional significance is the expanding circulation of the paper at job sites, which in the spring

also included the regular distribution of timely TIEDONANTAJA fliers. Also the sales of the newspaper in kiosks is increasing," says Sinisalo.

The fighting spirit of the October meeting in Lahti has continued and is becoming stronger. At the same time the chairman of the committee of SKP organizations emphasizes the politicization of the actions of the unification forces, especially the trend of the party sections toward mass actions.

"The preparations for next spring's struggle to increase real wages, to shorten the work week to 35 hours, to repeal the statute on fines for striking, and to prevent unemployment require from us more extensive and closer ties with old as well as new occupations. The recent meeting of the council of the SAK [Finnish Confederation of Trade Unions] demonstrated that Aalto's faction is once again accommodating the right-wing trend.

"The boycott against race discrimination in South Africa also demonstrates that the advancement of the peace movement is decisively dependent on the intensified role of the working class," states Sinisalo, a member of the executive committee of the Peace Defenders, in making reference to the importance of the annual meeting of the Vocational Peace Committee. "Preparations for the parliamentary elections are not just actions against discrimination and the dissolution of the SKDL's election alliances. What is needed is a broad coalition of progressive forces that are free of consensus and extend beyond the traditional framework of the SKDL."

The third Lenin Seminar held on Independence Day in Tampere continued the development work of the SKP's policy line, which was interrupted by the arbitrary decisions of the 20th Congress.

"The premises and guidelines for the preparation of a new party program set forth by the 20th Congress have, on the other hand, been pushed aside in the program proposals made by Aalto's faction."

Chairman Aalto's speech on the party program neglects the party's Marxist-Leninist nature and ideological foundation, the main line against big capital and the right wing, the struggle against right-wing trends and reformism, criticism of a consensus and government policy, and an analysis of the experiences of mass movements as well as characterizations of the ideological and political foundations of proletarian internationalism.

Division Is A Means of Liquidating Party

Division is a means which is ever more clearly aimed at liquidating the SKP as a communist party. It is for this very reason that persecution and indoctrination have been directed against those who adhere to the SKP's policy of class struggle, the ideals of Marxism-Leninism, and solidarity with the socialist world as well as cooperation with the CPSU and other fraternal parties. The transfer of the party's membership rolls to the supervision of the state and the banks along with a new method of collecting membership dues represents the modern method of liquidation.

The dissolution of the SKP is detrimental from a national as well as international point of view. It has already encouraged capitalist and right-wing circles. Aalto's faction has not actually received support from anywhere else except right-wing circles.

The interest and support expressed on the part of several fraternal parties toward the work of the committee of SKP organizations is an indication of the known concern in the international communist movement as the result of the situation in the SKP.

"The meeting of representatives of the CPSU Central Committee and the committee of SKP organizations was an important event, which greatly advances the intensification of work against the dissolution of the SKP," states Sinisalo in summarizing the trip made together with Jouko Kajanoja and Erkki Suti.

A Letter to Every Member

In supporting the members of the committee of SKP organizations the SKP's members and organizations support their statutory right to cooperate in actions against the dissolution and destruction of the party.

"In this lies the basis of a broad and warm solidarity," notes Sinisalo. By taking the "Letter to Comrades", written by the committee of SKP organizations, to each and every member, even to those who have not been of the same opinion with us, this solidarity movement in the SKP can still be expanded.

In addition to belittling members, the labelling of this coalition of SKP members, Communists, as a "hollow unity" or as a corruption of communist organization and an "alliance policy" also results in an isolation from other party comrades and from party oriented tasks. This is not a forward acceleration, but in practice only hinders real progress and weakens the struggle against the dissolution of the SKP.

"The SKP's members have behind them a difficult and demanding year. In summarizing the experiences of the past year, the point that becomes emphasized is that the struggle for the SKP's traditions, main party line, and unity will not end regardless of whatever the phases of events are at the beginning of the new year. This is an inseparable part of the conviction and actions of Finnish Communists.

The historical struggle on behalf of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, the SKP's line, name, and banner continues. We are waging this struggle aware of the fact that the great majority of the party's members and friends is opposed to the dissolution and liquidation of the SKP.

"A tightening of the ranks of party oriented forces is needed in this endeavor. Now is not the time for furtive glances to the right or the left. On the contrary, the situation has placed before Communists the inevitability of a struggle on two fronts, as we have confirmed in assessments by representatives of the SKP's organizations which publish TIEDONANTAJA. Only then can we overcome attempts to divide our ranks now when all developments should be directed at efforts to assemble forces.

"The initiative and experience of the party's members and primary organizations represent a firm guarantee of the fact that in the important and demanding trials of the coming year we will find common and correct solutions which will open up prospects for revitalizing our country's communist and whole progressive movement.

'Only Communist Newspaper'

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 30 Dec 85 p 6

[Column by Erkki Susi, Editor]

[Text] The argument according to which TIEDONANTAJA is the only progressive workers' newspaper in our country is not just empty boasting.

The expansion of the weekend issue, the reform of the editorial technique, the establishment of a monthly supplement, the increase in the number of subscribers by 2,700 during the fall, and the imminent move to better facilities attest to the advancement of TIEDONANTAJA.

The fact that there were more New Year's greetings than there have been for a long time also attests to its advancement.

There are many factors in the background of the paper's progress. TIEDONANTAJA has become more well known. Interest in it has increased. Its writings on peace, real socialism, Finnish foreign policy, the timely struggles of workers, and questions relating to the SKP have been observed to be correct or at least interesting.

However, one factor must not be forgotten. The knowledgeable contribution of the newspaper's friends and the party organizations which publish TIEDONANTAJA. For communists a newspaper does not represent an activity that is separate from other activities, but an important tool for all activities. If you want to improve your actions and promote your goals more effectively, strengthen the communist newspaper. This is the link.

Of course, it is no secret that the recent growth in support for TIEDONANTAJA is, to a great degree, the result of the situation in the SKP. As the only communist daily paper, TIEDONANTAJA's task has been to defend a united Marxist-Leninist SKP, reveal the disrupters, and assemble communists to work against dissolution.

Many of the party's members and friends who have previously kept their distance from the paper have come to observe TIEDONANTAJA's significance in this work. The logic of the struggle has broken down many doubts and prejudices. And it has educated not only these comrades, but TIEDONANTAJA also.

TIEDONANTAJA has, indeed, become a newspaper representing the majority of communists.

The nerve wracking nature and complexity of the struggle over the SKP has, on the other hand, caused difficulties for TIEDONANTAJA. TIEDONANTAJA has

observed the joint and unanimous policy line of its publishing organizations and has adapted its writings to this policy line. This has been criticized to some degree. As a public forum TIEDONANTAJA also has not related all the aspects and arguments of the line, tactics, and plans of the forces on the side of the SKP.

The demand for "more light to the membership" is, of course, correct, and it must be met in the party organizations as well as in the press. But the demand that it must be able to combine the "illegal" and the "legal" and not disclose to its opponents what need not be disclosed is also correct.

What is the future of TIEDONANTAJA? An iron rule holds true in the making of a newspaper: one must not stop! One must not be satisfied with what has already been achieved, but one must continue to move forward in the development of the paper's content as well as in strengthening its position.

The results to date indicate that opportunities do exist. I believe that as far as opportunities are concerned, TIEDONANTAJA is only just beginning to surpass its previous limits.

There are still thousands of Communists and People's Democrats who have never in their life seen TIEDONANTAJA, and if it were to up to Aalto's staff, they will never see it. The more wretched, more right-wing, and more nationalistic the newspapers under the supervision of Aalto's faction become, the more these people will need a communist paper.

Among the broad masses of workers TIEDONANTAJA also does not have any fateful limits which it cannot overcome. The trump cards of a communist paper are its scientific nature, truthfulness, and tenacity. TIEDONANTAJA can and should be made known as the only internationalist and real workers' paper which is free of consensus, involved in the life and struggle of the people, and is developed together with them.

Whether it is a case of daydreaming or not, the goal is to improve TIEDONANTAJA both qualitatively as well as quantitatively so that it will become the number one workers' paper in this country.

On behalf of myself and the whole TIEDONANTAJA staff I thank all our readers and friends for the past year and wish you a Happy New Year.

10576

CSO: 3617/54

POLITICAL

FRANCE

MITTERRAND, FABIUS CONTINUE LOSS IN SOFRES POLL

Paris LE FIGARO MAGAZINE in French 4 Jan 86 pp 68-70

[Article by Charles Rebois]

[Text] French people do not like baloney, especially when it is electoral. The government is dishing it out copiously. To listen to the authorities, all economic indicators project upswings. The government is spreading its bounty on credit. All the official and unofficial media are lauding its favors. Yet, in fact, nothing is happening and the French people are not grateful to their government.

Francois Mitterrand, the ultimate authority, is marking time. The number of individuals who distrust him has even risen by 2 points. The head of state is paying for the error that he committed by receiving Gen Jaruzelski.

He cannot simultaneously pose as the defender of human rights and assume the spotlight at the side of the Polish people's oppressor. The televised programs where Francois Mitterrand has tried to exculpate himself have not been convincing.

The revival in public confidence in the president begun in October 1985 has stopped dead in its tracks. This augurs badly for the socialists who, 2 and 1/2 months before the legislative elections, are placing all their hopes in the promises of the French president.

But it is even more costly for Laurent Fabius to have publicized his problems. The prime minister has taken a nosedive, dropping 8 points in December and 3 points in January. Only 38 percent of the respondents polled still expressed confidence in his ability to solve the problems facing France whereas his support quotient had stood at 59 percent 8 months ago (indicating a drop of 21 percent). By all evidence, the young prime minister that Francois Mitterrand has given France and for whom he still vouches appears to be very fragile today.

By playing Pontius Pilate in the Greenpeace affair, Fabius alienated a large section of French public opinion. He aggravated his case even farther by breaking ranks with President Mitterrand in the Jaruzelski affair.

And it should not be forgotten that in the meantime he had cut a pitiful figure in his face-to-face debate with Jacques Chirac. These are as many signs of discredit of a shameful Socialist who bedecks himself with the virtues of liberalism in order to survive.

Another leader in trouble who made a similarly equivocal move is Michel Rocard (down 2 points). He has tried to wash away the sins of socialism by engaging in confessions to the foreign press. The Left (down 10 points among the communists and down 7 points among the Socialists) has indicated to him that there are limits beyond which he should not go.

There are also blemished reputations: Charles Hernu (down 7 points) has learned this the hard way. The role of scapegoat does not sit well on one dreaming of the French presidency.

While they do not serve the cause of the government, the Socialist antics have enabled Georges Marchais (up 2 points) to patiently regain his health. This is so true that without winning anything on its right the French Socialist Party is beginning to yield ground on its left. The most recent cantonal elections already indicated such an evolution.

As for the opposition, several of its representatives have benefited from their recent appearance on television, the small screen being the prime instrument of political promotion. Raymond Barre, the star of a recent "Hour of Truth" program, and Jacques Chaban-Delmas, a skillful performer on the "Questions of Home" program, have improved their popularity quotient by 4 points. But these gains are often ephemeral.

The fact remains that Raymond Barre is securing for himself an increasingly dominant position in the UDF while Jacques Chaban-Delmas has seen his following increase gradually among the Socialists as the latter have sought to exercise damage control.

But in the opposite direction, the public opinion poll also indicates the return of pessimism among the French people. There are two reasons for this: The recent social strife, especially that which underlay the paralysis of the capital, and the increasingly numerous acts of violence.

Compared to December, the social climate has deteriorated and the struggle against criminality has become a priority concern.

Another subject of concern to the government is that the official indicators reflecting a drop in the number of unemployed workers have not been credible at all. The government's fight against joblessness continues to be viewed as ineffective.

Mitterrand: 53 percent no longer have confidence in him

Question: Do you have complete confidence, some confidence, little confidence, or no confidence at all in Francois Mitterrand's ability to solve the problems facing France right now?

	January 1986	Compared to Dec 1985
● Complete confidence.....	9 } 43	+ 2 } -
● Some confidence.....	34 }	- 2 }
● Little confidence.....	28 } 53	+ 1 } + 2
● No confidence at all.....	25 }	+ 1 }
● No opinion.....	4	- 2
	100 %	100 %

Fabius: 55 percent no longer have confidence in him

Question: Do you have complete confidence, some confidence, little confidence, or no confidence at all in Laurent Fabius' ability to solve the problems facing France right now?

	January 1986	Compared to Dec 1985
● Complete confidence.....	7 } 38	- } - 3
● Some confidence.....	31 }	- 3 }
● Little confidence.....	26 } 55	+ 2 } + 5
● No confidence at all.....	29 }	+ 3 }
● No opinion.....	7	- 2
	100 %	100 %

Technical Information about the SOFRES [French Opinion Polling Company] Poll

1. Public opinion poll taken for FIGARO-MAGAZINE.
2. Date of poll-taking: Between 19 and 23 December 1985.
3. National sample of 1,000 individuals representative of the overall population 18 years of age and above.
4. Method of selecting the respondent group (by sex, age, occupation of the head of household) and stratification by regions and categories of population centers.

Political personalities of the majority party

Question: For each of the following political personalities, would you tell me if you wish to see him play an important role during the months and years to come?

	January 1986	Compared to Dec 1985
Michel Rocard	57	- 2
Jacques Delors	41	- 1
Laurent Fabius	36	- 2
Jean-Pierre Chevènement	34	+ 1
Charles Hernu	28	- 7
Lionel Jospin	28	- 2
Pierre Mauroy	24	-
Pierre Bérégovoy	23	+ 1
Georges Marchais	12	+ 2

Political personalities of the opposition

Question: For each of the following political personalities, would you tell me if you wish to see him play an important role during the months and years to come?

	January 1986	Compared to Dec 1985
Raymond Barre	48	+ 4
Simone Veil	45	- 2
Jacques Chirac	37	- 3
François Léotard	35	- 3
J. Chaban- Delmas	33	+ 4
V. Giscard d'Estaing	28	- 2
Jacques Toubon	23	- 3
René Monory	16	+ 2
Jean-Marie Le Pen	12	- 3

Rating of political parties

	P.C.	P.S.	M.R.G.	U.D.F.	R.P.R.	Fr. Nat.
High opinion	15	45	23	40	43	11
Low opinion	71	43	44	42	42	75

Unemployment and Price Increases

Priority issue: Still unemployment

Question: Among the following issues, which is the one which in your opinion should receive the government's priority attention now?

	January 1986	Compared to Dec 1985
● Fight against price hikes.....	8	- 1
● Fight against unemployment.....	65	- 3
● Fight against violence and criminality	20	+ 5
● Maintenance of social peace.....	6	- 1
● No opinion.....	1	-
	100 %	100 %

58 percent deem the fight against inflation to be ineffective

Question: As regards the fight against price hikes, do you believe that the government's action can be described as:

	January 1986	Compared to Dec 1985
... Very effective.....	4	-
... Fairly effective.....	33	+ 1
... Not very effective.....	43	-
... Completely ineffective.....	15	- 1
● No opinion.....	5	-
	100 %	100 %

80 percent deem the fight against unemployment to be ineffective

Question: As regards the fight against unemployment, do you believe that the government's action can be described as:

	January 1986	Compared to Dec 1985
... Very effective.....	1	-
... Fairly effective.....	14	- 1
... Not very effective.....	47	- 1
... Completely ineffective.....	33	+ 1
● No opinion.....	5	+ 1
	100 %	100 %

Optimism and Pessimism

49 percent believe that things will be worse

Question: When you see the way in which France and the French are evolving, do you have the impression that things are improving or, contrariwise, that they have a tendency to worsen?

	January 1986	Compared to Dec 1985
● Things are improving.....	17	- 2
● They tend to worsen.....	49	-
● There is no change.....	31	+ 2
● No opinion.....	3	-
	100 %	100 %

43 percent believe that there will be much social conflict...

Question: Do you believe that in the coming 2 or 3 months there will be much or little social conflict?

	January 1986	Compared to Dec 1985
● Much social conflict.....	43	+ 4
● Little social conflict.....	39	- 5
● No opinion.....	18	+ 1
	100 %	100 %

... and 32 percent fear the return of the violence

Question: In your opinion, in the coming 2 or 3 months the principal problems facing France...

	January 1986	Compared to Dec 1985
... Can be resolved through negotiation and compromise.....	53	- 5
... Threaten to lead to confrontation and violence.....	32	+ 3
● No opinion.....	15	+ 2
	100 %	100 %

France's Role in the World

41 percent believe that France's role in the world is weakening

Question: Do you believe that at present France's role in the world is becoming stronger or is weakening?

	January 1986	Compared to Dec 1985
● It is becoming stronger.....	23	+ 1
● It is weakening.....	41	+ 1
● There is no change.....	29	- 1
● No opinion.....	7	- 1
	100 %	100 %

2662/7051

CS0: 3519/97

POLITICAL

FRANCE

DEBRAY ON PACIFISTS, NUCLEAR DETERRENT, EUROPEAN INTERESTS

Madrid TIEMPO in Spanish 25 Nov 85 pp 98-99

[Interview with Regis Debray, by Carlos Zeller; date and place not given]

[Text] An adviser to President Mitterrand and counselor of state, Regis Debray claims to have written his book "Los Imperios Contra Europa" [Empires Against Europe] in response to a certain kind of journalism that ideologizes international relations and makes them mythical. For Che's old comrade, the atomic bomb is in essence a pacifistic and anti-imperialist weapon.

[Question] One of the central ideas of your book is that new technologies will be the driving force ensuring economic development, security and the independence of Europe.

[Answer] I do not believe that class antagonisms can now be in the forefront of European life, first of all, because if there is deindustrialization, in the long run one produces a displacement of European labor and its subordination to American multinational companies. We are sometimes asked why the big industries in France were nationalized. The answer is in order to prevent the Americans from buying them. I prefer that the workers be working for French interests rather than for Japanese or American multinationals. On this point, I confess I am a nationalist. The class struggle does not seem to me to be a key to an understanding of international life. International relations are relations between nations; they have an autonomous order.

[Question] Then in your opinion, what is the dominant trend in the international realm?

[Answer] If there is one outstanding phenomenon at the close of this 20th century, it is the resurgence of the national problem. The main discussion today is not the proletariat against the bourgeoisie or even democracy against totalitarianism. For me, the major dilemma of the times is technology and nationalisms: on the one hand, the technical unification of the world by virtue of the internationalization of the productive processes; and on the other hand, the fragmentation, the national explosion everywhere, the proliferation of sovereignties. There are now 160 countries, compared with only about 80 some 40 years ago. Everywhere, there is a resurgence of cultural identities,

whether they be called Islam, Buddhism or Christianity, tribalism, regionalism or nationalism. This seems to me to be the decisive phenomenon: how human groups can maintain their historical identity in a world that is increasingly more homogeneous, technically and industrially speaking.

[Question] Since De Gaulle, the French nuclear strategy has enjoyed a broad consensus in the country. Everyone recognizes that it plays a key role in France's autonomy. Do you believe that Europe's independence depends on the development of nuclear weapons in other countries?

[Answer] Nuclear weapons are nationalist, very anti-alliance weapons. When China obtained the atomic bomb, it no longer needed its alliance with the Soviet Union and when France obtained it, it could also emancipate itself from NATO. Nuclear weapons -- Mitterrand said this years ago -- are somewhat in contradiction with the principle of any weapon due to the fact that their destructive effects are such that they can only be used for the defense of their territory and vital interests. In that sense, there is no credible nuclear umbrella. It is not logical to think that the United States would risk its life over the defense of any European city.

[Question] Following the installation of the Euromissiles, Mitterrand said that the pacifists were in West Europe and the rockets in the USSR!

[Answer] We have to recognize that we owe peace to the atomic era. It has been the balance of terror that has protected peace in West Europe. It is not by accident that a nuclearized continent such as Europe has enjoyed peace for 40 years. Nor is it an accident that continents without nuclear weapons are the regions of the world where all conflicts have been concentrated. In other words, one can only praise the atomic bomb as an anti-imperialist and pacifist bomb.

[Question] That seems to be a provocation.

[Answer] I would go even further. If the pacifists were consistent, they would have to support atomic weapons, which cannot be used against one's own people.

[Question] What role is played by military strategies in the unification of Europe?

[Answer] In my book, I say that we cannot leave Yalta without breaking the false America-or-Russia alternative. This leads us to the problem of European unity because there can be no overall military defense if there is not a political unit, above all, with nuclear weapons, which implies unified decision-making. In other words, there cannot be 12 fingers on an atomic trigger because crises are so rapid and what is at stake is something so far-reaching that only one can decide.

[Question] Do you believe that France, with its nuclear potential, is more independent in the international sphere than Sweden?

[Answer] No, France has mortgaged a goodly share of its autonomy because of its membership in the Washington Treaty. Now then, most of the bit of independence that France enjoys is due to the fact that it has a credible military and nuclear power. Its international influence responds more to its strategic autonomy than to its economic and industrial potential and, naturally, to the fact that it thinks for itself concerning major international problems.

[Question] How do you evaluate the understanding shown by Gorbachev in Paris concerning the Eureka project?

[Answer] On that there is a misunderstanding. Gorbachev wants Europe not to become involved in the "star wars" project. The Soviets are happy that France and other countries such as Germany do not want to be mere lackeys or subcontractors in the SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) project and there is fact a divergency of European and Soviet interests. The Soviets do not want the SDI because they know it represents an incredible technological efforts, an immense cost, and they are behind on all technologies necessary for a space defense project.

[Question] And can Europe expect to compete?

[Answer] Europe's interest, naturally, lies in clearly maintaining the nuclear deterrent, fighting to maintain its competitiveness with the United States in decisive technologies, which are those that are used in space, mainly micro-electronics and artificial intelligence. We must act in concert in order not to become underdeveloped and Gorbachev supports the Eureka project to the extent that he views it as a civil program. It is tactical support. The challenges put forth cannot be faced individually by each European country within the narrow framework of their borders.

[Question] What is your opinion of a referendum to decide whether Spain remains in or leaves NATO?

[Answer] I find the idea of a referendum formidable. It seems to me to be proof of democracy, civic maturity and citizen participation unique in the European world. There has never been such a vote. When France signed the Washington Treaty in 1949, it was not even ratified by Parliament. This referendum is out of the ordinary, but excellent. I am confident that it will result in quantities of information and a discussion on very specific aspects. Under such conditions, it can be a unique opportunity to educate the people.

11,464
CSO: 3548/23

POLITICAL

GREECE

U.S. INTENTIONS BEHIND BASES' ISSUE QUESTIONED

Athens ENA in Greek 19 Dec 85 p 13

/Article by Panos Loukakos: "The Bases and the Questions"

/Text/ Once again within the last few years Greek-American relations occupy the headlines. The bases are the main issue.

As opposition /party in the Chamber of Deputies/ PASOK used to say that "the bases will be removed." As the government a few years later, it signed an agreement which provided that the bases would remain at least until 1988. At the very moment this agreement was being signed, the big posters PASOK had put up proclaimed triumphantly that "the bases are thrown out, the struggle is now being justified." Of course, no struggle had been justified and no bases had been thrown out. Now the next round begins.

The American government has officially asked the Greek government "here and now" to clarify the future of the bases; that is, to say whether the agreement will be extended beyond 1988. Unofficially and behind the scenes, the Greek government has apparently given Washington the impression that the bases will stay. But already the American secretary of state has asked for a public and official commitment, and that's where the trouble starts--big trouble!

The Greek government has already abandoned the slogan of withdrawing from EEC. It shows no intention of leaving NATO. Two of the most important slogans used by PASOK to feed its followers have collapsed. Only one remains: "Throw out the bases of death." They will not be expelled immediately, but will be removed in 1988. This was the way out used until now.

But now time is running out. Washington is pressing for a clear answer which must be given in the first few months of this year. The pressure is not accidental--it comes at a time when the Greek government is searching abroad for economic support to deal with the economic crisis. This support will not be easily found unless our foreign policy is aligned with that of the West.

All these points are too obvious to need elaboration. What is not yet clear is the way PASOK will try to convince its followers to give up the slogan for

removal of the bases. Neither is it clear what will be left from the PASOK political program presented between 1974 and 1981 when it came to power.

The problem now facing A. Papandreou is not trivial. Anti-Americanism was one of the sacred cows of the Greek Left, communist or not. It was relatively easy to shift gears in the case of the EEC. Even remaining in NATO could be somehow justified. But retention of the bases after 1988, which must be formalized now, exceeds the limits of endurance by the PASOK rank and file.

For these reasons it is hard to foretell the government's reaction. The pressure Washington applies at this moment on Papandreou is very strong. The price sought by Washington is too heavy: it is asking PASOK to give up the last vestiges of its political program. This is tough; very difficult even for a government that has repeatedly changed its views.

Should PASOK now accept Washington's request, should it now give assurances that the bases will stay--the entire political edifice it erected since 1974 will crumble. Washington of course knows it well; and the question is why did Washington select this moment to raise the issue for retention of the bases after 1988? Why does it try to force the Greek government to face many different blind alleys, although it knows that in the end the bases will not be removed? What is behind this new scenario which once again may undermine the current climate of good Greek-American relations?

7520

CSO: 3521/77

POLITICAL

GREECE

GOVERNMENT RESHUFFLING EXPECTED IN MAY

Athens TAKHYDROMOS in Greek 19 Dec 85 p 6

/From the Paraskinios column/

/Text/ The government will appear in May with a new face. It seems that Premier A. Papandreou is likely to go in that direction. Suggestions by close associates to speed up the reshuffling (in January or February) were rejected. May appears to be more suitable for a cabinet reshuffling for two reasons:

First, by then the economic measures taken by the government will have some result.

Second, the cabinet will be approximately 10 months old and therefore it will be possible for the premier to evaluate the performance of the ministers.

Although it is too early to forecast the composition of the new cabinet, there are already some indications that:

First, there will be no significant changes in the key ministries.

Second, new cadres will be tried out.

Third, ministers will be moved from one ministry to another.

The idea to use persons outside the Parliamentary Group and Movement is being abandoned, in spite of suggestions made to the premier by close associates.

Nevertheless, I am told that certain cabinet members have asked to be assigned to other ministries either because they believe that in another post they will be more effective or that they exhausted their contribution to the post they now occupy.

A problem currently considered by the premier is utilization of persons with special talents who have been appointed to cabinet posts in previous PASOK cabinets. It seems that some of them may be used again. Already a former minister was told that he is going to be included in the next cabinet.

7520

CS0: 3521/78

POLITICAL

GREECE

LOOKING TO 1986: MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS, OTHER PROBLEMS

Athens KIRIAKATIKI ELEVTHEROTIPIA in Greek 22 Dec 85 p 48

[Text] A difficult year has ended and a more difficult one is beginning. The coming year is going to be more difficult because, during its course, the economic and social crises are going to peak. At the same time, it is a pre-election year because municipal elections are going to be held in October 1986 and, under the present conditions, their political impact is going to be tremendous.

It is precisely here where the big problems are going to emerge. Faced with municipal elections, how is the government going to be able to implement the announced policy? And, if, under pressure by its voters, it goes back on it, what are going to be the consequences on the course of the economy? On the other hand, the opposition parties will be able to avoid the facile criticism and the thoughtless promises when they know that the municipal elections will be the determining factors for the political proceedings.

Matters are relatively simple and it is not necessary for one to have divining powers to foretell their course. If Mr. Mitsotakis is able to sidestep the obstacle of his party's congress and has not been ousted by fall, it will be precisely in the municipal elections that he will fight his last battle. It is evident that if he does not win this battle too, he will be ousted the next day. The municipal elections constitute a determining factor for New Democracy and its leader.

Thus, the struggle fought by the official opposition will be tougher.

The KKE will also have no other alternative except to fight a hard and protracted preelectoral struggle. First, because it must regain, at all costs, the ground it lost in the June elections. Second, because it is already facing certain internal problems that will become more intense if the election results do not provide a clear indication that the Communists are once more rallying their forces. Already Mr. Florakis and the leadership group of the KKE are the target of criticism from their rank and file for the strategy they followed during the 1985 preelectoral campaign. Evidently, what the critics are mainly seeking is for the Communist Party to harden its position towards PASOK.

Finally, PASOK begins the preelectoral year under extremely difficult conditions. The economic crisis will grow during the months to come. The social pressures

will be intensified at the same time. 1986 will not be just an election year, it will be a year of strikes. The government knows this. It knows it, but it is unable to confront it. There are no margins for concessions.

An abandonment of the present hard financial policy will lead straight to the IMF. And words are not enough as a substitute for action. The government has officially admitted that during 1986 the buying power of the workers will decrease by about 10 percent. Actually, this decrease is going to be much greater.

This coming fall PASOK will have to face both the Right and Left opposition under these extremely difficult conditions. The result of this electoral battle is just as determining for New Democracy as it is for PASOK. Because a clear defeat of PASOK in the municipal elections will automatically pose a political question in view of the fact that the opposition will contend every day that the government plainly no longer has the confidence of the people. A PASOK defeat in this year's municipal elections will inevitably open the door for the holding of early parliamentary elections.

Of course, 1986 hides other problems beyond the municipal elections. With regard to the government, the first few months of the year will determine the course of Greek-American relations. During these first few months, the government must notify Washington unequivocally what it intends to do about the matter of the bases, whether they will remain or not. The pressure exerted by the United States on this subject is already great. The greater the pressure, the more difficult it will be for Mr. Andreas Papandreu to publicly commit himself at this time as to what he intends to do in 1988 when the existing agreement expires. A breakdown in Greek-American relations at this moment will give preelectoral arguments to New Democracy. Conversely, a solution of the question at this moment, when the Americans demand it, will supply the KKE's attack with new ammunition.

On the other hand, New Democracy has to confront its own endemic intra-party crisis. It goes to its convention without being sure of who is going to be its leader at this convention. Mr. Mitsotakis' opponents within the party always move effectively, while he tries, by jerky moves, to hold on to the party leadership. The first few weeks of 1986 will determine Mr. Mitsotakis' fate because during these weeks either his opponents will form an alliance and oust him or he will manage to reach the convention, which he, of course, will have succeeded in controlling in order to hang on to the leadership.

PASOK does not have similar problems because no one is opposing its leadership. However, this does not mean that there are no internal problems within the government party.

The expelled labor union leaders have already proceeded to form new movements, while a variety of creaks are being heard at the organized party base. There will be tensions even at the top level, as soon as the premier proceeds to effect the expected reshuffling because naturally some will leave, some will be brought in and, as always happens, the majority will once more remain outside the "bridal chamber," and during a preelection year, those who "remain outside the bridal chamber" can create problems.

The coming year will be difficult. Economic crisis, social tensions, political problems. All these pile up and demand urgent solutions. Who is to give them though, and how?

POLITICAL

GREECE

NAMES, FACTS, BEHIND PASOK YOUTH ORGANIZATION'S DIVISIONS

Athens ENA in Greek 26 Dec 85 p 11

/Text/ The intra-party crisis besetting PASOK lately has not left the Movement's Youth Organization unaffected. The opposite is true.

On the internal "front" of the Youth Organization we today find two opposing groups. On the one hand the old leadership of the PASOK student organization which is considered to belong to the Left wing of the Movement, and which continues to "uphold" the September 3 founding declaration; and on the other, a newly formed alliance of various leading cadres who reflect the official new party line and who personify in the youth area of PASOK what the traditional Left calls "a rightward shift."

Today the latter group controls the PASOK Youth Committee--mainly through Committee Secretary Thanasis Papageorgiou--which plays the role of a "conveyor belt" for transmitting directives of the party leadership from the /PASOK/ Executive Bureau to the youth area.

The "high-level overseers" on behalf of the party leadership are Khristos Papoutsis (a Eurodeputy and erstwhile chairman of the National Student Union of Greece /EFEE/); Kostas Skandalidis (a member of the Executive Bureau); and Stefanos Tzoumakas (alternate member of the Executive Bureau).

Kh. Papoutsis, who served in the past as an advisor to M. Koutsogiorgas, is regarded as a "Koutsogiorgas man" and is seen as trying to form--in the context of the new PASOK orientation--a strong "bridgehead" for the Koutsogiorgas group (E. Kouloumbis, E. Giannopoulos, G. A. Mangakis and others) within the party youth area.

For different reasons Papoutsis receives the cooperation of K. Skandalidis, a past "protege" and advisor to K. Laliotis (now those who dislike him accuse him of declaring publicly that "I never identified with Laliotis"), and St. Tzoumakas who, it is said, is lately "under the wing" of A. Tsokhatzopoulos.

The triad has won over the Youth Organization Secretary Th. Papageorgiou, who in the past had ties with G. Gennimatas, and tries to expand its strongholds throughout the organizational mechanism of the PASOK youth.

For the time being, its main goal is to dampen the objections of those who disagree with recent governmental measures, and push to the side the cadres of the Left wing who continue to defend the principles of the PASOK founding declaration.

The machinations of this triad are considered to be responsible for the removal of two of the three alternate secretaries of the PASOK Youth Organization and their replacement by persons having the absolute confidence of Th. Papageorgiou.

Specifically, Giannis Nikolaou (close to G. Gennimatas) and Khr. Smyrlis (a close friend of K. Laliotis who had clashed in the past with Th. Katsanevas when he was deputy governor of the Labor Force Employment Organization--both elected members of the Movement's Central Committee--were removed from the post of alternate secretaries and replaced by Giannis Papadonikolakis and Dimitris Karydas. The third alternate secretary, G. Magriotis, is still in his post but without any real power.

In the face of this situation, the Left wing has set up its ramparts in the ranks of the Student Youth. This wing is represented at the leadership level by Dimitris Katsandonis, chairman of the University of Salonica Student Union and a member of the Youth Committee; Vasilis Togias, a member of the leadership of the Student Youth in Athens; Alekos Petrakis, secretary of the Student Youth; Dionysis Kambourakis, and Giannis Tsamourgelis (a member of the EFEE Central Council who was deposed from the posts to which he was elected by decision of the General Council of the Athens Financial Section on charges of having agreed to allow the special Riot Control Units to enter the chemistry school, while he was a member of the Off-bounds Committee).

The Youth Leading Group, which is said to systematically promote cadres favored by A. Tsokhatzopoulos and M. Koutsogiorgas, lately resorted to two maneuvers to avert a further deterioration of the situation.

Specifically, according to those who disagree /the group/, trying to present a "Left alibi" launched "out of the blue" a harsh attack against Sotiris Kostopoulos, the former secretary general of Press and Information, and sought to have him expelled from PASOK for saying that the cabinet should broaden its base by bringing in I. Boutos and Dion. Livanos, etc.

The second maneuver was in the direction of giving greater autonomy to the Panhellenic Militant Student Faction /PASP/, the PASOK student youth organization.

This move is also a temporary solution of necessity, which will allow PASP leftist cadres to get rid of its organizational introversion which intensified after the resignation of Laliotis (the former deputy minister exercised great influence on these cadres who now seek new representation to the Executive Bureau and the high leadership groups around G. Rokkos and And. Tritsis) and to prepare the organization for the student elections.

One can understand how necessary this was by looking at the first results of the elections in the various schools where PASP lost a great deal of ground. On its part, the Left wing is preparing, according to certain reports, a document with signatures which--we are told--will cause a tremendous commotion in the leadership group of the Youth Organization.

The cadres' reply to the youth of the two communist parties, who ask "why aren't you leaving?" is the cryptic phrase, "let Andreas leave first and then we will reshuffle the deck of cards."

7520

CSO: 3521/77

POLITICAL

GREECE

REASONS FOR TSOKHATZOPOULOS' INCREASED POWERS

Athens TAKHYDROMOS in Greek 26 Dec 85 p 6

/Text/ Akis Tsokhatzopoulos has assumed additional responsibilities--not in the government but in the Movement /Party/. His main task is to coordinate all organizations and keep in touch with PASOK cadres to assure better organization and efficiency of the party mechanism. This was deemed necessary following certain events:

First, the premier's involvement with governmental operations which he wishes to control, while at the same time he wants to check implementation of economic measures. Under these conditions the premier cannot spend as much time now with the Movement as he did in the past.

Second, the recent complete change in membership of the Executive Bureau /EG/ where Tsokhatzopoulos is the only member from the previous bureau. So, he has the expertise and knowledge of the party mechanism to play a leadership role and give guidance on issues emerging in the party organizations. Despite their abilities the other EG members do not have the Tsokhatzopoulos range to intervene in certain operational problems of the party machinery.

Third, the expulsion of PASOK trade unionists and group moves of other cadres (in the trade unions) require existence of additional control to assure unity of the Movement.

Fourth, the forthcoming municipal election requires the existence of coordination among the party organizations to facilitate the nomination of PASOK candidates in municipalities and communities and the preparation and mobilization of the entire party mechanism for the October contest.

Because of these facts, it was deemed necessary to have a super-coordinator in the Movement, to guide the organizations on key issues.

Of course, the main choices and charting of the party line and strategy will be made by the EG which convenes (in plenary session, or with participation of certain members) at regular intervals.

In the context of the PASOK party mechanism restructuring, there are changes in the persons leading certain party organizations.

7520

CSO: 3521/78

ITALY

CRAXI-DE MITA 'TRUCE' DECLARED DESPITE PCI-DC TENSIONS

Polemics Attenuated

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 13 Nov 85 p 2

[Article by Giorgio Battestini: "The Secretariat and Directorate Tone Down Controversies with Palazzo Chigi"]

[Text] At Piazza del Gesu they calmly and coolly pull the plug before the majority gets a short circuit. The prevailing attitude could be summed up as follows: that's enough for now, let's avoid a brawl. We'll talk about it later. For the present let's deal with concrete problems. No direct response to Craxi's comments on TV. In order not to rekindle a controversy that appeared closed with the Senate vote on Friday, but which flared up immediately afterwards and was immensely magnified in the papers and on TV, Di Mita's staff say "Let's go ahead since the country's problems require it."

The DC secretary said something more than that to the directorate which met yesterday afternoon, after a morning devoted to a closed meeting of the secretariat. Di Mita seems to have completely gotten over the most recent flareups of controversy. He says "the settlement of the government crisis was a positive event." Christian Democracy contributed in a noteworthy if not conclusive way, even in straightening out the difficulties arising during the parliamentary debate on the confidence vote for the government. We did so with moderation and a sense of responsibility, carrying out that five-party line set forth by the congress, and which was our own firm choice. That remains the DC position. In a diligent and attentive way, we shall pursue it, explaining and justifying our positions in support of the alliance.

In the tense (and ostentatiously calm) climate prevailing yesterday at Piazza del Gesu, at an extraordinarily crowded directorate meeting (the pre-congress electoral arrangements were also under discussion), the measured words of De Mita should be weighed one by one. The DC leader would have the PSI note that the government was twice saved by Piazza del Gesu; that socialist criticisms are bound to compete with and collide with the "moderation and sense of responsibility" of the largest government party. The DC answers Craxi, who yesterday was speculating about a new socialist congress if the current five-party collaboration were called into question, with similar arguments, that is, by confirming its adherence to the political line "set forth at the

congress" stating "this remains the DC position." But the socialists are sent a warning: the biggest party in the alliance will pursue this line "in a careful and alert way." Which is to say there is the suspicion that others do not intend to stand by the agreements. This, as well as the possibility of early elections, came up several times at the directorate yesterday. Some people close to the secretary took it upon themselves to air this suspicion. "We do not want early elections, but we must be careful not to let ourselves be caught unprepared, because we do have the impression that somebody wants them," said Nicola Mancino, president of the DC senators. The day after Craxi's awaited reply on TV, the prevailing atmosphere in the DC establishment was the desire to let the government and majority have a quiet convalescence, and avoid undesirable relapses into the high fever of an explosive brawl. In the directorate Forlani, above all, is the chief advocate of this line. The vice chairman of the council said, "I fail to understand on what logical basis a group of leaders who are not in the service of the King of Prussia could cast aside a line of collaboration, other than which there is in fact nothing, except the King of Prussia." Early elections would be a dereliction of responsibility. It could only be justified if in fact the PSI were to use the government formula merely to exploit it against the DC to bring about a reversal of alliances. "But," Forlani states, "we know on the basis of facts that this has never been Craxi's line." However, while De Mita's conclusions after 5 and 1/2 hours of discussion admitted that Forlani was right, they do remind him that "something has changed during these days."

One of the three vice secretaries, Vincenzo Scotti, affirms that the squabble "is neither eliminated nor ended. Immediate responses? Calm. Politics have longer time periods than newspapers." Rognoni, who was directly attacked by Craxi ("it does not appear to me that his objections have a place in the constitution") adds that in any event "for us the controversy is ended if the socialists do not start up again. Now we are thinking of things that should be done." Certainly, discontent is still rife; but it is being curbed. "It is impossible that Craxi should say one thing and Martelli and Formica should say something else," Nicola Mancino goes on to say. "Obviously these are not unimportant party secretaries."

The fear expressed in muted tones is that a part of the controversy fed by the socialists has the real (but unavowable) objective: the coming DC congress. In a word, to spread discord in the adversary's camp. Perhaps even for that reason yesterday evening De Mita, while confirming "careful and alert" support for the alliance, made an explicit reference to the May congress. He said until that time we should "dedicate ourselves to adjusting our structures to link up with the people, associating them with the political proposal the party is putting forward. Furthermore, he added, these most recent developments themselves show how, for the whole Italian political framework, and the DC internally, there is the problem of new and more efficient forms of communication with society. The DC ought to be able to respond to the great receptiveness which public opinion is showing toward the party. To do that, now, more than ever, our internal unity, an indispensable element for the democratic equilibrium of the country, is necessary. All are called on to create that internal unity, with ones own contribution, ones own loyalty, ones own readiness." The first test is reform of the electoral rules for the next congress; a proposal for reform was distributed recently. (As Paolo Catras,

responsible for organization, explains) the most important innovation is eliminating the rigidity of the voting by list in order to introduce a "limited multiple" vote into the sections, making possible the "expression of minorities and freeing one from being cooped up in advance by party trends."

[Photo Caption] Arnaldo Forlani, vice-president of the council of ministers. The DC secretary confirms the faithfulness to the political line "set forth in the congress." For Forlani early elections would be a "dereliction of responsibility"

PCI Role in Parliament

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 13 Nov 85

[Article by Alberto Stabile: "Back Into the Game, but Suspicious; Natta Does Not Wish to 'Serve as a Buffer'"]

[Text] How is the communist party handling the sudden accelerations in the political situation? What responses is the largest opposition party giving to the prime minister's overtures, even though watered down by the conclusion that an alternative to the five party accord cannot for the moment be envisaged?

From the communist side recently there has been no lack of concrete indications of the attention given to these new signals from Craxian politics. The five party alliance is in the process of dissolution and yet, as Natta wrote in the Sunday UNITA, "There have been considerable changes and these are fully taken in." But, and here is the question, within which framework of alliance are these opportunities to be taken in? With what intentions? For which strategy?

The reply they give at the Botteghe Oscure does not ignore the importance of the collaboration Craxi requested on the parliamentary front (laws; budget), but goes well beyond that. It is said that the sole remedy for the death-throes of the five party accord (and the only antidote for early elections) is a government with a plan, without set formulas or line-ups. With the specification (as Massimo D'Alena will emphasize in the forthcoming number of RINASCITA) that the principal task of that government as an alternative prospect would be to "reform and renovate the democratic system."

Will this politico-institutional proposal, which appears to contain Ingrao's recent proposals for a "constituent government", be the key permitting the PCI to leave the perennial antechamber of power and enter into full participation?

Moments of satisfaction for having "re-entered the game," thus breaking out of an isolation lasting for years, alternate with evaluations characterized by a judicious suspicion. As a communist leader pointed out, the PCI fears serving as a buffer for Craxi's oscillations without being able to reap the advantages, and for that reason it responds with a proposal which is not based on any exclusions vis a vis the DC. And then there is the awareness (Bufalini apparently recalled it) that even the death-throes of the center-left were very long and years passed before the framework of alliances would change.

In reality the communist party today is passing through a particularly difficult time. The shocks inflicted on the political framework obliged it to offer an immediate proposal which was dropped (it was the program government). The internal crisis, confirmed by the double electoral defeat, obliges it to take into account the new elements of the pre-congress debate which is on the verge of reaching its highest point.

From today until Friday the commission of 77 will examine the text of the theses document which will constitute the basis for discussion. That weighty document, with its nearly 100 pages, is divided into chapters which probably embrace too many subjects to serve at the same time as a flexible instrument for discussion. The new PCI line is there, in those 97 pages which extend from foreign policy to organizational problems. The strategic prospect still remains an alternative, but the real problem is the "intermediate steps" to reach it. And it is known that on this front the leading communist group is divided between the "miglioristi" or reformists (favorable to a privileged relationship with the socialists), the Berlinguer center, and the Ingraoist left-wing.

There is no advance information. However it does appear that the proposal for the "program government" has been confirmed, since it is considered not to conflict with the tasks of institutional reforms characterizing the "constituent government" launched by Ingrao.

There remains the problem of relations with the socialists. According to Occhetto (who referred to it in RINASCITA) the PSI ought to have a "central" role, "a hinge," even in the "program government". If this proposal prevails the "liberal" Right, which identifies with Napolitano's positions, will be satisfied with it. It remains to be seen what Ingrao thinks of it. That will be known at the central committee which will be called for the end of the month. Meanwhile it can be said that Craxi's overtures were not ignored. There are contacts, between Chiaromonte and Formica, between Occhetto and Martelli: party diplomacy at work. The budget will be the proving ground.

9772

CSO: 3528/20

PCI'S NAPOLITANO LEADS SURVEY AS SUCCESSOR TO NATTA

Rome IL TEMPO in Italian 27 Nov 85 p 18

[Text] Geirgio Napolitano is the leading communist who Italian politicians are focusing their attention on. This is the result of a poll conducted by Demoskopea for Adnkronos of a sample of 511 parliamentarians, and regional and local councillors chosen on the basis of a statistical criterion.

To the question "who in the next 10 years will be the most efficient and productive leader of the PCI", Napolitano has in all obtained 110 votes, followed closely by 93 votes for Lama (who, however, within his own party collected the smallest number of votes).

The 110 votes obtained by Napolitano represent the total "preferences" expressed by parliamentarians (25), regional councillors (37), and town councillors (37). The poll brings to light different, relevant opinions among politicians of different groups. Parliamentarians and town councillors concur in their preference for Napolitano over other leading communists indicated on the questionnaire. Regional councillors prefer Lama.

Regarding the overall voting, the "results" are as follows: Napolitano 110, Lama 93, Occhetto 85, Zangheri 65, Natta 31 and D'Alema 30; 69 preferred not to respond while 38 polled have indicated other names.

Christian Democrats [DC] who were polled showed more preference for Lama, who received 49 votes out of a total of 175. In the DC ranking Napolitano is in second place with 45 votes, followed by Zangheri (29) and Occhetto (22). Natta received only 2 votes, one less than D'Alema.

Among the Communists polled, there is greater harmony, even though Occhetto takes the advantage (25 votes) over Napolitano and D'Alema (both in second place, receiving 24 votes). Natta received 22 votes and Zangheri 17, while Lama received only 10 votes.

The results of choices indicated by other parties again show Napolitano in the lead, Lama in second place, followed by Occhetto.

Finally, the "percentage" breakdown: Those polled with incomes up to 20 million lire prefer Occhetto, those between 20-40 million lire prefer Lama, those earning over 40 million prefer Napolitano.

MSI VICE-SECRETARY TREMAGLIA RESIGNS OVER ANTI-U.S. DISSENT

Rome IL TEMPO in Italian 29 Oct 85 p 18

[Article: "Tremaglia: I Disagree With the MSI Anti-U.S. Controversy"]

[Text] Giuseppe Nicolai's resolution, which provoked vice secretary Tremaglia's resignation at the MSI [Italian Social Movement] is considered by the latter as a "mishap along the way." Tremaglia explained the reasons for his decision although he sought to emphasize that "There was an explanation and there are no further misunderstandings" with Almirante, the party secretary. In any event the internal debate on the question was referred to the political office. "For the time being," stated Tremaglia, "the resignation stands."

The MSI-DN vice-secretary explained he had resigned because of a resolution adopted on foreign policy. It was a resolution that "did not follow the party line as fixed in the congress documents and all our policy statements. I am vice-secretary and responsible for foreign policy. Obviously I resigned from everything. Someone like me certainly doesn't stand on ceremony," Tremaglia added.

Concerning relations with the MSI-DN secretary, Tremaglia claimed "there is no further misunderstanding" between Almirante and himself. "If misunderstandings remain with someone else...we shall see. After my speech at the central committee Almirante stood up and said he agreed with everything [I had said] adding that the party line in foreign policy was as I had stated it. At this point I am confident there will be a meeting of the political office to clarify matters."

Tremaglia explained the nature of the resolution. "Recently at the NATO North Atlantic assembly, of which I am a member, I noted considerable progress toward Euro-Atlanticism. Hence, a joint attitude already exists and is confirmed in every quarter. At San Francisco the policy of the two pillars, USA and Europe, was clearly set forth." According to Tremaglia there are yet to clarify "Five points which represent the Right's image in the world, and there are no others: loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance and to Euro-Atlanticism; no subjection to anyone whatsoever; a policy for European and Western security without any place for the Third World dissuasion against Soviet aggression and imperialism; struggle against international terrorism against the 'Arafat and Qadhdhafi gangs; recognition of Israel's right to security and of the Palestine people's right to a homeland."

9772
CSO:3528/20

POLITICAL

NORWAY

POLL SHOWS LOSSES FOR LABOR PARTY, COALITION PARTNER

Center, Liberals Decline

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 1 Feb 86 p 9

[Article by Bjorn Talen]

[Text] The January political barometer from the Norwegian Opinion Institute [NOI] indicates unusually big shifts in party support levels. The Labor Party had a sharp decline, historic lows were recorded for the Center Party and the Liberals, and the Christian People's Party moved up substantially.

The Labor Party rating for this month was 41.0 percent. This is the lowest level noted since the Storting election last year and a decline of 2 whole percentage points since its peak in December. But it is too early to tell whether this is the beginning of a negative trend for the Labor Party. There is still a very high percentage of stability in the Labor Party and if the decline is a real one it is due more to eroding support among quite new voters than to the defection of old voters.

The Socialist Left Party, on the other hand, increased its support from 5.7 to 6.4 percent, its best rating since the election.

The Conservative Party's situation is very stable (+0.2 percent since December). The 30.4 percent support level is exactly the same as the party received in the Storting election. The Progressive Party gained slightly (+0.4) and seems to have ended up somewhat below the election result of 3.7 percent. The January poll gave the Progressives a 3.5 percent rating.

Little Stability

The picture for the other nonsocialist parties is far from stable. The Center Party is all the way down to 4.8 percent (-1.0), lower than the party has ever been in an NOI poll. The Center Party [SP] has lost about a quarter of its voters since the election in September, when its support level was 6.6 percent. The survey material suggests that the party has lost about the same number of voters to the Conservatives as to the Labor Party.

	Stor- tings- (1) valget 1981 %		Stor- tings- (1) valget 1985 %		Stor- tings- (1) valget 1986 %		Stor- tings- (1) valget 1987 %		Stor- tings- (1) valget 1988 %		Stor- tings- (1) valget 1989 %		Stor- tings- (1) valget 1990 %	
	Feb.	Mar.	April	May	June	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.
Ap.(2).....	37.1	39.4	38.7	38.2	38.9	37.6	37.3	40.8	41.6	41.9	42.6	43.0	41.0	41.0
DLF(3).....	0.6	0.8	0.2	0.5	0.1	0.3	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.0	0.3	0.4	0.4
Fr.p.(4).....	4.5	4.9	4.4	6.1	4.0	3.3	4.1	3.7	4.5	4.1	3.1	3.1	3.5	3.5
H(5).....	31.8	30.8	32.6	30.6	31.9	33.5	32.8	30.4	29.0	29.8	31.1	30.2	30.4	30.4
Kr.F.(6).....	9.3	8.2	8.2	8.3	8.7	8.7	8.9	8.3	7.4	7.6	7.5	7.8	9.5	9.5
NKP(7).....	0.3	0.1	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.4	0.4
RV(8).....	0.7	0.8	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.5	1.3	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.3	0.3
Sp.(9).....	6.6	5.5	6.6	7.3	6.5	5.8	5.8	6.6	6.2	6.8	6.5	5.8	4.8	4.8
SV(10).....	5.0	5.0	4.5	5.3	5.2	5.9	5.7	5.5	6.3	5.8	5.7	5.7	6.4	6.4
V(11).....	3.9	4.4	2.7	2.3	3.3	3.7	2.9	3.1	3.3	2.7	2.5	2.7	2.2	2.2
Andre(12).....	0.2	0.1	0.7	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.0	0.4	0.6	1.1	1.1
Sum:(13).....	100.1	100.0	100.0	100.1	99.9	100.1	100.0	100.1	100.1	100.0	100.1	99.9	100.0	100.0
Ap. + SV(14).....	42.1	44.4	43.2	43.5	44.1	43.5	43.0	46.3	47.9	47.7	48.3	48.7	47.4	47.4
H + Kr.F. + Sp.(15).....	47.7	44.5	47.4	46.2	47.1	48.0	47.5	45.3	42.6	44.2	45.1	43.8	44.7	44.7
Ap. + SV + V(16).....	46.0	48.8	45.9	45.8	47.4	47.2	45.9	49.4	51.2	50.4	50.8	51.4	49.6	49.6
H + Kr.F. + Sp. + Fr.p.(17).....	52.2	49.4	51.8	52.3	51.1	51.3	51.6	49.0	47.1	48.3	48.2	46.9	48.2	48.2

The figures show how many votes would go to each party if we had a Storting election tomorrow, as indicated by people who would definitely cast a vote. They were also asked which party they voted for in the 1985 Storting election. The difference between these answers and the actual election results in 1985 was used as a weighting factor.

There were 903 interviews with people 18 and older and 1010 with people 15 and older.

Interviews conducted in the period 10-25 January 1986 by Gallup/NOI.

Key:

- | | | |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1. Storting elections | 8. Red Election Alliance | 15. Conservatives + Christian |
| 2. Labor Party | 9. Center Party | People's Party + Center |
| 3. Liberal People's Party | 10. Socialist Left | 16. Labor Party + Socialist Left + |
| 4. Progressives | 11. Liberals | Liberals |
| 5. Conservatives | 12. Other | 17. Conservatives + Christian |
| 6. Christian People's Party | 13. Total | People's Party + Center + |
| 7. Norwegian CP | 14. Labor + Socialist Left | Progressives |

The Liberal decline was only 0.5 percent compared to September but the trend was even more ominous for SP. Its level of 2.2 percent is a historic low and does not indicate the prospect of a Storting comeback.

The Christian People's Party was this month's winner with 9.5 percent (+1.7) of the votes. That is well above the party's election results of 8.3 percent and the best level the party has had since NOI started taking polls for AFTENPOSTEN in 1982.

The Labor Party and the Socialist Left [SV] are still ahead of the government coalition parties by 47.4 percent to 44.7, but if the Progressives are added in, the nonsocialist bloc has a support level of 48.2 percent.

Party Leaders Comment

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 1 Feb 86 p 9

[Article by Morten Malmo: "Jakobsen Calls Poll Figures an Aberration"]

[Text] "A support level of 41 percent does not create pessimism in the Labor Party," said Labor Party secretary Ivar Leveraas in his comment on the party's decline from 43 to 41 percent in the January poll from Gallup/NOI. "The picture is confusing," said Center Party leader Johan J. Jakobsen, while Christian People's Party leader Kjell Magne Bondevik said this concerning the gains made by his party: "This was very encouraging!"

Bondevik, Jakobsen and Leveraas agreed that one cannot put too much emphasis on a single opinion poll and all three said that the balance of strength between the two "blocs" in Norwegian politics is very even.

Aberration?

Traffic Minister Johan J. Jakobsen, leader of the Center Party, wanted to wait and see the results of other polls before making definite conclusions. His party declined from 5.8 to 4.8 percent. He reminded us that the Center Party's support levels in the Gallup/NOI polls have fluctuated a great deal and recalled that the Center Party got a rating of 7.3 percent in April while its election result was 6.6 percent.

"When Market Data's January poll gave the Center Party a 6.2 percent rating, I think this latest poll is an aberration," said Jakobsen. And he did not see any political explanation for the fact that the Center Party and the Labor Party are declining while the Christian People's Party is gaining ground and the Conservatives are holding their own.

No Pessimism

What are people saying at Labor Party headquarters in Youngstorvet about the fact that the party dropped from 43 percent in December to 41 percent in January? Labor Party secretary Ivar Leveraas replied:

"If we take the margin of error into account, the poll indicates a stable situation. I do not find the poll remarkable and the blocs have equal levels of strength. A support level of 41 percent does not create pessimism in the Labor Party. The December rating of 43 percent was the highest we have had in a long long time and this can be regarded as a kind of natural readjustment."

While Jakobsen and Leveraas have experienced declines, the opposite is true for Christian People's Party leader Kjell Magne Bondevik. His party went up from 7.8 to 9.5 percent. Bondevik's comment went like this:

"This was a tremendous encouragement at the beginning of a new year. The poll confirms and reinforces the gains the Christian People's Party scored in the Market Data poll. I have no good explanation for this gain, but I am not ruling out the possibility that people have noted that at the beginning of a new year we have strongly emphasized our 'special issues,' namely the protection of life and human values and social responsibility. It is hard to give a more comprehensive explanation before more polls have been released."

Paper on Center's Setback

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 1 Feb 86 p 2

[Editorial: "Voters on the Move"]

[Text] With its 4.8 percent in the Gallup/NOI political opinion poll the Center Party has hit bottom. That is a record low for the Center Party in the history of this institute's political barometer. At times it has had an even lower support level in polls released by other institutes. The poll published in AFTENPOSTEN today is a dash of cold water confirming the fact that the party has lost ground on all sides.

As a predominantly business party the Center Party cannot become a really big party. In urban areas it lacks appeal and credibility and in rural areas its social and political structure are different than they were in the party's heyday. As banner bearer for broad nonsocialist cooperation, the Conservative Party has taken over the role of the largest government party, even in areas of the country where it once had trouble making any inroads. Only a small number of nonsocialist voters consider the Center Party an alternative today. The question for them in a nutshell is which of the three parties best safeguards their interests.

It is hard to read any clear pattern on the basis of a single opinion poll. This is especially true because the record low for the coalition's smallest party was noted at the same time as the Labor Party lost 2 whole percentage points. But the trend on the nonsocialist side is clear enough.

The Christian People's Party swings between ratings of just under 8 percent and--as now--just over 9 percent. As the largest and thus most exposed government party the Conservative Party has had remarkable stability around the

30 percent mark. The rating of 30.4 percent for January is precisely the same support level that the party had in the election last fall.

The stability among Conservative voters illustrates the growth potential of the government's biggest party. We assume that the new party leaders, headed by Rolf Presthus, will see the possibilities this opens up for an offensive liberal-conservative policy. The Center Party for its part faces a choice of possibly historic importance.

If the party misjudges this situation it may fall over the edge of the precipice. As we know opposition forces in the party have drawn the conclusion that the miserable Gallup figures are the price the party is paying for the government cooperation they have always been against. This analysis could not be more wrong and of course the party leaders are aware of that.

It is now more important than ever before to unite party forces in an active defense of the government cooperation that made it possible for the Center Party to refute all the predictions of the early demise of the party in the election. The necessity of gathering party forces should be obvious to all three government parties which still have less total support than the two socialist opposition parties.

6578

CSO: 3639/68

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

LOCAL ELECTION RESULTS REPORTED, ANALYZED

Details Provided

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 17 Dec 85 pp 4-6

[Text] Clean Sweep in Albufeira

For people watching local government, Albufeira posed one of the knottiest problems in the Algarve, and this was true for all parties. The renewal movement was confident of beating Xavier Xufre of the PS [Socialist Party], the social democrats argued at length with a view to covering the council, the alliance headed by the communists openly snubbed the PRD [Democratic Renewal Party] for its own exclusive advantage, and the socialists did not conceal the 6 October syndrome. But what happened was almost a clean sweep.

The PSD [Social Democratic Party] vote dropped from 3,245 (in 1982) to 2,937. The APU [United People's Alliance] vote dropped from 1,032 to 775, and the PRD won only 681 votes. A half a thousand of the 1982 CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] votes, many of those of the APU and still more of those of the PSD went over to the enormous field of those who abstained. The PS held steady with Xavier Xufre, winning yet another term of office (four), and the party must now engage in dialogue with the three PSD members of the council on its executive board.

The rise in the tone of Xufre's campaign was reflected in the pages of DIARIO DE NOTICIAS. He proved capable of making use of headwinds in his navigation. The socialist candidate reached port safely and has a clear field for keeping his electoral promises, above all for the rural sectors, which showed no great fondness for the winner.

Albufeira provided one of the most curious cases in the autarchic struggle in the Algarve, serving as an example for Silves, on whose ramparts the APU has now taken its stand, such that the PS can conclude that it cannot make use of Xufres everywhere. (C. A.)

Albufeira

Parishes Verified -- 3
Town Council - 1985

Registered Voters - 14,026
Votes Cast - 7,786 55.51
Blank Ballots - 79 1.01
Invalid Ballots - 107 1.37

Parishes To Be Verified -- 0
Town Council - 1982

Registered Voters - 13,167
Votes Cast - 8,605 65.35
Blank Ballots - 142 1.65
Invalid Ballots - 174 2.02

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>
PS	3,207 41.19	4
PSD	2,937 37.72	3
APU	775 9.95	
PRD	681 8.75	

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>
PS	3,546 41.21	3
PSD	3,245 37.71	3
APU	1,032 11.99	1
CDS	466 5.42	

Absolute Majority in Amadora

Everyone in Amadora relied on the PRD votes, but it was the APU which got them in the end. After a 6-year effort to win an absolute majority, the communists finally achieved it, electing six councilmen.

The PS and the PSD, which ran as a coalition, were seemingly well-placed to win the presidency of the council. However, the results at the post destroyed all illusions. The APU apparently won almost all of the votes which went to the PRD in the council election on 6 October.

Where the legislative elections are concerned, the PS-PSD coalition would have 40.4 percent (day before yesterday, it had 37.15), and the APU, with the aid of the democratic renewal electorate, would reach 48.9 percent (it won 47.65). The difference seen between the one block and the other will have shifted to the CDS, which has now seen an increase to 10.62 to the 5.7 won in October.

In very general terms, based on the somewhat superficial analysis, the transfers of votes appear to have occurred as described. However, it is not clear that all of the PRD votes went to the APU, just as it is not certain that all of those who voted for the PS and the PSD in October have now voted for the coalition.

What is really certain in Amadora is that Orlando de Almeida has an absolute majority with which to administer one of the most complicated municipalities in the enveloping Lisbon zone. (J.F.M.)

Amadora

Parishes Verified -- 8
Town Council - 1985

Registered Voters - 127,922
Votes Cast - 78,549 61.40
Blank Ballots - 1,409 1.79
Invalid Ballots - 1,739 2.21

Parishes To Be Verified -- 0
Town Council - 1982

Registered Voters - 117,701
Votes Cast - 85,209 72.39
Blank Ballots - 983 1.15
Invalid Ballots - 948 1.11

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>
APU	37,432 47.65	6
PS	29,178 37.15	4
CDS	8,341 10.62	1
PCTP	450 0.57	

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>
APU	34,966 41.04	5
PS	23,765 27.89	3
AD*	22,949 26.93	3
UDP**	962 1.13	
PCTP	381 0.45	
POUS	255 0.30	

* Democratic Alliance

** Popular Democratic Union

Consolidated Leadership in Amarante

A social democratic victory in the executive board of the Amarante Town Council was expected. There were doubts only as to the some thousands of votes which were cast on 6 October for the PRD, a political force which did not compete in the elections for the self-governing body. Even so, the PSD consolidated its leadership in the municipality, despite the strong challenge too it posed by all of the parties situated to its left and right.

For example, the PS nurtured some hopes of winning the presidency of the council, which was the reason for a rather enthusiastic campaign culminating in the presentation of an ambitious program. Then there was the expectation revealed in an PRD communique which was published in the JORNAL DE AMARANTE, but in the end, it gave no indication of the vote. Only the socialists came up against believers in the deterioration of the image of the president who has now been reelected, and throughout his term had difficulty in dealing even with the social democratic council members.

As to the CDS, for which the vote was weak, and the APU, with even less support, both fell far below what they had hoped. And just as the main force defeated, they can only find an explanation for this result now in the dynamics of the triumph of the party headed by Cavaco Silva. In any case, a question becomes increasingly pertinent: how will interparty relations develop in the Amarante Town Council? (A.M.)

Amarante

Parishes Verified -- 40
Town Council - 1985

Registered Voters - 37,483
Votes Cast - 24,894 66.41
Blank Ballots - 326 1.31
Invalid Ballots - 482 1.94

Parishes To Be Verified -- 0
Town Council - 1982

Registered Voters - 34,306
Votes Cast - 24,832 72.38
Blank Ballots - 433 1.74
Invalid Ballots - 638 2.57

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>
PSD	11,279 45.31	4
PS	7,877 31.64	2
CDS	3,093 12.42	1
APU	1,579 6.34	
UDP	258 1.04	

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>
PSD	10,281 41.40	4
PS	8,928 35.95	3
CDS	2,416 9.73	
APU	1,781 7.17	
UDP	355 1.43	

Socialists Lose Councilman in Braga

Despite the fact that it has won in the Braga municipal elections for the fourth time, the Socialist Party suffered a harsh blow this time. It lost the majority it had in the council and the municipal assembly. In fact, the executive board, headed as always by Mesquita Machado (who has been accused of murky administrative practices, illegalities and favoritism), found itself reduced by one council member in the election the day before yesterday. That seat was won by the PSD, with the support of the CDS and the PPM [Popular Monarchist Party], which formed a new kind of "AD," nominating an independent candidate, Armando Osorio. The socialists, who had an absolute majority in the municipal assembly, also lost that. They lost four municipal deputies' seats, all of which went to the PRD, which, since it did not elect a single councilman, now finds itself represented in that supervisory body alone.

Thus the electorate did heed the appeals of the opposition forces, which sought not only to strengthen their position with regard to the PS (they lost more than 3,000 votes for the council), but also to win the majority away from it. The United People's Alliance, although it won a slight increase in votes, did not succeed in electing another councilman, which it had hoped to do. It continues to have just one, while it maintained its representation in the municipal assembly. Similarly, the CDS, supported by the PSD in the election for that body, also maintained the same number of representatives won by the AD in 1982. (A. S.)

Braga

Parishes Verified -- 61
Town Council - 1985

Registered Voters - 93,100
Votes Cast - 69,452 74.60
Blank Ballots - 1,095 1.58
Invalid Ballots - 898 1.29

Parishes To Be Verified -- 0
Town Council - 1982

Registered Voters - 83,535
Votes Cast - 66,231 79.29
Blank Ballots - 1,360 2.05
Invalid Ballots - 1,087 1.64

	<u>Votes</u>		<u>Term</u>
PS	31,258	45.01	4
PSD	25,726	37.04	4
APU	6,935	9.99	1
PRD	2,642	3.80	
UDP	508	0.73	
PCTP	390	0.56	

	<u>Votes</u>		<u>Term</u>
PS	34,656	52.33	5
AD	21,225	32.05	3
APU	6,775	10.23	1
PCTP	653	0.99	
UDP	475	0.72	

PSD Gains in Cascais

Only the PSD won additional votes in Cascais, with an increase in its aldermen from four to five. The APU, which counted heavily on winning in the council, lost more than 4,000 votes as compared to 1982, although it retained its three seats.

As to the PS and the CDS, their "declines" were considerably greater. The socialists lost about 6,000 votes and the centrists nearly 9,000, and each lost one council member.

The PRD, for its part, saw a decline in relation to the legislative elections of about 10,000 votes. However, it succeeded in winning representation on the executive board of the council with one member. In this connection, it should be noted that in terms of a comparison with the 6 October results, only the PSD and the APU gained (10 and 8 percent, respectively). The rest suffered a decline, and in the case of the socialists and the renewal faction, a significant one. The PS lost 5 points, the CDS 1, and the PRD 12.

To summarize, it can be said that the harsh criticisms made of Helena Roseta's administration by all of the political forces serve no purpose in the Cascais Town Council. The new president of the municipal body, George Dargent, who has always been optimistic about his party's ability to retain the presidency, will therefore be somewhat surprised by the final result, which substantially strengthened the position of the PSD. (J.F.M.)

Cascais

Parishes Verified -- 6
Town Council - 1985

Registered Voters - 115,625
Votes Cast - 66,524 57.53
Blank Ballots - 657 0.99
Invalid Ballots - 646 0.97

Parishes To Be Verified -- 0
Town Council - 1982

Registered Voters - 107,079
Votes Cast - 76,883 71.80
Blank Ballots - 1,100 1.43
Invalid Ballots - 1,251 1.63

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>
PSD	27,711 41.66	5
APU	15,639 23.51	3
PS	8,572 12.89	1
CDS	6,954 10.45	1
PRD	4,768 7.17	
PPM	777 1.17	
UDP	501 0.75	

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>
PSD	22,909 29.80	4
APU	19,772 25.72	3
CDS	15,645 20.35	2
PS	14,738 19.17	2
PCTP	582 0.76	
PPM	466 0.61	
UDP	420 0.55	

PS Bests AD in Coimbra

In Coimbra, the PS was the victim of the same weapons as it used against the APU. In order to oust the communists from the presidency of some municipal councils, the socialists allied themselves with the PSD and/or the CDS, and these parties joined in a coalition with the PPM in the university city to defeat the PS. And they succeeded, although they did have the "aid" of the APU (which increased its representation from one to two seats) and the PRD (which elected one candidate). In other words, while the PSD-CDS-PPM succeeded in retaining the four members they already had, the PS lost to, precisely to the APU and the PRD.

But while the PS and the outgoing town council president (Mendes da Silva) were unable to resist the combined force of these three parties, the same cannot be said with regard to the town council, where the socialists continue to have a majority. This appears to be interpreted as meaning less social democratic loyalty to the coalition, since in the council they voted for their party member, but in the assembly, did not give unanimous support to the centrists who headed the slate of the alliance.

The relative majority obtained by the PSD-CDS-PPM was no great surprise in Coimbra, where there are some who even think that this was only a weak triumph. Without a doubt a better (or greater) result was achieved by the APU, which will again have two councilmen, having been able to resist the PRD and the prospect of a "useful vote" in the PS. The renewal faction members were, on the other hand, the great losers in Coimbra (between the legislative elections and the elections day before yesterday they lost about three-quarters of their voting support). (J.F.)

Coimbra

Parishes Verified -- 31
Town Council - 1985

Registered Voters - 110,815
Votes Cast - 63,516 57.32
Blank Ballots - 1,452 2.29
Invalid Ballots - 986 1.55

Parishes To Be Verified -- 0
Town Council - 1982

Registered Voters - 105,249
Votes Cast - 73,098 69.45
Blank Ballots - 1,513 2.07
Invalid Ballots - 1,371 1.88

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>
PSD	23,758 37.40	4
PS	20,766 32.69	4
APU	11,058 17.41	2
PRD	5,142 8.10	
PCTP	354 0.56	

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>
PS	34,015 46.53	6
AD	24,334 33.29	4
APU	11,188 15.31	1
PCTP	677 0.93	

Political Instinct Wins in Faro

The voters in Faro did not forgive the lukewarm nature of the opposition to Negrao Belo's exercise of local authority. This official was not "dropped" by the PSD but ran as a candidate, and was imposed bag and baggage on the local party factions (he made use of them). He won something over 9,000 votes, which had gone to the AD in 1982.

In this case, the other stronger parties were penalized by the abstentions.

The main victim of this painful electoral lesson was the PRD, which won an insignificant number of votes in the town council election. For the renewal faction members, who ran in the more important municipalities in the Algarve, at least one substantial group of councilmen in the regional capital was essential. They did not get it.

The political struggle was in fact waged between Negrao Belo and Joaquim Belchior of the PS. But the socialists too learned once again that a team of officials for a self-governing body who can win (or recover) the voters' confidence, after a long interval, is not developed overnight. Belchior emerged after such an interval, and appealing to the social memory of the people was not enough for him. Negrao Belo acted precisely during that interval, with "political instinct." The capital of the Algarve now has all of the conditions needed for stability, but the people of Faro are eager for proof. (C.A.)

Faro

Parishes Verified -- 5
Town Council - 1985

Registered Voters - 37,289
Votes Cast - 21,578 57.87
Blank Ballots - 361 1.67
Invalid Ballots - 265 1.23

Parishes To Be Verified -- 0
Town Council - 1982

Registered Voters - 35,439
Votes Cast - 24,728 69.78
Blank Ballots - 429 1.73
Invalid Ballots - 421 1.70

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>
PSD	9,531 44.17	4
APU	4,846 22.46	2
PS	4,620 21.41	1
PRD	1,793 8.31	
UDP	162 0.75	

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>
AD	9,227 37.31	3
PS	8,226 33.27	2
APU	6,155 24.89	2
UDP	270 1.09	

Fifteen Thousand Votes "Gone" in Lisbon

Even a hasty analysis of the results of the 1985 elections for the self-governing bodies in Lisbon immediately suggests one statement and two questions.

The first has to do with the expected reelection of Nuno Abecasis. The camouflaged coalition of the PSD and the CDS left no room for much doubt, in view of the traditional weakness of the PS in the capital, while Goncalo Ribeiro Teles lacked a very solid support base for his aspirations.

The second question has to do with where the 15,000-vote difference between the PSD slate for the executive board of the council and the CDS slate for the municipal assembly went. Did they go to the Socialist Party, which showed a decline of almost 70,000 votes from the 1982 figure? Were they blank votes, due to the refusal of the social democrats to vote for the CDS slate, even though it was negotiated by the party?

The answers will inevitably be inconclusive, due to their axiomatic nature, and they will naturally suit the whim of those who seek to provide an answer, claiming sociological, political or any other kind of factor.

The second question posed will be more readily answered. The president who has been reelected is already accustomed to governing with a minority, but this time, the scale seems to be tipping more drastically. The eight seats won by the PSD need the support of Ribeiro to tip the balance in its favor if the PS reaches an agreement with the APU.

And, as has already been said, the former is a part of the opposition. (E.V.)

Lisbon

Parishes Verified -- 53
Town Council - 1985

Registered Voters - 675,033
Votes Cast - 396,341 58.71
Blank Ballots - 5,211 1.31
Invalid Ballots - 4,639 1.17

Parishes To Be Verified -- 0
Town Council - 1982

Registered Voters - 664,610
Votes Cast - 479,650 72.17
Blank Ballots - 7,044 1.47
Invalid Ballots - 6,884 1.44

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>
PSD	177,439 44.77	8
APU	109,013 27.50	5
PS	71,275 17.98	3
PFM	20,113 5.07	1
UDP	5,839 1.47	
PCTP	1,675 0.42	
POUS	1,137 0.29	

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>
AD	198,274 41.34	7
PS	129,499 27.00	5
APU	127,384 26.56	5
POUS	4,183 0.87	
UDP	4,039 0.84	
PCTP	2,343 0.49	

Sweetest APU Victory in Loures

Severiano Falcao and the APU are firm and strong in Loures. If there had still been any doubt, the results on Sunday served as a plebiscite for an extremely productive and popular presidency.

The PS-PSD coalition notwithstanding (which also had the "cooperation" of the CDS, through its absence), the APU substantially strengthened its position, winning an absolute majority on the executive board of the council.

The communists did not gain much in numbers of votes, but as Severiano Falcao predicted before the election, abstentions "worked to its benefit." In other words, the APU saw a substantial increase of 2,000 votes, but the PS-PSD-CDS bloc lost more than 25,000 in comparison to 1982. In percentage terms, and with regard to the legislative elections, the APU saw an increase from 25.8 to 47.4 percent, and the coalition a decline from 46.7 to 39.2 percent. This serves to confirm the fact that mathematical gains do not suffice when one is faced, as here, with a "personalized vote."

The decline suffered by the PRD, on the other hand, should be emphasized. Its voting strength dropped significantly. It won 22.4 percent in the legislative elections (second, immediately after the APU), while it now commands no more than a modest 7.6 percent.

Loures will have been the sweetest victory in these elections for self-governing bodies in Loures. But what is beyond doubt is that this happened thanks to Falcao, who is in reality "difficult to beat." (J.F.M.)

Loures

Parishes Verified -- 19
Town Council - 1985

Registered Voters - 213,266
Votes Cast - 140,156 65.72
Blank Ballots - 2,926 2.09
Invalid Ballots - 1,612 1.15

Parishes To Be Verified -- 0
Town Council - 1982

Registered Voters - 196,694
Votes Cast - 146,017 74.24
Blank Ballots - 1,031 1.19
Invalid Ballots - 1,717 1.18

	<u>Votes</u>		<u>Term</u>
APU	66,473	47.43	6
PS	55,030	39.26	5
PRD	10,654	7.60	
PCTP	1,385	0.99	
POUS	1,045	0.75	
UDP	1,031	0.74	

	<u>Votes</u>		<u>Term</u>
APU	64,728	44.33	5
PS	41,529	28.44	3
AD	34,023	23.30	3
PCTP	893	0.61	
UDP	857	0.59	
POUS	539	0.37	

Cabral Wins in Oporto

Fernando Cabral was expected to win the presidency of the Oporto Town Council, an eminently political position in the second city in the country in socioeconomic importance. Just as happened, moreover in Lisbon.

In truth, the social democratic candidate was one of the group of five favorites going in, as we have emphasized in articles on the preelectoral situation in that municipality. However the fact that this victory for Fernando Cabral was not essentially based on his personality or political image, despite the fact that he is not exactly unknown in this northern capital, but rather on the strength of the PSD electorate, in quantitative terms, should not be overlooked.

However, if there was no great personal component in the triumph of this social democratic candidate, the same cannot however be said of the main loser in this popular consultation, the socialist Rosado Correia. He even relied heavily on his own charisma and on the exposure he gained while he headed the Ministry of Social Equipment in trying to win the post which had twice escaped him.

The stability of the APU electorate, which enabled it to retain both councilmen from the preceding term, was another relevant factor in this election. But the centrist voters had already decided to punish their candidates, with the loss of one of its two seats on the executive board, which was won by the candidate heading the renewal faction slate.

Oporto

Parishes Verified -- 15
Town Council - 1985

Registered Voters - 268,351
Votes Cast - 163,100 60.78
Blank Ballots - 1,704 1.04
Invalid Ballots - 1,763 1.08

Parishes To Be Verified -- 0
Town Council - 1982

Registered Voters - 259,187
Votes Cast - 191,210 73.77
Blank Ballots - 2,104 1.10
Invalid Ballots - 2,112 1.10

	<u>Votes</u>		<u>Term</u>
PSD	58,824	36.07	5
PS	43,682	26.78	4
APU	29,524	18.10	2
CDS	13,665	8.38	1
PRD	12,089	7.41	1
UDP	1,494	0.92	
PCTP	355	0.22	

	<u>Votes</u>		<u>Term</u>
AD	81,475	42.61	6
PS	65,881	34.45	5
APU	37,275	19.49	2
UDP	1,568	0.82	
PCTP	480	0.25	
OCMLP*	315	0.16	

* Portuguese Communist Organization, Marxist-Leninist

Continuity Guaranteed in Santarem

The possibility of the "diversion" to the new PRD of the votes lost by the PS between 1982 and this year cannot be excluded. But they did not suffice to oust Ladislau Botas from the presidency of the Santarem City Council, after three consecutive terms.

Even taking the boycott of the 1985 elections for the self-governing bodies in two of the parishes of the municipality into account, the numbers already verified tell us that the PSD and the CDS together achieved the same results as were obtained 3 years ago by the extinct Democratic Alliance, which also happened, moreover, with the APU. From this it can be concluded that the members of the renewal faction were the sole factor "disturbing" the traditional electorate of the PS.

Recalling what was previously said about Santarem, another inference which can be drawn, to the effect that the "pragmatism" of this municipal leader is quite resistant to projects which are without a doubt ambitious, but based on inefficient knowledge of the municipal realities, in terms of the material resources for carrying them out. The people of Santarem do not hesitate long between a "bird in the hand" and "two in the bush," and they reelected the man who, if results are to be believed, have governed the municipality satisfactorily for 9 years, even if his administration merits some criticism. The people of Santarem are, seemingly, not unaware of the fact that the good is the adversary of the optimal. (E.V.)

Santarem

Parishes Verified -- 26
Town Council - 1985

Registered Voters -	48,997	
Votes Cast -	31,823	64.95
Blank Ballots -	537	1.69
Invalid Ballots -	344	1.08

Parishes To Be Verified -- 2
Town Council - 1982

Registered Voters -	47,984	
Votes Cast -	33,752	70.34
Blank Ballots -	628	1.86
Invalid Ballots -	639	1.89

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>
PS	12,403	38.97
PSD	8,586	26.98
APU	4,799	15.08
PRD	3,463	10.88
CDS	1,691	5.31

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>
PS	16,564	49.08
AD	10,172	30.14
APU	5,208	15.43
POUS	381	1.13
PCTP	160	0.47

APU Dethroned in Setubal

Setubal was one of the two municipalities in the district (the other was Montijo) where the presidency of the municipal council went from the APU to the PS. This result was not however the cause of great surprise. In fact, although there was no PS-PSD coalition formally, such did exist in fact and in substance (and, in the self-governing bodies of Setubal, for the first time). It further benefitted from the votes of the CDS, which did not sponsor a slate on Sunday. Now the PS and the PSD had always, taken together, won a majority of the votes in the council. If we compare the results in the 1982 local elections with those in 1985, we see that the APU saw a decline from 43.21 percent of the votes cast (23,755) to 39 percent (19,822), with a reduction from five to four seats. This decline was affected, apart from the greater number of abstentions, by the fact that the PRD competed for votes in the self-governing council for the first time, winning 14.74 percent (7,491 votes--one seat). The PS and the PSD, which competed for votes separately in 1982, obtained 31.01 percent (17,048 votes) and 14.33 percent (7,877), respectively, this year, which taken together total 45.34 percent (24,925 votes). They thus won four seats (three for the PS and one for the PSD), just as many as they have now in coalition. But the table below will show that the results obtained by the two parties in the "central bloc" taken together showed a decline between 1982 and 1985, apart from the fact that the goal of winning five seats and thus an absolute majority (as the candidate heading the slate, Mata Caceres, emphasized to DIARIO DE NOTICIAS) was not achieved, such that this majority remained in the hands of the opposition.

Setubal

Parishes Verified -- 8
Town Council - 1985

Registered Voters -	79,180	
Votes Cast -	50,823	64.19
Blank Ballots -	720	1.42
Invalid Ballots -	462	0.91

Parishes To Be Verified -- 0
Town Council - 1982

Registered Voters -	73,661	
Votes Cast -	54,970	74.63
Blank Ballots -	667	1.21
Invalid Ballots -	809	1.47

	<u>Votes</u>		<u>Term</u>
PS	21,414	42.13	4
APU	19,821	39.00	4
PRD	7,491	14.74	1
UDP	704	1.39	
PCTP	211	0.42	

	<u>Votes</u>		<u>Term</u>
APU	23,755	43.21	5
PS	17,048	31.01	3
PSD	7,877	14.33	1
CDS	3,597	6.54	
UDP	880	1.60	
PCTP	337	0.67	

Socialist Effort in Sintra Fails

In Sintra, everything has remained (practically) the same. While 3 years ago, the PSD-CDS won the presidency of the town council by a close margin (1,413) over the APU, that difference was decreased by about half on Sunday (712 votes). And it can be said that if there was a loser, it was the PS.

In fact, the great change seen in the membership structure of the council from one administration to the other lay in the "transfer" of one seat from the PS to the PRD. The socialists, although they recovered some of what they lost to the renewal faction on 6 October, failed categorically in their bid to win the presidency of the council.

In relation to the legislative elections, the PRD suffered a decline of "only" 14 points. These were votes which "slid over" to the APU (about 12 percent) or "returned" to the PS (1.5 percent). The sharp decline for the democratic renewal faction, such as to provide the "perhaps" greatest surprise in the voting for the council, also served to reverse a trend which has been seen in Sintra since 1979, the domination of the "political vote" over the "personalized vote." Thus the results in practice went contrary to the predictions, which pointed to some potential for the PRD in the race for the council presidency. It would be well not to lose sight of the fact that the renewal faction there was that which won the most votes in the legislative elections. (J.F.M.)

Setubal

Parishes Verified -- 13
Town Council - 1985

Registered Voters - 171,767
Votes Cast - 99,746 58.07
Blank Ballots - 1,336 1.34
Invalid Ballots - 1,390 1.39

Parishes To Be Verified -- 0
Town Council - 1982

Registered Voters - 158,768
Votes Cast - 113,449 71.46
Blank Ballots - 1,684 1.48
Invalid Ballots - 1,820 1.60

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>
PSD	32,181 32.26	4
APU	31,469 31.55	4
PS	21,387 21.44	2
PRD	10,433 10.46	1
PCTP	451 0.45	

	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Term</u>
AD	37,362 32.93	4
APU	35,949 31.69	4
PS	34,792 30.67	3
UDP	1,186 1.05	
PCTP	656 0.58	

Situation Unchanged in Vila do Conde

Engineer Mario Almeida, who was reelected as president of the Vila do Conde Town Council, was right when he told us he had confidence in the voters and in the work done by the executive board he has headed for some years now. The fact is that there have been no major changes in that pretty town. The PS has had absolute majorities in the council, and perhaps more important, in the municipal assembly.

It is not of interest at this point to count the votes each party won or lost, since what is important are the final results. Out of seven councilmen, the PS elected five, as happened before. The PSD garnered the other two seats, while the CDS, which had previously competed in a coalition with that party, found itself excluded. The APU, which came close to placing a representative in the council, will have to await another opportunity, and the PRD did not sponsor a candidate for this body.

The main concern of the PS was the possibility of losing its absolute majority in the town council, and now that this can be discussed without fear of charges of trying to manipulate, as occurred when a report on that council was published, there was the impression that all of the parties counted more on that possibility, because we have been told that the socialists, "proposed and disposed" because they were always certain that the municipal assembly would sagely say "amen" to all their undertakings or lack thereof.

It remains to comment on the PRD. Its hopes were dashed and in the end it elected only one deputy to the assembly, in which body the socialists are represented by 18, the PPD-PSD by eight, the CDS by two, and the APU also by two. (P. de C.)

Vila do Conde

Parishes Verified -- 30
Town Council - 1985

Registered Voters -	45,777	
Votes Cast -	33,062	72.22
Blank Ballots -	362	1.09
Invalid Ballots -	453	1.37

Parishes To Be Verified -- 0
Town Council - 1982

Registered Voters -	42,439	
Votes Cast -	32,154	75.77
Blank Ballots -	536	1.67
Invalid Ballots -	702	2.18

	<u>Votes</u>		<u>Term</u>
PS	19,420	58.74	5
PSD	8,813	26.66	2
CDS	2,130	6.44	
APU	1,884	5.70	

	<u>Votes</u>		<u>Term</u>
PS	17,402	54.12	5
AD	10,382	32.29	2
APU	3,132	9.74	

CDS Regains Council Control in Viseu

The CDS has recovered the presidency of the Viseu City Council after 3 years. This period was not in fact the most auspicious for the local PSD. The candidate heading the slate with which it won the 1982 elections was in the end to be removed following an inquiry into his administration, and he was succeeded in the post, by the fourth of his council members, because the rest were legally barred. And the drafting of the slate with a view to the election held day before yesterday also turned out in the end not to be a peaceful process.

The Christian Democrats, led by the charismatic engineer Engracio Carrilho, thus succeeded, as moreover was expected in various circles, in winning back a post which that party has always keenly desired.

This was achieved, however, mainly at the expense of the PS, which, having elected two individuals in 1982, now has but one representative. The PRD obtained which is really a very insignificant electoral percentage (3.9 percent), like the APU itself, whose "score" dropped from 3.7 to a mere 2.9. It will not be possible to say that this time, as in fact they were in the legislative elections, the renewal faction members were the "executioners" of the socialists.

The centrist advantage over the social democrats was not to reach the 1,000-vote level. But in fact this sufficed to deprive them of the majority they had had for 3 years. (S.R.)

Viseu

Parishes Verified -- 33
Town Council - 1985

Registered Voters - 62,987
Votes Cast - 40,851 64.86
Blank Ballots - 674 1.65
Invalid Ballots - 825 2.02

Parishes To Be Verified -- 0
Town Council - 1982

Registered Voters - 58,895
Votes Cast - 40,553 68.86
Blank Ballots - 801 1.98
Invalid Ballots - 1,055 2.60

	<u>Votes</u>		<u>Term</u>
CDS	15,537 38.03	4	
PSD	14,678 35.93	4	
PS	6,103 14.94	1	
PRD	1,611 3.94		
APU	1,177 2.88		
UDP	246 0.60		

	<u>Votes</u>		<u>Term</u>
PSD	14,512 35.79	4	
CDS	12,453 30.71	3	
PS	8,652 21.34	2	
APU	1,518 3.74		
PPM	1,023 2.52		
UDP	539 1.33		

Comparison With Legislative Elections

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 20-26 Dec 85 p 9

[Article by Jorge Gaspar, who occupies a professorial chair at the Jeographic Studies Center: "Results for the Increasingly Self-Governing Bodies"]

[Text] The map showing the distribution of votes in the elections for self-governing bodies, and in particular the municipal elections, still remains rather close to that for the legislative elections. Three main factors contributed to this result: the requirement that only parties or party coalitions sponsor candidates in the municipal elections; the relative youth of the political party system, with a rather rigid pattern of electoral behavior since the first election; and, finally, the frequency with which legislative elections have been held, since with the aid of the major mass media, in particular television, they tend to have the effect of carrying local elections along with them. However, a comparative analysis of the election results for the self-governing bodies since 1976 shows that the differences from the legislative elections have been tending to increase.

For example, there is increasing autonomy on the local level, justified and strengthened by daily practice. Local forces and personalities are asserting themselves, in many cases against the current of the political party forces which are dominant in ideological terms. The proof of this is seen in the successive victorious candidacies of individuals who have changed party support. And there have now been changes in the widest variety of party affiliations, in both directions: APU-PS, PS-PSD, CDS-PSD, CDS-PPM, PPM-PSD, PS-PRD, and PSD-PRD.

Thus the results in the election for self-governing bodies have increasingly been losing overall political meaning, and therefore the framework for their analysis should be more limited and localized. Case by case, it is important to focus the analysis on real local situations, and very especially on an assessment of the "work" done, since unlike the background for the legislative elections, very often the desire for progress and identification with those who may achieve it are replaced by the fear of losing what has already been achieved locally ("in such a short time"), and the identification is with the city council, i.e., the president.

Electoral Map Stable

However, we must not lose sight of the most important characteristic of the electoral geography with regard to the self-governing bodies--the stability of the major outlines on the map which has been developing since 1976. The main variations are local and have more to do with the men who are the protagonists in politics "in the field" than with the changes, realized or desired, espoused by the party forces on the national level.

With advances and retreats, although it is not always possible to say which is dominant, the large areas remain, because, among other things, the country has not as yet changed too much, and the political forces themselves continue to adapt to the changes. Thus the more conservative and/or liberal parties dominate in the center and the north, with greater overall voting support in the interior, while Lisbon and a part of its Western periphery constitute an exception within the territory, to a certain extent, explained by the dominant social structure. The Communist Party, in coalition with the MDP [Portuguese Democratic Movement], continues to show strong influence in Alentejo and in the Lisbon metropolitan area. The Socialist Party dominates in the hinge areas between the north and the south, in the urban industrial areas along the central and northern coast and in the Algarve.

Winners and Losers, Where and Why

In the elections last 15 December, even more than in others, with one single exception, all of the party forces regarded themselves as victors. What seems generally to be difficult to accept does have an explanation: all of them scored important triumphs, and all of them had reasons to be satisfied. This was due to two main causes. First, the various temporary alliances, explicit or implicit, which have followed one upon the other in the various elections, make comparative analyses difficult, and second, the primary focus of comparisons was the election on 6 October last, and in that connection, what the PRD lost served to satisfy the other four party groups.

Obviously, although a comparison with the recent legislative elections is necessary, the only correct method within the context of local government is to limit the comparison to the local elections. Basically, what was at stake was an assessment of the self-governing bodies elected in 1982, and not the PS-PSD government in office between 1983 and 1985, nor the Cavalco Silva government which emerged from the 6 October elections.

Viewed thus, and taking the various coalitions mentioned into account, the only triumph (measured by the increase in percentage of votes) which is not subject to doubt is that which the complex of parties in the old AD can claim. But it is still difficult to analyze separately, for example, the portion of the victory which can be ascribed to the PSD (the party which clearly benefitted most from the policy of alliances, both with the right wing and the left). The situation in Lisbon is quite indicative. In that city alone, the PSD had the support of 10.8 percent of its total electorate for the city councils, with doubt remaining as to what portion fell to the CDS.

Therefore, we have analyzed the variation in the percentages of votes (percentage votes) between the elections for city councils in 1982 and 1985 on the basis of adjusted voting totals. Naturally, we examined the APU and also the PS, which did not participate in a coalition in 1982 (a single case with the UDES [Union of the Social Democratic Left] is not significant) separately.

The complex of parties in the AD which controlled a total of 42 percent of the votes in 1982 saw an increase by 1985 to 44.2 percent. The PS saw a drop from 31.1 to 27.4 percent, and the APU a decline from 20.5 to 19.4 percent. It should be noted that we are using provisional and still incomplete values, but the likely changes are in the range of one-tenth.

Thus the greatest difference in the results between the two municipal elections is seen in the PRD votes (4.7 percent). In other words, had that party not participated, which it did in slightly more than one-third of the municipalities, everything would nonetheless have remained about the same. The total for the AD parties would not have changed, the APU would not have seen the loss, or might even have seen a slight increase, and the PS would have suffered a smaller decline. Or, in other words, the APU and the PS would have retained a few more majorities and the PSD would have gained an additional one or more.

An analysis of the variations by district (Fig. 1) more clearly reveals the continuity in the voting, in which the only (limited) "disturbance" reflects the introduction of the PRD.

Thus the APU held steady in 10 districts and in the autonomous regions, gained in Lisbon and lost in the northeast, in Leiria, Santarem, Beja and Faro. The results of an analysis of the consequences of the polarization caused by the coalition (implicit or explicit) between the PS and the PSD (with or without the support of the CDS) are curious. Generally speaking, the advantage went to the APU, and so, among other conclusions, it can thus be viewed as the only force in local government capable of providing an alternative to the other more influential parties. Where there was polarization, a stronger APU vote was not more widespread (in Setubal, Ribatejo, Alentejo and the Algarve) due to the intervention of the PRD.

The PS gained only in Beja (benefitting somewhat from the coalition with the PSD), and it held steady in Setubal (for the same reason) and in Braganca, showing a decline in all the other districts and in the autonomous regions. Generally speaking, the PRD was the main beneficiary of this decline, although on the northern and central coasts, the PSD also won significant gains over the PS.

The parties in the former AD, among which the PSD still seems to dominate with the greatest strength, had the most significant gains in Viana do Castelo and Aveiro, thanks to the PS, and only lost strength in the districts of Setubal, Lisbon, Evora and Beja, in part due to votes which went to the PS, and in part due to the "resistance" of the APU.

If, finally, we study the variations in the votes of the capital PS-PSD-CDS-PPM as a whole, which to some extent were involved in (implicit or explicit, two-, three-, or four-way coalitions in 1982 or 1985), it becomes clear that there was only an increase in Vila Real (+1.3 percent) while the group maintained its position in Braga (+0.6 percent) and Beja (-0.8 percent) and showed a decline in the autonomous regions and the remaining districts, more severe in some of them--Setubal (-6.8 percent), Castelo Branco (-8.6 percent), and Santarem (-7.5 percent). In its main outlines, this map corresponds to that showing the relative influence of the PRD.

Influence of the 6 October Elections

As can be seen from what we have said, the parliamentary elections have not basically influenced the voting choices of the electorate in the local elections. Despite the lack of financial, technical and human resources, all of the self-governing bodies are doing tangible work, either mainly cosmetic, developmental or pertaining only to social security (aid). Therefore the leaders of the self-governing bodies tend to remain in office. In the parliament, however, the discontent of substantial sectors of the electorate, prepared to try some change, has always been present.

However, the proximity of legislative elections always influences others to some extent. Similarly, the resulting practice of the parties in the government or the Assembly of the Republic may also have electoral consequences, although in another sector.

Something of this sort, although with different characteristics, may have occurred with the PRD and the PSD. The electorate of the former, strongly characterized by anxiety and the hope for immediate action, in particular in the promised change in practice, which it did not see reflected in the local candidates the party proposed, may be disillusioned, leading it to increase the sector abstaining or to return to its origins. In the PSD, on the contrary, there is not only a dynamics of victory but also the hope that the promises will be kept alive, which favors the prospects for harmony between the local and central governments. Here again the PSD has once more won with its policy of alliances (implicit or explicit).

The Rural and Urban Votes

The fact that the officials of the self-governing bodies are reelected in successive elections, both in the rural and the urban town councils, serves to a certain extent to challenge some ideas about the difference between the two votes. Voting for personalities and the emergence of local bosses may not be limited to the rural sectors alone.

On the other hand, in order to understand the gradual standardization of the rural and urban votes, in the north as well as the center, south and autonomous regions, it is necessary to consider the changes which have occurred on the social and economic levels, and which have contributed to the elimination of the particular difference between the urban and rural sectors in terms of access to information and individual aspirations.

A further comment is merited on the voting in the two urban industrial areas, Lisbon and Oporto, which we might call the metropolitan vote. It is first of all a more politically aware vote, both in the sense that the relationship between ideological choices and social status can be more clearly seen, and in the sense that local issues lose relative importance in comparison to the problems of social and economic achievement. It remains interesting to note, however, that in the metropolitan areas as well, local issues are gradually becoming of greater concern to the people who, feeling incapable of intervening on the superstructural level, in an atmosphere of crisis, are seeking at least to protect (and improve) their living circumstances on the residential level. This is seen, for example, in the discussions which have developed in the rural sector about the specific problems in the two leading cities in the country, and in the great differences between the political vote and the self-governing body vote of the APU in the municipalities most affected by the negative external effects of the growth of the metropolitan phenomenon--Loures, Amadora, Vila Franca de Xira and the Southern Strip.

Rate of Abstention

For well-known reasons, important among them being the absence of the full force of the mass communications media, as well as the consensus reached by certain candidates, leading their political opponents to fail to take a stand (as electors) in the elections for self-governing bodies, these elections always have higher rates of abstention than the parliamentary elections. This is natural.


On the other hand, due to external reasons, which we have already analyzed, including for example the inadequate method used to update the electoral records, the abstention rate has always been an artificial component which tends to rise. But this alone does not explain the 36 percent last Sunday, which is very close to the 35.4 percent in 1976. Another explanatory factor, moreover, comes into this comparison: the proximity in time between elections tends to tire the voters. In 1976, we had three consecutive elections. We can see that with elections for the parliament and the self-governing bodies separated by 15 days in 1979, the abstention levels were 12.5 percent and 26.2 percent, respectively, a larger difference than that seen now between October and December--24.6 percent and 36 percent.

A rapid analysis of the percentage variation in the rates of abstention between the 1982 and 1985 municipal elections (Fig. 2) serves to reveal three additional aspects which it is important to remember. First, abstention tended to increase more in the districts where the level was lower. Second, it tended to remain high in the districts with less political polarization. And third, there were great increases in districts where, due to the polarization of the positions of some parties, a reduction in the usual voting

choices of the electorate occurred in a certain number of councils (clear cases in the districts of Setubal, Lisbon, Beja and Evora).

It is important then to remember that abstention, although it had reached the highest level (or highest levels?) since 1975, was not by any means a reflection of apathy or an antidemocratic attitude. As we have written earlier in more detailed analyses, abstention is also a political and democratic attitude. Unlike what is sometimes claimed, democracy cannot be limited to the choice of the lesser evil, nor can abstention mean one does not favor democracy.

Percentage (Point) Differences Between 1982 and 1985



Variation in Abstention Between 1982 and 1985



5157
CS0: 3542/55

POLITICAL

SPAIN

ORDONEZ CONFIDENT ON NATO REFERENDUM, SPEAKS ON OTHER ISSUES

Madrid TIEMPO in Spanish 18 Nov 85 pp 19-22

[Interview with Foreign Minister Francisco Fernandez Ordonez by Nativel Preciado; date, time and place not given]

[Text] [Question] Do you know that you arouse great passions?

[Answer] No, in fact I didn't know.

[Question] Either they hate you or they admire you; there is no middle ground.

[Answer] That puzzles me, because I consider myself very insignificant. The problem is, in Spain there is a type of celebrity that lives in what Azana called the temperate zone of the spirit. That was the case with him, and perhaps with me as well. We are people who cause irritation in certain sectors of the right by being reasonable.

[Question] They say terrible things about you.

[Answer] I have never been accused of anything specific, nor have I done anything to provoke hatred. I do not think I am capable of inspiring great passion in favor of me either, because we moderates by definition do not arouse passion.

[Question] They say you are intelligent and effective, but above all malleable, and that is a defect in politics.

[Answer] Malleable? I have always had a reputation as an "enfant terrible," a destructive person. . . . These are contradictory criticisms. It's not that I have such a high opinion of myself; on the contrary, as the years go by one tends to judge oneself more harshly. But to say that I am malleable strikes me as a stupid and contradictory judgment, like so many others.

[Question] Do you think they are envious of you?

[Answer] I am not an enviable person, either. It is true that I have led a happy and tranquil private life. I have overcome the classic obstacles, I

have attained a respectable status as a professional . . . but I have always worked hard. Envy in Spain is an uncontrollable emotion.

[Question] A man who is so persuasive in his modesty does not seem real.

[Answer] If I am persuasive it is because I say what I think. I go by the "maybe," the "I think," the "it seems to me" . . . I always stay in the territory of what is reasonable, and in some cases that in itself ends up convincing people.

[Question] It is bad for a politician to be so doubtful.

[Answer] I know that here the politician is supposed to choose between black and white, true and false. The president of the government has been criticized a lot because he said he was not certain of the roads that lead to liberty and justice. That is very much in line with what Willy Brandt said. It has been said for a long time that doubt is a form of intelligence.

[Question] Do you feel you are the prototype of the useful politician?

[Answer] That is nasty question. You know I don't.

[Question] Are you proud to be indispensable?

[Answer] No, I consider myself absolutely dispensable.

[Question] How do you manage to prevent them from doing without you?

[Answer] I was out of politics for several years, and I led a tranquil and happy existence. I get the feeling that I am in politics, but that I am not a politician; the feeling of being someone who gets by. The fact is that I have been more at ease in politics since I made the final break with the Democratic Center Union (UCD), going on 5 years ago, rebuilt my old social democratic party, and finally joined up with the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE).

[Question] It is considered bad form here to belong to governments with diverse ideologies.

[Answer] A respected politician like Andreotti has participated in a wide variety of governments in his country, and has been president several times. . . I have not committed any ideological contradictions or betrayed myself. Going over what I have written, what I have said, and what I have done, I find a tremendous consistency. Looking back, I feel terribly monotonous. Ten years ago I was a social democrat as I am now; I had the same opinions about divorce, fiscal reform, NATO, . . . and even about what my future would be in a socialist party like this one.

[Question] What is your idea of political loyalty?

[Answer] Friendship has a hard time flowering in politics. There is a strong dose of ambition, vanity and envy, but there is also generosity and affection.

I have always tried to be understanding with my friends and not judge them. Friends don't judge each other.

[Question] And what about the other kind of loyalty? Your marriage is known to be indestructible.

[Answer] Yes, we are still very close, although I have not spent much time at home since I was named foreign minister.

[Question] Are you happy at 55 years of age?

[Answer] I always like to quote the saying that happiness is a stroke of luck that lasts. When one begins to look back, a little of the maturity has already gone by. I have become, as Maranon said, a packrat of time. In other words, someone who does not waste a single minute or let an instant go unused. When I discover that I have little free time when my mind is organized, I get anxious. I would like to write a great book on Spain. I have the material to do it; I lack only the time.

[Question] Would you like to go down in history?

[Answer] What I want to do is write about history, not go down in it. The cemeteries are full of people now forgotten who had the illusion of going down in history.

[Question] In Finance, fiscal reform; in Justice, divorce; what mark would you like to leave in the Foreign Ministry?

[Answer] My role in this ministry is nothing brilliant. In politics, as in bullfighting, you have to fight all kinds of bulls. I have to consolidate the EEC issue, resolve the matter of NATO, reduce the U.S. military presence in Spain, restore relations with Israel, adapt the Foreign Ministry to Spain's new situation . . . As you can see, the bull I have in front of me is enormous.

[Question] You could go down in history if you manage to get rid of the U.S. military.

[Answer] It is a question of reducing their presence, and I think we will accomplish that. Didn't you say I am very persuasive?

[Question] Spaniards would greet the news with tremendous enthusiasm, but it seems impossible that they will ever leave.

[Answer] Well, let's be serious. We are explaining to the Americans that their military presence has not been reviewed in 30 years, and that at this time it is probably excessive, given current needs.

[Question] Reagan and Shultz do not appear to be familiar with President Gonzalez' decalogue.

[Answer] It has been explained to them, by both the president and myself, and I am convinced that they are perfectly well informed.

[Question] They give the impression that they do not believe what they hear. The idea of cutting back on their troops strikes them as an audacious suggestion by Spain.

[Answer] Not at all. We have a right to bring up the issue, with all its ramifications. That is what Spain wants, and we have reason on our side. This will not diminish our contribution to collective security. The Americans know this, even those who at first may not have understood the problem. The cutback will take place, in spite of the incredulous ones.

[Question] They say Felipe Gonzalez named you because the Americans were comfortable with you.

[Answer] I would like you to ask them about that. The fact is, I must not be too easy for them to accept. When it comes time to defend Spain's interests, I am as tough as anyone. I know them very well and I have been talking with them for years; they also know me, because I have some great friends who are U.S. politicians. I do not have a complex. I was very happy during the years when I lived in the United States.

[Question] At any rate, if there is any success, President Gonzalez will take the credit, not you.

[Answer] Of course, and that is as it should be, although I don't perceive him as being so eager to take credit.

[Question] Don't you feel the need for more autonomy? You give the impression that you do not take a single step without consulting with Felipe Gonzalez.

[Answer] Any foreign minister would do the same with any president in any country in the world. The best parts, like the upcoming talks between Reagan and Gorbachev in Geneva, are reserved for the presidents. The important thing is for the president to communicate very well with his minister. And in this case, you needn't have the slightest doubt about it. Besides, I have as much autonomy as I need.

[Question] Who made the blunder of expelling the Polisario Front from Spain, the president or you?

[Answer] These things can result in a lot of demagoguery. It pains me to keep bringing up that unfortunate incident. It was the response the entire government took to the machine-gunning of our boats, in which two Spaniards lost their lives. That was an isolated incident, a specific response to a specific action.

[Question] A dramatic response.

[Answer] Not nearly as dramatic as the action. Anyway, the government wants to play down the affair with the Polisario Front. I can say that this regrettable incident will not change Spain's foreign policy with respect to North Africa.

[Question] We are very bad off in North Africa.

[Answer] What people in the EEC call the southern shore of the Mediterranean could be one of the most tense spots in the world. We may have even more elements of tension. The 800 boats that are fishing in nearby waters are a problem we must bear in mind. We have already resolved the dispute with Algeria, and in general our relations are calmer with all of North Africa. But the problems are inevitable, because neighbors always have problems in their relations.

[Question] The problem is that Spain will be a target for international terrorism if it establishes relations with Israel.

[Answer] I don't think so. We are holding talks with almost all the Arab foreign ministers, and they are aware that Spain will take that step on the basis of the principle of the universality of diplomatic relations. That will not change our policy in the Arab world.

[Question] Will we be in the EEC on 1 January?

[Answer] I am confident that we will be; that is my desire and my hope.

[Question] Is the government preparing any surprise for the foreign policy debate that will take place in December?

[Answer] There is no surprise left.

[Question] I am referring to the NATO referendum.

[Answer] I cannot and should not say anything new about that matter. The referendum will take place, and we will win it.

[Question] It is rumored again that the elections will be moved up to March, so goodbye referendum.

[Answer] Calling elections is not within the purview of my ministry. I have no reason to believe they will be moved up. In any case, we are working normally here, based on our assumption that the dates will remain the same and that the referendum will be held.

[Question] "White cat, black cat, what difference does it make if it catches mice?" is a saying tailor made for you.

[Answer] Like all sayings, it is meaningful in the proper context. When President Gonzalez quoted it, he was referring to Chinese communism; thus, it was taken out of context. It is a thought expressed by Deng Xiao Ping, quoted

in many books. I am surprised it drew so much attention; that means that some people are not very well read.

[Question] Anyway, you are an excellent mouser.

[Answer] In politics, the means are becoming increasingly important. Don't tell me about the ends you are pursuing, I care only about the means you use. Ideological content has been reduced all over the world. The important thing in any policy is how much does it cost and who will pay for it. And that lies at the heart of great debates: who catches the mice and who lets them get away.

8926

CSO: 3548/25

POLITICAL

SPAIN

NATO ATTITUDES SLOWLY CHANGING; PSOE, GONZALEZ STILL POPULAR

Madrid ACTUALIDAD ECONOMICA in Spanish 2 Dec 85 pp 22-28

[Text] The government's intention of garnering more social support for Spain's remaining in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has begun to find some backing: For the first time in the past year, ACTUALIDAD ECONOMICA's "Barometer" has been able to detect a slight decline in the number of people favoring our departure from NATO, and a slight increase in those who defend membership or the maintenance of the status quo. The results of the referendum are still in the hands of Socialist voters.

The publication of the 24th opinion poll, which marks the end of the second year of ACTUALIDAD ECONOMICA's exclusive "Barometer," coincides with the 7th anniversary of the referendum in which the Constitution was approved. After 7 years, it can be confirmed, as was noted after the poll conducted in September of this year, that the majority of Spaniards have a high opinion of both democracy as a political system and the Constitution that was drafted on the basis of a consensus among the majority parties.

Voting Plans: Still Pending

Democracy, as in the first poll of December 1983, is regarded as "good" by more than 3/4 of Spaniards, and the Constitution by more than 3/5.

It is appropriate to take another look at the oft-measured image of the Spanish Government and its president, Felipe Gonzalez. On this occasion, both have improved. The government garners 3.6 percent more "good" responses and 0.2 percent more "bad" responses, resulting in a neutral vote 3.4 points higher, though still negative.

President Felipe Gonzalez has a 2.1-percent higher "good" rating, and a 1.6-point drop in his "bad" rating, yielding a neutral vote 3.7 points higher.

The improved image of the government and the president holds true across the board among the different constituencies, coinciding with the stability of the Socialist vote. There is hardly any difference with respect to the previous poll, in which, it may be recalled, a simulated parliamentary election resulted in an absolute majority of deputies for the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) with a slight margin.

Aside from the almost identical results among Socialist voters, people's plans to vote--both the direct responses and the projected plans of undecided voters--reflect a certain downward trend in the vote for the Popular Alliance (AP). The latter loses 2.1 points in this poll on the direct responses and 1.2 points on the projected undecided vote, compared with last month's survey.

The Spanish Communist Party (PCE) declines slightly and the Democratic and Social Center (CDS) increases, which puts it in third place again, overtaking Gerardo Iglesias' party.

CiU, even with the loss of a tenth of a point, remains in good shape. In last month's simulated parliamentary election it tied with the Socialist Party of Catalonia in the number of deputies: 17 seats each.

The Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), Herri Batasuna (HB) and EE appear to be holding onto their respective constituencies, although their reduced influence among the national parties prevents them from exerting more pressure.

The PRD is losing ground from its already weak political position.

NATO Referendum: Date and Question

Given the apparently imminent referendum on NATO, we are obliged, as we have been since the first poll, to repeat the research on the kind of relationship Spain should have with the Atlantic Alliance. This question will have to be asked again in the next survey if, as expected, the government announces the specific wording of the question that will be put to the public in the referendum.

For the time being, a slight decline can be detected in those advocating our departure from NATO; 6 months ago they represented 45 percent of the respondents, and in the past 4 months they have dropped to about 41 percent. Nevertheless, those who want to pull out of NATO (41.3 percent) still outnumber those who want to stay (35.6 percent) in either of the possible forms, total membership or just membership in the political organization, not the military one.

In any case, as has been noted previously, it is the Socialist voters who will determine the outcome of the referendum, and at present 46.8 percent of them favor leaving NATO, compared to 30.5 percent advocating continued membership. If 6 percent of Socialist voters changed their vote from pulling out to staying in, or if 12 percent of Socialist voters favoring our departure decided to abstain, the results would change and the government's pro-NATO option would ultimately win.

Suarez Closes

Adolfo Suarez gains ground in the ranking of leaders according to popularity, with 2.4 points more than before. This is the highest rating he has obtained in the "Barometer," and the closest he has come to the perennial front-runner,

Felipe Gonzalez. In January Gonzalez had a 17.5-point lead, and now the gap between them has narrowed to just 6.2 points.

Alfonso Guerra is still on a downslide. Roca, with a 2.8-point increase, confirms the rising prestige of the leaders of the center. On this occasion, this trend has a certain impact on the leader of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) and the old left-wing standard-bearer in the pack, Oscar Alzaga.

The Communist leaders, with their ongoing internal disputes, continue to reach new lows.

Technical Data

Poll directed by: Tecnicas de Comunicacion, Consultores, S.A.

Poll conducted by: Sigma-Dos, S.A.

Population: People 18 years or older.

Location: Spain, except for the Canary Islands, using 11 autonomous regions as a sample.

Sample: 1,111 interviews, with a margin of error of 3 percent, for a confidence interval of 95.5 percent and $p/q = 50$, according to the Arkin and Colton tables.

Selection: Random, on the basis of the "Random Route" method, complemented with the system of correcting for sex, age and profession.

Interviews: conducted personally in the home.

Dates of field work: 4 to 8 November 1985.

NATO Gaining Ground

In your opinion, what kind of relationship should Spain maintain with NATO?

Overall

	Dec 83	Jun 84	Oct 84	Nov 84	Dec 84	Jan 85	Jun 85	Sep 85	Oct 85	Nov 85
Total membership	13.7	15.2	11.8	13.6	13.0	12.8	13.1	14.8	14.9	15.7
Political membership only, not military	20.0	15.0	12.3	21.7	19.4	19.9	16.5	16.3	18.3	19.9
Total withdrawal	49.2	39.8	44.4	44.0	46.8	44.8	45.4	47.6	42.6	41.3
Don't know/no resp.	17.1	30.0	31.5	20.7	20.8	22.6	24.8	28.4	24.2	23.1

By Party



	Dec 83	Jun 84	Oct 84	Nov 84	Dec 84	Jan 85	Jun 85	Sep 85	Oct 85	Nov 85
Total membership	4.0	4.2	6.2	5.6	6.5	5.1	7.3	4.9	6.6	8.4
Political membership only, not military	16.1	17.3	12.4	22.9	23.7	20.6	18.3	22.7	21.9	22.1
Total withdrawal	63.0	48.6	53.6	53.5	48.7	55.4	50.4	48.4	44.8	46.8
Don't know/no resp.	16.9	29.9	27.8	18.0	21.0	19.0	24.0	24.1	26.6	22.7

ap

	Dec 83	Jun 84	Oct 84	Nov 84	Dec 84	Jan 85	Jun 85	Sep 85	Oct 85	Nov 85
Total membership	38.5	41.2	29.7	37.7	35.4	43.3	39.9	47.3	45.2	39.2
Political membership only, not military	23.1	15.3	14.4	26.3	23.0	19.2	16.5	14.2	17.7	20.3
Total withdrawal	24.8	12.2	15.7	16.7	15.5	16.3	21.8	10.2	11.8	19.8
Don't know/no resp.	71.6	31.3	40.2	19.3	26.1	22.7	21.8	28.3	25.3	20.7

CE

	Dec 83	Jun 84	Oct 84	Nov 84	Dec 84	Jan 85	Jun 85	Sep 85	Oct 85	Nov 85
Total membership	2.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.8	0.0	2.1	8.6
Political membership only, not military	12.5	8.3	5.8	4.4	1.3	1.8	1.8	0.0	4.3	8.6
Total withdrawal	81.3	88.1	85.5	93.7	90.5	92.9	94.7	90.7	91.5	81.1
Don't know/no resp.	4.1	5.6	8.7	2.2	0.0	5.4	1.8	9.3	2.1	1.7

The Good Constitution

What do you think of the Spanish Constitution?

Overall

	Dec 83	Feb 84	Apr 84	Jun 84	Aug 84	May 85	Sep 85	Nov 85
Good	61.1	61.1	66.3	59.9	67.0	66.9	61.0	61.9
OK	24.0	24.5	20.8	22.8	20.9	20.4	22.2	23.5
Bad	5.9	7.2	5.9	9.6	5.7	6.9	8.6	8.4

By Party



	Dec 83	Feb 84	Apr 84	Jun 84	Aug 84	May 85	Sep 85	Nov 85
Good	73.6	71.5	79.2	74.0	77.5	79.7	75.0	74.2
OK	18.4	19.6	12.5	18.0	15.6	12.2	16.0	16.0
Bad	1.7	2.6	2.1	3.7	3.1	4.2	2.9	5.3

ap

	Dec 83	Feb 84	Apr 84	Jun 84	Aug 84	May 85	Sep 85	Nov 85
Good	52.9	56.7	50.8	53.8	67.7	60.4	61.0	54.1
OK	25.6	28.8	33.3	22.0	18.6	30.0	22.4	29.5
Bad	11.9	9.0	9.2	16.7	7.9	5.8	13.2	10.9



	Dec 83	Feb 84	Apr 84	Jun 84	Aug 84	May 85	Sep 85	Nov 85
Good	70.9	72.2	68.9	54.1	54.4	70.2	55.8	77.6
OK	25.0	24.5	25.0	27.0	21.2	17.9	34.9	19.0
Bad	2.1	5.6	4.2	8.1	12.1	11.9	4.7	3.5

Democracy Firmly Entrenched

Spain is a democracy. What is your opinion of democracy as a political system?

Overall

	Dec 83	Feb 84	Apr 84	Jun 84	Aug 84	May 85	Sep 85	Nov 85
Good	74.5	76.1	79.0	72.6	75.0	81.0	77.0	76.5
OK	16.4	14.3	11.9	13.9	14.3	11.6	11.4	14.5
Bad	5.7	6.6	5.5	10.1	7.8	5.5	7.4	6.6

By Party



	Dec 83	Feb 84	Apr 84	Jun 84	Aug 84	May 85	Sep 85	Nov 85
Good	81.7	86.1	89.1	84.9	85.9	89.6	85.2	85.9
OK	13.6	8.6	6.0	9.9	10.9	5.7	7.4	9.4
Bad	2.9	2.3	1.9	3.4	1.9	3.2	4.6	3.4



	Dec 83	Feb 84	Apr 84	Jun 84	Aug 84	May 85	Sep 85	Nov 85
Good	70.1	66.7	66.7	57.6	71.6	73.7	67.3	66.6
OK	16.2	20.7	20.8	15.2	14.7	18.8	16.1	17.6
Bad	11.1	9.9	10.0	21.9	11.8	6.8	15.1	12.8



	Dec 83	Feb 84	Apr 84	Jun 84	Aug 84	May 85	Sep 85	Nov 85
Good	81.2	80.5	85.4	70.3	66.7	79.1	81.4	81.0
OK	8.3	13.9	10.4	13.5	15.2	13.4	9.3	13.8
Bad	10.4	5.6	4.2	16.2	15.2	7.5	4.7	5.2

The President Is Moving Up

What is your opinion of the current president of the government, Felipe Gonzalez?

Overall

	Dec 83	Jun 84	Dec 84	Apr 85	Jun 85	Aug 85	Oct 85	Nov 85
Good	54.1	42.3	39.8	36.8	34.8	35.5	36.5	38.6
OK	29.2	31.8	35.6	33.1	33.7	33.2	32.5	32.8
Bad	12.3	22.9	20.5	26.8	28.6	28.5	28.2	26.6
Neutral Vote	41.8	19.4	19.3	10.0	6.2	7.0	8.3	12.0

By Party



	Dec 83	Jun 84	Dec 84	Apr 85	Jun 85	Aug 85	Oct 85	Nov 85
Good	77.4	67.9	61.3	61.1	60.0	61.3	61.8	64.9
OK	17.9	26.3	27.9	28.0	29.6	29.6	29.0	25.7
Bad	3.2	4.4	9.9	9.3	9.6	7.6	8.1	9.3
Neutral Vote	74.2	73.5	51.4	51.8	50.4	53.7	53.7	55.6



	Dec 83	Jun 84	Dec 84	Apr 85	Jun 85	Aug 85	Oct 85	Nov 85
Good	38.5	25.5	15.7	11.9	3.7	5.2	12.4	14.0
OK	35.0	31.3	38.1	29.0	32.5	32.3	30.1	39.2
Bad	21.4	40.1	39.0	56.3	62.5	60.9	53.8	44.0
Neutral Vote	17.1	-14.6	-23.2	-44.4	-58.9	-55.7	-41.4	-31.0



	Dec 83	Jun 84	Dec 84	Apr 85	Jun 85	Aug 85	Oct 85	Nov 85
Good	50.0	30.2	14.8	27.4	21.1	30.0	17.0	20.7
OK	29.2	37.3	50.8	49.3	40.4	35.0	31.9	43.1
Bad	18.8	32.4	32.8	23.3	36.8	35.0	51.1	36.2
Neutral Vote	31.2	-2.2	-18.8	4.1	-15.7	-5.0	-34.1	-15.5

Government Improves Its Image

What is your opinion of the current government of the nation?


Overall

	Dec 83	Jun 84	Dec 84	Apr 85	Jun 85	Aug 85	Oct 85	Nov 85
Good	39.4	30.7	27.8	27.8	26.9	26.9	24.5	28.1
OK	38.5	35.9	40.9	37.2	36.5	40.9	41.3	38.8
Bad	17.6	30.0	26.5	31.4	33.3	29.6	30.9	31.1
Neutral Vote	21.8	0.7	1.3	-3.6	-6.4	-2.7	-6.4	-3.0

By Party



	Dec 83	Jun 84	Dec 84	Apr 85	Jun 85	Aug 85	Oct 85	Nov 85
Good	65.5	56.5	45.6	52.7	52.7	50.6	47.0	50.6
OK	29.8	33.9	38.9	33.4	34.4	40.3	41.4	36.1
Bad	3.7	8.1	12.9	12.0	12.5	7.8	9.9	12.3
Neutral Vote	61.8	48.4	32.7	40.7	40.2	42.8	37.1	38.3



	Dec 83	Jun 84	Dec 84	Apr 85	Jun 85	Aug 85	Oct 85	Nov 85
Good	19.6	4.6	8.1	5.8	1.1	1.6	0.5	4.6
OK	40.2	37.9	35.4	27.6	21.3	33.9	37.1	41.0
Bad	35.1	53.8	49.3	64.1	76.1	64.6	57.5	53.2
Neutral Vote	-15.5	-49.2	-41.2	-58.3	-75.0	-63.0	-57.0	-48.6



	Dec 83	Jun 84	Dec 84	Apr 85	Jun 85	Aug 85	Oct 85	Nov 85
Good	35.4	21.6	13.1	20.5	10.5	22.5	17.0	19.0
OK	39.6	40.5	45.9	53.4	52.5	22.5	40.4	36.2
Bad	25.0	37.8	39.4	26.0	35.1	50.0	42.5	44.8
Neutral Vote	10.4	-16.2	-26.3	-5.5	-24.6	-27.5	-25.5	-25.8

Suarez Closes the Gap

Popularity Index

	Jan 84	Mar 84	May 84	Jul 84	Sep 84	Nov 84	Jan 85	Mar 85	May 85	Jul 85	Sep 85	Nov 85
Felipe GONZALEZ	55.8	55.0	52.1	52.6	51.8	54.4	50.6	52.5	50.0	50.1	50.9	50.4
Adolfo SUAREZ	38.3	39.5	41.9	40.8	43.3	43.0	41.8	43.6	42.6	39.6	41.8	44.2
Alfonso GUERRA	44.1	44.8	41.7	41.0	41.0	43.5	41.1	42.8	40.9	41.0	39.8	39.5
Manuel FRAGA	39.3	35.9	38.0	39.5	36.2	38.3	35.3	34.8	34.2	36.4	35.6	36.3
Miguel ROCA	32.6	29.3	36.3	32.1	31.5	33.2	32.0	33.4	33.6	31.8	32.2	35.0
Antonio GARRIGUES	30.4	28.3	31.9	30.0	28.8	28.0	26.6	28.3	30.2	27.2	28.0	30.0
Jordi PUJOL	28.3	24.4	35.7	29.1	38.7	29.2	27.9	29.4	29.5	28.8	29.1	29.1
Santiago CARRILLO	27.7	28.0	30.3	27.9	31.2	31.9	30.2	32.3	29.0	29.7	27.5	27.2
Oscar ALZAGA	21.1	24.0	24.3	24.9	21.8	24.0	23.4	25.0	24.8	22.3		26.5
Gerardo IGLESIAS	29.9	29.2	30.4	29.3	31.3	32.3	27.7	30.6	29.2	28.7	27.1	26.1
José Antonio ARDANZA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20.7	20.5	24.2

Vote by Vote

Voting Plans with Projection of Undecided Votes

	Voted 82	Dec 83	Dec 84	Dec 84	May 85	May 85	Jul 85	Jul 85	Oct 85	Oct 85	Nov 85	Nov 85
PSOE	48.4	40.3	35.1	41.6	33.7	40.1	37.2	42.5	35.8	40.0	35.2	40.3
AP	26.1	24.2	24.7	26.5	25.9	28.5	26.2	27.4	24.9	26.5	22.8	25.3
PCE	4.1	4.7	4.9	5.8	6.1	7.0	5.6	6.8	4.7	6.4	4.5	5.9
CDS	2.9	2.4	3.8	5.4	5.1	6.1	4.3	5.3	5.3	5.9	5.3	6.2
CIU	2.7	3.2	3.2	3.3	2.9	3.4	2.9	3.5	3.0	3.7	3.1	3.6
PNV	1.9	1.7	2.0	2.1	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.1	1.9	1.9
EE	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5
HB	1.0	0.8	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.0	0.8	0.8	1.1	1.1
PRD	-	-	0.5	0.8	1.3	1.5	0.5	0.7	1.4	1.8	1.2	1.2
Others (+undecided)	2.4	22.1	24.3	12.8	21.6	9.9	19.9	10.3	21.4	12.2	24.4	14.0
Decided to abstain on census				14.0		9.3		8.5		10.2		11.3

Unions in Dispute

Could you give me your opinion of the performance of the following unions?

	Jan 84	Mar 84	May 84	Jul 84	Sep 84	Nov 84	Mar 85	Jul 85	Sep 85	Nov 85	Voted PSOE	Oct. 82 AP	PCE
UGT													
Good	21.3	16.5	18.7	18.4	19.6	17.0	20.4	18.5	21.2	25.3	40.4	10.6	24.1
OK	25.5	29.6	26.6	28.6	28.9	29.2	26.8	27.9	25.1	26.3	27.1	24.0	37.9
Bad	19.8	20.8	26.5	23.0	20.6	24.5	25.0	28.4	27.1	21.7	10.0	36.8	31.0
CC. OO.													
Good	16.7	16.9	15.6	18.6	19.6	15.3	20.7	21.6	19.4	21.2	28.8	6.1	63.8
OK	26.2	24.8	23.6	26.9	25.0	27.3	25.0	26.4	26.5	27.5	33.8	19.8	17.2
Bad	23.4	21.9	31.4	24.1	23.2	27.5	26.3	25.7	26.9	23.8	13.6	45.3	12.1

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MILITARY

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

FIRMS OF THREE COUNTRIES IN JOINT SHELL PRODUCTION VENTURE

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE AFTEN in Danish 27 Dec 85 - 2 Jan 86 pp 1, 10

[Article by Øjvind Kyro: "'Ammunition Deal of the Century': Scandinavian Weapons Plants Begin Joint Shell Production"]

[Text] In spite of Danish industry's reluctance, a weapons industry consortium is about to take shape. Three Scandinavian firms have united for the mass production of heavy ammunition, and new shells are high on the Danish armed forces' wish list. At the Armed Forces Command the order is now to be submitted for the armed forces agreement's largest area: three billion kroner worth of ammunition. But Danish industry is being criticized both in the armed forces and at the Industry Ministry.

Three Scandinavian firms have united for the mass production of heavy ammunition, i.e., a new generation of 155-mm shells for heavy artillery. They are the Swedish Bofors concern, the Norwegian Raufoss plant and Jørgen Høyer Enterprise in Machining A/S [Inc.] in Denmark.

The three concerns will produce parts for the new advanced type of shell in accordance with a West German design. It will be at one of the two industry giants Rhein Metall in Düsseldorf or Diehl in Nürnberg that the parts will be assembled and installed. Production is beginning in 1986 and will go on for about 10 years.

The Scandinavian ammunition arsenals will buy about two billion kroner worth of new shells, and one fourth of the production will take place at the Danish partner's, Jørgen Høyer. The 120 employees at the plant at Måløv near Copenhagen will produce fuses for the new shell.

The reason that the sum will be so high is that, among other things, it has been decided that ammunition reserves in Denmark are to be doubled.

The reputation of the Danish manufacturer, Jørgen Høyer, is enormously commendatory in NATO and Danish armed forces circles; "He is strikingly good at manufacturing ammunition," one comment goes. Jørgen Høyer, who has a hard time killing a mouse who visits his residence, reports that, "Exports to other European NATO countries will most likely follow in the wake of production."

Wish List

It was decorated with a Christmas tree, hearts and spruce in the Danish Pentagon when the Danish armed forces presented their wish list to WEEKENDAVISEN the other day, and the new shells are high up on it. The secretaries in the concrete building made the desk-job generals comfortable and an Advent candle burned in Commander S. Torp Petersen's office, and a bowl with Christmas cookies lay within reach on the desk.

Torp Petersen is the chief of the materiel and logistics department, and his long wish list combined constitutes the largest single area within the armed forces agreement: new ammunition.

The issue is that over a number of years war reserves of ammunition have been eaten into because of what is characterized here as "too few and too small appropriations." But now it is hard to keep the pessimism intact, for in the latest armed forces agreement--what was previously called a /compromise/ [in italics]--the politicians realized that the reserves must be strengthened. "We got about 10 million kroner a year for this purpose, and although it is far from enough it is now going in the right direction," Commander Torp Petersen says.

Shell with Plastic Darts

The artillery is about to be modernized--or "beefed up," as the jargon goes--and therefore there is a need for the new type of shell, both for the self-propelled M-109 guns and for towed howitzers.


The new 155-mm shell is able to travel farther, because its ballistic properties have been improved. Technically it is called a "carrier," i.e., a "transport shell," because at the factory end it can be outfitted with various charges:

It can strew out a dozen little infantry mines which will put soldiers out of action on contact.

It can find its way to the areas on an enemy tank which are protected by the least armor, i.e., on top, underneath or in back, and burn itself through here and "neutralize" the enemy.

It can spit out thousands of small plastic darts which will render enemy soldiers harmless. Afterwards the plastic darts cannot be registered on x-ray apparatus. But the Danish armed forces will under no circumstances purchase this type.

A decision has still not been made regarding how many shells the armed forces will procure, and also not regarding which properties they will be furnished with.



Armed Forces' Representation of How the New Shell Works When It Is Charged with Infantry Mines

New Missiles for F-16

Another important item on the shopping list is new air defense facilities for the army. The so-called Redeye system--which roughly speaking consists of a tube with a rocket inside which can be fired by a soldier--is to be replaced by a modern system--either the RBS-70 from Bofors in Sweden, the Stinger from General Dynamics in the USA, the Javelin from Great Britain (the system was tested with success during the Falklands War) or the Mistral from France.

One billion three hundred million kroner have been applied for for this purchase, which is also expected to be made in 1986.

The air force is also counting on being able to supplement its missiles on F-16 combat planes and therefore the development of the AMRAAM, the long-range radar-guided air-to-air missile which will soon roll off the assembly lines at the American Hughes Aircraft Company, is being followed closely.

Finally, they are interested at the armed forces command in a new type of air-to-surface missile, titled the Maverick. It is a guided missile which itself finds its way to its target by means of optics or infrared sensors. Such an extremely harmful gadget costs about one million kroner, and Torp Petersen figures that "a few hundred" will be bought.

In sum total, within the next two years three billion kroner worth of ammunition will be procured.

Fear Unrest

But there is not much interest in Danish industry in taking part in weapons manufacturing. The three Scandinavian firms which are taking part in the new shell production are all old specialists in the field.

A couple of years ago the Armed Forces Research Service with the industry minister's blessing attempted to involve several hundred Danish firms in a military-industrial complex with large NATO projects, and both being privy to advanced technological secrets and nice profits were offered as enticements.

But it is still the same handful which dominate weapons manufacturing here at home today: Jørgen Høyer, Chr. Røvsing, A.P. Møller's DISA, Nea-Lindberg, Terma in Århus, Wejra near Aalborg, Per Udsen in Grenå and Kristian Kirk in Horsens.

"It is our feeling that industry wants to have only ready-made food; it must simply have orders served on a platter," Commander S. Torp Petersen says. "But we are still interested in weapons' being produced here at home, in part because it is easier to get weapons purchases approved when Danish industry takes part, and in part because it is important to have an industrial base in one's own back yard."

A highly placed official at the Industry Ministry, who wishes to remain anonymous, adds: "Some firms desist from weapons production because they do not want to risk unrest on the job, or because they do not like to be subjected to the security restrictions which come with this form of production. Some of the biggest in Danish industry say no because they do not believe in the promised technological lead and, besides, believe that they are doing fine as it is."

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CSO: 3613/53

MILITARY

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

GABON ORDERS ATR-42--The first military version of the French-Italian ATR-42 biturbo-propeller aircraft has been ordered by the Gabonese armed forces for use by paratroopers. This version, which can carry 40 fully equipped men, was developed largely by Aeritalia and features a reinforced floor, a sliding side door, and a rear loading ramp. Aeritalia also provides the final assembly of the aircraft at its Naples factory. Contacts are in progress with many other countries for the naval patrol version of the same aircraft, the ATM. [Text] [Chiavari RIVISTA ITALIANA DIFESA in Italian No 1, Jan 86 p 5] /8309

AGUSTA CUSTOMERS ABROAD--Many foreign military and civil organizations became Agusta customers last November. The Finnish Border Guard [Rajavartiolaitos] has ordered three AB.412's for patrol and rescue missions in the North Sea equipped with the latest generation radar and radio navigation equipment as well as a high performance hydraulic winch which can lift loads of up to 300 kg. The first model has already been delivered. An A.109 MK-II has been delivered to the DMR Department which supervises road traffic in New South Wales, Australia. Destined for road patrols and fast transport, it proved successful in competition with various American, French, German, and Japanese helicopters. The A.109 MK-II performs this type of work in many other countries, including Italy, Yugoslavia, and Venezuela. Finally, two NH-300 helicopters made by Breda Nardi, one of the firms of the Agusta Helicopter Division, have been delivered to the Greek Military Air Force flight school. This is the first sale of Breda Nardi helicopters to a foreign customer. One of the few helicopters in the world that can be used efficiently in a flight school environment, the NH-300 can also be employed for various other tasks, including air patrol and control, executive transport, farm and forestry work, and photographic surveys. [Text] [Chiavari RIVISTA ITALIANA DIFESA in Italian No 1, Jan 86 p 5] /8309

CSO: 3528/60-M

MILITARY

AUSTRIA

STEYR PRESENTS PROTOTYPE ARMORED VEHICLE

Chiavari RIVISTA ITALIANA DIFESA in Italian No 1, Jan 86 p 9

[Text] The Steyr-Daimler-Puch trust recently presented the prototype of its new 6x6 armored vehicle, the PANDUR, to the Austrian Army. The vehicle currently is on operational trials with the Bundesheer units and may already go into mass production in 1986.

As is customary for this type of vehicle, the PANDUR is offered in a basic version [VTT] and in many specialized variations. Steyr offers a VCI with a turret-mounted 12.7 mm light machinegun, a reconnaissance vehicle with 20 mm automatic cannon, a self-propelled antiaircraft vehicle with 20 mm weapons, a support vehicle with 90 mm low pressure cannon, a mortar-piece carrier [81 mm weapon], an armored ambulance, and so on.

In the basic version [without turret] the PANDUR in combat order weighs 8.5 tons and can carry up to 12 men. The armor-plating meets the usual standards, insuring protection against 12.7 mm bullets in front and 7.62 mm armor-piercing bullets on the sides. The vehicle is powered by a Steyr WD612.5 six cylinder diesel with turbosupercharger and intercooler joined to a five-gear automatic transmission and can supply 155 kw [210 hp]. The Steyr firm refers to a "flat bottom," which suggests the existence of H-shaped propeller shafts.

The main characteristics of the basic PANDUR are as follows:

Weight empty [tons].....	8.5
Weight in combat order [tons].....	11.3
Length [mm].....	5,697
Width [mm].....	2,500
Hull height [mm].....	1,810
Ground guide [mm].....	420
Track [mm].....	2,134
Wheelbase [mm].....	1,530/1,530
Maximum road speed [km/h].....	105
Road range [km].....	650
Maximum superable slope [%].....	70
Vertical obstacle [m].....	0.50
Trench [m].....	1.20
Steering diameter [m].....	16

/8309

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MILITARY

DENMARK

ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND CHIEF ON MISSION, PROBLEMS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 22 Dec 85 p 8

[Article by Nils Eric Boesgaard: "Everything Is Stocked Here--From Buttons to Cannons"]

[Text] The Army Materiel Command in Hjørring has 90,000 different groups of merchandise in its depots and has more than twice as much business as the Illum department store.

One of Denmark's biggest department stores is in the outskirts of Hjørring. It never advertises in the newspapers, but nevertheless has 1.2 billion kroner worth of business--more than twice as much as Illum. And it is in a position to deliver everything--from buttons, textiles, surgical instruments and canned goods, to cannons and tanks.

The operation is the Army Materiel Command, HMAK, whose chief, Major General T. Hjalb, has 1350 people directly under him, 1100 of whom are civilian engineers, office people and tradesmen, and who in addition manages 1600 military and civilian technicians around the country.

"We have three main duties," the major general relates in his office in the materiel command's modern facility on Arsenalvej [Arsenal Street] in the southern outskirts of Hjørring.

"We are to procure the army's materiel, we must keep it operating, and when it is worn out we must see to scrapping it. The materiel command has its headquarters in North Jutland but has command over materiel departments, depots and workshops over all of Denmark."

Sixty Thousand Regular Stock Items

"Keeping things operating is the duty which requires the greatest effort. We have 60,000 stock items which we deal in every single year, and in addition there are 30,000 more which are needed every other year. This concerns, for example, spare parts for materiel which is normally found at mobilization depots."

"The concept of 'procurement' encompasses the gigantic problem of procuring for the armed forces the best possible materiel for the limited funds we have available. This is becoming constantly more difficult, among other things, because we have difficulty in holding on to competent personnel. For example, at the moment we are short 5 civilian and 12 military engineers. And this is due not only to the State's salaries; it is also due to HMAK's location. There is very little industry in the area and it is hard to entice people so far north."

"The last of our duties is scrapping. Some of the worn-out materiel is sold at auctions. Weapons are destroyed, and the same holds true for ammunition. Some is blasted off, but normally the explosive is melted out of the cartridge cases, after which these are sold as scrap metal. Incidentally, it is surprisingly large sums the sale of these scrapped goods brings in," Major General Hjalp relates.


"The Army Materiel Command has command over a number of workshops around the country. One of these is a neighbor on Arsenalvej, the West Denmark Workshop, which in part builds prototypes of materiel which will later be manufactured by civilian firms, and in part modernizes and reconditions the armed forces' heavy materiel. In addition to the workshop in Hjørring there is the truck repair shop in Rørdal near Aalborg and the tank repair shop in Nymindegab. They use almost exclusively civilian tradesmen and permanently have not quite 50 EFG [not further identified] students in training," Engineer T.W. Asmussen relates.

"The West Denmark Workshop receives in behalf of HMAK all newly purchased motor vehicles and tests them before they are accepted and paid for. At the moment the workshop is about to modernize the army's 155-mm howitzers, which will have new, longer barrels. This is taking place by means of American "do-it-yourself kits" and a good deal of Danish hardware; for example, gun clips and Danish fire extinguishers. This is the only place outside the USA this modernization is taking place, and it will bring the almost 20-year-old artillery completely in line with the artillery which the USA's armed forces, for example, command."

"A noteworthy feature of the modernization is that the Danish technicians have furnished each of the guns with a little Honda electrical generator so that they will be self-sufficient in terms of electric power while shooting, without its being necessary to run the big gluttonous main motor. This is a nicety which the Americans have shown great interest in."

"Comparable modernization is being done for the Centurion and M-41 tanks, and will be performed at the workshop in Nymindegab according to a prototype developed in Hjørring," Graduate Engineer Asmussen relates.

In spite of its name, the Army Materiel Command also takes care of supplies of some common materiel for the other two services, as well as the Home Guard. This relates to, for example, the supplying of combat uniforms, while the navy and air force themselves take care of sailor suits and the blue-gray airmen's uniforms.



The Army Materiel Command's West Denmark Workshop is at the moment about to modernize the army's 155-mm howitzers, which will get new, longer barrels. Photo: Henning Bagger



New Mercedes jeeps ready for delivery to armed forces units. The Army Materiel Command buys and inspects all rolling stock for the armed forces.

Tests Durability

An important share of the testing of the armed forces' electronic equipment takes place here in Hjørring in HMAK's special quality control section, whose head is Chief Engineer Tony Hansen. The laboratory contains a series of machines which can test whether an item is sufficiently durable to be introduced in the armed forces, and the facilities are used to a great extent by civilian industry also, for the testing of new products, Research Chief, Engineer P. Mortensen relates.

"Here a 48-hour study can be made of whether a radio still functions after having rattled away in a vehicle for hundreds of kilometers in rough terrain. Here studies are made of whether an electronic measuring instrument can endure the effect of an F-16 plane traveling at supersonic speed while firing big machine guns, or whether an item can cope with the salt water during a winter voyage back and forth across the Atlantic Ocean," Engineer Mortensen says.

"The army has a strong need for replacements. We are doing what we can to keep the wheels running," Major General T. Hjalp concludes. "When weapons assistance was dropped in 1967, it was decided that the armed forces were to have 400 million kroner a year for new procurement. We have never seen this money, and it is only with extreme thrift and with summoning of all our ingenuity that it has been possible to keep the armed forces running."

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MILITARY

DENMARK

COUNTRY'S FIRMS WIN CONTRACTS FROM NATO JOINT FACILITIES FUND

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 26 Dec 85 p 3

[Article by Nils Eric Boesgaard: "Billion-Kroner Orders for Danish Firms"]

[Text] NATO's new joint-financed facilities program is providing over a half billion kroner worth of orders to Danish firms, but at the same time the Faeroes are tapping the Danish national treasury to the tune of 20 million kroner in customs duties for air raid warning equipment, the periodical STAMPERSONEL [REGULAR PERSONNEL] writes.

Among the new purchases is a Lynx flight simulator which is being purchased in cooperation with Holland, Norway and West Germany. It will be used in connection with the training of pilots for the navy's Lynx helicopters. Denmark's share of the expenses is 6.8 million kroner.

Twenty million kroner will be used to construct squadron air raid shelters with accompanying road and parking facilities at the Vandel and Tirstrup air stations.

The NATO projects encompass primarily 260 million kroner for the construction of air shelters at a number of military air fields. The alliance's infrastructure program totaled 11.6 billion kroner in 1985. Denmark will get the 200 million kroner refunded, but in addition there are a number of national accompanying expenses. The 1986 program includes, as far as Denmark is concerned, facilities work and purchases to the tune of 270 million kroner. This concerns, among other things, a cost increase of 30 million in connection with the procurement of the new IHAWK air defense missiles, construction at six air stations, improvement of fuel installations, and also the expansion of Combaltap's war headquarters. This money, too, is expected to be refunded.

On the other hand, what we do not expect to get back is the 20 million kroner which the Faeroes have demanded in customs duties for the importation of air raid warning materiel to the tune of seven million kroner and equivalent materiel for a British radar station. In spite of the fact that the warning stations are a big advantage for air and shipping traffic around the islands, the Faeroese authorities plead that it is Denmark and not the Faeroes which is a member of NATO and that Denmark must therefore pay.

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MILITARY

DENMARK

DEFENSE MINISTER DENIES OPPOSITION TO WOMEN IN FORCES

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 1 Jan 86 p 15

[Article by Nils Eric Boesgaard: "Defense Minister: I Have Nothing Against Women in the Army"]

[Text] The defense minister denies that he is keeping secret the report on women in the navy because he is opposed to women soldiers.

"The chairman of the Equality Council, Helle Degn (Social Democratic Party), knows perfectly well what it is said in the secret report regarding women in the armed forces. The council has had an observer present during all the discussions of the steering committee which was established in connection with the experiment with women in the navy," Defense Minister Hans Engell (Conservative Party) says in a conversation with BERLINGSKE TIDENDE.

The context is the criticism which Helle Degn raised in the periodical STAMPERSONEL [REGULAR PERSONNEL], which is a members' magazine for sergeants, enlisted privates and other permanent employees in the armed forces. In it she claims that the report on the experiment, which concluded a year ago, must now come out and maintains that the defense minister has classified it secret in order to check the debate regarding the place of women in the services.

"Helle Degn is very well acquainted with the report which she is putting out a bulletin for," Hans Engell says, and adds:

"At the moment the report has been sent out for comments by the military authorities, in part the Armed Forces Command and provincial commands, and in part the units in which women are doing service. I figure that we can hold the last meeting in January, after which I will receive the final recommendation."

"For this reason I think that it is strange that Helle Degn is coming out with this criticism, especially in light of the fact that the Equality Council has been represented during the discussions."

"There is nothing mysterious about the fact that the report has been classified as secret. It is a question of an internal white paper which contains

a number of pieces of information on military conditions," the defense minister continues. "I cannot judge to what extent it is a question of classified or non-classified information. According to the rules it is always the authority which prepares a report which decides the classification level. I am certain then that as soon as the work has been completed we will then be able to put it out for a general broad debate."

"Helle Degn has hinted that the secretiveness is due to the fact that I am against women in the armed forces. I want to emphasize strongly in this connection, then, that it definitely is not this which it is about," Hans Engell says.

"I myself have read the report very thoroughly and it can be said that the lessons learned have been varied. It is clear that one does not establish an entirely new system without its having a number of consequences, both positive and problematic. But to sum it up it is my impression that the experiences have been good."

"We expanded the experimental system to cover, in part, the army antitank infantry and, in part, the navy's motor torpedo boats," Hans Engell says, who is calling for a debate regarding the ethics of using women in the armed forces.

"The very question is whether it is even ethically right to use women in combat units. My own attitude is that I can well understand those people who are doubtful of the use of women in actual combat missions. On the other hand, it must be realized that the war picture has changed. One can no longer talk about a front line where the men fight while the women look after the home and children in safety behind the front. Today we talk of far greater integration of combat areas and civilian areas and with this the ethical dimensions in connection with the use of women as combat troops have also changed. A modern war will be so horrible and have such frightful consequences that there are many concepts which were totally unambiguous 30 years ago but which today have lost their real content."

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COLONEL CHARGES HOME GUARD HARMED BY BUREAUCRACY

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 1 Jan 86 p 2

[Article by RB: "Colonel: Home Guard Plagued by Bureaucracy"]

[Text] "Bureaucracy is threatening the Home Guard's status as a popular movement," believes the commander of Home Guard Region III, Colonel J. Frederik Edeling of Haderslev.

"Today we must recognize that the Home Guard has gradually become strapped into a set of provisions and rules which, in pace with the bureaucratization of the other armed forces, have become constantly narrower and stricter. The Home Guard has to a very high degree 'bought' or had forced upon it the Armed Forces Command's stipulations, especially in the administrative area," J. Frederik Edeling says.

This has meant a growing drain on personnel resources. The latest shoot on the stem of new administrative stipulations is, according to the region commander, the drawing up of 1.5-kilogram-heavy accounting instructions. The observance of these involves, as far as Home Guard Region III alone is concerned, the need to employ three full-time salaried employees.

Region Commander Edeling foresees that the service which the regular system can offer volunteers in the Home Guard will thereby become steadily more limited.

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MILITARY

DENMARK

NAVY'S OPERATIONAL COMMAND CONCERNED OVER DEFENSE CREDIBILITY

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 27 Jan 86 p 6

[Text] "Today, the Danish defense is militarily credible. This fact has often been established by our NATO allies when our units participate in joint maneuvers. Such statements of confidence in the Danish military units are often followed by statements of surprise at our ability to maintain that level of military professionalism in view of the limited funds available to the military. We thus have military credibility. The question is whether we shall be able to maintain it."

The above statement was made by the chief of the Navy's Operational Command, Rear Admiral J. F. Bork in his speech last Sunday night on the occasion of the 107th anniversary of the Ex-Servicemen's League in Copenhagen.

Rear Admiral J.F. Bork pointed out that the defense of a country is based on two pillars of credibility--the military and the political.

After mentioning examples of outstanding performance on the part of Danish units participating in NATO maneuvers, Rear Admiral J. F. Bork added that he was somewhat concerned over Denmark's political credibility in the security policy area. Many of the other NATO countries do not always understand Denmark's actions in relation to the countries that are our allies and with which we cooperate. Most recently, many foreign friends of Denmark are now following in astonishment the commotion in this country in connection with the EC package.

Rear Admiral J. F. Bork concluded his speech with the following reflections on the future of the Danish defense:

"We shall have to make an effort to maintain the military credibility that Denmark today still enjoys--and, in this connection, the Defense people need the support of the civilian friends of the Defense, including the support of the many ex-servicemen around the country," the chief of the Navy's Operational Command stated.

Rear Admiral J.F. Bork pointed out three problems to which the Danish Defense will have to find solutions in the coming years, viz. its budget, the depletion of the reserves of materiel and the personnel problems resulting from the ability of the civilian sector to offer competent people better conditions than the Defense is able to.

7262

CSO: 3613/60

AIR DEFENSE WEAPONRY, GUIDANCE SYSTEM INNOVATIONS REVIEWED

ROLAND Command Center Options

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Oct 85 pp 74-77

[Article by Wolfgang Flume]

[Text] For achieving coordinated, and therefore effective, operations of ROLAND, which is to protect Luftwaffe airfields, and other air defense weapons, such as the 20 mm Zwillling [twin] gun, radar-equipped command centers are to be procured simultaneously with the introduction of ROLAND. At present an evaluation is in progress of several proposals from industry which are mostly based on existing systems, partly on systems which would require modification. This article describes requirements for the ROLAND air defense command center and proposals from industry.

Between 1986 and 1990 the German Luftwaffe will receive 95 wheel-mounted ROLAND air defense systems for the protection of 12 TORNADO and F-4 air bases, as well as the three USAF bases at Frankfurt, Sembach and Wiesbaden. The ROLAND are organized in 15 batteries, divided among three battalions: the 41st Air Defense Missile Battalion in Wangerland near Bremen; the 42nd in Schoeneck near Frankfurt and the 43rd in Leipheim. The personnel will come from the present NIKE regiments, as it will for the six PATRIOT regiments. In addition, there will be 20 ROLAND to protect the naval aviation at bases located at Nordholz, Eggebeck and Jagel. Of the 95 Luftwaffe ROLANDs, the German-U.S. agreement on PATRIOT/ROLAND provides that 27 be deployed for the protection of the above named three U.S. air bases. This leaves 5 to 6 ROLANDs each, or one battery, for the German air bases--fewer than had been thought necessary years ago. Prior to the 1981 Defense Examination, which stopped the ROLAND program, the Luftwaffe had planned procurement of a total of 170 ROLAND, i.e., about eight ROLAND per facility to be protected.

Specifically because of the smaller number of ROLAND systems per base and the concomitant requirement for better coordination of their deployment, the ROLAND Air Defense Command Center (Flugabwehrgefechtsstand ROLAND or FGR), which is to be activated simultaneously with the ROLAND at the rate of one per battery has gained increased importance. This FGR is to exert centralized control at the air base over ROLAND and the other air defense weapons, such as the 20 mm Zwillling gun and possibly the AIM-9L ground-to-air launchers, so as to achieve an effective defense, particularly against saturation raids.

Requirements

The requirements for the FGR are still based on the old tactical requirements for a ROLAND combat control system, whose design was greatly influenced by the combat control system for the HAWK air defense missile system. The Defense Examination killed the entire Luftwaffe ROLAND project; but the German-U.S. agreement caused it to be resuscitated, which led to the integration of the FGR as a system and to the elaboration of outline specifications in 1984.

The mission of the ROLAND air defense command center can be described as follows:

- Analyze the air situation with a radar sensor possessing a range of about 40 to 60 km and an altitude covering range of up to about 5000 meters;
- description and display of the air situation on viewing screens in the command center;
- command and control in conjunction with the wing on the air base, i.e., determination of the defense situation, threat analysis and identification of aerial targets; target allocation to specific weapon systems and/or initiation of defensive measures, e.g., starting friendly aircraft (for defensive or protective operations) or moving aircraft into shelters when a raid is found to be impending;
- Attacking targets with weapon systems available at the facility.

To be able to accomplish this mission, the FGR must have certain capabilities. While it is to defend a stationary facility, it must be able to change location, for its own protection and to make enemy reconnaissance more difficult. This is true for the ROLAND as well as for the FGR, which must therefore be of mobile design, i.e., contained in a truck-transportable compartment. This means further that communications between the weapons and the FGR are by radio, with highly automated transmission of all data required by the weapon systems. For this purpose, ROLAND must be designed in such a way that automatic programming is possible. The less sophisticated systems, 20 mm Zwilling and AIM-9L are to have terminals whose displays have to be acted upon by the gun or launcher controller. Additionally, if the FGR and the weapons are emplaced in prepared positions, communications can be transmitted via interference-immune cables.

With the FGR it should become possible that only the FGR air surveillance radar be used for air situation analysis and target allocation, and not the ROLAND air surveillance radars, whose position thus remains concealed from enemy electronic reconnaissance. For attacking the target, the ROLAND crew then uses only the fire control radar or the optical aiming device. Target data thus must be extremely accurate for transmittal to ROLAND. To be able to allocate targets to the weapon systems, the FGR will have on its radar scopes adequate data on the status and position of friendly weapons and their ranges.

At the same time the FGR provides connection with the NATO integrated air defense, from which (from the CRCs) it receives early warnings. Maybe someday it will be possible to transmit information direct from the AWACS to the FGR. All this makes it clear that the function of the FGR depends significantly upon

the performance of the built-in computers and the software. In the functional chain between analysis of the air situation and attacking the targets the greatest possible number of steps must be automated--among them the description of the air situation, the threat analysis, recommendations for the type of defensive operation and target allocation. However, the command to fire will always remain a human decision.

For reasons of time, but primarily of cost, the Bundeswehr renounced a specific FGR development. A contributing factor was the fact that in past years German industry and that of allied nations had already developed combat command centers on their own initiative which could be usable at FGRs, though partly requiring modification.

Proposals From Industry

In August 1984 the Bundeswehr headquarters requested the firms AEG and Siemens to write product specifications for the FGR, using the greatest possible number of existing components or those already under development; sensors were specified. Later on a proposal was received from the Kongsberg firm, resulting initially in five approaches:

- AEG, with two proposals based on the GIRAFFE and TRML radars;
- Siemens, with the BCP and RCC;
- Kongsberg, with a proposal based on the LASR radar.

The GIRAFFE and BCP proposals can be considered simple solutions; the three others are more complex systems.

AEG-GIRAFFE

This FGR approach uses the Ericsson GIRAFFE C-band radar in its Mk IV version (still being developed), which has a range of 40-50 km. The antenna is attached to the control cabin and can be telescoped up to a height of 8-10 meters. The cabin contains the control center with two work positions and all accessory equipment such as radar, computer, etc. For the combat control portion AEG proposes two solutions: one is based on the components and software of the army defense reconnaissance and control system (still in the development phase), the other is a "free" approach, optimized for FGR application.

AEG-TRML

TRML (Telefunken Radar Mobil "Low") is a simplified 2D version of the 3D air surveillance radar developed for the army air defense reconnaissance and control system TRMS (military designation: airspace surveillance radar LUe), having a range of about 50 km (compared with 100 km for the TRMS). The radar works in the C-band. Here too the antenna is mounted telescoped on the cabin. AEG proposes the two approaches described above as the combat command component.

Siemens-BCP

The Siemens-developed BCP (Battery Coordination Post) also combines radar and combat control instrumentation into a single unit. Among others, BCP is

proposed for use as a combat command system for the Greek ARTEMIS 30 mm air defense system. It is capable of controlling up to 12 different weapons. Radar used is the Siemens X-Band DR 641 (formerly designated MPDR-30X), having a range of 30 km; the cabin has a two-man crew.

Siemens-RCC

The ROLAND Coordination Center (RCC), which was developed on its own initiative by Euromissile in cooperation with Thomson CSF and Siemens, has been configured specifically for the ROLAND weapon system. From the control cabin, with its two-man crew, fire from up to eight ROLAND and eight tube- or other weapons can be coordinated. Data received from up to three radar instruments can be processed. To date, interfaces have been developed to the Siemens DR-641 and Thomson-CSF TIGER: the Siemens proposal would use for the FGR the C-band radar TIGER G (TGRS 2105) by Thomson-CSF with a range of about 60 km, as specified by the Bundeswehr. In the RCC the radar remains separated from the control cabin on a trailer.

Kongsberg-ARCS

Kongsberg is offering a variation of the ARCS (Acquisition Radar and Control System) which it had developed together with Hughes for the Norwegian HAWK (where it is to be used jointly with the Bofors 40 mm L/70 gun in a multiple system, among other things for air base protection). The first ARCS is to be operational in January 1987. The proposal directed to the Luftwaffe combines ARCS, into a single unit; it is operated by two persons at two multiple-function Kongsberg consoles. The Hughes 3D LASR radar in the X-band as an air surveillance and target tracking radar is a refinement (preserving about 90 percent of the original components) of the AN/TPQ-36 FIREFINDER mortar radar, 160 of which have been delivered so far. It works in the X-band and has a range of about 60 km.

As to their complexity, the five proposals are not too different. Final selection of one proposal should take place toward the end of the year by decision of the Luftwaffe chief of staff, after a technical and budgetary evaluation by the Bundeswehr and tactical evaluation by Luftwaffe headquarters. It is obvious that apart from performance capability the cost is of paramount importance. The question remains open however whether the projected budget of about DM 200 million for the 18 systems for the Luftwaffe and three for the Navy will be sufficient for procuring more than a bare-bones system.

We do not wish to preempt the evaluation of the proposals in this article, but we should like to address a few points which may have a bearing on the final selection:

--For practical purposes, only two systems are in existence as prototype hardware: the Siemens BCP and the Euromissile RCC. The BCP's configuration is better suited for tube weapons and short-range missiles (infra-red anti-aircraft guided missiles); the software would therefore have to be modified for better integration of the ROLAND systems. The RCC, as stated above, is configured specifically for the ROLAND system, but can integrate other weapons also.

--The proposed radar instruments are more or less proven systems--some work remains to be done only on the TRML, which derives from the TRMS, which has been approved for operational use. The GIRAFFE Mk IV still requires some development work also, but is based on a system which has proven itself in operational use in several countries.

--From the standpoint of logistics, the TRML radar could provide certain advantages to the Bundeswehr: the TRML would have about 60 percent of the same components as the TRMS, which will be deployed in the army air defense reconnaissance and control system as an airspace surveillance radar and in the Navy as a coastal radar. Apart from logistic simplification, production of the TRMS would be less expensive also.

--Concerning performance capability, the LASR, being a 3D radar, provides altitude information also--this could be useful for better allocation of targets to the tube or missile weapons, because their use depends on the target altitude also. Later on, the TRML could be expanded into a 3D radar through combat effectiveness upgrading.


--The radar antenna, which telescopes in most cases, is attached to the control cabin in all except the RCC proposal. While this means that the FGR would require only one truck, the threat posed by anti-radiation missiles (ARM) would make separation of radar antenna and control center preferable (the latter could for instance be located in an aircraft shelter), even though this would require two motor vehicles. Only the RCC has this feature so far.

--Proposals made to date incorporate a prescribed combination of the combat control component and a specified type of radar. While the strengths of one component can compensate for weaknesses in the other, a more flexible combination would be preferable. Thus the RCC is not tied to a specific type of radar. This consideration has recently caused the Bundeswehr to issue another short-term request for proposals which would provide for other combination options.

It would be desirable that the Luftwaffe and the Navy receive an air defense control center for ROLAND whose components, especially radar and computer, are configured in such a way that later adaptation to a change in threat are possible through combat effectiveness maintenance or upgrading. Apart from changes in software, this could mean also integration of new hardware. Even today there are plans for a combat effectiveness upgrading of the ROLAND system, addressing, among other things, greater immunity to electronic countermeasures and an 8 km increase in the range of the missiles. In addition, a combination with the infrared guided STINGER fire-and-forget missiles on the same launcher is conceivable.

For the longer term, consideration can be given to enlarging the areas to be protected by facilities protection, to counter the introduction of enemy standoff weapons; in other words, a defense against standoff weapons should be provided. Thus the configuration of facilities protection and threat adaptation will remain an interesting subject in years to come.

Chart: Coordinated Functioning of the RCC Components



- Key:
1. To the central surveillance radar
 2. To the ROLAND weapon system
 3. To the weapon terminals
 4. Communications facilities
 5. Radar interface
 6. Radar operator console
 7. Computer
 8. Image display processor
 9. Data synthesizing
 10. Data synthesizing
 11. Data synthesizing
 12. Color TV monitor
 13. Weapon console
 14. Surveillance console
 15. Alphanumeric keyboard
 16. Operating controls
 17. Commands
 18. Ball tap

GEPARD Upgrading Planned

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Oct 85 p 78

[Article by Juergen Mogilowski]

[Text] The GEPARD air defense armored vehicle has been in use by three European ground forces for almost 10 years. The project officer for the

GEPARD in the Bundeswehr Materiel Office, Engineer Juergen Mogilowski, describes the weapon system in this article and lists the aims of the planned combat effectiveness upgrading.

The essential tactical requirements for the GEPARD have been the following:

- great hit and destructive probability;
- effective range in the main battle area: up to 2,500 meters; maximum range 4,000 meters;
- autonomous operation, i.e., independent search, recognition, identification and attack by an air defense armored vehicle;
- reduced manpower requirement for operation and maintenance.

Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands agreed in 1973 on the joint introduction of the GEPARD air defense armored vehicle 35 mm weapon system. The version selected, developed by the Swiss firms Oerlikon and Contraves, were at that time the most advanced version of an autonomous air defense gun.

Germany procured 420, Belgium 55 and the Netherlands 95 armored vehicles between 1976 and 1980. These numbers permitted the FRG to activate one air defense regiment, with 36 air defense armored vehicles each, per division. In addition, a battalion was established in Schleswig-Holstein (LANDJUT). Each regiment consists of six batteries with six air defense armored vehicle each.

Equipment

The monopulse-Doppler search radar with high ground clutter rejection and ECCM capability serves for the surveillance of the airspace and the acquisition of targets. Its range is about 16 km. The IFF is integrated into the surveillance radar.

The tracking radar as monopulse-Doppler radar tracks the target automatically after target allocation in the azimuth angle.

Use of the Neodym-YAG-Laser (as an EW protective measure), tracking radar or surveillance radar is optional for distance determination.

The crew's periscopes also serve for airspace surveillance and target tracking. The commander can use his periscope independent of the gunner and thus save time in defense against several targets (e.g., in attacking a two-aircraft formation).

The angles and distances measured by the sensors are converted by the fire control computer into lead angles, considering also the ballistics of the munition. The aiming mechanisms of the turret and the weapons are automatically controlled by the computer.

The fire control computer was developed in analog, since at the time the weapon system was introduced this method provided the best computing accuracy (data refinement) and reliability.

The two 35 mm weapons, which are mounted externally on the turret, are used to attack the target. 640 rounds of munition (HEI high-explosive incendiary and SAPHEI armored high-explosive incendiary) are stored in an annular magazine in the turret cupola in a space which has low vulnerability. For attacking ground targets, each weapon has 20 rounds of small caliber armor-piercing ammunition (APDS). For exact calculation of the lead angle the muzzle velocity of the munition is measured and corrected during the burst of fire.

Crew Training

Crew training occurs largely on simulators:

- Training system air defense armored vehicle, operating elements of the console;
- simulated combat work space (training of a 2-man crew);
- aerial target simulator (inside the vehicle; optics simulated by CGI);
- tactical fire evaluation facility for monitoring crews inside the vehicles during combat training.

Maintenance personnel are trained on training simulators dedicated to the specialties of fire control, weapon and power supply.

Combat Effectiveness Upgrading

A combat effectiveness upgrading of the weapon system must be used to adapt to the threat, especially from

- high-performance aircraft;
- combat helicopters;
- electronic warfare.

The following is proposed:

- Procurement of a higher-velocity munition (to shorten its travel time) and greater impact in the target, e.g., a small-caliber non-explosive round with fragmentation effect;
- Integration with a command and reconnaissance system with external sensors (army air defense reconnaissance and control system);
- passive optronic sensors with infrared imaging and tracker;
- digitalization of fire control and internal guidance and monitoring by a digital computer which also processes the information of the command system (enemy air situation).

These measures are intended to result in the following:

- increased hit and destruction probability;
- passive operation, i.e., little or no use of the actively radiating radars, to reduce enemy reconnaissance and to reduce the threat from anti-radiation-missiles (ARM);
- coordinated defense against enemy aircraft and combat helicopter formations approaching in large numbers (swarms).

German STINGER Modifications

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Oct 85 pp 78-82

[Article by Klaus-Juergen Glee]

[Text] Following a market survey of several portable antiaircraft missile systems, the Bundeswehr has decided on procuring the U.S.-developed General Dynamics STINGER. The weapon system is to be produced in Europe under license by the general contractors, Dornier and Diehl. Engineer Klaus-Juergen Glee, program engineer for the STINGER with Dornier GmbH, describes the system, called Fliegerfaust 2 in Germany, and mentions a few possibilities for upgrading it during the 1990s.

Lightweight, portable antiaircraft systems like the Fliegerfaust 2 (FLF2) are generally used under optical visual conditions for defense against low and very low flying aircraft for self-defense or facilities defense. Systems of this nature are generally known in NATO terminology as man-portable-air-defense systems (MANPADS). In the Bundeswehr they are known as "Fliegerfaust." The following are at present deployed worldwide:

- SA-7
- BLOWPIPE
- RBS-70
- REDEYE
- STINGER

The essential tasks for these systems are the following:

- all-around defense against approaching aircraft and helicopters at low and very low altitudes;
- target speeds of zero to Mach 1.4;
- target maneuvers of up to 8g;
- method of use: fire-and-forget, if possible;
- highest possible countermeasure invulnerability;
- availability 0.95;
- shelf life of more than 12 years.

Common MANPADS characteristics are light system weight, small missile diameter, small warhead weight and command guidance or IR homing.

Problem areas for portable missile systems are mainly in their portability, i.e., limitation in weight and dimensions concomitant with adequate performance and in detection capability, i.e., target acquisition, target identification and target tracking.

Portable guided missile systems are used under visibility conditions, in which the human eye serves as the sensor.

The U.S. portable STINGER air defense systems was selected as Fliegerfaust 2. This system is to replace the portable air defense system Fliegerfaust 1

(REDEYE), a predecessor of the STINGER, which is currently in use by the Bundeswehr, in 1986.

The STINGER Basic missile has a passive IR search head. The search head of the upgraded STINGER POST works in the IR and UV sectors. The illustration shows the components of the weapon system and the training device. Additional system components are a field handling trainer, the gas pumping unit, argon gas supply, and the metal weapon round container and the wooden missile round container.

Among the main features of the weapon system are the following:

- rolling airframe (length: 1,074 mm);
- proportional navigation with target adaptive guidance (LEAD BIAS);
- great start and lateral acceleration capability;
- high supersonic speed (approximately Mach 2);
- great kinetic impact and penetration energy at the target;
- impact fuze with ignition delay, causing detonation of the warhead charge in the target.

The performance of such a portable air defense system is determined essentially by optical, visual target perception, reaction time and the fire and deployment areas. Minimum reaction time of the weapon, after target search and visual perception have taken place, takes several seconds.

Since the weight of the high explosive in the warhead is relatively small, the missile does not have to score a direct hit on its target in order to destroy it. Some systems, e.g., the STINGER, do not even have a proximity sensor. The goal is to have the warhead detonate inside the airframe, so as to obtain maximum effect. A sophisticated ignition system with appropriate ignition delay causes the warhead to explode inside the target.

The upgraded STINGER POST model has a two-color search head (IR and UV), which works with a rosette scan rather than with reticle modulation. In addition, a slightly conical external contour of the search head provides slightly improved aerodynamics. This improvement should provide the following advantages for the STINGER POST in comparison with the STINGER Basic:

- improved IRCM capability;
- improved fire and hit capabilities, especially in head-on approach;
- improved separation of double targets;
- improved target acquisition (using the UV component for targets having suppressed IR radiation characteristics).

The lack of an automatic IFF instrument and the relatively late acquisition of approaching targets causes a trend in several countries to more fully exploit the capabilities of this missile by using it in other weapon systems having better sensors or their own fire control system. Basic research in this area is proceeding for Fliegerfaust 2 also.

The great expense of developing new ground-to-air guided missile systems would indicate a future requirement for a Fliegerfaust 3, which would meet the threat in the close and immediate vicinity in large numbers and in conjunction with tube weapons in a personnel and cost economic manner.

The following improvements are desirable for the 1990s:

- an adequate solution of automatic target identification;
- improved flight mechanics and guidance equipment;
- missile speed approaching Mach 3;
- greater lateral acceleration capability;
- better hit accuracy, so as to render unnecessary either a heavy warhead weight or the development of "aimed" warheads with very expensive fuze-warhead combinations;
- improvement in head-on capability with two-phase guidance, i.e., improved target search heads, especially for the final approach;
- improvements in the areas of all-weather capability, enlargement of the acquisition distance through the use of electro-optical instruments, automation of target identification, tracking and guidance of the missile inside the target, resulting in reducing reaction time;
- adaptability to a variety of carrier vehicles and suitability for integration with other weapon systems.

These desired improvements must however not cause the cost of the systems to preclude their procurement in large numbers.

Chart: Portable Air Defense Guided Missile Systems

			BLOWPIPE	RBS-70	SA-7	REDEYE	STINGER	
							BASIC	POST
eingeführt in	1		GB, CAN	S (N)	W.-P	NATO; S	USA —	
Reichweite	2	m	~ 3 000	5 000	3 700	3 800	5 000	5 200
Flugzeit	3	s	14	16	6.5	~ 10	8.5	
max. Einsatzhöhe	4	m	1 700	3 000	3 000	2 500	3 000	
max. FK-Geschw.	5	Mach	1.3	1.6	1.6	1.6	2.1	
max. Zielgeschw.	6	Mach	0.9	~ 1	< 1	0.7	1.2	
System-Gewicht	7	kg	20.7	82.5	~ 13.9	13.1	15.6	
Länge ¹	8	mm	1 350	1 320	1 440	1 272	1 524	
FK-Durchmesser	9	mm	77	106	72	70	70	
FK-Gewicht	10	kg	14	15	9.2	8.3	9.4	
Lenkung	11		16 Funk-Kdo	Laser-Beamrider	pass. IR-Homing	pass. IR-Homing	pass. IR-Homing + UV	
			17 Zieldeckungs-verfahren	Zieldeckungs-verfahren	Prop.-Nav.	Prop.-Nav.	Proportional-Nav.	
Gefechtskopf	12		18 3 kg HE oder Hohlladung	1 kg HE St-Kugeln	1 kg HE	1 kg HE	1 kg HE	
Zunder	13		20 Aufschlag u. Annäh.	21 Aufschlag u. Annäh. Laser	Aufschlag	22 Aufschlag	Aufschlag	

Störfestigkeit	14	ECM	23	"keine"	IRCM	IRCM	IRCM ger. IRCM
Besondere Merkmale	15	gegen anfl. Ziele	24	gegen anfl. Ziele	gegen abfl. Ziele	25	gegen abfl. Ziele
						25	gegen an- und abfl. Ziele

1) des Startrohres mit Abschlußdeckel

- Key:
1. Used In:
 2. Range (meters)
 3. Flying time (seconds)
 4. Altitude ceiling (meters)
 5. Maximum speed (Mach)
 6. Maximum target speed (Mach)
 7. System weight (kg)
 8. Length (of launch tube with cover) (mm)
 9. Missile diameter (mm)
 10. Missile weight (kg)
 11. Guidance
 12. Warhead
 13. Fuze
 14. Immunity to interference
 15. Special characteristics
 16. Radio command
 17. Line-of-sight course method
 18. 3 kg high explosive or shaped charge
 19. 1 kg high explosive steel balls
 20. Impact and proximity
 21. Impact and proximity laser
 22. Impact
 23. "none"
 24. Against approaching targets
 25. Against departing targets
 26. Against approaching and departing targets.

Transition to NADGE Successor

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Oct 85 pp 82-85

[Article by Werner Gerlitzki]

[Text] The NADGE NATO air defense system, designed in the 1960s, is to see a transition to a new ACCS system within about 15 years in 5-year increments. Engineer Werner Gerlitzki, head of the Ground Radar Systems Branch of the Position Finding Division of AEG, Ulm, describes in this article the current state of the art in information acquisition and processing in air defense and talks about future developments.

Three different levels can be defined in the command and deployment structure of air defense:

- command of subordinate units and deployment planning at the tactical air command level (ATAF); specific command facilities are provided by the two sector operations centers of an ATAF (SOC);
- execution of tactical tasks and deployment of weapon systems at the air defense command centers (CRC), several of which are subordinate to a SOC;
- actual engagement at weapon system level (antiaircraft missiles, fighter aircraft).

Taking a closer look at the second and third level, we find that the air defense components represented there depend for the accomplishment of their tasks to a large extent upon data provided by their sensors (almost exclusively radars). Sensors available today and in the foreseeable future are the following:

- for second-level systems: allocated air defense radars, other surveillance radars (e.g., ATC), surveillance radars in attached weapon systems; AWACS;
- for third-level systems located on the ground: surveillance and fire control radars of the air defense missile weapon systems; in the air, on-board radars and IR sensors of the flying systems.

Functions to be accomplished with the aid of sensor information include the following:

- at the second level: acquisition, identification and classification of aerial targets, air situation display, threat calculation, target allocation to the weapon systems, interceptor deployment, command of friendly flying units and groups;

- at the third level on the ground: determination of the air situation, threat calculation if necessary, target acquisition, target tracking, fire control; in the air, navigation, ground and aerial target acquisition, target tracking, fire control.

State of the Art and New Concepts

In the NADGE (NATO Air Defense Ground Environment) system, designed for air defense in the 1960s, a CRC usually has a stationary, co-located long-range radar which provides the air situation as well as radar information for fighter command functions. The attached HAWK or NIKE air defense missile systems, which have their own radars at their level, receive target allocations from the CRC and return status reports to BOC and CRC. However, an information exchange on the air situation is possible only via the LINK-1 connection between the CRCs (Crosstell procedure). The vulnerability of this system in case of interference with or destruction of the CRC radar is obvious. It would require independent functioning of the air defense missile systems, which impairs weapon effectiveness.

To counter these weaknesses, the GEADGE (German Air Defense Ground Environment) program has been in operation since the early 1980s in the Southern Germany area, that of the 4 ATAF. This permits connection with supplemental

radars, connected with the CRC radar, which transmit their air situation data digitally; in addition, there is a procedure for receiving AWACS situation reports. Based on the incoming target data from the radars, the CRC computers are able to conduct multi-radar tracking. This results in better radar coverage of the CRC area and in diminished vulnerability.

At the same time, the introduction of new data transmission procedures in the HAWK system (ATDL) permits automatic transmission of status and air situation information to the TSQ-38 HAWK battalion command post and, in a further upgrading, from and to the CRC (via TADIL-B).

AEG currently has a contract for implementing the requisite modernization which will permit transmission and display of status and situation reports to the TSQ-38.

Beyond that, there have been since about 1980 NATO studies and plans for a revision of the air defense system, known as ACCS (Air Command and Control System). The following are the basic requirements and prerequisites for their fulfillment:

- Reduced vulnerability by data networking existing positions and sensors; connecting additional mobile radars with the CRC; introduction of passive sensors into the radar frequency bands; hardening of stationary facilities to the maximum extent possible;
- Increased immunity to ECM by interference-resistant modern radars; networking of radars in different frequency bands; use of passive sensors to locate jammers;
- Adaptation to the characteristics of next-generation targets through improved acquisition of small and low-flying targets; adaptation of the computer software to greater maneuverability of the targets; acceleration of the defense sequence through software support;
- Improvement of identification procedures by standardizing the IFF/SIF process in the NATO area; computer support in executing procedural identification sequences;
- closer coordination between offensive and defensive air war components (Joint Airspace Management) by improved data links and therefore a better exchange of information at the ATOC-SOC-CRC level (ideally: co-location of ATOC/SOC); new definitions of functional sequences and procedures; integration of new command systems (EIFEL, HEROS).

In addition, attention must be paid in the air defense structure of the future to the impacts deriving from the introduction of new weapon systems, e.g., PATRIOT. Also, detailed procedures must be worked out for coordination with the ground forces (air defense, army aviation).

Considering the special characteristics of the NATO Central Air Defense Region, the implementation of the outline structure for ACCS leads to the basic organization shown in Figure 1. In it, ATOC and SOC are closely linked by data networks; the CRCs have, instead of less firmly committed radars, a sensor net which in addition contains supplementary mobile active and passive sensors. The new tasks resulting therefrom for the network or

sensor management must be newly integrated with today's functional sequences. One essential task for the CRC is the determination of a validated air situation for its area (Recognized Air Picture, RAP) and its maintenance under enemy attack. It is available to the fighter command and for transmission to the attached air defense missile units. Note must be taken in the future also of the fact that in view of the planned HAWK/PATRIOT weapon mix air defense missile systems with differing deployment parameters and effective ranges will have to be controlled. The additional functions required for this will have to be performed by the mobile air defense missile control centers of the future.

What defense-oriented instrumentation is available, especially, from German industry, for implementing this system? In recent years the AEG-Telefunken 3D TRMS surveillance radar has been developed as a highly mobile 3D radar, all the way to field use readiness. In the passive sensor area, several firms and institutes are conducting research and development which should result in deployment during the 1990s. It will cover a wide operating spectrum, extending from the bistatic radar (SEL), to passive radars for detecting the position of radiation emitters in the frequency ranges of surveillance radars and AEG on-board radars, and to triangulation of jamming transmitters by the interference direction finder of ground radars made by Siemens.

Industry can also supply--contrary to the situation 20 years ago at the beginning of the NADGE program--fully developed display and indicator units, computers and basic software modules. However, in producing complex software for air defense purposes, special care must be taken, apart from the available experience of German firms and available software capabilities, to define the required function in a programmable manner before starting out. This is a task beyond the capacity of industry alone; it can be accomplished only by joint efforts between user, procurement officials and industry.

Aspects of System Transition

NATO plans exist for transitioning the present air defense system into an ACCS condition within the next 15 years in five annual increments. This will require a series of time-phased implementation steps, since on the one hand a number of system components must be improved and maintained, while on the other hand new weapon systems will become operational relatively early within this period. Thus the modernization of the present inventory must proceed in parallel with the introduction of new subsystems and components.


The following would be a conceivable sequence of programs:

- better crosslinking of air defense operations centers and weapon systems by appropriate data transmission; introduction of multiradar tracking where it does not presently exist; integration of supplementary available sensors (ATC radars);
- introduction of a limited number of mobile sensors and operational control centers; linkup with the data flow in higher echelon command systems (EIFEL, HEROS);

In a further upgrading, about the middle of the 1990s, passive sensor networks could be integrated into the system.

Thus the users, procurement officials and industry are faced with a very ambitious program which would incorporate the areas of sensor technology, hard- and software of the control centers and new communications equipment and command and control centers and new communications equipment and command and control systems. Such a program can be brought to fruition only through the joint efforts of all concerned.

Figure 1: Basic Organization of ACCS (Central Region)



- Key: 1. Sensor network, stationary radars, mobile radars, passive sensors, AWACS
2. Supplementary information (e.g., EIFEL network, Army Air Defense Reconnaissance and Command System)
3. Fighter aircraft
4. Air defense missile control centers
5. Command status
6. Air situation
7. Air defense missile units (HAWK, PATRIOT)

Air Defense Simulator Developments

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Oct 85 pp 87-88

[Article by Siegfried Schulz]

[Text] Addressing the requirements for training in the operation of air defense systems, Engineer Siegfried Schulz, of the Philips Systems and Special Technology Division in Bremen, describes presently available training systems and those of the future, emphasizing optical simulation of the environmental and target images as used in the GEPARD aerial target simulator.

Why Training Simulators?

The successes achieved by simulators in defense technology are closely linked with developments in the field of electronics and especially with digital data processing. Only by using these aids has it been possible to reproduce complex events and to process large quantities of data.

There are two reasons for using simulators in defense technology:

- simulation is in many cases the only means of attaining the desired training goal;
- usually, a great deal of money can be saved: after just a few years (1 to 3) there is usually proof of the economy of using simulators, despite the relatively high procurement cost. Such proof is valid if only about 10 percent of the operating hours and munition of the actual weapon system are saved.

Points of Emphasis in Training

Apart from operational training, the main requirement is for tactical combat training and the weapons disposition, in conjunction with the following sensors:

- periscope
- radar and IFF
- navigation instruments
- laser rangefinder; all this in:
- different scenarios
- realistic flight patterns
- under increasingly difficult conditions
- with multiple targets and alternate targets
- while encountering ECM
- in all operating sequences
- with intentional operational malfunctions
- under reproducible conditions
- under conditions subject to analysis and control
- independent of weather conditions
- environmentally harmless
- time and cost effective.

Due to the importance which will be gained in the future by passive sensors (IR, Peri), training in the use of these sensors will have to be emphasized even more, thus increasing the share of the optical component within the overall system. At present, the share of optics in combat situations amounts to about 30 percent; in the future it will come closer to 50 percent.

Simulators for Air Defense Systems

For the GEPARD and ROLAND air defense systems the following major training facilities are available:

ROLAND:

- simulator crew compartment
- aerial target simulator

GEPARD:

- training facility
- simulator crew compartment
- aerial target simulator.

Let us discuss the aerial target simulator for the GEPARD in greater detail.

Periscope Simulation in the GEPARD Aerial Target Simulator

The optical component in the GEPARD consists of the periscopes for the commander and the gunner.

For simulation with the aerial target simulator the original periscopes are replaced with training periscopes. The training periscopes contain, apart from the steering mechanism and the optics, one black and white monitor each. The monitors display a portion of the landscape or the targets which corresponds with the visual angle of the periscope at that moment.

The simulated picture in the aerial target simulator is generated in three steps:

- generation of the landscape image
- generation of the target image (max. three simultaneous)
- superimposition of landscape and targets.

The image to be displayed is chosen either manually with the joysticks or automatically (e.g., in a radar chase).

Generation of the Landscape Image

Three different methods are used for displaying the landscape:

- use of a 360° panoramic photograph and scanning of the photograph by a TV camera (in the GEPARD aerial target simulator five different panoramas can be selected per program);
- use of a digitalized panorama image. Every point of the image is stored on a magnetic disc. This is used in the ROLAND simulator crew compartment;
- use of a 2-D landscape model with distance information.

The model is stored on magnetic disc. Choice of five panoramic images per program in the GEPARD aerial target simulator.

A panoramic photograph is the starting point in the GEPARD simulator for generating a 360° landscape image.

The relevant parts of this photograph are digitalized by sections. For this purpose horizon lines, shapes of houses, trees, etc. are scanned manually and the data stored.

Finally, distances and textures are allocated to individual objects.

To intensify the depth effect in the simulated landscape image, the texture for each surface can be supplemented with shades of grey in 64 intensities out of a total of 256 available ones.

Textures for Landscape Image Displays

To generate a realistic image, the various surfaces of a landscape model can be covered with so-called textures. A total of eight different textures are available, e.g., for leaves, grass, masonry. In addition there is a perforated texture, which serves to generate such partially transparent images as treetops in conjunction with the "leaf" texture.

Principle of Target Display

In addition to generating the landscape display, the images of a maximum of three target silhouettes are generated in the GEPARD aerial target simulator. These targets may be either ground or aerial vehicles. They are displayed in the shape of triangular or rectangular models.

Model Generation

The targets are stored in a computer memory as mathematical models. Each model consists of two parts:

- it contains for each surface corner point the x, y, and z coordinates in a three-dimensional Cartesian space;
- an instruction indicates which of the corners are to be connected so as to generate triangles or rectangles.

Target Projection

For proper display of targets according to their aspect angle at any particular moment the models are turned mathematically in the three-dimensional space. This takes into account such maneuvers as rolls, turns and pitch, as well as distance from target, to generate a display of appropriate size. Transformation occurs every 40 milliseconds in accordance with the TV raster.

Inasmuch as the 13 targets of the GEPARD simulator are stored in the computer memory as mathematical models, aspect angle transformations can be made for

parts of these models also. These so-called "pre-transformations" (execution prior to the aspect transformation) permit such displays as changing the wing angles of a swing-wing aircraft, or the rotation of a helicopter rotor.

Training Systems of the Future

In view of future requirements by the users, development is proceeding on further improvements of optical simulation:

--Multiple Unit Training: For future joint simulation training of a six-GEOPARD battery, different types of positions within the training area are important for the optical component of the simulators. These positions, as well as targets to be jointly attacked by several weapon systems, must be linked to each other by several simulators. This would mean for instance that a target hit by one weapon system would have to be shown as having been hit by all other systems participating in the simulation.

Another item of progress concerns free mobility in the training area. It permits training of tactical variants, e.g., the selection of a position for the air defense armored vehicle by the commander.

Technically, mobility permits the use of so-called computer generated (synthesized) images (CGI or CGSI).

- Improvements in the Optical Image: The display of optical simulators, i.e., their realism, can be improved in a number of ways:
- target imaging with shades of gray (already in use in the ROLAND simulated crew compartment);
- use of color for the landscape as well as the targets;
- higher image resolution (e.g., 1280x1024 dots) as well as more rapid image turnover (50 Hz without intercalated scanning);
- replacement of projection display by a spatial target display.

These measures would also make the simulator suitable for target identification training.

--Consideration of Additional Sensors: apart from the "periscope" optical sensor, infrared sensors will in the future be integrated into the weapon systems also. The display of infrared images will therefore be a new task for optical simulation.

Targets in Color

All target models are composed of flat polygons (triangles and rectangles). This gives an "edged" impression to all models in normal monitor display. However, special shading methods can impart an impression of curved surfaces to images which were "edged" originally (the so-called "Gouraud Shading").

Fire Control Data System

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Oct 85 pp 88-91

[Article by Ralf Liebers]

[Text] Luftwaffe facilities protection is currently provided by the 20-mm Zwilling [twin] antiaircraft guns. To be able to practice with these weapons and to train gun commanders and gunners, the antiaircraft gun training unit (AAF) was developed; it has been used by troops in the field since 1982. Captain Engineer Ralf Liebers, from the Office of the Commanding General, Luftwaffe Materiel, of the Department of the Luftwaffe, Koeln-Wahn, here gives a description of this unit.

Luftwaffe facilities protection is generally provided by the ROLAND Rad weapon system, 20 mm Zwilling antiaircraft guns and twin-mounted machineguns as active protection. Passive protective measures are added to supplement them: camouflage and deception (which are expected to become more important in the future than they have been to date) and hardening of various facility components.

In this setup, the MK-20 mm Zwilling is charged with attacking aerial targets flying at low and very low altitudes. These extend, by definition, from 0 to 150 meters (very low) up to a maximum of 600 meters. The guns are emplaced in a ring, about 1000 meters in front of the facility, thus providing an engagement range of up to 2000 meters away from the facility. Since the guns do not have radar support, airspace observers (Luftraum-beobachter, LRB) are positioned at 4 to 5 km distances in a circle around the facility. They report the number, direction and speed ranges of the approaching aerial targets within seconds to the antiaircraft gun crews. Apart from its antiaircraft mission, the MK-20 mm Zwilling can also be used against ground targets in case a higher priority intervenes.

Development History of the AAF

Upon approval of the tactical requirement for a antiaircraft gun training unit (AAF), the request for such a unit was formally made and justified on 16 March 1977. The unit was to have the following capabilities:

- simultaneous operation of several guns;
- training opportunities with or without ammunition;
- firing practice at aerial targets including estimation of target speed and the so-called minimum slant range with separate evaluation;
- determination, recording and evaluation of all aiming failures as well as their image display and representation options for purposes of documentation;
- separation of performance results for gun commander and gunner;
- determination and recording of various times, distances and weapon data during the engagement operation.

In addition, the unit should be easily transportable.

The unit was designed by Dornier and Rheinmetall and, after construction was authorized, built mainly by Dornier. The AAF was issued to the field on 4 May 1982 and has been in use since that date.

Function and Operational Use of the AAF

Optional Uses and Deployment Parameters

The AAF is suitable for use with manually operated antiaircraft guns with optical aiming instruments. It provides actual, but primarily simulated, engagement of a real aerial target. Its transportability enables the AAF to be used at the actual position of the guns. This has not only the advantage of permitting the incorporation of all object-specific conditions into the training; it also provides the opportunity of flying all conceivable wartime attack profiles with the aerial target and to practice dealing with their specific problem areas. Up to 20 guns can be used simultaneously.

Functional Principle

The flight course and speed of a target acquired by a radar is compared with the theoretical flight course of the simulated munition, which had been computed based on the barrel angle at the moment of fire. This calculation of the theoretical munition flight course includes ballistic data for the gun and the munition as well as the previously estimated wind velocity and direction. The result is available immediately upon completion of any engagement at the gun data terminal, which is attached to every gun. The type of error is shown immediately, identified as to the individual who made it, i.e., the gun commander or the gunner.

Main Components of the Unit

An attached, dedicated tracking radar furnishes the AAF control center with the measured position and speed of the aerial target.

The control center is contained in a standardized II Fm A communications cabin and has an instructor console which can tune into and monitor the activity at every single gun or the actual target position. Also, this is the place from which the telemetered target position data are transmitted to the individual gun data terminals, where they are fed into the computer. In addition, the control center is capable of recording and evaluating all relevant exercise data.

Every gun has its own gun data terminal, which receives, via an adapter, the gun-specific data as well as the power supply. The terminal provides the calculation of the theoretical munition flight paths as well as a comparison with the actual target position, an immediate evaluation and display.

Up to 22 items are displayed, among them

- minimum slant range, measured and estimated;
- target speed, measured and estimated;
- target distance at target acquisition, start and end of fire sequence;
- number of rounds per burst of fire;
- duration of burst of fire;
- number of hits per burst of fire;
- target acquisition time;
- aiming accuracy;
- crew reaction time.

The weak point of the entire unit is at present the obsolescent SUPERFLEDER-MAUS type radar. The high failure rate of this instrument causes unsatisfactory use frequency rates for the AAF.

Fire Sequence of a MK-20 mm Zwilling Without AAF

The engagement sequence breaks down into three phases:

- in the first phase the approaching aerial target is acquired by the airspace observation squad (LRB squad), identified and reported within seconds;
- in the second phase the gun crew is alerted and gun commander and gunner observe the airspace in the direction indicated. Upon target allocation by the gun commander the gunner acquires it with the auxiliary gunsight and subsequently transmits it into the optics of the gun. The gun commander now estimates the speed and minimum slant range of the target and enters these data into the lead angle computer of the gun;
- in the third phase, fire is opened and the target is attacked until shot down or until the minimum slant range is reached.

Critical Points

Depending upon flying speed, the gun commander has 10 to 15 seconds to estimate speed and slant range, from which however 5 seconds must be deducted for entering the data into the gun. The remaining time of 5 to 10 seconds is short, but adequate.

However, the critical point is not the time factor, but human inability to estimate distances or speeds in a halfway accurate manner.

Operation of the AAF

First, a gun data terminal (GDT) is connected to each gun via an adapter and the exact position of the gun with relation to the radar is determined. This measurement must be highly accurate, with an error tolerance of 0.5 meters maximum if adequate hit accuracy is to be achieved. The measured data are automatically entered into the GDT computer and stored.

During the engagement sequence the gun commander must enter the estimated minimum slant range and target speed data into the gun as well as the GDT. The barrel positions are scanned through the adapter and continuously

transmitted to the computer. When the fire command is given, the theoretical point of intersection or the miss distance, as the case may be, is calculated and subsequently displayed.

Impact on Firing Performance

Data available since the introduction of the AAF in 1982 indicate unequivocally that there has been a steady decrease in the number of rounds per hit, and a percentile increase in the number of gunners demonstrating minimum proficiency in their first firing at actual targets.

Final Evaluation of the Unit

In the AAF the Luftwaffe has a training aid which provides optimum training with or without ammunition, and in which performance can be objectively evaluated. It is optimal not because of that capability of objective evaluation, but because of its ability to point out each operator-caused error according to its cause. The unit does not require modification of the weapon feasible. Simultaneous functioning of several gun crews and practice at the location of the facility to be protected makes it possible to practice especially the time-wasting estimating of minimum slant ranges and speed at small expense and using actual targets. The present weakness, the obsolescent radar, will have to be replaced by a reliable instrument within the foreseeable future.

To increase the engagement range of the MK-20 mm Zwillling up to the self-destruct limit of the munition of about 2000 meters, accurate aiming is required. However, this could be achieved only if present-day estimates of minimum slant range and target speed could be replaced by exact measurements.

Increased computer capacity of the AAF component control center and GDT would permit use and onward transmission of flight data determined by the radar to the gun commanders. The gun commander would then only have to read these data on the GDT scope and to enter them into the gun or to make the necessary correction in case the aerial target changes its direction and speed. It is conceivable also that under certain circumstances the gun commander and the GDT could be bypassed and that the data could be radioed from the control center direct to the gunner, who would then have to enter these data himself.

9273/9435
CSO: 3620/177

MILITARY

GREECE

DETAILS ON ARMED FORCES EQUIPMENT 'OPERATION RENEWAL'

Athens TO VIMA in Greek Dec 85 p 12

[Text] The new program of equipping the Armed Forces, the first phase of which has already begun being implemented, places greater emphasis on defense of the country, on the revitalization of domestic industry and cottage industry and ensuring the highest possible offset benefits for any purchase whatsoever.

"Operation Renewal" of the weapons systems began quietly a few months ago, based on the 5-year economic plan, activating, at the same time, hundreds of Greek industries that, perhaps, may this year have equal participation in defense arming of the country. With the participation of these industries there will be the benefit of several billion drachmai in foreign exchange, in addition to the revitalization of domestic production and a reduction in dependence on foreign countries.

While the first phase of the armaments program has already begun, new proposals for the modernization of the Armed Forces are about to be submitted--as confirmed by a military source--to KYSEA, aiming not only at the balance of forces in the Aegean, but at meeting the needs of all three services, up to the year 2000.

In implementing the decisions of KYSEA, the Ministry of National Defense established these armament programs, one for each branch of the Armed Forces. To wit:

Navy

The building of four ultramodern frigates. The selection of the platform for the design of the vessels by Greeks has already been made and we are now in the final phase, the selection of bids for their construction. Bids have been submitted by many countries, but only three have been chosen: West Germany, Great Britain and Italy. The Netherlands, which built the two frigates, "Elli" and "Limnos," has also submitted bids, but these were not considered satisfactory for the needs of the Armed Forces.

Prior to the completion of the selective process, of course, the Navy is awaiting the American and NATO approval of the selection of the proper type, a fact, however, that is not binding for Greece. The frigates will be built abroad with Greek cooperation in their construction and, according to projections, their delivery to the Navy is expected to take place by 1992. The new frigates will be smaller than the ones presently in service, with a more modern weapons system and be more maneuverable for their patrols in the Aegean.

By the middle of May the modernization of the destroyers "Apostolis" and "Kriezis" is expected to begin at the Skaramanga shipyards; their weapons systems will be replaced and they will be modified in order to carry "Sea Sparrow" missiles and the Italian gun of the OTO Melara type with its ultramodern firing system.

At the Elefsina shipyards the destroyers "Miaoulis" and "Themistoklis" will follow in being modernized and for general repairs and, in the first quarter of 1987, the destroyer "Aigaion," which the Navy acquired with German aid, is to undergo modernization (it will also carry missiles).

Within days the "secret," as the "Kanaris" fire guidance system is classified, is going to be delivered to the Navy. This ultramodern system of locating and destroying underwater targets has been designed exclusively by Greek specialists and is considered to be one of the most advanced of its kind. It was built in the United States under the supervision of Greek officers. All submarines of the fleet are going to be equipped with this system as well as many other vessels such as missile-carrying PT boats, destroyers, etc.

Emphasis should be placed on the procurement, in stages, of the "Harpoon" and "Sea Sparrow" surface-to-surface missiles as well as of the extremely expensive "Exocet" missile, which a few weeks ago the Navy impressively demonstrated.

However, over and above all of this, the staff officers of the Navy have prepared new proposals (they call them "projections") that they are going to submit to KYSEA.

These proposals are made, as explained in the introductory report, with the idea of strengthening domestic industry and meeting the needs up to the year 2000. In essence, they project:

The building of a floating drydock;

The construction of two tankers and a fleet oiler;

The construction of three towed barges and an additional two ocean-going ones;

The construction of two patrol vessels of the "Ambekin" type.

The plan also provides, but not with immediate priority, for the construction of four self-propelled barges and two more towed ones as well as the construction of two missile-carrying PT boats and an additional two patrol vessels.

Army

In addition to the mass production of the "Artemis" anti-aircraft system and the "6-3" rifle, not only for the needs of the Armed Forces, but also for export purposes mainly, the production of the first military jeep (a 1/4-ton vehicle) has begun. It is a perfect vehicle, built by the "Mercedes" and "Stayer-Hellas" company, and for which Greece secured 80 percent of its purchase price in offset benefits.

It is significant to note that in this case, the Greek industries had built the engine of the jeep, which is the same as that of the "Mercedes" 240 diesel

engine. The manufacturing companies have begun delivering the first of the ten thousand jeeps ordered by the Armed Forces. However, the companies can sell these jeeps to private individuals.

Building of artillery fire-control systems by EAV with a budget of 1 billion drachmai.

Building of auxiliary vehicles for the Armed Forces (tankers, fire trucks, etc.) by domestic manufacturing firms.

Production of various types of ammunition by PYRKAL that are also exported to third countries.

Manufacture of Greek mortars, mines and 155 and 105 mm. artillery shells.

Building of a Greek tank, the first to be built in Greece. The Ministry of National Defense has already sought bids to choose the type of tank to be built in Greece (under the joint production system) together with the manufacturing countries. At the same time, directives were issued for the building of another Greek armored personnel carrier of the "Leonidas" type. The new tank will be named "Leonidas II" and is considered to be one of the most modern of its kind.

The first anti-tank missile of the "Aris" type is being developed and expected to be delivered to the Armed Forces in full operational readiness within the next 3 years.

The projections of the Army also include:

The purchase of 10 "Chinook" personnel transport helicopters;

The manufacture (under the joint production system), with the Italian "Agusta-Bell," of a combat helicopter of the "A-109" type. EAV has already signed the relative agreement;

The purchase of assault helicopters, mainly anti-tank. Bids were sought for the purchase of six helicopters of the "Apache" type (extremely expensive, but ultramodern, with tremendous fire-power) of American manufacture, each costing 14 million dollars. Bids were also sought for helicopters of the "Cobra" type costing 8 million dollars, and for the Agusta "A-29" type.

Air Force

The Air Force program is known to all of us with the "purchase of the century." However, although a contract for the purchase of 40 "Mirage-2000" (which are already being built in Bordeaux) has been signed with the French "Dassault" firm, nothing has happened yet with regard to the American "General Dynamics" firm for the purchase of the 40 "F-16's."

Up until the time of the writing of this article, the American government--despite the signing of the "G-SOMIA" agreement (which privately guarantees it)--has not

granted the export permit so that the final contract can be signed. Air Force officers figure that the export permit must be granted before the end of the year (the manufacturing company is pressing for this) in order for the contract to be signed in January or early February. With the signing of the contract the Americans will receive 20 million dollars as a down-payment!

However, in addition to the fighter aircraft, the Air Force will modernize itself by commissioning EAV to construct an advanced technology system for the self-protection of aircraft. It is a complex system that allows the aircraft to attack without being hit by hostile projectiles. In essence, this system consists of flares (that attract enemy missiles) and aluminum foil [chaff] (as countermeasures for magnetic missiles) that are launched by the aircraft a few minutes prior to the attack. The entire self-protection system is estimated to cost 2 billion drachmai.

9731

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MILITARY

ITALY

OFFICERS PROTEST NEW RULES ON PROMOTIONS

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 27 Nov 85 p 8

[Article by Leonardo Coen]

[Text] Aspiring Lt Cols outraged at sudden cutbacks in promotions. Defense Commission bombarded with angry telegrams. Waiting for promotions are 814 officers who have completed advanced courses at Modena Academy now discover that only 101 of them will get the expected rank. Protest greets Angelini's bill: "We are the backbone of the Armed Forces."

Milan -- The men on the standard promotions list are no longer prepared to live by the long-standing motto: "Make it a habit to obey in silence and to die in silence." Early this month they sent personal telegrams to every member of the Defense Commission, conveying their protest in no uncertain terms, more or less along these lines:

"The newly introduced Angelini Bill runs counter to our interests as a category." Then they started inundating the news media with letters crammed with bitter recriminations but, alas! accompanied by over-specific missives from attorneys, and all too heavily slanted in favor of their particular sector. Today they are readying to move onto the battlefield, and there are grounds for believing that they mean what they say, given the fact that the aggrieved parties are 814 lieutenant-colonels, graduates of the Modena Academy, all expecting promotions. That promotion, owing to legislation enacted and repealed or amended (since 1959, there have been more than 100 such bills enacted) will go to only 101 of them. What about the rest? They need only wait for next year's lists of "available assignments"... and so it comes to pass that there are lieutenant colonels who have been wearing the same uniform for 12 to 15 years, but will be taking it off for good on the day they reach retirement.

"Just take a close look at this bill, which is now practically assured of passage: you will find that special privileges are written into it for colleagues in the other two arms of the military." Lt Col Angelo Coviello, class of 1933, an architect who has served as a military engineer in the Northwest Regional Military Command in Turin -- that special single command that is made up of unassigned officers, the so-called "retained" officers who have achieved permanent active-duty status by scoring high in a competitive examination, and another group, of those who are "finishing out" their careers, meaning that they have been promoted without competition." What is the real basis for this disparity?

Let's take it, as the saying goes, one step at a time. The Standard Single List (RNU) is made up of officers from the Academy who have survived the stiff courses at Modena, and some of whom have also even attended the War School, and who, in the course of command assignments as lieutenant colonels have undergone frequent transfers and their concomitant upheavals. The Single Special Rolls (RSU), however, are crowded with command officers transferred at their simple request to permanent active-duty status: once they have accumulated sufficient seniority -- at least 10 years -- do their jobs as a rule in only one post, without command responsibilities. The terminal roll, however, receives no further input of active-duty personnel, but even so, it does take positions away from the other two arms, particularly the first. In practical terms, a lieutenant colonel makes a net salary of 1,600 million lire per month. A full colonel is paid 2 million. The standard career brings the trigger-point in after 6, or, at most, 10 years of service -- including command of a battalion. However, several factors have redimensioned the "transitions," forcing commands to make sometimes debatable cuts.

"It is true that Italy has too many colonels, especially in the Army. It is not our fault, though: the General Staff had planned for a very different level of strength when our country joined the European Defense Community, which De Gaulle torpedoed in 1958; the restructuring of the Army, begun in 1975, which in fact meant a one-third cut in divisions and agencies, not to mention the "Lynch-Law" (PL 804, passed on 10 November 1979, that called for a cap on the colonel list at 1,379. As of now, there are 2,658 lieutenant colonels and colonels on permanent active-duty status available on the RNU. It will be 1991 before we get thin the ranks down to normal." Result: officers on the RSU and terminal rolls have been granted adequate career advantages (including economic advantages), "but, all of a sudden, those coming out of the Academy are penalized." In short, Covielli is complaining on behalf of all his colleagues, "we who are the backbone of the armed forces are told to bug off, while those who do not come in by the front door get precedence over us..."

The gripe-file is fraught with anger at idiotic regulations: you rise in rank if you happened to be born in a particular year. "The good years are those from 1920 to 1930; any year later than that means that promotion is going to be a random occurrence."

Absurdity and paradoxes: for any promotion, a man has to attend up-dating or training courses at the university level. This is designed to upgrade your fitness report. No way! In the same classification on the standard list, people have moved within a few years of graduation to 100 percent on their third evaluation, to 40 percent 3 years prior to being hit by the age-limit, which for Army officers is fairly low at 56 years of age. Instead of planning one's own career around one's professional abilities, we see our professional military leaders waxing so wroth as to scorn appointments as colonel and pensions at the brigadier-general level. War? Oh yes: that's something you fight with officially stamped government stationery missiles....

6182

CS0: 3523/34

MILITARY

SPAIN

ARTILLERY REEQUIPMENT PROGRAM DETAILED

Chiavari RIVISTA ITALIANA DIFESA in Italian No 1, Jan 86 p 10

[Text] E.N. Santa Barbara of Spain has released the first detailed information about its new 155/39 mm howitzer/cannon which is intended for the reequipment program of the division and brigade-level artillery units of the Spanish Army [where it will replace the existing "mix" of the American 155/23 mm M-114 and the Spanish 105/26 mm R-58 and 122/46 mm R-390 weapons].

The oscillating mass which is the base of the new howitzer/cannon uses a monobloc barrel with double span muzzle brake and semi-automatic vertical wedge breech. The new howitzer/cannon is designed to perform like other modern NATO materiel such as the FH-70, the 155TR, and the M-198. The scoring of the 155/39 is of 48 righthand turns with a pitch of 20 bores; the recoil system is oil-pneumatic with hydraulic braking.

The piece is designed to fire all types of 155 mm munitions standardized by NATO: The standard HE projectile weighing 43.5 kg can be fired a distance of 24 km with an 8 charge while the RAP [rocket additional propulsion] projectile can reach 30 km.

The maximum rate of fire is six shots per minute while the continuous rate is 2 shots per minute. The traverse arc in elevation ranges from -3 degrees to +70 degrees while the training arc is 30 degrees on each side. Loading is assisted by a semi-automatic system similar in concept to the one used on the FH-70, with a device automatically placing the projectile in front of the cartridge chamber.

The piece is being developed in three different versions:

--SB 155/39 mm REMO [Remolcado], the basic version with mechanical haulage, weight 9 tons;

--the SB 155/39 mm REMA [Remolcado with auxiliary motor], similar to the basic version but with a 70 hp diesel engine that, in addition to making battering easier, allows small autonomous shiftings;

--the self-propelled SB 155/39 mm ATP cannon [Autopropulsado].

This version has a tracked chassis which Santa Barbara is basing on an original design stemming from its experiences with the licensed production of the AMX-30 tank. The new self-propelled gun with turret-mounted armament for complete training will have a fighting order weight of 38 tons and will be powered by a General Motors 12V71QTA diesel engine supplying 912 hp at 2400 rpm and joined to an Allison CD-850-68 automatic transmission.

The choice of an unusually powerful engine for this type of vehicle, together with its moderate weight, give the new Spanish self-propelled gun a power/weight ratio that is unique for a self-propelled artillery gun [24 hp/t]. Therefore, this piece has correspondingly high mobility qualities: maximum road speed, 70 km/h; maximum slope, 60 percent, vertical obstacle 90 cm, trench 2.8 m. The 1,300 liter fuel reserve allows an operating range of 550 km. The hull and turret are welded steel and can resist 20 mm armor-piercing bullets. The ballistic performance of this version is exactly the same as that of the mechanical haulage model but the recoil system has been modified to hold the recoil stroke within 900 mm rather than 1,400 mm. The projectile and propelling charge reserve totals 28 shots. The rolling train type Vickers has six double wheels and five track-bearing rollers on each side. The suspension is torsion bar type, with hydraulic shock absorbers on four wheels on each side. The specific pressure on the ground is 0.75 kg per sq.cm.

In addition to the application of this piece to the field artillery reequipment program, the Spanish Army is studying the feasibility of using the oscillating mass in the modernization of its coastal defense weapons sites, which at present use old 152/50 mm Vickers pieces. The expected conversion, which would make use of carriages, cradles, and recovery gears from the old guns, is first of all seen as a logistical advantage resulting from the standardization of 150 mm munitions.

/8309

CSO: 3528/61-M

MILITARY

SPAIN

BRIEFS

CONTRACT SIGNED WITH ITALY--Following the Spanish Government announcement concerning the adoption of the SKYGUARD/ASPIDE antiaircraft missile system--produced by Contraves Italiana and Selenia--a contract was signed last 19 November in Madrid. The total value of the contract, which foresees the intergration of the ASPIDE missile into the SKYGUARD system, is about \$150 million. The SKYGUARD system has been in service in the Spanish Army but has been limited to the conventional configuration which employs 35/90 mm paired systems. The Spanish will have a role in coproduction of the system, which is designed for the defense of fixed and mobile ground facilities against low-altitude and very-low-altitude aircraft attacks. Through the integration of 35 mm components in ASPIDE missiles, a very large coverage range is obtained. Moreover, the system, equipped with many target sights, can effectively confront multiple attacks and, at the same time, engage more targets. ASPIDE not only represents one of the best defensive mobile antiaircraft systems in its class, but also offers considerable economic and operational advantages because it can be used for naval point defense as well as ground and air-to-air defense. Moreover, it can be adopted by more than one armed forces branch of a given country thereby guaranteeing the possibility of integrating different logistical channels. Spain, which had adopted ASPIDE solely for naval point defense as did 13 other countries, will now be the second one after Italy to also use it for ground point defense. Italian armed forces will also use ASPIDE in the air-to-air role. [Text] [Chiavari RIVISTA ITALIANA DIFESA in Italian No 1, Jan 86 p 12] /8309

CSO: 3528/61-M

MILITARY

SWEDEN

NAVY TO RECEIVE FOUR TYPE 90 COASTAL CORVETTES BY 1990

Stockholm UNDER SVENSK FLAGG in Swedish Dec 85 pp 16, 19

[Article by Lt Commander Johan Forslund: "Coastal Corvette 90: a Versatile Type of Ship"]

[Text] On 31 October the government decided to give the Defense Materiel Administration permission to order four type 90 coastal corvettes from the Karlskrona Shipyard. That marked the end of several years of study, planning, and design work. The vessels will be ordered from the Karlskrona Shipyard in the fall of 1985 and are to be delivered to the Navy at the end of the 1980's.

Coastal corvette 90 is a modification and further development of the recently delivered coastal corvettes of the Stockholm class. The changes consist mainly of improved antiaircraft capability, increased command and control capacity with great potential for development, and better protection from mines thanks to new propulsion machinery and a shallower draft. Coastal corvette 90 is also the first navy vessel since the 1950's to be designed from the start for antisubmarine operations, among its other missions.

The ship is constructed on an all-welded longitudinally framed displacement hull of steel with an aluminum superstructure. The hull is divided in the traditional way into watertight compartments and has a double bottom.

The coastal corvette is 57 meters long and 8 meters wide. It has a shallow draft and displaces about 370 tons.

Located under the main deck in the forward half of the ship are the berthing compartment and messdeck for the 36-man crew. Immediately aft are the combat information center, the radio room, and instrument spaces. Combat by the ship and the group is conducted from the combat information center. The after third of the ship contains the engines. The propulsion machinery and electric plant, which are located in two engine rooms, are supervised from the engine control room. The steering gear and certain storage spaces are located farthest astern.

The propulsion machinery consists of three diesel engines, each connected to its own water jet drive unit. So the coastal corvette has no propellers or

rudders! This type of propulsion machinery involves a new approach whose big advantages are quieter operation and a shallower draft, resulting in less danger from mines and reduced interference with its own hydrophones. In addition, maintenance is simplified and maneuverability is improved in comparison with conventional propulsion systems.

Most of the weapons are in the main deck. This includes the main armament: antiship missiles and torpedoes, antiaircraft guns, and antisubmarine weapons.

The superstructure houses officers' quarters and storerooms as well as the conning bridge. The conning bridge is designed in accordance with the latest findings to provide the greatest possible safety in maneuvering and navigating the ship.

The coastal corvette is fully equipped to handle a large number of tasks in every phase ranging from peace, crises, incidents, and neutrality to war.

The chief weapon for operations against naval targets during attack is the antiship missile: the Swedish-made RBS-15. The RBS-15 is a heavy antiship missile with advanced homing and a long range. The ship's command and control system makes it possible to place missiles at a great distance with no need for the ship to use its own sensors. As a complement or alternative to the RBS-15 missile, the ship can carry heavy torpedoes designed for operations against surface ships. The Swedish Navy has a long-standing tradition in torpedo weaponry, of course, and Swedish torpedoes do very well in international competition.

Ensuring a warship's safety and thereby providing it with great freedom of action in use means that it must be equipped with good antiaircraft defenses. Coastal corvette 90 is equipped with two complete ordnance systems whose chief purpose is to operate against air targets in cooperation with the electronic warfare system. The pieces in the ordnance systems consist of two light all-purpose guns that can also be used against naval targets when the tactical situation calls for it.

The design of the ship's command and control system reflects a new generation of technology. It is built around three general operator stations and database distributed information, thus providing great flexibility in use and good redundancy. The commander can therefore assign priority to various functions if operator stations are lost. The control function is built around both internal and external passive and active sensors. Information picked up by the sensors is received in the ship's combat information center, where it is processed and displayed. The system's capacity allows it to be used to control not only the ship's own operations but also those of additional units as well as antisubmarine and escort operations.

The arrival of these coastal corvettes will mean a valuable improvement in the Navy's antisubmarine capability. The ship is equipped with active towed sonar (VDS) for seeking out and locating submarines. In the antisubmarine fire control system, sonar information is evaluated to form the basis for attack. The weapons used in antisubmarine warfare are antisubmarine mortars, depth

charges, and antisubmarine torpedoes, making possible a graduated response at both short and long range. During antisubmarine operations, the ship will function both as a hunter unit in the antisubmarine force and as a command ship.

In addition to the above-mentioned tasks, the ship can carry out minelaying operations, which will be an important task for the Navy in the event of war.

The coastal corvette is a very versatile ship that can participate in most types of naval warfare operations. Its long-range missiles, combined with its advanced antiaircraft defenses and its command and control system, signify a high degree of freedom of action for the coastal corvette group. The group commander can choose to fight out on the open sea or close to the coast.

The starting position for an attack can be frontal or from the flank at will, and it can be anywhere in a very large area. The new-generation weapon system means that we are the ones who can choose the time and place for combat to a greater extent than before. When the coastal corvettes are delivered at the end of the 1980's, they will form a necessary and important part of the total invasion defense and also play an essential role in our antisubmarine forces.

11798

CSO: 3650/112

MILITARY

SWEDEN

DEFENSE INSTITUTE PLANS NEW RESEARCH ON SUBMARINE INCURSIONS

Stockholm UNDER SVENSK FLAGG in Swedish Dec 85 p 23

[Article: "Breadth and Depth in FOA's Research Into Antisubmarine Defense"]

[Text] The Defense Research Institute [FOA] recently published its public annual report.

We take the liberty of reproducing the portion dealing with the institute's research efforts in the area of defense against submarines.

Research concerning defense against activity by foreign submarines has had a very high priority within the FOA in recent years. To some extent, completely new technology and new technical system solutions are required in order to detect, locate, identify, and combat small targets in shallow water.

Research in hydroacoustics, for example, has been directed particularly toward matters of antisubmarine defense. Other research groups, which ordinarily have not concerned themselves at all with "submarine questions," have become involved to a greater extent.

In the area of hydroacoustics, great efforts have been made in connection with the propagation of underwater sound waves. Submarine relief, sediment layers, and their characteristics have been charted in several geographical areas. Measurements of sound propagation have been taken, and they will be compared with the results from new mathematical sound propagation models.

Numerical methods concerned with wave propagation and especially adapted for processing in supercomputers are being developed. Active high-resolution sonar has been used to study echo structures from submarines and the bottom of the sea.

Theoretical studies have also been made of the possibilities for active, low-frequency hydroacoustic reconnaissance. Among other things, those studies have included computer simulations that are to be verified and field tests for which preparations are now being made.

Mathematical methods of signal processing for use with high-resolution hydroacoustic reconnaissance systems were developed earlier, and their performance has been investigated by mathematical simulations in computers. Preparations have also been made to test such systems in practice.

Hydroacoustic countermeasures of various kinds were demonstrated during the year under review.

In the field of magnetics, analysis methods and alarm criteria for the Navy's magnetic coils were investigated. This has reference to background interference and the "signatures" of various objects. An effort was also made through research to elucidate the possibilities and limitations of extremely hypersensitive magnetometers.

Another method of reconnaissance and surveillance studied at the FOA involves airborne laser radar. This is especially useful for rapid surface reconnaissance.

Special attention was paid to problems related to the detection and identification of small objects on the surface of the water--submarine periscopes, for example--and extensive measurement programs were carried out. Various techniques were used--everything from "ordinary" radar wavelengths to optical wavelengths.

Multisensor systems--with a higher probability of detecting a target and less risk of false alarms than today's systems--must be used to an increasing extent to compile information from measurements in which different kinds of measurement techniques are used. Also needed is a large sample card showing how various objects are interpreted by the combined system--that is, a kind of reference library--and at the same time, we must gain a good understanding of the usual interference environment.

An important tool in that work will be the permanent passive multisensor station that the FOA has set up out in the archipelago. From the various kinds of sensors to be studied, signals can be transmitted around the clock in digital and encrypted form to one of the FOA's computers. The signals are stored and analyzed with a view to producing advanced detection classification and location methods and programs. For this purpose, use can be made of experience at the FOA's seismic station in Hagfors and elsewhere as well as the classification work and criteria used in negotiations concerning test bans in the area of nuclear weapons.

As far as research into launching, propulsion, and warhead technology is concerned, some of the matters dealt with were the problems related to input and counteraction.

Matters related to energy supplies that are of interest in the context of antisubmarine defense were investigated and studied experimentally.

11798
CSO: 3650/112

ECONOMIC

DENMARK

DEBATE OVER POSSIBLE INTERVENTION AS TRADE DEFICIT WORSENS

Exports Again Drop

Copenhagen: BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 25 Jan 86 Sect III p 2

[Article by Erik Bendt Rasmussen]

[Text] The trade figures for December were disappointing, showing a deficit of 2.9 billion kroner. The Federation of Danish Industries predicts that business is on its way to increasing the market shares of our exports after the strike of last spring.

The trade figures for December show that it is still business that accounts for the large import of raw materials and machinery for production.

The trade deficit amounted in December to 2.9 billion kroner. That is a large trade gap compared to December of 1984, when the figure was 953 million kroner. For the whole year, it is a question of a trade gap of 12 billion kroner, which is twice as much as for 1984.

The import amounted in December to 16.94 billion kroner as against 14.86 billion kroner in December of the previous year, while the export amounted to 13.96 billion kroner as against 13.91 billion kroner in December of 1984.

Verner Puggaard, head of department, of the Federation of Danish Industries points out that the trade figures are preliminary, and that it will only be possible to draw more exact conclusions from the final figures which will appear next week.

"It will be interesting to find out what the reason may be for the increase in imports. For it is not inconceivable that the figure may be affected by the speeding up of purchases of goods in the municipalities in anticipation of the cuts in block grants in 1986," Verner Puggaard states.

The Federation of Danish Industries, incidentally, points out that, following the labor dispute in the spring, industrial exports have largely reverted to the growth rates recorded in 1983 and 1984. It is expected that the market

shares lost in 1985 as a result of the labor conflict will be regained, and that there will, furthermore, be an additional increase this year in the foreign market shares of Danish industry.

Per Bendix, chief economist, of the Commercial Bank, stresses the necessity of increasing exports:

"The situation is very serious in view of these negative figures. Industrial exports are 1 billion kroner below the estimated figure. We are now compelled to improve our competitiveness. We are forced to damp the domestic demand and increase investments. If we fail to do so, we shall not be able to adhere to our krone rate of exchange policy."


On the basis of the preliminary trade figures, Erik Hoffmeyer, Governor of the National Bank, yesterday told RITZAUS BUREAU that the balance of payments deficit for 1985 probably will exceed 25 billion kroner and that the balance of payments deficit for this year will become larger than the hitherto estimated 16-17 billion kroner. It will more likely amount to 19-20 billion kroner.

Exports increased in 1985, viz. from 165 billion kroner in 1984 to 179 billion kroner. Erik Hoffmeyer finds this quite good, adding, however, that he is concerned over the sharp increase in imports.

"Private consumption shows a broadly increasing trend, which must primarily be attributed to the fact that more people have become employed. There is no doubt that the increasing trend will continue into 1986. For that reason, it will be necessary to restrain consumption, but that is, of course, nothing new," Governor of the National Bank Erik Hoffmeyer says.

The Department of Statistics divides the export trade into three main groups, and the total export figures of 1985 and last year are given in billions of kroner with the figures for 1984 in parenthesis: agriculture 37.440 (35.575), industry 115.100 (106.818). fuels 9.360 (8.297).

The import trade is divided into the following main groups: goods for industry 109.360 (99.915), fuels 32.110 (30.386), goods for consumption and passenger automobiles 41.570 (36.328).



Trade balance developments during the past year. Figures for December 1985 are preliminary.

Minister Rejects Intervention

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 25 Jan 86 Sect III p 2

[Article by Helle Ravn Larsen]

[Text] "There is no reason to conceal the fact that the trade figure for December is unsatisfactory. It, furthermore, underlines the necessity of the measures of intervention which were adopted by the government and the Folketing prior to the Christmas holidays. The balance of payments deficit will now amount to 25-26 billion kroner. It will be absolutely necessary to curb the costs of the public sector."

These are the comments by Minister of Economic Affairs Anders Andersen (Liberal Party) on the most recent trade figures. Contrary to Arne Bjerregaard, finance policy spokesman of the Christian People's Party, who finds the trade deficit very alarming, he does not, however, mention the possibility of any further economic intervention.

"It clearly shows what I said at the most recent intervention that new measures to curb private consumption may become necessary in the near future to prevent too drastic measures of intervention at a later date which will restrain the economic activity," Arne Bjerregaard says.

Mogens Camre (Social Democratic Party) finds the deficit of 2.9 billion kroner worse than expected.

"It ought to give all of us cause for deep concern. The government cannot deny that the sad result is in glaring contrast to the plans and predictions of the government. The figure is solely the result of the government's unsuccessful policy in 1984-85," Mogens Camre says.

The minister of economic affairs establishes that the rate of consumption is still too high.

"It underlines the need for us to improve our competitiveness abroad through a very moderate rate of increase in wage and price levels," says Anders Andersen, who wants to ascertain whether the measures of the Christmas package, combined with the lower dollar rate and the lower oil prices, will suffice to correct the situation.

7262

CSO: 3613/60

ECONOMIC

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

ARBED SAARSTAHL PLANS TO END SUBSIDIES BY 1987

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 20-21 Dec 85 p 19

[Interview with Kurt Kuehn, chief executive of Arbed Saarstahl GmbH, by Rolf H. Fricke: "We Want to No Longer Be a Subsidy Recipient as Soon as Possible"; Voelkingen an der Saar, date not given]

[Text] Voelkingen an der Saar, 19 Dec, HANDELSBLATT--"We want to no longer be a subsidy recipient as soon as possible. And this situation is conceivable for 1987." With these words, Kurt Kuehn, chief executive of Arbed Saarstahl, described the hope of the largest metalworks on the Saar, which has been kept afloat over the last 5 years by public resources amounting to more than DM 3 billion, and his hopes for the company in a HANDELSBLATT interview in Voelkingen an der Saar.

The basic condition for the fulfillment of this prognosis mentioned by Kuehn are the continuation of a relatively low rate for the dollar (because of price relief on the part of raw materials) and a continuation of the acceptable state of the market for long products, in which Saarstahl is active. In the 1985 business year that is now coming to an end, the company has clearly progressed part of the way on the road to recovery. Thus, projecting for the entire year, raw steel production rose approximately 10 percent compared to last year, up to 2.7 million tons. Rolled steel production was raised by 11 percent to 2.4 million tons, and sales, at DM 2.6 billion, will be about 17 percent higher than in the previous year. Over the course of the year, the workforce was brought back by seven percent, up to 13,400. Kuehn gave a figure of 1,300 to 1,400 employees for the current necessary reduction in personnel.

The plan for 1985 included a subsidy requirement of DM 202 million, plus a sum of DM 70 million for "risks." Use was made of DM 155 million during the year under review, whereby beginning in July no public funds were used for 4 months, and only in December (because of end-of-year payments) was DM 40 million needed. "As things look now, we need at worst DM 200 million in 1986, while at best we would be almost at zero, it depends on the dollar and on market conditions," Kuehn said.

The director of Saarstahl formulated a very ambitious goal: "We want to become the supplier with the lowest prices in the German steel industry for

all products." For some products this is already the case, he said. Kuehn, who sees benefits and synergistic effects from possible cooperation between Saarstahl and the Dillinger metalworks (Saarstahl produces only long products, Dillinger only flat products), has the following attitude towards the entry by steel concerns from the Ruhr into Saarstahl which is currently under discussion: "I neither have objections, nor am I particularly an advocate of a step such as this. Everyone who wants to help the company is welcome. In previous times we hardly got any response from the Ruhr to our efforts, and now things are somewhat different."

Participation by Ruhr concerns in Saarstahl would in Kuehn's opinion "at any rate lead to better organization of the steel market." Recent attempts by German steel manufacturers to arrive at an agreement on "market conformity" (meaning disciplined pricing and product resolution) were not successful. "Not everyone is going along. Everyone would like to expand his share of the market," Kuehn said. As a concrete example, talks "about one product" concerning a sales system based on the rolled steel model fell through. Since concordant conduct on the too heterogeneous level of European steel cannot be restored, participation by Ruhr concerns in Saarstahl would "help in terms of market strategy."

Every conceivable solution for Saarstahl has its advantages and disadvantages, he said. Thus, Kuehn pointed out that the Dillinger metalworks, which is striving for not only the business purchase agreement for Saarstahl that has already been arranged, but also for a majority of capital in the largest Saar works, is in the end dependent on Sacilor, the French state-owned steel producer. If Saarstahl is controlled by German companies, then there will supposedly be the danger of market regulation "by force." In the coming year, Kuehn wants to "maintain price discipline." He suggested that criticism in this realm has not always been unwarranted. However, this is also true for other areas, he said.

In contrast at least to the public statements by Saarland Minister President Oskar Lafontaine (SPD), Kuehn is not of the opinion that the debt-clearing fees from the Land, the federal government, banks and IG Metall for Saarstahl can be cut back before the end of this year. He hopes for binding decisions in the course of January, in which a round-table discussion between all interested parties is planned. Should even one of the participants not "go along," Kuehn still sees "a clear risk of bankruptcy." The director of Saarstahl made it quite clear that the company expects more from Bonn than the sacrifice of surety amounting to DM 760 million, which has already been decided upon. However, the federal government has thus far firmly rejected the desire by Saarland that it also assume the approximately DM 500 million in Land surety. In this context, Kuehn would like to see emphasis put on the words "thus far."

Kuehn is convinced that after the option held by the federal and Land governments on 76 percent of the Saarstahl company stock shares was "parked" in the Saarland-controlled SIKB bank, the Luxembourg Arbed steel concern is ready to hold onto the remaining 24 percent share (at one time 100 percent) in the metalworks. Arbed is possibly even prepared to strive for a higher share than it has at present, in the course of the restructuring of the terms of

ownership at Sairstahl. Kuehn explained that "in order to make Sairstahl into an attractive bride," it is necessary that the federal and Land governments relinquish the long-term improvement bonds maintained for the surety.

The sales system between Arbed-Luxembourg and Sairstahl was recently restructured. While domestic and foreign sales of bulk steel have up to now been handled to an overwhelming extent by the Luxembourg Trade-Arbed companies, Sairstahl is now carrying out approximately 80 percent of domestic sales in bulk steel. Only bar steel and structural steel are still sold by Arbed. The export business remains in Luxembourg.

Kuehn considers the partial liberalization of the EEC steel market on 1 January 1986 "premature." It will have a detrimental effect on the market, he said, because the already tangible drop in proceeds for liberalized products could radiate out to other products. "This will result in additional risks for earnings," he said.

In Kuehn's opinion, Dillingen's business purchase agreement for Sairstahl will not interfere with the ability of Sairstahl management to function. Thus, it is entirely conceivable that several seats in this new arrangement will be filled in a personal union. By his own admission, Kuehn is looking forward to this cooperation. "That would be fun."

12271

CSO: 3620/181

ECONOMIC

FINLAND

BRIEFS

FINNISH-POLISH TRADE MORE FLEXIBLE--(FNB)--Next year, according to an announcement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it will be possible to make payments in connection with trade between Poland and Finland either in freely convertible Finnish markkas or U.S. dollars. The arrangement applies only to 1986. The new feature of the agreement is that besides the dollar, the markka can also be accepted now as the invoicing currency. Previously, the markka could indeed be used in submitting a quotation, but not as the invoicing currency. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs expects the change to make the flow of trade more flexible and reduce the firms' risks in connection with foreign exchange rates. There were urgings from the Polish side to make the currency basis permanent, but Finland declined to go along with such an arrangement, since Finland shows a substantial deficit in its trade with Poland. [Text] [Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 23 Dec 85 p 7] 11798

CSO: 3650/105

ECONOMIC

GREECE

EXPORTS TO USSR PURSUED

Athens | KATHIMERINI in Greek 9 Jan 86 p 9

/Text/ A broad conference with representatives of the export sector took place yesterday at the Ministry of Commerce. The participants were briefed by officials on the results achieved in Moscow by the ministry's delegation. More specifically, the exporters were told about possibilities for expanding Greek exports to the Soviet Union, following the agreements reached last month in Moscow.

However, the exporters were warned that they must make the effort to improve competitiveness of the Greek products, while Deputy Minister of Commerce G. Katsifaras assured them that, in their effort to enter the Soviet market, they will have the full cooperation of the government. Katsifaras further stated that the ministry, in the framework of the Export Council which will convene in January, will deal favorably with the matters raised by the exporters (insurance, financing, etc.)

The meetings put special emphasis on the effort Greek exporters must make in promoting new products in the Soviet market. It should be recalled that, on the basis of the recent agreements, a new serious rise in our exports is expected in 1986, especially in the sector of light industry products.

7520
CSO: 3521/77

ECONOMIC

GREECE

EEC REGIONAL FUND TO PROVIDE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Athens | KATHIMERINI in Greek 10 Jan 86 p 7

/Text/ Greece will receive 25.2 billion drachmas for infrastructure projects from the EEC Regional Fund.

This represents the fifth and sixth portion which will finance the National Power Corporation projects in Ptolemais and Amyndaion, modernization of the railway line between Oinoi and Larisa, projects of social infrastructure such as the hospitals of Amfisa and Kefalonia, and projects scheduled by the Public Investment Program. Deputy Minister of National Economy P. Roumeliotis said that with the above sum the total payment from the Regional Fund to Greece in 1986 will exceed 53.5 billion drachmas. Roumeliotis added:

--The second Greek Mediterranean Comprehensive Program /MOP/ dealing with information will be submitted soon.

--The MOP-Crete will be approved by the end of April and its financing will begin in early May.

Roumeliotis underlined that certain EEC member-states expressed some objections on certain investment projects included in the MOP-Crete (expansion of the irrigation network for citrus groves) and added that "we will fight for our national positions and interests in order to implement our development targets." He also said that our country has an obligation to submit all its MOPs by the end of 1986. The total financing for the Greek MOPs will reach 268 billion drachmas.

In summing up, the deputy minister underlined that the Greek MOPs will apply to all geographic areas in the country.

7520
CS0: 3521/77

ECONOMIC

GREECE

SLIGHT DROP IN FARM INCOME REGISTERED IN 1985

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 8 Jan 86 p 7

/Text/ The 1985 farm income in Greece and specifically the income of farmers and their families, dropped by 0.8 percent according to the EEC Statistical Service which claims that the EEC income, after marking a rise in 1984, dropped again, due mainly to inclement weather conditions.

On the other hand, appropriate Greek authorities say that the income of our farmers will be affected negatively this year because of the low prices of products and price increases in production cost factors as a result of the drachma devaluation.

According to a telegram to the Athens News Agency from Brussels, the EEC Statistical Service announced that: In 1985 the income index for all persons occupied with farming within EEC marked a drop of about 8 percent compared to 1984. In 1984 this index had increased by 3 percent compared to 1983 when it declined by 6 percent compared to 1982.

In 1985, the income index dropped by 12 percent compared to 1984 when it increased 5 percent compared to 1983. In 1983, the index declined almost 10 percent compared to 1982.

An analysis by country-member of the development of the real added true value (to production costs per unit of personal work) between 1985 and 1984 shows that in 1985 the drop in farm income affected all country-members except Italy (+ 3.2 percent) and Denmark (+ 1.5 percent). The decline was particularly serious in Great Britain (- 17 percent); Federated Germany (- 15 percent); Ireland (- 12.2 percent) and France (- 9 percent). This decline is below the average Community figure in Holland (- 4.4 percent) and Luxembourg (- 2.9 percent). The decline is minimal in Belgium (- 0.6 percent) and Greece (- 0.8 percent).

In most cases, the almost general decline of farm income in 1985 is a continuation of the 1984 particularly significant increases, especially in Federated Germany (+ 18.5 percent); Ireland (+ 13.6 percent); and Great Britain (+ 10 percent).

7520

CSO: 3521/78

ENERGY

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

SCANDINAVIAN GAS COOPERATION SEEN NEAR REALIZATION

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 18 Jan 86 Sect III p 18

[Article by Henrik Damm]

[Text] Following the report last Friday and the purchases of stocks by Statoil and Shell in the state-owned Swedish Swedegas as well as Minister of Energy Knud Enggaard's "very understanding" attitude toward the desires on the part of DONG chairman Holger Lavesen, a gigantic, Scandinavian natural gas cooperation is on its way.

Three days before Christmas Eve in 1985, Holger Lavesen, chairman of the board of DONG, expressed the following desire in BERLINGSKE TIDENDE: "A closer Nordic cooperation within the natural gas sector." Friday afternoon it looked as if Holger Lavesen will get a delayed "Christmas package."


Minister of Energy Knud Enggaard stresses his positive attitude toward the offer on the part of the Swedish Swedegas company, and DONG is expected to be able to purchase 10 percent of the stock of the state-owned company.

Earlier in the day on Friday, Swedegas reported from Stockholm that the Norwegian Statoil and the Dutch Shell company will each acquire a stock holding equivalent to 40 percent of the now expanded capital stock. If Knud Enggaard gets the necessary, but expected, political support, the two companies will have to surrender 5 percent each, as a result of which the holding ratio will be as follows: 60 percent for Swedegas, 30 percent for Statoil and Shell International as well as 10 percent for DONG.

Already in December, Holger Lavesen told BERLINGSKE:

"We have been in contact with Statoil for the past year. A contact which remains open. In order to secure the necessary supplies and to obtain the best possible business terms, it is necessary to study all possibilities, but DUC [Danish Underground Consortium] (which includes both Shell and A.P. Møller, editor) is our most natural cooperation partner. It is only natural that the supplies for an expanded Danish and Swedish market should primarily be taken from the Danish section of the North Sea."

The Minister of Energy will now negotiate the final details of a Danish participation in Swedegas.



The graph shows the possible model for a close Scandinavian gas cooperation. The fully drawn line is the gas network now established, while the broken line shows the further expansion of the gas network in Sweden and Norway.

7262

CSO: 3613/60

ENERGY

DENMARK

ELECTRIC POWER IMPORTS DROP

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 25 Jan 86 p 4

[Article by RB]

[Text] Electric power imports, especially from Norway, dropped to such an extent in 1985 that electric power consumers in Jutland and Funen only saved 100 million kroner in fuel costs.

Eight percent of the electric power consumption was covered by way of imports from Norway, Sweden and West Germany, as against nearly 30 percent in the years from 1981 to 1984. During the first 3 years, the savings amounted to approximately 250 billion kroner annually, in 1984, however, only to 175 billion kroner.

The sharp decline in imports last year was, to a large extent, due to weather conditions. Especially Norway sends low-cost energy to Denmark on account of years with large volumes of precipitation and a corresponding surplus production by hydroelectric power stations.

In 1985, however, the reserves were fairly low, at the same time as the demand in the Norwegian domestic market increased as a result of better business conditions, says Arne Ring Nielsen, chief of ELSAM, the Organization for Coordination of Electric Power in Jutland and Funen.

When imports of low-cost electric power from Norway were at their highest level, a few of the power stations were able to stop their entire production. Elsam, however, cautioned the power stations against basing their expansion programs on a continued favorable electric power exchange.

7262
CSO: 3613/60

ENERGY

GREECE

INCREASED ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION LIMITS IMPORTS

Athens | KATHIMERINI in Greek 11 Jan 86 p 7

/Text/ Industry and Energy Minister A. Veryvakis announced yesterday that the country's 1985 energy production increased by 11.6 percent compared to 1984, while energy imports during the same period decreased by 70.9 percent. He added that the total load of the country's energy producing system increased by 2.8 percent and reached 24,669 million kilowatt hours.

Veryvakis pointed out that this favorable development in production of electrical energy is due exclusively to the large production--by 17.6 percent--of the stations using lignite as fuel following connection of the two large lignite-using units to the central system and after the Agios Dimitrios unit in Kozani started operations in the middle of 1985.

In all, seven new units were added to the central system, including the Asomaton hydroelectric unit and two units of the Sfikia hydroelectric station. Capacity of the seven units is 1,228 mw and the total capacity of all installed units is 22 percent.

The minister also said that by early 1987 the Agios Dimitrios 4th unit (using lignite and having a capacity of 310 mw), the two units of the Amymdaios lignite station (total capacity: 600 mw), and the 3rd unit of the Sfikia hydroelectric station will be connected to the central system.

Participation of the Public Power Corporation's lignite-using units represent 66 percent of the total load (compared to 57.7 percent in 1984, while that of oil-using stations marked a decline and represents 19.7 percent of the total.

The energy production of the hydroelectric stations also showed a slight decline--it reached 11.3 percent of the total. The 1985 imports of electric energy represent 3 percent of the total load compared to 10.6 percent in 1984.

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END

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West Europe Report



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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25 February 1986

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POLITICAL

BELGIUM

NEYTS ON POSITION OF FLEMISH LIBERAL PARTY

Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE in French 21-22 Dec 85 p 3

[Interview with Annemie Neyts, president of the PVV, by G. Dz, and V. d. W.: Brussels; date not specified]

[Text] In her modern office where the new president of the PVV [Party of Liberty and Progress] holds forth, newsmen were coming and going. All of them, even foreign journalists, had come to take a close look at Annemie Neyts; the woman whose likeness was plastered all over the Belgian capital on the eve of the elections of 13 October 1985. "Annemie answers" one could read on one of the five slogans displayed on the posters. And she did indeed answer our questions--in faultless French, incidentally.

[Question] Don't you have the impression of being a plaything heading the PVV?

[Answer] I don't believe so. I have had 4 years' experience as secretary of state. I think that the work I did there prompted some people to ask me to assume the party's presidency.

[Question] Party presidents have less power today than under earlier legislatures. Doesn't it bother you to remain in the shadow?

[Answer] It does not bother me. I have always found that the growing weight of party government represented a pernicious evolution in political life.

I shall not play the role of mother-in-law to the government as was the case with the party presidents between 1976 and 1980. I was a member of the cabinet for 4 years; I would not have liked the party president to tell me what to do then.

The Verhofstadt Line

[Question] Will you be following the neoliberal line that Guy Verhofstadt has blocked out for the PVV?

[Answer] I don't have the intention of changing the party line because I believe that it is basically sound. But it is obvious that I have a

different type of personality. Well then, say what you will, a party president inevitably becomes the face and voice of the party. I am who I am. I believe, then, that this will involve changes in emphasis over time. In my district of Brussels-Hal-Vilvorde, the PVV is an eminently popular party.

[Question] Is the right-leaning speech of the former party president not responsible for the electoral loss experienced by the PVV?

[Answer] It is true that we lost six deputy seats in parliament. We had hit a historic "peak" in 1981 and we had won a certain number of marginal seats. The mere drop of 0.75 percent made us lose four seats right away. We find ourselves at the level where we were in 1978, which represents the second best showing of the PVV.

I believe that people have unjustly stuck the label of right-wing liberal on Mr Verhofstadt, pitilessly, with little generosity. This is due to the role that he played at the time of the party congresses of 1979 and 1970 when he indeed adopted a certain number of radical positions. What was involved was an ideological program that had not yet undergone the acid test of the reality of things.

[Question] Do you shun ideologies?

[Answer] I don't like ideologies which become kinds of catechism. I prefer by far to start with the reality of things.

Like a Detergent Powder

[Question] You conducted a very personal electoral campaign. Don't you believe that the people voted more for an image than for ideas?

[Answer] That is hard to determine.

[Question] Who created your campaign posters?

[Answer] I undertook my electoral campaign of 1981 more or less singlehandedly; it was amateurish. The outcome reflected the measure of the preparation. At the communal elections of 1982 where I took the risk of appearing at the head of the Brussels slate, my campaign was already run more professionally with the help of marketing and promotional experts. At the European elections I made a good personal showing: I won 7,500 votes in the Brussels district, 12,000 votes across Flanders, even though my name was near the bottom of the slate.

For the legislative elections we said: "It is now or never." The specialists in political promotion diagnosed the situation. My image was deemed too bland. The campaign thus led to achieve two goals: to build up my image very significantly and to secure the support of the largest number of voters. The public relations people decided to focus exclusively on the product, on me, Annemie. But the five campaign posters nevertheless contained

a political message: Here is the individual, here is what she is and how she acts. Hence the slogans were "Annemie listens," "Annemie answers," "Annemie decides," "Annemie serves Brussels," and plain "Annemie."

[Question] Aren't you upset by the fact that this political message was advertised just like a plain detergent?

[Answer] The creators of detergent will tell you that a detergent is not created just like that. This is even true for political candidates. Recall the campaign focusing on Mr Baguette. It was a marvelous attempt to project a political personality out of nothing. It was a total failure.

[Question] Don't you have the feeling that this Brussels executive is weaker than the previous one. Francois-Xavier de Donnea, the president, divides his time between this position and that of minister of national defense, and your successor, Jan Bascour, hails from Lennik-St Quentin....

[Answer] Ethics require that an outgoing minister show reserve with reference to the position that he has occupied. What seems more important to me is the governmental agreement that I helped to negotiate. It is important for two reasons. On the one hand, it marked the end of the status quo: Brussels emerged from the superfreezer. On the other hand, the agreement opened the way to a discussion among the inhabitants of Brussels: It must bear on the institutional, political, administrative organization of the area occupied by Brussels.

Brussels has indeed fewer funds than before the start of regionalization. But this process is irreversible. Brussels can then no longer claim as self-evident, as a fact, its function of capital. Brussels must give indications of opening up, must negotiate with the other two regions to continue to be accepted as a capital. The residents of Brussels can thus no longer consider the rest of the country as an immense playing field at their disposal, as had been the case in the 19th century.

Accordingly, additional funds will no longer be budgeted to Brussels automatically, without discussion. Brussels has to depend much more on itself than before. I favor the merging of certain Brussels communes. Politically, the matter is not simple and I know that many inhabitants remain attached to their autonomous commune. Still, some functions would be enormously enhanced by being integrated. This is an extraordinary challenge. It will be up to the citizens of Brussels to meet them, whether under the aegis of their executive or not depending on its dynamism.

Two Difficult Years

[Question] To what other section of the government's statement do you also attach great importance?

[Answer] The budgetary goals and specifically the liberal emphasis on this issue. The budget must be balanced much more by putting a cap on expenditure than by increasing revenues. These limitations must be realized

essentially by adapting the machinery of outlays rather than by impacting on the beneficiaries of these outlays. But this will call for political courage. In the field of health care, for example, it is more difficult to attack the intermediary institutions than the sick. The 1986 and 1987 budget years will be difficult, but if we refuse to cope with this problem the subsequent obstacles will be even more insurmountable.

[Question] One point in the government agreement seems to disturb you--the extension of military service--does it not?

[Answer] We are not ready to accept an extension of military service before reexamining the entire system of exemptions, the organization of the service, and its improvement. For the time being, one young man out of two is doing his service: If the draft time is extended even more, the discrimination will become that much greater.

[Question] Following the elections of 13 October 1985, Flanders has for the most part remained under the control of the CVP. This was reflected in the makeup of the Flemish executive. What is your influence?

[Answer] We have three liberal members out of a nine-member Flemish executive. The Social Christians are thus twice as numerous. But the division of responsibilities is better balanced than it used to be under the previous executive where Gaston Geens used to monopolize the responsibilities for the regional prime ministership, economic development, scientific research, budget and finance, and the entire area of personnel management. This is no longer the case today since budget and finance are the responsibility of the regional vice premier minister, Louis Waltniel (PVV). In the field of policy and personnel management, the other members of the executive will have the right of initiative. Each promotion or nomination will have to bear the signature of the minister of the budget.

[Question] How do you coexist with the Christians in your party?

[Answer] I have no problem. I am not one of those products of Catholic education who spend the rest of their lives making amends for the ideas received. In my home we have always been very tolerant: I took courses in religion in primary schools and I took formal communion. I am not a believer but this has never posed a problem.

[Question] In the PVV don't you have a problem of political personalities?

[Answer] It is true that the PVV of 1971 was led by outstanding personalities such as Willy De Clercq, Frans Grootjans, Mr Vanderpoorten, and Herman De Croo who dominated the life of the PVV. The succeeding generation did not have the opportunity to surface or was possibly less well-endowed in terms of heavyweights. Then came the generation of Guy Verhofstadt. Patrick Dewael, and their colleagues. Miraculously, I have nevertheless succeeded in emerging before they did since I am 9 years older than Guy Verhofstadt: I am 41 years old.

[Question] This Saturday you will be the only candidate running for your party's presidency. Is this because no one else has sought the position?

[Answer] Guy Verhofstadt was the only candidate in 1982. I was endorsed for the party's presidency by a sizable number of district federations which were not obliged to do it. The fact that I used to be acting party president is also an advantage.

[Question] Do you have contacts with your opposite number, Louis Michel, president of the PRL?

[Answer] Yes, but we have to improve these contacts further. The PRL and the PVV are two separate parties which at times have different orientations. However, they belong to the same family and it should thus be possible to restore or develop a dialogue between us. But the impetus for this should come from both sides.

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POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

PUETZHOFFEN POSITIONED FOR TOP SPOT IN UNITED NRW CDU

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 21 Oct 85 p 4

[Article by Gerd Kroencke: "Quick Climb of a Previous Unknown"]

[Text] Krefeld's Dieter Puetzhofen - Rival for Biedenkopf just as for Kohl

The national chairman of the CDU first waited a while. After his previous favorite, Bernhard Worms, failed so miserably, Helmut Kohl avoided the new kid from the lower Rhine. Whether or not Kohl had tried to block the Mayor of Krefeld, Dieter Puetzhofen, on his way to the top of the Rhineland CDU, by his sending forth State Secretary Wolfgang Vogt, cannot be ruled out. In any case, with or without Kohl's blessing, the amateurish attempt clearly failed. Only now this coming Friday (25 Oct 85) has the man from Krefeld been invited by Kohl for a breakfast, beginning at 8:30 a.m. for "sixty minutes", as Puetzhofen remarked, as if that were a bit meager.

Whether or not a new spirit has entered into the Rhineland CDU along with the new man has yet to be seen. A new vitality is there in any case. There was a striking contrast: the departing chairman Bernhard Worms gave his last statement of accounts not without bitter undertones in a very polished manner, as is his style - and he was sent off with polite applause. Then there was the way Puetzhofen arrived. Light and easygoing, he gave the last Rhineland CDU Party Congress delegates the feeling that now things could really get moving ahead.

That he got 82 percent of the vote right from the start may show what the party can expect from a man who was until recently known only in Krefeld and its immediate area. Right from the start, Puetzhofen made it known that he really intended to make a new start: a comprehensive lead resolution, which still bore all too clearly the non-binding signature of his predecessor, was not passed due to Puetzhofen's intervention. Puetzhofen immediately added his weight to the scales after his own election, and before the election of the Land managing subcommittee. His appeal for the election of two women was successful. His intraparty opponent, Wolfgang Vogt, on the other hand, failed. "There are manners of conduct," said Puetzhofen, in reference to Vogt's resentment, "which you shouldn't exceed."

For the time being, the man from Krefeld is declining to declare his candidacy for the top post in the combined Land (North Rhine - Westphalia) party organization, but it would only be logical because after the planned fusion of the Rhineland and Westphalia the chairmanship of the old posts would be meaningless. The question is if Dieter Puetzhofen's quick climb signifies not only the end of the Worms episode, but also the end of the resurrection of Kurt Biedenkopf. Whether and how Puetzhofen settles up with Biedenkopf could provide a clear indication of how the Union's top leadership on the Rhine and in the Ruhr will get along in the future. In any case, Puetzhofen says, "I won't consider the question of whether I will permit any sort of argument with Mr. Biedenkopf."

Puetzhofen, who has no mandate in the Bundestag or in the Land Assembly, will need to take a long breath. He wants to strengthen the Party organization, as he currently complains "that a party like the North Rhine - Westphalian is not so attractive." With the election of a common chairman, a preliminary decision will already be made early next year for the CDU lead candidate in the 1990 Land-wide elections. Should Johannes Rau, as the defeated candidate for Chancellor, return home to Duesseldorf, a man like Puetzhofen could be dangerous for him.

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

OPINIONS ON MITTERRAND, FABIUS, POLITICIANS, TRENDS

Paris LE FIGARO MAGAZINE in French 7 Dec 85 pp 140-142

[Article by Charles Rebois: "A Drop of 8 Points in a Month: The Collapse of Fabius"....]

[Text] The French have scheduled rotation. The December poll shows that this prospect influences the general atmosphere (5% more optimists and 6% fewer pessimists) and the men who still hold power appear like figures of the past.

First Laurent Fabius. The "youthful old prime minister" sees his share collapse. He loses 8 points at one swoop. Fifty percent of those polled no longer have any confidence in him to solve the problems which France now faces compared with 41 percent who express a contrary opinion. The drop is 10 points in the answers to the question about the role he could play during the coming months and years.

Since last April, the credit of the head of the government dropped from 59% to 41% (-18%) with two spectacular breaks, the first in June (July poll) and the second at the end of October (December poll).

Some exact facts explain this double drop.

In June: on the 13th, Michel Rocard announces his candidacy for the Elysee; on the 14th in Marseille, Laurent Fabius presents himself as the natural leader of the socialists and joins conflict with Lionel Jospin; on the 24th, Francois Mitterrand attacks the communist party; on the 26th, the proportional method of voting is adopted. It is a turning point. The PC does poorly in the polls and opinion with the revelation of the existence of a "war of leaders" in the socialist camp. Laurent Fabius suffers from it severely.

Second break: On 27 October, when the inquiry for the November poll had just been completed, the televised Chirac-Fabius

confrontation led to the embarrassment of the latter. The French discovered the real character of the young prime minister whom Francois Mitterrand had given them, that of an arrogant Rastignac concealed under a mask of tolerance. It was more than a mistake. There was deception about the real nature of the person. He will not be forgiven.

Thus, the champion of modernity who was to mobilize those disappointed by socialism during the parliamentary election campaign is prematurely disqualified.

But if the French condemn Laurent Fabius, they know that they will still have to deal with Francois Mitterrand in 1986. Forty-three percent (+2%) now express confidence in the chief of state compared with 51% (-4%) who express their misgivings. The presidential proportion settled to the lowest level in over a year. It is recovering at the very time when that of the prime minister is sagging severely.

One has often said that if socialist ideology has failed, the personalities of the left were saved. One offers as proof of it, the inability of opposition personalities to regain the favor of the French. This opinion will have to be revised. The only figures of the left who are advancing are Jacques Delors (+4%) and Pierre Maurot (+3%). They no longer belong to the government and are not included among the prime minister's friends.

On the other hand, the opposition leaders are regaining part of the lost ground. With a gain of 6 points, Simone Veil (+6%) returns to the head of the group. Raymond Barre (+1%) is patiently increasing his store of confidence, although only appearing in second position. As for Jacques Chirac (+5%), he is closing the gap with great strides. His performance with Laurent Fabius has helped him, also his omnipresence on the election front as the leader of the main opposition party. He also has a bonus of (+3%) with Jacques Toubon, his chief lieutenant.

Handicapped in the polls for a long time, President Valery Giscard d'Estaing (+4%) is beginning a rise which is the result of his tireless efforts to unite the opposition.

A prime minister in free fall, socialist personalities who are marking time, opposition leaders who are regilding their coat of arms, so many signs to remember, 100 days before the parliamentary elections.

Mitterrand: + 2

[Question] Do you have complete confidence, some confidence or not much confidence or no confidence at all in Francois Mitterrand to solve the problems which France faces now?

	December 1985	Compared with November 1985
Complete confidence.....	7)	-)
Some confidence.....	36) 43	+2) +2
Not much confidence.....	27)	-2) -3
No confidence at all.....	24) 51	-1)
No opinion.....	6	+1
	100%	100%

Fabius: - 8

[Question] Do you have complete confidence, some confidence or no confidence at all in Laurent Fabius to solve the problems which France faces now?

	December 1985	Compared with November 1985
Complete confidence.....	7)	-2)
Some confidence.....	34) 41	-6) -8
Not much confidence.....	24)	+3)
No confidence at all.....	26) 50	+6) +9
No opinion	9	-1
	100%	100%

The Political Figures of the Majority

[Question] In the case of each one of the following political figures, please tell me if you would like to see him or her play an important role in the coming months and years.

	December 1985	Compared with November 1985
Michel Rocard	59	+1
Jacques Delors	42	+6
Laurent Fabius	38	-10
Charles Hernu	35	not available
Jean-Pierre Chevenement	33	-
Lionel Jospin	30	-
Pierre Mauroy	24	+3
Pierre Berezgouvoy	22	+2
George Marchais	10	+1

The Political Figures of the Opposition

[Question] In the case of each one of the following political figures, please tell me if you would like to see him or her play an important role in the coming months and years.

	December 1985	Compared with November 1985
Simone Veil	47	+6
Raymond Barre	44	+1
Jacques Chirac	40	+5
Francois Leotard	38	+1
V. Giscard d'Estaing	30	+4
J. Chaban Delmas	29	+4
Jacques Toubon	26	+3
Jean-Marie Le Pen	15	-3
Rene Monory	14	-1

SOFRES [French Opinion Polling Company] technical data

Poll conducted by FIGARO-MAGAZINE.

Date conducted: 22 to 28 November 1985.

National sample of 1,000 persons representative of the French population 18 years old and over.

Proportion method (sex, age, profession of head of household PCS [not further identified]) and classification by region and types of urban areas.

The share of the political parties

	PC	PS	MRG [Left Radicals]	UDF	RPR	National Front
Good opinion	14	46	25	41	43	11
Bad opinion	71	43	44	41	41	73

The Priority:

still unemployment

[Question] Among the following subjects, which one do you think the government must give priority to now?

	December 1985	Compared with November 1985
Fight against rising prices.....	9	-
Fight against unemployment	68	+2
Fight against violence and crime	15	-2
Maintaining domestic tranquility	7	+1
No opinion	<u>1</u>	<u>-1</u>
	100%	100%

Increased Prices and Unemployment

Fifty-nine percent consider the battle against inflation ineffective

[Question] Regarding the struggle against rising prices, do you consider the government's action is...

	December 1985	Compared with November 1985
Very effective	4) 36	+2) +5
Fairly effective	32)	+3)
Not very effective	43) 59	-3) -5
Not effective at all	16)	-2)
No opinion	<u>5</u>	<u>-</u>
	100%	100%

Eighty percent consider the battle against unemployment ineffective

[Question] As regards the battle against unemployment, do you think that government action is...

	December 1985	Compared with November 1985
Very effective	1)	+1)
Fairly effective	15) 16	+3) +4
Not very effective	48)	-1)
Not effective at all	32) 80	-3) -4
No opinion	4	-
	100%	100%

Optimism and Pessimism

Forty-nine percent think that things are going to get worse

[Question] When you look at the way in which France and the French are developing, do you have the impression that things are improving or on the contrary, that they have a tendency to get worse?

	December 1985	Compared with November 1985
Things are improving	19	+5
They have a tendency to get worse	49	-5
There is no change	29	-2
No opinion	3	+2
	100%	100%

Thirty-nine percent think there will be many social conflicts...

[Question] Do you think there will be many or few social conflicts in the 2 or 3 coming months?

	December 1985	Compared with November 1985
Many social conflicts	39	-8
Few social conflicts	44	+7
No opinion	<u>17</u>	<u>+1</u>
	100%	100%

And 29% fear a resort to violence

[Question] In your opinion, the main problems which are going to arise in France in the next 2 or 3 years...

	December 1985	Compared with November 1985
will be solved by negotiation and compromise	58	+4
or...they threaten to lead to resort to confrontation and violence	29	-7
No opinion	<u>13</u>	<u>+3</u>
	100%	100%

France's Role in the World

Forty percent think that France's role in the world is declining

[Question] Do you think that France's role in the world is now strengthening or declining?

	December 1985	Compared with November 1985
Is strengthening	22	+3
Is declining	40	-3
There is no change	30	-
No opinion	<u>8</u>	<u>-</u>
	100%	100%

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

SERIOUSNESS OF MITTERRAND-FABIUS RIFT DISCUSSED

Paris LE FIGARO in French 14 Dec 85 pp 108-110

[Article by Jean Bothorel: "One Hundred days of Difficulty for the French Prime Minister."]

[Text] In spite of all the "appeasing efforts" made Monday evening by Francois Mitterrand, the divorce between him and his prime minister is quite genuine. From now on, Laurent Fabius is "kept on a leash." And the president is going to hold the first rank in the next 3 months.

It was a wild and unusual week. Nothing indicated that the surprise visit of General Jaruzelski to the Elysee Palace was going to publicize a distressing dispute which had been brewing for months between Laurent Fabius and Francois Mitterrand.

It is not new for a difference to arise between the chief of state and his prime minister under the Fifth Republic. On the contrary: degrees of tension between the two heads of the executive branch are the rule, not the exception.

However, we have just witnessed an original spectacle for at least two reasons. On one hand, a prime minister had never yet selected the rostrum of the national assembly to express his "dissent" about a presidential initiative. On the other hand, a prime minister never had abruptly broken with the Elysee, 100 days before a decisive election for his majority.

Such behavior was not based, as George Marchais said on "a planned action." It is the culmination of a slow and concealed deterioration of relations between Francois Mitterrand and Laurent Fabius. A story which began last May when the question arose: who, the prime minister or the first secretary of the PS will lead the parliamentary battle?

Contrary to the impression which prevails, the famous "he is himself and I am myself" which Fabius declared on 5 September 1984 on the broadcast the Hour of Truth, would have hardly irritated the chief of state. The fact that his "young prime minister" shows a quiet desire for emancipation, using an effective statement, what is more legitimate after all? Relations between Mitterrand and Fabius were marked for a long time by a mutual affectionate admiration. This is rare enough to be noticed. The prime minister appeared like the beloved grandson of the prince, an image which, moreover, was very poorly accepted by the PS leadership.

This honeymoon extended without any real dissension until the spring of 1985. On that date the socialist leaders were in the process of outlining their election strategy. Was it necessary, as Laurent Fabius desired, to expand and attempt to organize around a "republican front," or rather was it necessary as Lionel Jospin demanded, for the PS to remain the PS, by exorcising the demons of an assumed "recentralization"? Jospin--supported by his main lieutenants--mounted the battlements regularly on the subject of the ideological perpetuity of his party and "the anchorage on the left." Facing this agitation and these great declarations of principle, Matignon's tactic was to observe and wait. Laurent Fabius, in fact, was not in a hurry; he thought it was necessary for this bouillon of ideas and cultures to pour off gently. After which, with the support of Francois Mitterrand, he would assert himself very naturally as the leader of the election campaign.

A Feeling of Incomprehension

Alas! The prime minister's calculation was going to be thwarted by the ruthless offensive of Lionel Jospin who wrote on 22 June in a seven page letter addressed to the 130 members of the PS Executive Committee: "The question of knowing who is leading the PS now and what the party decides itself is the responsibility of the executive committee...The PS will direct the campaign itself in all its aspects: political agenda, slogans, discussions on alliances, decisions on organization and the mobilization of the necessary facilities." Finally, the first secretary rejected the PS merging in a republican front and intends, on the contrary, for his party to become "the motive force of an extensive recruitment of the left."

It was a declaration of war against the prime minister. It left Laurent Fabius aghast, who expressed his "feeling of incomprehension."

In fact, the correspondence of Lionel Jospin was a challenge to Francois Mitterrand: from now on, should not the latter decide?

No president of the republic had been in a similar situation. Did De Gaulle ever have to choose between his prime minister and the UNR [Union for the New Republic] Secretary General? Closer to us, did Valery Giscard d'Estaing have to settle publicly a conflict of authority between Raymond Barre and Jean-Pierre Soisson?

One knows Francois Mitterrand made a judgment of Salomon. On the other hand, it was not known that Laurent Fabius interpreted the president's attitude as an implied disavowal. He expected clear and detailed support, along the social democratic line--it is necessary to call a spade a spade--which is his. He felt let down.

The spell between the two men was broken. All the more so since at the same time, the prime minister played very poorly his "lightning rod" role for the chief of state. It must be remembered that on 31 December 1984, Mitterrand declared, offering his best wishes to the French: "Let us look at 1985 well: nothing which cannot be overcome, everything is within our grasp. I approach it with unflinching determination. I hope, one will have the opportunity to notice it." Now, 6 months later his unpopularity is still high. In short, one does not see anything come, while Laurent Fabius rarely puts himself in the front line to serve as a shield--in the logic of the Fifth Republic--for his president.

In this deteriorated atmosphere, the Greenpeace Affair takes place. It is going to reveal the exceptional distrust which characterizes the relations between the five actors of this astonishing bungle: Francois Mitterrand, Laurent Fabius, Charles Hernu, Pierre Joxe and Roland Dumas. Without dwelling here on the "affair" itself, the many vicissitudes which will happen between the sabotage of the Rainbow Warrior on 10 July, and Charles Hernu's resignation on 20 September, all point in the same direction: the prime minister tries to clear himself, devotes all his energy, to not knowing, to not "being compromised" and consequently does not observe his function as a screen, a "fuse" between the Elysee and the government. Laurent Fabius did not make a single decision at any time, without protecting himself under the umbrella of the president of the republic. It was so with the mission entrusted to Bernard Tricot; it was so especially in the way in which the minister of defense resigned.

Let us remember. Thursday evening on 19 September, after LE MONDE had "revealed the existence of a third DGSE [General Directorate for External Security] team in New Zealand, which

reportedly carried out the attack, Francois Mitterrand addresses a public letter to his prime minister. Stating that "this situation cannot last any longer," the chief of state declares: "We must immediately proceed to remove the persons responsible for these mistakes." On Friday the 20th, Laurent Fabius answers him in a letter which is also public that he will take the necessary measures, while covering himself admirably. His letter is a model of disengagement: everything which he did since the beginning of the "affair," he did it because the chief of state had asked it of him. He never became the champion of the president of the republic. He plays more the part of public prosecutor: the ludicrous escapade of the Rainbow Warrior, it is not my style, Laurent Fabius. I do not agree to assume responsibility for the incompetence and amateurism which characterize the Greenpeace Operation from beginning to end. Besides, the prime minister's circle does not bother to show its colors: "They stonewall because they cannot allow themselves to be involved in this dirty affair."

However this exchange of letters is fraught with consequences. Everything takes place as if Francois Mitterrand and Laurent Fabius want to call on public opinion to witness their mutual decisions. It no longer involves governing together, but protecting themselves, each one on his own, in the eyes of the French. A strange method of governing which strains relations a little bit more between the Elysee and Matignon.

However, the prime minister will manage to turn around a situation which appeared lost. At the socialist congress in Toulouse on 11 October, one expected Michel Rocard; it is Laurent Fabius who is rediscovered, pugnacious, cruel, sure of himself.

The Divorce is Consummated

After the cold showers of summer, has he recovered his courage? His success in Toulouse is a sham. It is due to the counter performance of the mayor of Conflans-Sainte-Honorine. One will realize it 2 weeks later, 27 October--the prime minister's black Sunday--at the time of the confrontation with Jacques Chirac. What happened that day? Laurent Fabius had the opportunity of confiding afterwards. He was "disconnected" in a literal sense; he suddenly wondered what he did there on a television screen before millions of Frenchmen. He experienced what the professionals call "a blank." Fatigue? It was more than that. At the end of October and in spite of his performance in Toulouse, he is no longer a prime minister who has the confidence of the president of the republic and he knows it. The team is broken up. The man doubts himself, the ideas he must defend and his role in the election campaign. It is that man who confronts Jacques Chirac. How could he be "good"?

Far from wanting to minimize the scope of this smarting failure, the entourage at the Elysee coins some clever phrases about the prime minister's "inexperience." The chief of state in person allows himself to indulge in confidences with some journalists. In the PS jokes spread and occupy most of the time of the socialist general staff. It is the death blow.

Francois Mitterrand will give the coup de grace at his press conference on Thursday 21 November, when he states: "I declare that the immigrants are welcome in France. Whoever has another argument has the argument of hate or racist segregation." Without mincing matters, he corrected his prime minister who had expressed his agreement with most of Jacques Chirac's ideas on the subject. Certain notables of the left, moreover, did not fail to emphasize, vying with each other, the scope of the president's words, as if the latter erased Laurent Fabius' poor performance before the RPR leader. On Friday, the 22nd, the prime minister goes on sick leave, a diplomatic malady. He was to receive Jacques Delors. The meeting was postponed. Has there been an explanation between Mitterrand and Fabius since this Friday? Or rather, is it an additional sign of the depressing uneasiness which affects the head of government?

It is necessary to evaluate in this perspective, the indignation--or the "distress"--of the prime minister about the welcome given General Jaruzelski. We have every reason to believe that Laurent Fabius indeed proposed his resignation to the chief of state and that he did it in writing, at the latest Wednesday morning 4 December. Matignon did not refrain from presenting the prime minister's point of view: he could not accept being misunderstood on a question connected with political morals and the rights of man because of a presidential initiative and consequently he must say so clearly. On his part, Francois Mitterrand admitted at Jean-Pierre Elkabbach's microphone that "Fabius is a sincere man." Is this a graceful way of explaining that his sincerity, under the circumstances, was too loud or too ostentatious to be true?

It is strange, in any case, that having fixed a date in such a spectacular way before the deputies, the prime minister hesitated on the edge of an outright break. The two men settled matters. One went--a classic setting--when tension rises at the summit--as far as organizing a family lunch bringing together Francois, Daniele, Laurent and Francoise. What could they say to each other? Nothing, obviously. Henceforth the divorce is consummated.

Laurent Fabius is under the control of the chief of state, like never before. No thoughtless remark, no affirmation of his

specific responsibilities will be allowed him. As for his authority with respect to the PS, it is definitely jeopardized. There he is in the costume of a prime minister kept on a leash. He will have to survive 100 days in this position as uncomfortable as it is fantastic. One hundred days which will be painful for him every moment. They could be ruinous for his future.

Francois Mitterrand, on his part, seems to want to return to the front of the stage to lead his troops to the parliamentary battle. Is it by necessity? It is not very probable that he will manage, by exposing himself, to check the bewildering disintegration which is affecting his 7-year term.

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POLITICAL

GREECE

PROSPECTS IN LIGHT OF MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS DISCUSSED

Athens ENA in Greek 9 Jan 86 p 11

/From the "Counter to the Current" column by Panos Loukakos: "Prospects for 1986"/

/Text/ In this country it is well for one to avoid making predictions. Not only because conditions are fluid and change from moment to moment. Not only because people change opinions from hour to hour. But because many are those who intentionally mislead those whom they can mislead. At least this was the lesson in 1985. And, of course, nothing shows that many things will change in 1986. For that reason let us put aside "information" that comes from official and unofficial sources about forthcoming activities and future intentions but let us simply limit ourselves to describe the basic political facts of 1986 so that through them some conclusions might come forth --if they should come forth.

So, the first political fact is the economic crisis and its repercussions. Not only in 1986 but at least for the next 2 years the policy of economy cannot be abandoned because neither the economic capability exists nor do certain commitments that have already been assumed permit it so that the Greek economy might be supported from abroad.

The second political fact, the municipal elections. They will take place in October of this year and the major battle will be waged in the big municipalities. This battle will be waged by PASOK, paying the cost of the economic crisis and at the same time confronting a particularly strong attack from its left and right. The results of the municipal elections will be final and the major element that will determine future developments.

If PASOK does not show a marked drop in its strength in these elections then it is certain that it still has a great governing future. If, on the other hand, it should lose the big municipalities and its electoral strength decreases generally speaking, then it is certain that we are heading toward significant political developments in the first months of 1987.

This is so because if PASOK is defeated in the municipal elections, the government opposition-- primarily ND-- will begin maintaining that, as revealed by the popular verdict, there is at last conflict between the makeup of the Chamber of Deputies and popular opinion, demanding the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies and the calling for early elections. Political pressures that would be exercised under such conditions would certainly be so great that Prime Minister Papandreou would shortly have to make certain decisions.

One of these decisions might be his leap to the office of the presidency of the republic if he should realize that there is no possibility for PASOK gaining a third electoral victory. A second possible decision might be early elections so that the crisis might abate. A third possibility might be the formation of a government having broader cooperation so as to confront the crisis.

In other words, the scenario being shaped at present is as follows:

Despite the economic crisis, despite strikes and worker reactions, the government will arrive at the municipal elections in October 1986 without great unexpected events. If it should win these elections it finally will solidify Mr Andreas Papandreou's firm political supremacy. If Mr Papandreou was not censured last fall for his economic policy he will never be censured for anything. If, on the other hand, PASOK loses the elections the road is opened for political developments that, at any rate, will be difficult to take shape before the first months of 1987.

All of this, of course, will have their effects on ND. If Mr Mitsotakis manages to get as far as the municipal elections and win them, then no one would be able to challenge him any longer. If, on the other hand, he loses these elections too, then he should give up the leadership of the major government opposition party the very next day.

Regardless of how things stand, October 1986 is the critical month of the new year. All subsequent developments will depend on that month since all possibilities up to then remain open.

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POLITICAL

GREECE

PROSPECTS FOR MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS REVIEWED

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 12 Jan 86 p 5

/Article by Kh. K. Bousbourelis/

/Excerpts/ The municipal elections issue has already begun to take shape 9 months before they will be held, i.e. 12-19 October 1986. Since it will be the first official popular verdict some 16 months after the 1985 elections and a whole year after the announcement of the economy measures these elections should be the leading political event of the year that is just beginning.

Normally, since these are municipal elections and, indeed, coming a whole year after the announcement of the economy measures --that is, in a period of time when these measures will not have produced results, consequently continuing to be unpopular-- one must consider that the government has something to lose and the government opposition something to gain. The only thing is that matters are a little more complicated. The famous Eurodim poll taken last November had shown losses for both PASOK and ND compared to the June 1985 elections in four and not five districts of the Athens basin. PASOK dropped from 44 percent to 32 percent, while ND dropped from 38 percent in 1985 to 37.5 percent (divided into 32.5 percent for ND itself and 5.5 percent for DI. ANA. /Democratic Renewal/. PASOK's 12 whole percentage point loss is due to the repatriation of communist voters (3 percent for each of the communist parties) and to the disappointment of the remainder who in the long run declared themselves as undecided. Since the battle of the minds will take place in the big municipalities, where it is evident that the strength of the conservative party (well, a little bit liberal since they insist on it) has reached its limits, one may ask what more could this party expect to gain in the big municipalities from what it gained in 1985?

The most characteristic example will certainly be Athens. In order to win Athens municipality, the conservative party must still and under the best possible conditions secure the support of the communist Left --or at least its abstention-- in the second electoral round. Since everything is possible in Greece we might even see this happen under certain conditions. The most significant condition would be to discover or invent that personality, incorruptible, young, bright, without the original sin of active service in ND, a personality that would be able to take voters away from PASOK so as to take first place in the first electoral round and be so tolerable to the communist Left that its voters would vote for it in the second electoral round --with or without the permission of its leadership.

In other words, the conservatives could get Athens if in the meantime some Messiah "is born unto them." But if, indeed, they do manage to discover or invent such a Messiah, then it is certain that all will be disposed to worship him. All the followers, not, however, ND's cadres and especially not its leader because on the day after the triumph of the Messiah he will have to begin packing up from Regillis Street.

If, on the other hand, a Messiah is not invented, ND is in danger of seeing the "independent" candidate that it will support remain in third place during the first electoral round. For Athens especially this is not within the realm of the impossible. There is already one mayoral candidate from the party who reportedly has decided to enter as an independent if he does not get the blessing of the party. This is Mr Zakhos Khatzifotiou. If there should be a second conservative candidate from DI. ANA. and also a third extreme rightist, what would happen then? When, indeed, there is the possibility, following the expected name change by the KKE (Int.), that PASOK's leftist wing might prefer a personality who has authority and who impresses PASOK's leftist wing should he become a joint candidate. Then the expected triumph will end up as a complete disaster from which ND will not be able to recover.

The municipal elections in October will certainly be the leading political event of 1986. Even though it is still early, one would not hazard much to maintain that as of now the one who remains not only the most charismatic political personality of the country and also the most talented in matters of political tactics will come out on top, as this column has been saying since May 1984.

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POLITICAL

GREECE

REPORTED SECRET POLL SHOWS PASOK LOSING GROUND

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 19 Jan 86 p 3

/Text/ According to a poll conducted for the government (and for Mr Papandreou personally) by a reliable polling organization, PASOK comes out as the number two party. The poll was conducted throughout Greece during the first 10 days of November (following the devaluation of the drachma). A total of 2,500 persons were polled. The results were as follows: ND 39 percent and PASOK 38 percent. Of course, the results have disturbed the government because it is the first time since the 2 June elections that in a strictly secret poll PASOK comes out as the number two party regardless of the degree of percentage it lost.

According to information, the poll shows a large number of undecided voters and an even larger percentage of persons who refused to answer. After the figures were processed it was determined that 72 percent of those who refused to answer had voted for PASOK in the last elections. This fact is judged to be especially significant because usually the followers of the government party, when indeed it had recently won elections, answer with great willingness as compared to those who belong to the government opposition parties. The picture is completed by the fact that the biggest percentage of those undecided (they answered "I don't know" when asked if they would today vote for the party they voted for on 2 June) were PASOK voters in the last elections.

Poll analysts as well as political observers interpret the results of the poll as follows:

- A big percentage of PASOK voters --much greater than the one that gave it the recent election victory-- would not vote for it today. Nevertheless, these voters have not yet decided to join one of the opposition parties.

- Most of the "disappointed" PASOK voters belong to the democratic sector and a relatively small percentage to the Marxist Left. This means that the two communist parties, and especially the KKE, have not gained anything more from the strength that PASOK seized from them in the last elections with the "ploy" of the "anti-right rallying together."

- With regard to ND, its strength appears substantially stronger if one takes into consideration the fact that the same polling organization, in a poll conducted one week prior to the elections, had given 38.5 percent to PASOK and 35 percent to ND. Despite all of this, however, PASOK's "disappointed" voters still appear

rather reticent in joining the major government opposition party. Political experts are interpreting the situation as follows:

1. ND internal frictions and especially their exaggeration by a segment of the press, might not have unsettled the party's followers but at the same time they have not constituted a pole of attraction for those who are leaving PASOK.
2. The fact that PASOK had taken over the government for a second time just 6 months ago causes many people to believe that it cannot cease being the party in power for a period shorter than that provided for by the constitution.
3. Voters, besides ND followers, had doubts --last November-- as to whether the ND leadership would be able to lead the party to the February congress. They thus did not decide to express their preferences for a political group whose cohesion and leadership they did not consider as a given fact.

The poll analysts emphasize that those queried do not appear to have realized the significance of the government's measures last October (either positively or negatively) and only the psychological factor influenced their position. They stress that they can have a formed opinion only if they are queried after the first 10 days of February.

Political observers note that it is up to ND to pick up PASOK's dissatisfied members. They point out also that the picture of the party has significantly improved since mid-December. Contributing to this was the course of the pre-congress, the certainty that Mr K. Mitsotakis is leading the party to a congress with substantial participation by the grass roots that appears to be decided to definitely isolate anyone who attempts to create problems even as to the "picture" of the party.

They also add that Mr Mitsotakis' appearances in the Chamber of Deputies, the party's political speech and the positive activation of the party's deputies and cadres are being judged favorably --for the first time after the elections-- by the entire electoral body and not only by the party grass roots.

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POLITICAL

GREECE

PASOK OPTIMISTIC EXPECTATIONS DOUBTED

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 5 Jan 86 p 3

/Article by I.K. Pretenderis/

/Excerpts/ It is a common secret that PASOK's party mechanism is not going through its most productive period of its life. The election of the new executive office, the announcement of the restrictive economic policy and the departure of Mr K. Laliotis have all had serious intra-party repercussions concerning which no one expects that they will be overcome in the next 24 hours.

This organizational breakdown is revealed both in centrifugal tendencies being manifested in the trade union sector and also in the more general intra-party psychological climate whose major constituent element is not enthusiasm.

It is a fact, nevertheless, that the feeling among high-level party organs is that "the storm has passed." According to this evaluation,

- The wave of social demonstrations that the rightist and leftist opposition tried to organize "for opposition reasons" did not find broad support and is already decreasing. Some high-level officials believe that there might be some small increase in the spring but others seem to share the opinion that "things in the social arena will be better."

- Centrifugal tendencies (but also intra-party gnashing of teeth) that have been observed in the trade union sector primarily will gradually begin to wane. The main argument here is the incapability of the purged trade unionists to form a credible political vehicle. High-level PASOK officials maintain that they will not go far through their presence alone.

Of course, it is not the first time in the last few months that the party leadership is making optimistic evaluations in order to give the lie to events. The latest "instance" was the forecast that no more than 100 trade unionists from the government ranks were scheduled to convene at the "President." In the long run, the number of those attending surpassed 400. Subsequently, memoranda from trade union and student quarters do not always attest to such optimism.

As much as it seems unusual, however, the opposition to the government's economic policy is not the major problem facing PASOK. According to high-level party officials, the provinces have not up to now shown any special "sensitivity" to the economic policy.

On the other hand, the major problem seems to be centered on the more general "impatience" that has taken hold of the party apparatus and that has increased over discontent over the economic policy. Indeed, it is not at all by chance that intra-party criticism is increasing all the more with regard to a whole series of issues that have to do with the "style and character of power" and is not limited to some shallow evaluations of the type "we are or we are not engaging in a rightist policy....."

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POLITICAL

GREECE

LEFT'S DILEMMA: HOW, WHEN TO COUNTER PASOK

Athens KYRIAKATIKI ELEVTHEROTIPIA in Greek 19 Jan 86 p 48

/Article by Panos Loukakos/

/Excerpts/ Great uncertainty has recently prevailed within the communist Left. It is not only the KKE (Int.) that has been embroiled in the question of realignment and upgrading. It is also the KKE that with one eye on KKE (Int.) developments and the other eye on its own internal crisis that although it is not trumpeted publicly continues to be evident. Thus, the communist Left today has turned inwards more than at any other time. If one were to exclude its attacks made on economic policy issues, politically speaking it is altogether absent from the scene. This is so because since it is occupied with its own major internal problems it does not have the capability to intervene in prevailing daily political developments by pronouncing its own comments.

At this time, therefore, the major problem within the KKE (Int.) is whether it will remain the party of the Euro-communists or will become the party of the Euro-leftists, whether it will maintain its present title or change it. All of this, of course, with strong internal dramatics that might at some point threaten its cohesion.

Within the KKE, on the other hand, there prevails "subdued optimism" that soon it will be the sole party to be called communist. At the same time, it is preparing for the forthcoming municipal elections with the same spirit and same conditions that prevailed in all of the post-dictatorship elections up to now.

All of this is nice. It would have been even nicer if it had constituted the continuation of problem-solving with regard to the present course of the Left. If subsequent questions would be raised since some others had been answered previously, as, for example, why the communist Left dropped 12 percentage points overall in the last elections, while there were objective conditions that could have favored its upward course. Or why whenever there is a bigger political problem, Mr Papandreou manages to make the communist Left an accessory of his, taking away from it any possibility in intervening in developments. Or, finally, how PASOK succeeded in appropriating all of the slogans of the communist Left without the latter making a protest and without trying to defend itself from political invasions and pillaging of slogans and votes.

These are the questions which the communist parties must now answer before the municipal elections in October arrive and they are once again slaughtered.

Here especially there should be efforts at problem-solving and lesser attention paid to titles or posters.

There have been many errors committed. Today, the only point that differentiates the communists from PASOK is their opposition to the economic measures and their objections to Mr Papandreou's economic policy. And for that reason the prime minister, facing his first substantial clash with the communist Left, became exasperated to the point where he called one the unnatural appendage with the Right and the other a patron of salons.

Of course, confrontation will continue and intensify as the municipal elections approach. PASOK will once again employ arguments about barren islands of exile of the Right and in general take out from the time depository of history the entire antiquated arsenal of populist anti-Right political speeches. This is well-known because the play had already been played before with, indeed, the same protagonists. The question is what will the communist Left do this time. Will it once again become PASOK's rear guard marching to a new electoral defeat? Will it still discuss titles and authority? Or will it formulate a new political speech that will relate to present conditions and problems? That political speech that could catch the attention of the broader strata of the Greek people, those beyond the traditional communist voters.

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POLITICAL

GREECE

DI ANA: MOVES, DEVELOPMENTS DESCRIBED

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 19 Jan 86 pp 3-4

/Article by Mikhalis Dimitriou; passages in slantlines printed in boldface/

/Text/ The presence of Mr K. Stefanopoulos, DI ANA /Democratic Revival/ president, next to Mr Giannis Boutos at the banquet honoring the Greek deputy and Euro-deputy the other evening fired up discussions over developments in the so-called /anti-Mitsotakis Center-Right/ sector.

At the same time, the presence of some 1,500 deputies, politicians and other elements of our political life, as well as businessmen and former ND cadres at the banquet honoring Mr Boutos is another factor adding to the intense activity that characterizes those described as /intermediaries/ (between PASOK and ND).

This activity, either organizationally or from an ideological and political standpoint, is indicated by the following:

- The latest public pronouncements on the municipal elections (with separate candidacies) by DI ANA President Stefanopoulos and the --as we shall see-- new organizational makeup of his party.
- The political positions being promoted, the new initiatives (for example, the announcement about a /national united social movement/ and the "coinciding" processes on matters of principle and programs proclaimed by Mr G. Boutos, one of the very few Greek politicians with an internationalist perception.
- The statements of independent deputies, namely/Messrs Dionysis Livanos and Dim. Nianias,/ that /they do not want "PASOK's downfall that would be destructive for the country"/ and --mainly-- that they would vote for certain of the proposed new constitutional regulations.
- Contacts and problem-solving over ND's future by certain former deputies and politicians who reportedly will make known their opposition to "Mitsotakis' plans" during the second party congress scheduled to convene in Salonica in the middle of next month.

Without anyone downgrading the significance of the moves, discussions, intentions and ambitions that characterize the "intermediary center-rightist" domain at this time, one may at the same time observe certain of their major characteristics.

The first is that the belief has been created that a Center-Left party will be established /not merely as a result "of personal disagreements and clashes"/ but as a result of broader ideological and political differences.

For that reason, moreover, both Mr Stefanopoulos and Mr Boutos affirm that the possibility of their return to ND does not depend exclusively on Mr Mitsotakis' leadership but is also connected with the modernization of the party's ideology, program and structure.

Nevertheless, if one were to except the DI ANA party, processes toward unity among the "intermediaries" continue to be put off, while all the others --topped by Mr Giannis Boutos-- are maintaining a wait-and-see and "private" attitude.

Mr Stefanopoulos is reportedly unwilling to discuss anything having to do with the abolishment of DI ANA or its being absorbed by other elements or movements (even in the hypothetical case of Mr G. Rallis becoming politically independent). Mr Boutos has already announced the establishment of his own "national united social movement" but more to stress his political independence rather than to set up such organizational processes and, indeed, on an all-Greece level.

From their standpoint, Messrs D. Livanos and Dim. Nianias do not appear to be examining the idea of joining DI ANA, while their orientation seems to be to cooperate in a broader (up to a Center-Left) political movement, for example, headed by "moderate" PASOK cadres.

Even if DI ANA organizational officials assert that middle-level ND cadres are continuing to join up (as well as certain PASOK voters, according to them), almost all the "intermediaries" agree that /mass departures or purges of ND deputies is not expected./ Perhaps the case of /Deputy Mikh. Papagiannis/ is being discussed, whose relations with Mr Mitsotakis are at a low level since Mr Papagiannis' son is a leading cadre in the DI ANA youth group.

On the other hand, Mr Mitsotakis' moves are said to have created some narrow margins for maneuver among the "intermediaries" and primarily in DI ANA. Mr Mitsotakis' attacks that they constitute PASOK's "tail" are forcing certain individuals to give anti-PASOK examinations (that have recently increased) and to create some problems of /"isolation"/ for them.

The results of the municipal elections will certainly influence political developments decisively and --as the "anti-Mitsotakists" hope-- both ND and the Center-Right area. Many are those who even if they do not hope for the upsetting of Mr Mitsotakis believe that there will be new departures and purges and a new wave of people joining DI ANA as well as people declaring themselves independent. Everything seems to have been put off until October. Nevertheless, even prior to the municipal elections, Mr Stefanopoulos' party seems likely to distinguish itself as the major pole of attraction for the "renewed Right" since it will work, on a local level, for its own mayoral candidates with Messrs G. Boutos, Dion. Livanos, Dim. Nianias, etc.

No apparent prospects are in sight for DI ANA's or Mr Boutos' cooperation with the KODISO /Democratic Socialism Party/ of Mr Khar. Protopappas and with Mrs Virginia Tsouderou or Mr Giangos Pasmazoglou of whom the latter two seem to be maintaining discreet distance from Mr Mitsotakis but not from ND.

The belief that conditions have been created for a "Center-Right" party is further reinforced by certain common perceptions by the "Center-Right intermediaries" such as the simple proportional electoral system, opposition to "neo-liberalism" and preference for a "welfare state" (without intervention in the economy but more with an intermediary role), the historical reference to K. Karamanlis, self-criticism tendencies, new political behavior, "Europeanization" of political customs, etc.

In these matters, Mr Boutos has made the most concrete political proposal (and, indeed, with the use of Marxist-type terminology) with the major component being the reasoning of a modern bourgeois politician. Mr Stefanopoulos' DI ANA is systematically trying to promote "centrist" political positions together with persistent efforts to have all deputies acquire similar unity of views.

On an organizational level, DI ANA has formed two committees, one headed by Mr Nikos Anastasopoulos, deputy from Messinia, responsible for all organizations in southern Greece up to Thessalia, and one headed by Mr Th. Gatsos, deputy from Pella, (and members made up of former Deputies Stamos and Mavridis and Professor Mavridis), responsible for the 15 nomes of Makedonia and Thraki.

Appointed to be responsible for organizations abroad was attorney Theod. Georgiou, while Mrs Poly Ristou was appointed officer for the administration of party offices. The secretariat for local self-administration affairs is headed by Mr Khr. Moskhandreou (who also heads the committee for proposals of mayoral and community council head candidates of the Athens basin area), while another committee, made up of Deputies Th. Gatsos, K. Giatrakos, G. Moundzouridis and Khr. Moskhandreou, will select the mayoral candidates of the big cities.

The most probable candidacies up to now for the mayor's office in Athens is that of Deputy Stratis Stratigis and Municipal Councilor Nikos Giatrakos, while the candidate for Piraeus is Mr Giannis Katsafados. According to the same information, DI ANA has set up about 25 committees in the Athens basin area and in the provinces 90 percent of the nome officers.

In conclusion, the "Center-Right intermediaries" sector --with the pioneer in working out modern ideas being Mr G. Boutos assisted by Mr Kostis Stefanopoulos-- is making its presence felt all the more.

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POLITICAL

GREECE

FACTORS AFFECTING ND COURSE REVIEWED

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 22 Dec 85 pp 10-11

/Article by T. Athanasiadis/

/Excerpts/ ND's course in the new year will be very important given the fact that our political life is entering a new phase and also because developments are taking shape that will decisively influence its future. Both outside and inside factors will have an effect on ND's course, factors that will shape both the broader political landscape and the narrower party one, while at the same time it is expected that the overall picture of our political affairs will be cleared up, affairs that had been in a fluid state since the 1985 elections.

Foremost among the outside factors is undoubtedly the course of the country's economy. The expected aggravation of the economic situation, something unpleasant for all the Greek people regardless of their political affiliation, is certainly changing the psychology of the electoral body and its frame of mind that after 4 whole years of PASOK government rule is coming to a conclusion, comparing the present era of uncertainty, mental anguish, insecurity and dangers with the era of stability and prosperity that it lived with under ND governments.

Already, a recent poll conducted in Athens in an irreproachably scientific manner gives the lead to ND, for the very first time in 4 years, despite the withdrawal from it of the K. Stefanopoulos group and the creation of the DI. ANA. /Democratic Renewal/.

The economy will be the first big sector that will influence ND's course because of one additional reason: the major government opposition party will wage its biggest battles on the economy, performing its duty to the nation and people.

Another outside factor that will influence ND's course in 1986, and especially during the first 6 months, is the increase in terrorism. So long as terrorism rises so will public opinion recollect the security and order (to the extent possible, of course) that it enjoyed under ND and that would have continued now to be the same had PASOK, as the government opposition at that time, not followed a policy of tolerating terrorism that in essence encouraged terrorists and had consented to measures to exterminate it.

A third factor is certainly social unrest as a consequence to the economic crisis and the more general shaking of public opinion's confidence in the government's ability to effectively confront it and to govern the country responsibly. So long as social unrest spreads so will PASOK show another side of its personality. Authoritarianism. It now bring this authoritarianism out in the open in confronting its own trade union officials who believed in the demagogic pyrotechnics of their leader with regard to free dialogue and independent trade unionism and who now look dumbfoundedly upon the coup d'etat policy in their supreme organization, the GSEE /Greek General Confederation of Labor/.

Of course, discontent among the trade unionists might not fuel ND's party engine but it does inflate its sails with the wind caused by public opinion that is steadily turning in favor of the major government opposition party. Social unrest will spread, as it appears from the prospects of the Greek economy (OECD sees recovery in 1990) and from the government's incapability to open the way for investments (an indispensable condition for economic recovery) and to cut inflation and unemployment.

Another outside factor influencing ND's course up to the summer when the Chamber of Deputies recesses is the confrontation in the Chamber of Deputies of the major issues that Mr Papandreou had promised. Education, health, mass information media, and particularly the press, social policy, etc.

The most important of all --on a purely political level-- outside factors will be the results of the municipal elections.

It is certain that public opinion is waiting for PASOK at the ballot boxes in October 1986 in order to repay it for its being deceived since June 1985 about seeing better days.

To what extent discontent and exasperation of public opinion over PASOK's policies is leading it in the direction of ND will certainly become evident during the municipal elections that even from now Mr Mitsotakis has been emphasizing that he will politicize by throwing in the gauntlet of confrontation with PASOK.

However, many other things within ND will be judged from the outcome of the municipal elections. Consequently, the October 1986 race constitutes with regard to ND a common outside and inside factor for its further course.

Since the June 1985 elections this course has been marked by events that reveal internal frictions. The departure of Mr Stefanopoulos and his nine deputy friends as well as the departure of Messrs Boutos and Livanos and the purging of Mr Nianias is a result of these frictions.

Nevertheless, ND's "wounds" from these frictions do not appear to have affected it seriously. The grass roots continue to remain faithful to the party that reestablished democracy and to raise its banner. At the same time, they showed an astonishing "reflex," reacting to the "grumbling" and to the frictions created at the middle and high cadre level by calling for unity, without, of course, this meaning that they have given up the right to criticize.

ND's maintenance of its cohesion and its lengthy existence is due basically to three major factors:

1. To the fact that the people have acquired partisan awareness. That is, the awareness that the thing that unites them and that constitutes its characteristic point that differentiates them from the followers of other parties is their common ideology, their common belief in certain principles and their conviction that the party is above and beyond personalities. Persons come and go but the party remains. And it is exactly this awareness that has "armed" ND's followers, the anonymous workers of its force, to survive persecutions and pressures endured under 4 years of the PASOK partisan state and that has rendered them stronger today compared to 1981 when the party gave up power.

2. To the fact that its founder, Kon. Karamanlis, despite the fact that he moved over to the office of the presidency of the republic, never ceased being interested in the party's cohesion and fate, even when he was the above-party supreme authority and within the context of his mission and duties as chief of state.

It is to K. Karamanlis that a major part of party awareness that was acquired by ND's followers and members is due. He himself was the first to forge it with the pre-congress (1977) and congress (1979) in Khalkidiki. With the intra-party elections for the election of the party's operating organs. With the ideology with which he imbued it and formulated under the title radical liberalism.

3. To the fact that after K. Karamanlis political cadres came to ND's helm, cadres that were imbued with the same sentiments and the same belief in the party as he. Karamanlis' successors really showed that they are imbued with high political sensitivity that focuses on the fundamental principle that above and beyond their person, above the grandeur that power creates and that is both humanly justified and desirable, these men had and still have the unity of the party.

Consequently, the frictions that are observed at the middle cadre level, especially within the parliamentary group, are not provoking any damage to the party's cohesion or to its grass roots. They do, however, lessen its effectiveness as a battle party. As a party on which the great majority of the Greek people is pinning its hopes for the salvation of the country.

From the standpoint of generative causes, these frictions are the consequence not of party cliques, as is the case with PASOK, but of different evaluations over the strategy and tactics being followed as well as open dialogue that prevails within ND as contrasted with the government party where the "one man" principle and an "Inquisition" atmosphere prevails.

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CSO: 3521/81

POLITICAL

GREECE

KYP REORGANIZATION: UNPRECEDENTED STRIKE ANTICIPATED

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 19 Jan 86 p 48

[Text] And nevertheless, the KYP [Central Intelligence Service]...is on strike! For the first time tomorrow, the employees of the secret services will be camping in front of the prime minister's residence in Kastri and asking that they be admitted by Mr Papandreou to discuss their requests.

This time, the employees of the secret services have also invited dozens of newsmen and photographers, so that from now on we'll know with whom we are dealing! Officially, the...camping of all the "KYP-ers" concerns certain claims of a financial nature. Unofficially, however, I am told that the demonstration is related to the declared wishes of the government (verbal so far, since the relative bill had been promised for last October and we are still waiting) to reorganize the service and change it into a civilian organization. I am even told that former KYP employees, who were let go in 1982, will also participate in the demonstration. Moreover, various...simple informers have expressed their support as well, because they are afraid that if the rumored changes take place, they may lose their "handlers!"

However, this whole affair has a certain background. When the government announced its intention to restructure the KYP, the employees' administrative council asked to be heard on this subject. When the relative presidential decrees were compiled, the government transmitted them to the council through the head of the KYP Gen Politis. The employees read them and declared that they are unalterably opposed, even if the council had sided publicly with the change to civilian status.

However, I have been informed that this does not in the least concern them, since they will not be promoted: Among the 1,200 civilian employees of the KYP, 200 have not even completed their secondary education, the large majority have only a high school education, while out of the more or less 200 holding a university degree, most entered the service after 1981.

In spite of all this, certain extremist moves and boastings of the council (of the type "there will be blood in Kastri if we are prevented from demonstrating") made some employees (even those who are not really enamored of the PASOK) to distance themselves from the council and to establish a Union of Scientific Personnel. Therefore, there may be a rift among the "blue" (with a lot of "black") and the "green" employees of the KYP.

The former speak about an intensification of the demonstrations (why not a hunger strike in front of the Akropolis?). The latter declare that they want the democratization of the KYP and its immediate restructuring.

As a result, the Turkish papers have found out about this affair and are joking about us in front-page articles.

The government is of course concerned about this problem and--at least so I am told--the bill that will be submitted to the Chamber of Deputies will not simply resume the KYP (to National Intelligence Service), but will also consider its employees' problems.

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CSO: 3521/86

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

CAVACO SILVA-EANES: COMMON POINTS, DIFFERENCES

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 24 Jan 86 p 4

[Article by J. C. B.: "Two Drops of Water"]

[Text] It can be said of them: they are like two drops of water. Their images almost fade one into the other, they are characterized by the regional accent, ideological vagueness is common to both of them, and their modest origins make brothers of them.

Antonio dos Santos Ramalho Eanes, 51, and Anibal Antonio Cavaco Silva, 46, are in opposite camps even if they seem made to share one.

Behind the scene in the presidential elections, they are conducting a struggle that has some dramatic aspects.

And this is happening at a time when there is, between Belem and Sao Bento, an institutional understanding seldom witnessed before during the PS-PSD government, that permits to view Eanes and Cavaco in the same struggle, sharing the concern to make the state moral and the ideal to make the parties bacteriologically pure.

What is most different between them is not age, nor the military versus the university status of the two, because both can be considered young politicians, and because academic clothing would not ill fit Eanes, and Cavaco Silva could easily don a military uniform.

What most distinguishes them is, above all, the fact that one of them, before becoming the leader of the PSD and prime minister, had enthusiastically bet on the candidate on whom he is still betting, of course, but now in a more distant manner, while the other, after having discouraged Costa Braz and having perhaps been "pushed" by Melo Antunes to launch Zenha's candidacy, ended up by supporting the latter in the kind of emotional tone that never characterized his double mandate.

Cavaco Silva used Freitas as a emblem in the Figueira da Foz congress that elected him leader of the PSD. It was Sa Carneiro's failed hypothesis: "One government, one president." However, the 6 October election results have made him realize that the best hypothesis is not the sole good hypothesis. And if

Freitas do Amaral in Belem would strengthen Cavaco's victorious "dynamic," the election of another candidate (especially if this candidate is Mario Soares), would be far from meaning the defeat of the 1985 "leader-revelation."

Overtaken by the Pintasilgo "hurricane," Ramalho Eanes witnessed the division of the PRD in the presidential elections before it could even be born as a political party. And the excellent third place it won in the parliamentary elections--almost competing with Cavaco Silva in last year's "revelations"--because shaky in the face of a possible splitting of votes, not only in the PRD area, but also among the communists.

Thence the difference in tone: for Cavaco, it is enough to keep this word, to support from a distance, convinced, as he is, that he could not lose all, no matter who is the winner. For Eanes, on the contrary, only victory would serve.

Only victory could help leave Belem without a loss of prestige; only victory would guarantee him a future without a painful "crossing of the desert"; only victory can give him the strength to rid the PRD of its notorious deficiencies; only victory will guarantee him the continuity that many Eanists consider essential so that the "change in the political system not be confused with that of the regime."

It can be said of them: they are like two drops of water. One, however, is cold. The other is boiling.

/9274

CSO: 3542/64

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

TYPICAL PROFILE OF MUNICIPAL LEADERS

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 13 Dec 85 pp 19R-22R

[Article by Jose Antonio Lema, Jose Manuel Fernandes and Luis Fraga]

[Text] Who are the presidents of the municipal chambers? What are their professions, ages, experience in local government? What factors influence the variations in the votes cast, municipality by municipality, when we compare the local elections with the legislative elections? These are the questions which these two studies, conducted with the aid of computers, seek to answer.

Armando Afonso Moreira, Social Democratic president of the municipal chamber of Vila Real, is married, aged 46, and has held the post for 9 years. He attended university and before he occupied his office in the Pacos do Concelho building, he was a secondary school teacher. He is the most typical of our 305 chamber presidents, the one who most closely fits the "robot" profile, the image of the average Portuguese municipal leader. What is that image? This is what we were looking for, based on an analysis which took into account such characteristics as age, civil status, profession, educational background and experience in local government. To this end, we conducted a study--the methodology for which is explained in these pages--covering 255 of the 305 chamber presidents.

The two most obvious--and expected--characteristics are that almost all the chamber presidents are married males.

In fact, only six women have reached the top of the municipal hierarchy. Three of them are Social Democrats--in Estarreja, Cascais and Santa Cruz da Graciosa (in the Azores)--and two are Socialists--in Peniche and Sardoal. One was put up by the PPM [Popular Monarchist Party]--in Vagos. Three of them are serving their first term, whereas only 15 percent of all the chamber presidents are completing their first term in municipal office. At least one of the women--Helena Roseta, in Cascais--will not be reelected, since she is not even a candidate.

So women are not well represented in the leadership of the municipal bodies. In fact, in these elections in which the local factor predominates, it is really difficult for a woman to project well enough to overcome the sexist resistance, which is still strong.

Table 1: Profile of Local Chamber Presidents Nationwide

<u>Characteristic</u>	<u>Finding</u>
Male	98 percent (only six women)
Married	96.5 percent
Attended university	34.5 percent
Attended secondary school	32.4 percent
Secondary school teacher	15.4 percent
Service-related occupation	15 percent
Serving third term	49.6 percent
--or second term	35.6 percent
Average age	46 years

Table 2: Profile of Local Chamber Presidents by Party Affiliation

<u>Characteristic</u>	<u>Socialist Party</u>
Male	97.6 percent (two women)
Married	97.2 percent
Attended university	28.4 percent
Completed secondary school	32.3 percent
Banker (or service-related occup.)	23.5 percent
Serving third term	55.6 percent
--or second term	30.6 percent
Average age	44 years

<u>Characteristic</u>	<u>United People's Alliance</u>
Male	100 percent
Married	94.2 percent
Attended university	33.3 percent
--or secondary school	31.3 percent
Service-related occupation	28.3 percent
--or technical cadre	17 percent
Third term	44 percent
--or second term	42 percent
Average age	40 years

<u>Characteristic</u>	<u>Social Democratic Party</u>
Male	96.6 percent (only three women)
Married	98.9 percent
Completed secondary school	34.5 percent
Attended university	32.2 percent
Civil servant	21.6 percent
Secondary school teacher	15.9 percent
Third term	48.7 percent
--or second term	30.8 percent
Average age	48 years

Table 2 (con.)

<u>Characteristic</u>	<u>Democratic Alliance</u>
Male	100 percent)
Married	98 percent
Attended university	38.8 percent
Completed secondary school	32.7 percent
Secondary school teacher	20.4 percent
--or technical cadre	12.2 percent
Third term	52.3 percent
--or second term	40.9 percent
Average age	49 years
<u>Characteristic</u>	<u>Social Democratic Center Party</u>
Male	100 percent
Married	88.9 percent (one divorce)
Attended university	46.2 percent
Completed secondary school	23.1 percent
Secondary school teacher	29.6 percent
--or technical cadre	37.5 percent
Third term	45.8 percent
--or second term	37.5 percent
Average age	50 years

'Ripe' Age

As mentioned, most of the chamber presidents are married. There are only 5 bachelors, 2 divorces and 2 widowers (in 255 responses). These results are consistent with the fact that most of the local leaders are in an age range from 30 to 70 years, in which marriage is the customary state. Although the relatively small number of divorces is [no] surprise, it is odd to note that one of the divorced presidents is a CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] member. (The other belongs to the APU [United People's Alliance].)

More curious is that, with regard to the age of chamber presidents, there are noticeable differences according to region, as can be observed on Map I. Nationwide, the smallest age group is what we would call the "ripe age." [Most presidents] are between 40 and 50 years old, the average age being 46 years.

In fact, two-fifths of the chamber presidents are about 40 years old. The trend is strongest in the districts of Aveiro, Beja, Braganca, Coimbra, Evora, Porto and Vila Real and the Azores. In contrast, the 40-year-olds are rarest in Leiria, Viana do Castelo and Viseu.

The district in which the average age of the Chamber presidents is the highest is Castelo Branco (53 years), followed by Guarda (51 years), Vila Real and Viseu (50). The youngest chamber presidents are concentrated in the south:

Evora (38 years), Porto Alegre and Setubal (41 years). It is evident that the age of the chamber presidents goes up as we move from the coast to the interior and from south to north. Map I [not reproduced] clearly shows this trend.

APU: Youngest

This age study also makes it quite easy to separate the different parties; on a rising scale in age, they are aligned from Left to Right: APU, 40 years; PS [Socialist Party], 44 years; PSD [Social Democratic Party], 48 years; and CDS, 50 years. The AD [Democratic Alliance] falls between the latter two parties, at 49 years.

It is not surprising that the APU elected the youngest chamber presidents-- in Portel and Nisa (both presidents are 27 years old), in Sobral de Monte Agraco (28 years old) and in Borba (29 years old). In contrast, the only two chamber presidents over 70 years of age are from the CDS: in Tabuaco (aged 72) and in Vila Nova de Ourem (80 years old). Oddly, at the extremes of this age range we find two physicians: Jose Manuel Basso, in Nisa, and Antonio da Silva Teixeira, in Vila Nova de Ourem.

This age distribution is somewhat at odds with the public image of the highest leaders of the various parties, particularly, of the APU (the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party] leadership has the highest average age) and the CDS--whose most prominent national leaders for many years have been the dauphins of political life (Freitas do Amaral, Adelino Amaro da Costa, Lucas Pires).

Only Fourth Grade

Another characteristic which we analyzed was the educational background of the chamber presidents. The first noteworthy finding was the existence of at least 29 chamber presidents (out of the 246 who responded to this question) who had only the minimum educational requirement, i.e., fourth grade. Incidentally, only 4 of the 20 districts or autonomous regions do not have at least one chamber president in this group. They are Braga, Setubal and Vila Real districts and Madeira.

The greatest frequency of councilmen with minimal educational qualifications appears in Braganca District, where one-third of the chamber presidents did not go beyond primary school. This circumstance might be related to the fact that in this district of Tras-os-Montes there are also the most chamber presidents who are in business (proprietors, merchants, manufacturers).

The educational level of the local leaders also varies by party affiliation. Here the CDS has the advantage, presenting the highest rate of chamber presidents with university degrees (46.1 percent), followed closely by the AD (38.8 percent) and the APU (33 percent).

The lowest rate is registered by the Socialists (although the PS had a higher rate of non-response); the secondary school graduates predominated (62 percent). The PSD has the highest incidence of local leaders with only a minimum education (15 percent); the lowest incidence was registered for the APU (8.3 percent)

and the PS (8.8 percent). This factor is curious, since we would have tended to assume that the APU--whose local leaders would theoretically come from the lowest social strata--would present the largest number of municipal leaders with only a fourth-grade education.

This is probably an indication that the APU does not recruit the majority of its local elected officials from these social strata. This is, in fact, the case.

Services

While most of the APU chamber presidents had service-related occupations, second place went to technical cadres (engineers, economists, architects). Equally frequent were bankers, civil servants and secondary school teachers, although factory workers are also concentrated in the APU. In fact, six of the eight chamber presidents who are factory workers belong to the APU; the other two are Socialists. We also note the existence of three physicians, although we did not turn up a single attorney, which is not true of any of the other large parties. Finally, a small manufacturer was elected chamber president on an APU ticket: Emilio Rato, of Marinha Grande.


The Socialists present the largest number of bankers, and if we combine this profession with other service occupations (office workers and civil servants), we find that 62 percent of the PS chamber presidents come from these typically middle-class professions.

Teachers

It is interesting to note that the PS has recruited its local candidates from a class with particular local prominence: bankers. It is also certainly the local prestige which teachers enjoy which explains the weight of this professional class, particularly among the chamber presidents elected by the parties in the former AD; 30 percent of the CDS chamber presidents are secondary school teachers and another 7.5 percent are primary school teachers.

The importance of the teaching profession in being elected chamber president stands out particularly in such districts as Castelo Branco, Guarda, Viana do Castelo, Viseu and Vila Real; i.e. in districts where the rural vote is decisive and generally goes to the PSD or the CDS. More specifically, in Vila Real, 6 of the 13 chamber presidents for whom we have data were teachers before they were elected to local office.

Other occupations seen most frequently among office-holders elected by parties to the right of the political spectrum are linked to property (proprietors, merchants and manufacturers); they represent 18.3 percent of the combined CDS, PSD and AD councilmen. Technical cadres represent 11.6 percent. It is worth mentioning that no less than 20.6 percent of the PSD chamber presidents are civil servants, the highest percentage of all the parties. This might not have been expected in a party which is so averse to the public sector, but the fact is that, in the Azores, a region which is almost entirely Social Democrat and where only 2 of the 19 chambers are not controlled by the PSD,



Maps II, III, IV and V show the districts (in gray) in which the different occupations are predominant among the chamber presidents. Striped areas indicate districts for which we did not have sufficient data (Coimbra, Santarem and Faro).

we find the largest percentage of civil servants--no less than 31.6 percent--serving as chamber presidents. Close behind is another Social Democratic district: Aveiro (31.2 percent). Only then comes Beja, which is solidly APU.

The other professional class which is represented most strongly among PSD office holders is that of attorney (8.0 percent)

Analyzing the distribution of occupations nationwide, aside from the already mentioned incidence of teachers, it is interesting to note (see maps II, III, IV and V):

--The concentration of property-linked occupations in the districts of Branco (perhaps the most backward district in the country) and Porto;

--The very broad distribution of service-related occupations (office workers, civil servants and bank workers), but with a high concentration in the southern and coastal districts (Beja, Evora, Setubal, Portalegre, Leiria, Aveiro and Braga) and in the autonomous regions of the Azores and Madeira;

--Technical cadres predominate in Braga, Lisbon and Evora.

The last characteristic considered in this study was length of experience in local government.

From the analysis of the data at our disposal (responses from 334 municipalities), the first conclusion is clear: the stability of local power; i.e., the stability of the municipal governments. In 110 (49.6 percent) of these municipalities, the current presidents have been members of the municipal executive for at least three terms. Moreover, 31 had some experience prior to the first local elections, generally acquired on administrative commissions.

In contrast, very few (only 35, or 15 percent) of the chamber presidents were serving their first term.

This stability varies according to the parties which the elected presidents represent. The Socialists have the largest number of presidents serving a third term, which is a good indication of how well the PS is entrenched in local power.

In fact, this party has succeeded in electing a large number of presidents in municipalities where the PS does not have a majority in legislative elections. The reason for this is that many of its local office holders are truly popular figures. With these figures presiding over the chambers, the Socialists have been able to hold on to many local governments which they otherwise would have lost.

Local Factor

It is somewhat different with the APU, in which only 34 of the office holders are in this position. Although the APU is the political force which, in terms of overall percentages, usually does the best in local elections, in which it obtains "scores" which are generally higher than those in the legislative elections, its influence is very solid and is independent of its candidates.

In other words, to insure victory, the APU does not always have to renominate the outgoing president (as in the case of the Socialists); it has more freedom to revise its ticket.

Regarding the CDS and PSD, parties whose electoral logic places them closer to the PS, they are hurt by the fact that a significant portion of the chamber presidencies which they hold were won back in 1975; 1979 was the year of the AD "tidal wave" which swept the Socialists out of the presidency of some dozens of municipal councils.

Also regarding the parties, it is noted that the only two local presidents elected on tickets of minor political forces (ASDI [Independent Social Democratic Action] and PPM) are both serving their third terms. This confirms the theory that candidates are valued for themselves and not for the parties which put them up. Incidentally, it was only in 1982 that these two men ran on the tickets of these two small parties for the first time.

One of the strangest contrasts is between the educational level of the local leaders and their length of service. Those with only a fourth-grade education have done the best at holding on to local office (56 percent of them are running for a third term) and those who have attended universities have done the worst (only 40 percent serve a third term). This relationship seems to indicate that the ease with which these individuals are elected to successive terms would have to be attributed to the same strong, winning personality which got them elected chamber president with only a fourth grade education, i.e., which made them popular figures.

On the other hand, the pay scale of chamber presidents may not be particularly attractive to cadres with better qualifications, which could help to explain why chamber presidents who have attended college tend to serve for a shorter time. We cannot be too sure about this deduction, however, because it is very difficult to establish any general rule. One need only consider, for example, the case of two liberal professions which can bring in a large income: the law and medicine. While the legal profession is well represented among chamber presidents who have served for 9 years or more (55 percent), the reverse is true of physicians (only 27 percent fall into this category).

This observation serves, incidentally, to underline the relative nature of this study, particularly since it is biased by the lack of data on a significant number of Socialist municipalities. Although the study enabled us to draw a profile of the average Portuguese municipal leader, i.e. to see what these chamber presidents have in common, it provided only a partial idea of the diversity of personalities, motivations and circumstances of these local government leaders. Well, the great value of local government is precisely this diversity, which makes each municipal election unique.

Variation in Voting Patterns Between Legislative and Local Elections

In a study of two types of elections--legislative and local--held close together, it was seen that, in Portuguese political life over the last 10 years, each party--be it the APU, PS, PSD or CDS--has experienced pronounced variations in votes and has exhibited distinctive behavior.

Why does a party make a better showing in local elections than in legislative elections? What effect do such factors as local entrenchment or the expedient vote and the ideological vote have in these results?

The following analysis may clarify these questions and define patterns of behavior among the voters of each political party in the two types of elections. First of all, it provides a clearer and more definite idea of the changes which next Sunday's elections will present, given the unexpected results of the 6 October legislative elections and the current distribution of local power.

The study was based on three periods in which there was a similar interval between the local and legislative elections: 1976 (elections for the AR (Assembly of the Republic) in April and local elections in December); 1979/1980 (local elections in December 1979 and legislative elections in October 1980); and, finally, 1982/1983 (local elections in December, as usual, and AR elections in April 1983). This comparative analysis of pairs of elections makes it possible to detect the zones where various forces are competing more intensely for votes--zones of conflict which are not revealed in studies of isolated elections.

More Abstention in Local Elections

The map showing overall voter variation [between the local and legislative elections] for all parties in the three periods combined and the map showing the variation in abstention rates are almost identical, which indicates that abstaining voters are largely responsible for the voting variation in practically all the municipalities in the country. The abstentions carry so much weight that they almost obscure the transfers of votes among the parties.

In fact, abstentions go up spectacularly throughout the country when local elections are held. In 1976, for example, abstentions in local elections were 50 to 60 percent higher than in the legislative elections. Of the 305 municipalities in the nation, there was only one--Cabeceiras de Basto, Braga District--in which more votes were cast in the local election than in the election for deputies to the AR. Incidentally, in 1979/1980 and 1982/1983, Cabeceiras de Basto was always included in the small group of municipalities which attributed more importance to the choice of their local representatives. Although the difference in the abstention rates in legislative and local elections gradually diminished in these last two periods, the abstention rate for local elections is still quite high, indicating that the people attach less importance to the local elections. On the other hand, the results in December 1982, in which abstentions rose less sharply, might mean that those elections benefited from the fact that they were held in a period of political crisis, with the breakup of the AD, and before the legislative elections, so the more intense political climate may have brought more voters out.

The local elections this 15 December will not take place under the same circumstances; the early legislative elections on 6 October and the presidential elections in January 1986 have resulted in a certain lack of interest in the political impact of the local elections, particularly among the very parties competing in them. The parties' capacity to mobilize the electorate may be

limited and there could be a new trend toward a significant abstention rate in next Sunday's local elections.

Consulting the map showing the variations in abstentions, it is also curious to note the geographic distribution of the zones where abstentions varied less for the two types of election: almost all of the Alentejo, Minho, Vila Real District and the mountain municipalities in the north of Viseu District. The explanation for this distribution may be that these are relatively homogeneous zones, politically, and party leaders have an easier time getting the voters out for both types of elections.

In a final comparison between the two maps, it is noted that, on the map showing variations in voting patterns, there are areas in black (where the variation was greatest) which do not correspond with the map showing variations in abstention rates (on which these areas appear in white). These black areas represent municipalities where the competition among the various parties is more intense and there are significant crossovers of votes: they include Ourique (a three-way contest between the PSD, PS and APU); Sesimbra (PS and APU); Fronteira and Monforte (PS, APU and AD); Alviázere (which has already had PS, AD and CDS chamber presidents); Aguiar da Beira, Fornos de Algodres and Figueira de Castelo Rodrigo (CDS, PSD, AD and PS) and Mesão Frio (PS, PSD and CDS).

Now let us look at the variations observed for each party, with reference to each of the three periods.

APU: Better Results in Local Elections

The APU is clearly the political force which obtains better results in local elections than in legislative elections. However, as seen on the map, since its electorate is concentrated in the south (with negligible weight in the center and north of the country), it is precisely in its zone of influence that it experiences the most marked variations, particularly in municipalities in which it competes with the PS, where the mechanism of the expedient vote causes a significant fringe of voters to oscillate between the two parties.

Thus, in 1976, when all the parties were just beginning to establish themselves locally, it was in the southern districts that some municipalities were giving less support to the APU in local elections than in the legislative elections. (Of the 16 municipalities in which this occurred, 14 were in zones where the APU was the dominant party). This could be attributed to the fact that the APU was competing with the PS in the legislative elections and the expedient vote favored the APU. In the north, there was a general but weak trend favoring the APU in the local elections, representing the recovery of some expedient votes lost to the PS in the legislative elections.

In the 1979/1980 and 1982/1983 periods, the focal point of the variation shifted to the zones bordering the PS strongholds (Algarve, Portalegre and Santarém), with the combined effect of two distinct types of behavior. In these zones, the local APU-controlled governments or the APU's local candidates

are preferred by an appreciable portion of the electorate which votes with the PS, because this is more expedient, in the legislative elections. On the other hand, in the north of the country the ideological vote tends to go to the APU in the legislative elections, accompanied by a loss of votes to the PS in the local elections. This was the case in 1979/1980 in the Beira Interior and in the northern textile industry zone. This trend was more accentuated in 1982/1983, and the APU campaign to establish itself locally in the north has begun to produce some results; in the Vouga valley and the Braga region, the APU is becoming competitive with the Socialists.

Still, it must be stressed that, generally speaking, the APU has shown the best local election/legislative election consistency in all three periods; in 1983, it lost no more than 5 or 6 percent of its electorate in any local election.

PS: Pros and Cons of Being Swing Party

The PS has an unstable electorate outside its strongholds. In the Alentejo, the greatest variation occurs in municipalities where it is in competition with the AD or the APU, municipalities which appear on the map as real cordons defining district borders.

In the north, those who vote with the PS in the legislative elections vote AD/PSD in the local elections, which--despite some exceptions--reveals its representatives' lack of local influence, since they cannot maintain the considerable force of the PS vote in the legislative elections.


In the three periods under analysis, the PS map shows the least variation in its own zone of influence, but it is precisely here that it experienced the great bloodletting on 6 October at the hands of the PRD [Democratic Renewal Party]. One of the most interesting revelations of Sunday's elections will be how this electorate behaves toward the PS local office-holders whom it already knows (in some cases) and toward the PRD competition. We are referring to the regions of the Vale to Tejo, Estremadura, the Algarve, Coimbra, Porto and areas in Braga District.

It can be said that the PS has clearly shown that it is at the center of the nation's political spectrum, showing up in each region to compete in the elections with the dominant parties there. This versatility, which has made the PS the "party on the Right" or the "party on the Left"--depending on the viewpoint of the regional majority--and which potentially could be a factor for growth, has to a large extent become a handicap because of contradictory policies which have managed to antagonize not only groups which are not a part of its constituency (AD and APU) but the base of its own party support (PRD).


In 1976, the PS rose prominently in the local elections in predominantly APU zones, benefiting from the votes of the more conservative electorate. As the pivot party, it also benefited from the expedient vote of the APU in the north (Guarda, Viseu and Tras-os-Montes). In the western region and the northern coast, it lost to the PPD [Popular Democratic Party], which has great local influence.

Maps show variation in voting patterns between legislative and local elections for all parties in all periods and variation in abstention rates.

General Variation



Variation in Abstentions




In 1979/1980, the appearance of the AD attracted some of the local Socialist voters in the legislative elections, specifically in the border region between Evora and Beja districts and in the Beira Interior.

In 1982/1983, the PS registered gains in the local elections, particularly in the coastal and urban zones. It lost votes only in the south (influence of the APU office holders), Coimbra, Vale do Douro and part of Tras-os-Montes (wher the AD was strong in the local governments). The PS improved and balanced its constituency at the national level.

AD and PSD: Competition with the PS, Decline of the CDS

A comparison of the AD and PSD maps reveals that, in the south, their vote varied only in municipalities where they could compete for part of the PS electorate. In the north, where the voters are more fickle from the standpoint of party loyalty, the variations were marked in zones where the CDS vote went over to the PSD and between the AD and the PS, which occurred specifically in the Beira Litoral, Guarda, Braganca and the coastal zone of Leiria District.

Maps show variations in voting patterns between legislative and local elections for each party in the three periods under study. Black areas are those in which the variation exceeded 15 percent, gray area represent variations of 5 to 15 percent and in the white areas the variation was less than 5 percent. Dotted portions are areas in which the party did not compete.



In the Beira Alta and Alto Douro, there was a close similarity among the three parties, based on their local characteristics, in which the ideological factor has little significance and the vote switches are numerous and complex. This is what happened with the PPD in 1976, which came out ahead in the local elections in broad areas where the CDS was not on the ballot.

In 1979/1980 the AD achieved better results in the legislative elections in APU and PS zones; in 1982/1983, despite its disorganization and the fact that it entered candidates in very few municipalities, the AD still managed to maintain the general trend of the previous period, with a stronger showing in the legislative elections than the PSD or the CDS (except for Vale do Tejo, in which the united conservative vote was no longer a factor).

CDS: Local Personalities

The CDS variation corresponded almost uniformly to its electoral decline from 1976 to 1983. Logically, as the map shows, the variation was much more pronounced in the zones where the Christian Democrats had been in power or were competing for it against the PPD/PSD.

In 1976, a similar pattern is noted in the legislative and local elections, which means that ideology was important to the electorate. In the south and center of the country where the CDS did not compete, its votes were switched directly to the PPD. In Tras-os-Montes and the Beira Interior, the variations reflect intense competition between these two parties, benefiting the party with the best local organization, and the switch of local leaders from one party to the other.

In 1982/1983, the CDS showed a marked loss of strength in the legislative elections compared with the local elections, with its votes going to the PSD (which, with Mota Pinto, managed to maintain its electoral equilibrium). For its part, the CDS began to lose its conservative ideological nature and its influence was based primarily on local personalities.

'PRD Effect': How Far-Reaching?

After its astonishing performance in the 6 October elections, the PRD is now faced with the responsibility of maintaining its image as the third major party, with 18 percent of the vote, a responsibility which it may not be ready to accept so soon, particularly in local elections that require organization and local implantation which the party clearly does not have. In fact, the PRD will not be competing in many of the local elections and even if it can hold on to the votes it won on 6 October in those municipalities where it is putting up candidates, it will see its national "score" drop to a half or a third of its showing in the legislative elections.

The PRD is not competing in about 80 municipalities where it received from 10 to 20 percent of the vote in the legislative elections, or in about 24 municipalities where it won more than 20 percent. While it is clear that the PS will basically be the party to benefit from the absence of the PRD, it is strange that Herminio Martinho's party is not putting up candidates in

most of the APU-controlled zones (Baixo and Alto Alentejo), nor in the central coast and interior. It will compete in most of the urban municipalities in Vale do Tejo and Castelo Branco (its strongest zone), Algarve and scattered municipalities in the north and central interior (where it received fewer votes). In these locations, the Socialists will again suffer the greatest effects from the PRD, but without the devastating breadth of the "PRD effect" on 6 October. Although the PS will certainly lose several chamber presidencies because of votes switched to the PRD, it could recover an appreciable percentage of the votes which deserted it in the legislative elections in October.

Note on Methodology

In calculating the variation in voting [between legislative and local elections] in the periods 1976, 1979/1980 and 1982/1983, both the declines and gains for each party are included. That is, the 5 percent which the APU gained in 1976 in Ourique in the legislative elections (relative to its vote in the local elections) does not cancel out the 5 percent which the APU lost in Ourique in 1982/1983 in the AR elections (relative to the results in the local elections). Both values count as variations which are cumulative and are reflected in the overall APU variation in Ourique. (The method of the quadratic means of the differences between legislative and local elections in each period was used.)

The keys on the maps represent the percentage by which a party vote varied on the average (losing, gaining or maintaining votes) between the two types of elections. The areas in black correspond to the largest variations, the grey areas represent intermediate changes and the areas in white represent the smallest variations.

Where it is indicated that a political party did not compete, this means that the party did not run in both types of election in any of the three periods studied.

Finally, it is noted that in the local elections the study was based on the votes for the municipal chambers and not for the municipal or parish assemblies.

6362

CS0: 3542/52

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

POPULATION MOVEMENTS SHOW NONTRADITIONAL PATTERNS

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 15 Dec 85 p 11

[Text] The traditional attraction which Lisbon and Porto held for the mainland Portuguese population has declined in the past decade, in favor of the districts in the center of the country, the northern coast and the Algarve, notes a study by the IACEP [Institute of Situational Analysis and Planning Studies].

The IACEP document addresses the question of the changing pattern of internal migration observed in Portugal in the last decade.

In the period from 1973 to 1981, the study notes that 295,056 people, about 3.6 percent of the population of mainland Portugal in 1981, moved to a different district.

The districts involved in these moves were, on one hand, Lisbon and Setubal, which attracted the most people, and the Alentejo districts, which recorded the largest rate of emigration.

The IACEP document notes that, in 9 years, the highest rates of migration were recorded in the age group from 25 to 34 years, followed by the groups from 15 to 24 and over 60 years of age. The youngest age group shows the least inter-district migration on the mainland.

According to the IACEP analysts, the migrations are not geographically balanced. If one excludes the migratory movements in Lisbon and Setubal, which represent a reorganization of the population in the Lisbon metropolitan area, the districts in the interior, which represented 31.1 percent of the resident population, registered 46.5 percent of the migrations in the period under study.

Meanwhile, the coastal districts (including Faro) received 75 percent of the migrants. Taken together, Lisbon, Setubal and Porto were accounting for more than 50 percent of the "immigrations" registered on the mainland.

The result of the unbalanced migratory flow was that only five districts showed a positive balance of internal migration (more people entering than leaving): Setubal recorded a positive balance of 32,622 people, followed by Lisbon (9,539), Porto (6,935), Aveiro (2,158) and Faro (1,895).

The districts with a negative balance were in the Alentejo, the northern interior and the center of the country.

The study reveals that, in general, the indicators of the development of migratory movements clearly show a coast/interior separation.

In the period from 1973 to 1981, some 46.9 percent of all changes of residence were migrations between coastal districts, 31.6 percent were migrations from the interior to the coast, 15.5 percent were in the opposite direction and 6 percent were migrations between districts in the interior.

The study concludes that what characterized internal migrations in the last decade in Portugal were first, a reorganization of the population in the more developed coastal areas and, next, the strong attraction of these areas for the population in the less developed areas of the interior.

6362

CS0: 3542/53

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

BRIEFS

ALMOST CORRECT PREDICTIONS--When everything is said and done, and with the necessary corrections, the first round's most probable outcome is a Freitas do Amaral victory with a percentage that will be above 40 percent, followed by Mario Soares (with a little over 20 percent), Salgado Zenha (with nearly 20 percent) and Lourdes Pintasilgo (around 15 percent). [Excerpt] [Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 24 Jan 86 p 3] /9274

APU SUPPORT TO ZENHA--Between 1530 and 1600 hours last January thirteenth a van owned by the Amadora Municipality (where the APU has the majority) unloaded all kinds of equipment in front of the Zenha candidacy offices in that city, located by Avenida Santos Matos. The van was a Dina Toyota and bore the license number CM-87-86. There are witnesses of this fact. For the candidate who affirms that he is not asking for anyone's support, this instance proves that he is accepting support--and a lot of it--from the APU. But there are other examples as well. A few days ago, witnesses in front of the PC headquarters in Lisbon, located on Soeiro Pereira Gomes Street, noted that officials from Alvaro Cunhal's party were preparing to load loudspeakers on a car used by the Zenha electoral campaign, as well as posters of Zenha himself. And all of this, before Veloso desisted in his favour.... [Text] [Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 21 Jan 86 p 20] /9274

ANOTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAW--The Ministry of International Administration is once again analyzing the Internal Security Law bill (the previous bill, prepared by the Mario Soares government, had been sent to the Assembly of the Republic for study, and its validity deadline has already expired). Our newspaper found out that the Ministry is thinking about preparing a new document (which will not be ready before next summer) and is also giving some thought to the reaction that the previous document had awakened. [Text] [Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 21 Jan 86 p 8] /9274

VELOSO ELECTION VIEWS--Asked yesterday in Coimbra about his preference for an election victory in case the second round is disputed between Mario Soares and Freitas do Amaral, candidate Angelo Veloso replied: "Neither." As for the hypothesis of a second round between Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo and the former CDS leader, would Veloso be ready to do for the former what he is now doing for Zenha? He replied: "Probably." [Excerpt] [Lisbon DIARIO DE LISBOA in Portuguese 17 Jan 86 p 8] /9274

CSO: 3542/64

POLITICAL

TURKEY

CWP PROPOSALS FOR CONSTITUTION

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 9 Jan 86 pp 1, 13

[Interview with CWP General Chairman Husamettin Cindoruk by Ankara Bureau Chief Yalcin Dogan: "Constitutional Proposal, Content of Cindoruk's 'Formula for Democracy'"]

[Text] Ankara - Correct Way Party [CWP] Deputy General Chairman Mehmet Dulger brought an interesting proposal to the political agenda a couple of days ago. With the notion that there is a "regime problem" in Turkey as the point of departure, he proposed a three-step formula to get rid of it. According to his proposal, a constitutional convention must first be formed, then the constitutional convention must write a new constitution and, after that, elections must be held.

The proposal of a "constitutional convention" by a civilian body for the first time since Ottoman days, presenting Turkey with a new political agenda, is something which in our opinion must be discussed, not overlooking the debate over the "validity" of such a proposal under current circumstances. These political parties are not the kind that participate "on their own." They only answer "when a question is asked." Unfortunately, it is too much of a "bother" for the majority of today's political parties to act on their own, debate or add to the body of thought. Is not reticence already partly at the bottom of the political vacuum? Vis-a-vis the CWP's recent proposal, we reiterate the "must" which we cited above.

It is CWP General Chairman Husamettin Cindoruk who is father to the proposal, and we felt that we should learn his thoughts on it.

Our conversation with CWP General Chairman Cindoruk follows:

[Question] Mr Cindoruk, you -- the Correct Way Party -- made a remarkable proposal recently, presenting Turkey with a new political agenda. Where did such a proposal as this come from?

[Answer] We have said that our nation has been unable to prepare for self-regulating institutions. We have said that there are countless advantages in having self-regulating institutions and they need to be established by the nation. We expressed our ideas on this when the Consultative Assembly was formed. Naturally, we could not exert any influence in this matter. In my opinion, the first crisis in Turkey is a constitutional crisis. The Turkish founding constitution, the 1924 constitution, was consistent within itself; it was a new and austere constitution. Our republic took its character from that constitution. As a lawyer, I do not favor having too many details in the constitution, as the supreme law. It may be better for Turkey to write a law which sets forth general rules. In fact, the 1924 constitution was able to s p a w n both the multi-party era and democracy.

[Question] How could this proposal of yours be put into practice? How should a Constitutional Convention be convened?

[Answer] It has been done twice. There were the post-war instances on the European continent. And later in Italy and Germany. There can be two kinds of constitutional convention. First, a constitutional convention may be called for a purely constitutional ideal. Thought may be given to a constitutional convention for which the political parties would field candidates and openly express their ideas on the constitution. Second, it is possible to call a new constitutional convention to assume the task of formulating a democratic structure. If Turkey does not want to hold two elections or finds two elections objectionable, this would be the way to go. In the next elections, the political parties would make public their views on economic, social and constitutional change. When an interparty consensus was obtained on the writing of a new constitution, the nation would know that it would be a new constitution along the lines of the votes they had cast.

[Question] What kind of political timetable would this require?

[Answer] Turkey has an important obligation to hold such an election during 1986. Turkey is always in turmoil because it has been unable to formulate a consistent structure as regards regime. I am saying openly, because I said the same things at the Yassiada trials in 1960, that the 1960 revolution was definitely a turning point in the Turkish Republic. At bottom, the 1960 revolution was the debut of the national will. The 1961 constitution unveiled the national will. The 1961 constitution was a throwback in state structure in the Turkish-Ottoman synthesis. It was to return the sovereignty of the civilian-military bureaucracy to the governing of the state. The people have been sharing their sovereignty with the civilian-military bureaucracy. There are examples of this. It came of age with bodies such as the National Security Council, the powerful Constitutional Court, the independent (or "autonomous" as we call it) university, the radio and television administration and the Senate. In fact, after 1961, our social, legal and even economic structure was determined by this separation of powers. Sadly, the framers of the 1961 constitution have perceived the results produced by that constitution in Turkey as the root of the 1980 takeover. It is clear that a lawmaking organization based on the assembly-senate-constitution triumvirate will work slowly. The

results and disadvantages of this slowness became a burden upon the national will, democracy, the parliament and politics in 1980. For the 21st century, Turkey must build a state which mutually accepts the supremacy of the law but in which the national will is quickly reflected structurally upon the legislature and social events and which can perform quickly. Within this structure, the principle of separation of powers and supremacy of the national will must be closely guarded.

[Question] The political formula that you are proposing in order to realize these principles, the constitutional convention-new constitution-elections formula, would have to be accepted by the political parties which presently figure in the decision-making mechanism and not least by the Assembly. Do you think this is likely?

[Answer] The constitution is a document of national consensus. From the preamble to the conclusion, it is hard to believe that the present constitution is a document of national consensus. This constitution is a committee constitution. It is a constitution conceived, written and placed in effect by the takeover power. The referendum was only a formality. The underlying will was the will of the National Security Council. It cannot produce national consensus. It is not a national directive, either. It is an instrument which projects the Republic of Turkey as a military republic. I am using military republic as a legal term. The preamble to this constitution contains the principle that the takeover army may intervene in the structure of the state and dissolve parliament. The Consultative Assembly appears in the preamble of this constitution as the legitimate representative of the people. This constitution is the apology, rationale and line of defense of the takeover. A national consensus cannot emerge from this constitution. In fact, it is impossible for all democratic parties to reach a consensus with this constitution.

[Question] How, in your opinion, could the present political parties accept your proposal since the present parliament is a product of the constitution?

[Answer] It is necessary for the parties to unite in the appraisal that this constitution is not conducive to democracy in the formation of new political parties.

[Question] Since the constitution represents a national consensus, is the present parliament not also a part of this consensus according to your definition?

[Answer] I have no hope for this parliament.

[Question] Then what do you think about its validity?

[Answer] We think it is necessary to find a solution from the bottom up. Political parties which think as we do must campaign for a new constitutional formula in the new elections. If the nation seats a parliament from among the parties which bring this new constitutional formula to the nation, it will

be of the same mind as that parliament. I am not saying here, "Let it be the constitution that I want." But I hope that the notion, or consensus, would emerge for a constitutional convention composed of parties representing various political ideas.

[Question] That is, the parliament that would result from the elections would assume the task of a constitutional convention in a sense, is that correct?

[Answer] It has to. This is a formula on which consensus is easy. It is possible for us to return to civilian democracy, a civilian republic within the framework of this formula.

[Question] The first task of the newly elected parliament, then, is to write a new constitution.

[Answer] I am not saying that it should neglect the progress of the state and the republic or the governing of the country so as to assume the task of a new constitution. If, in fact, the democratic left and right are represented in that parliament, a national consensus can even be reached on the matter of government.

[Question] You keep using the term national consensus for this. Would you go so far as actual cooperation with other parties in this regard?

[Answer] We are ready to begin preparations in this regard with all like-minded political parties. The CWP is not asking for a constitution after its own heart. The 1961 constitution turned the RPP's 1957 declaration of its primary goals into a constitution. It did not stick; it was a one-sided constitution. The representation of the RPP and the lack of representation of other parties [in] the constitutional convention produced a lopsided constitution. There was no consensus there, only constraint. The 1982 constitution, meanwhile, bans politics. Members of the Consultative Assembly were prohibited from being political party members. This is a professional view, that it is totally the constitution of the takeover council.

[Question] Suppose the parliament that would be formed after elections wrote a new constitution. A national consensus was formed around this constitution. In writing a new constitution, would it have produced a document that would prevent military interventions in the future?

[Answer] Definitely. The present constitution applies the formula of the people at the service of the state. Our constitution of consensus will have the state at the service of the people. This constitution will specify that parliament cannot be dissolved and that the attributes of the republic cannot be changed. It will be written in the new constitution that legislative immunity cannot be lifted. The National Security Council will not appear in the new constitution. The new constitution, if you ask me, ought to introduce formulas or clauses to regulate or prevent any national administration other than a constitutional court which performs the function of senate. The point is, Turkey has had a parliament for 110 years. Unfortunately, the Turkish

parliament has been dissolved once by the sultan, once by occupying forces and twice by takeovers. The rationales for all the dissolutions were similar, only the dissolvers were different, but those who deplored the sultan's bringing in occupying troops to dissolve one state's parliament, who labeled the sultan the Red Sultan or considered the occupying forces enemies, subsequently applauded the dissolutions of parliament.

[Question] You are firmly opposed to military intervention. But would writing the rules you have indicated into the constitution prevent military interventions, I wonder? Regardless of how many such rules appear in the constitution, takeovers are carried out by force of arms. How will this intervention be prevented?

[Answer] It is impossible in this day and age to prevent an army from conducting an overthrow. Formerly, kings and even the church prevented army takeovers by forming a guard. But, if you put a whole corps around Cankaya to protect it against what could be done with conventional arms, the army could still take over if it decided to. The advanced Western nations have only one force preventing takeovers: the resolve and resistance of the people. It is moral -- the takeover deterrent, and the takeover justification -- not material. This constitution of consensus would produce a national resolve. I am saying that, to date, takeovers have been against the people and also, to me, cancel out the constitutional referendums and the votes cast by the people. Some say they get their authority from the constitution, others from the Internal Service Law. All of these legal bases must be eliminated. I feel for the first time that the constitution was violated by regulations and laws. Turkey feels it. This constitution must at least bring some clarity to them. The preamble of this constitution must start with the National Independence Army. It must talk about democracy. It must speak of the national will. It must state that no one may revolt against this will and that solutions will be sought by democratic means. We are feeling the lack of such a document to date. I believe that the Turkish army loves democracy. Turkey must have a constitutional text that specifically binds it to a democratic order. This must be done. This framework must be provided and must provide within the framework of the constitution for our army's position within the national supremacy. This document is lacking. Despite the lack of this document, the people resist those who would conduct takeovers. Then national resistance is in place. The revolutionaries are ready for the counter revolution.

[Question] I think this proposal of yours will be debated widely in days to come.

[Answer] This is something vital. The Turkish intellectual is striving to grasp the importance of this phenomenon. The strangest thing I have experienced in the past 25 years is that professors who signed documents testifying to the illegitimacy of the Democratic Party in 1960 are writing articles against me now. They are professors of law, the constitution and government. Turkey will overcome this scholarly class. It is a continuation of the medrese [elite Muslim schools from which officials were usually drawn] in Turkey. Allowing the medrese and the barracks to go beyond the national will must be prevented. There is no other way.

POLITICAL

TURKEY

SOVIET FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS HEAD TO VISIT TO TURKEY

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 6 Jan 86 pp 1, 9

[Article by Sami Kohen on return from Moscow: "Warm Relations"]

[Text] --Natural gas pipeline project to be taken up in talks. Turkey wants Russians to buy as much in imports as they sell in natural gas.

--The new year saw a "Turkish tourism boom" to USSR. Soviet authorities are happy to see this many Turks, even all at once.

--Growth in Turkish-USSR trade accompanies success in putting new Turkish products on Soviet market in 1985.

The Soviet Union's new State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations Chairman Katushev is expected to come to Ankara at the end of the month for the Turkish-Soviet Joint Economic Commission talks.

This cabinet-level official, charged with conducting the USSR's foreign economic relations, will make the focal point of his contacts in Ankara the work on the Natural Gas Pipeline Project. The Joint Economic Commission (JEC) was actually supposed to have met in Ankara last November. However, the talks were postponed at Moscow's request when Mikhail Sergeychik, the official who would have headed the Soviet delegation, was removed from his post.

Preparations have been completed for the talks to be held in Ankara at the end of this month, and the delegation will be headed by Katushev, newly appointed to administer foreign economic relations.

The natural gas pipeline to run from the Soviet Union to Turkey is supposed to be operational by the first of next year according to the agreement. The agreement calls for Turkey to purchase 1.5 billion cubic meters of natural gas in the initial phase. This amount is to increase starting in 1989 and reach 6 billion cubic meters in 1990.

Some snags over the form of payment have developed in recent weeks between the two sides in technical-level endeavors. Turkey wants the Soviets to buy as many Turkish goods as the value of the natural gas that would be purchased. That is, the Turkish side is proposing a kind of exchange system. The Soviets, however, are asking for "cash" in equivalent foreign exchange outside of the goods they import.

Even though the Soviets have seemed willing to buy more goods from Turkey in recent contacts, they are obviously avoiding any commitment in this regard at the present. The main problem involves practical points such as whether Turkey will in fact be able to sell goods of the type to meet the Soviet Union's needs in years to come and whether the prices it will ask for these goods will be competitive with world market prices. Even though it is important for the Soviets to make commitments now in this regard, realization of them in the future will still depend on the USSR's needs and the ability of Turkish goods to penetrate this market.

The cabinet-level talks in Ankara are expected to produce agreement.

Market for Turkey

Meanwhile, the development in Turkish-Soviet trade in 1985 allows hope for the future. The trade volume between the two countries last year was \$450 million. Although this is well below the goal of \$600 million, the important thing for Turkey is that there was an import-export balance and Turkish products from leather goods to razors were able to be sold to the Soviet Union for the first time. Soviet leader Gorbachev's policy of developing and opening up the Soviet economy will make it possible for Turkey to increase and diversify its exports to this country, it is hoped.

Prime Minister Ozal's anticipated visit to Moscow will also add impetus to the development of trade and economic relations. The date of this trip has not been set, but it will probably take place in the spring.

The latest development in increased contacts in various areas with the Soviets is the interest shown in this country by Turkish tourists at the first of the year.

More than 700 Turks joined tours to Russia arranged by various travel agencies. The most Turkish tourists went to the Soviet Union for New Year's. The most important reasons for this choice are the low cost of the trip and its cultural and arts-related attractions.

Officials at "Intourist," the state-run agency that organizes all tours in the USSR, were, of course, surprised and delighted by this "Turkish tourist boom."

Turkey in Soviet Press

Two articles about Turkey appeared in the Soviet press during the week. PRAVDA on New Year's Eve published a magazine-type article about the life of Father Christmas in Turkey. A monthly journal named NEW TIMES, published in

various foreign languages, carried an article on the Eastern Mediterranean Security seminar held recently at Tarabya and offered the interpretation that the West was inciting Turkey against the Soviets. The article said that, despite the curtailment of freedoms in Turkey, voices had been raised against the U.S. military presence and many Turks were opposed to Washington's desire to "establish hegemony." A cartoon accompanying the article showed the United States stirring up Turkey against the Soviet threat.

Meanwhile, the Soviet press is avoiding any publication about the situation of the Turks in Bulgaria. Moscow's official position is that this is an internal problem of Bulgaria's. However, it seems to be an embarrassment for Soviet diplomats, and the press, never mind expressing its views, is totally ignoring the subject, including Bulgaria's claims about it.

8349

CSO: 3554/28

POLITICAL

TURKEY

BULGARIA WANTS TO RAISE PRICE OF ELECTRICITY, SOVIET PRICE STEADY

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 6 Jan 85 pp 1, 9

[Article by Zulfikar Dogan: "We Said 'No' to Bulgarian Price Hike"]

[Text] Ankara - Talks between Turkish Electric Power Corporation [TEK] and Bulgarian officials on renewal of the electricity contract ended in "dis-agreement." It was decided that another meeting would be held in March.

According to information given by TEK officials, Bulgaria wanted to raise the price, currently 17 pfennigs (40.46 liras) per kilowatt hour, by 10 percent. The TEK told the Bulgarian officials that "electricity will be purchased if the contract is extended for 1 year at the same price, otherwise the agreement will be discontinued." Officials said the Bulgarian side asked for time when the price hike request was not accepted and it was decided to meet again in March.

"All Right If We Don't But"

One official who attended the Turkish-Bulgarian electricity contract talks said that "Bulgaria is badly in need of foreign exchange and wanted to raise the price of electricity for this reason." "Our cost is 20 liras and our average charge is a mere 33 liras. We are buying electricity at a higher price than this because we have an agreement with Bulgaria. But we will not pay the price hike they are asking. If necessary and if they do not agree to sell at the old price, the agreement cannot be renewed. We are self-sufficient in electricity at the moment," he said.

Turkey buys 1.2 billion kilowatt hours of electricity a year from Bulgaria. Electricity is continuing to be transmitted even though the talks were severed, according to officials. Depending on the outcome of the talks in March, electricity will continue to be purchased at the same price or it will be cut off if agreement cannot be reached.

Meanwhile, agreement was reached to continue the purchase of electricity from the Soviet Union at the same price following the trip to Moscow by a delegation headed by TEK Deputy General Director Muhittin Babalioglu. The fixed price according to the electricity agreement with the Soviets is 2 cents (12 liras) per kilowatt hour. Prices may be renegotiated if there is an

extraordinary rise in oil prices according to the agreement. However, there is reportedly no question of such a possibility at the present time when oil prices are steadily falling.

The final protocol on the agreement to retain the former price will, therefore, be completed this month and signed during the Turkish-Soviet Joint Economic Commission meeting. We are buying 700 million kilowatt hours of electricity from the Soviet Union annually.

8349
3554/28

MILITARY

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

UNIFIED EUROPEAN DEFENSE STRATEGY ADVOCATED

Paris LE FIGARO in French 6 Jan 86 p 5

[Article by Pierre Darcourt: "Single Strategy for European Theater"]

[Text] Military doctrines evolve but fundamental factors influencing the art of warfare remain constant: identification of the enemy, definition of the mission, assessment of resources and capabilities, and for the battle per se, terrain, surprise, and maneuver. Today's debates on defense, the economy, and political solidarity all center on Europe.

The three-circle theory recently set forth by the socialist government does not withstand serious examination. This theory can be summarized as follows: the first circle is the national sanctuary, the second the defense of Western Europe, the third the protection of our overseas territories and supply lines. But the European theater is a single theater. There is no strategic discontinuity between this side and the far side of the Rhine.

Given the formidable power and size of the forces available to the Soviets in a major conflict, allied and French forces would have to engage the Soviet forces on a single unified front. There would not be two battles, only one. The primary Soviet objective would not be to establish a bridgehead on the Elbe but to go all-out, break through, and establish a bridgehead on the Rhine. Trying to carve the battle "into slices" is patently absurd. This battle will be won or lost, but we shall not be able to afford the luxury of fighting a second one by ourselves alone.

What Mission for Hades?

French-German "cohesiveness" will continue to be an illusion if we do not take the risk of filling and holding a forward "slot" on the eastern border instead of positioning ourselves rearward in a second line of defense. No progress will be made in the European defense system as long as this problem is not settled. Reinforcing the Rapid Action Force (FAR) to have it venture into a hostile environment marked by extremely heavy enemy fire would be a dangerous illusion. Regrouping Hades [new-generation mobile tactical nuclear surface-to-surface missile] fire units into a reserve force for a second battle that will not take place would solve nothing.

The new conception of the Hades system raises a fundamental question. Exactly what are tactical nuclear weapons? They are battlefield weapons. He who has them and takes the risk of using them brings things to a head. He who has no such weapons is overwhelmed. In that case; what then does the new term "prestrategic weapons" mean?

Up until 1981, our nuclear doctrine linked the use of tactical weapons to a limited warning and included in its evolution the development and deployment of neutron weapons with a larger number of warheads. Military leaders did their utmost to tone down the linkage between tactical nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear weapons.

Since 1981, the socialist government has moved in the opposite direction. It has strengthened the final warning concept, thereby moving into that inevitable sequence culminating in a sweeping response by our strategic nuclear strike force. The enemy, superior in manpower and materiel, would pull out all the stops within a well-defined limited area. The immediate use of our tactical nuclear weapons upon large troop concentrations would be one way of reestablishing a certain balance.

Forward area deterrence can be effective only by direct and rapid intervention. How could we possibly participate in the action belatedly and advance through a large devastated area with bridges and roads damaged or jammed with streams of refugees and chaotically withdrawing troops?

We would have no depth, no room. We would very quickly have our backs to the sea. Conversely, the Soviets have immense expanses. General de Gaulle once succinctly described our situation with the following quip: "The distance between Czechoslovakia and the Atlantic is two laps in the Tour de France [bicycle road race]."

Rejection of Strategic Defense Initiative

The Hades missile's greater range--350 to 400 kilometers--is not decisive. Should this missile be employed against second-echelon forces? Against airfields? Against depots? Attacking such targets is the job of aircraft. The latter are more accurate and designed for these missions. Surface-to-surface tactical nuclear weapons are fit for use within the fringe contact area--30 to 40 kilometers--against detected and continuously observed targets. These weapons have an important role in the European theater and should--why not?--be placed under a "dual-key" system for joint French-German control of their use, like the U.S.-FRG system governing use of U.S. weapons deployed in the FRG. On the other hand, our strategic weapons cannot and must not be integrated in Europe. They must remain under France's sole control. They are France's last resort and not a last warning. Conventional forces and their tactical nuclear weapons must probe the enemy's real intentions and stop him with a brief and violent strike.

Actually, implementation of nuclear strategy brings three nations into play. There is no real correlation of forces between France and the USSR. But we are not alone. When we shall have 300 to 400 nuclear warheads, our threat to use them will become more credible. The Soviets, who are excellent chess

players, will then take our threat seriously, because the United States would immediately exploit this momentary position of weakness. And Moscow would be more preoccupied with the enormous U.S. threat than with vitrifying France in a nuclear strike.

In fact, the United States and the USSR spend their time discussing and negotiating in an effort to attain approximate parity and thus avoid having either party placed in a position of weakness. The current French theory of "deterrence of a strong nuclear power by a weak nuclear power" is absurd. It means that we are acting as if the American forces and the guarantee they constitute did not exist.

As for our government's negative attitude toward the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)--an attitude which consists in offhandedly dismissing the Soviet threat and its extraordinary build-up in space--it is an affront to our allies and may well force us ultimately into an unacceptable position of technological and scientific backwardness.

8041/9869
CSO: 3519/101

MILITARY

BELGIUM

FIRST TRIPARTITE MINEHUNTER/SWEEPER ENTERS SERVICE

Brussels LE SOIR in French 19 Dec 85 p 8

[Article: "First New-Generation Minehunter, 'Aster', Christened in Ostend"]

[Text] Princess Paola christened the first of the Belgian Navy's 10 new minehunters Monday at the Mercantile-Beliard shipyard in Ostend.

Several dignitaries were present at the ceremony, including National Defense Minister Francois-Xavier De Donnea, Public Works Minister Louis Olivier, Middle Classes Minister Jacky Buchmann, Armed Forces Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Gijseberg, and Naval Chief of Staff Vice Admiral A. Schlim. Also in attendance were Governor Vanneste of the province of West Flanders and Burgomaster W. Content of Blankenberge, the city sponsoring the ship.

After christening the ship "Aster," Princess Paola, as tradition demands, broke a bottle of champagne across its bow. She then made a short visit aboard the ship, during which the ship's officers and several members of the crew were presented to her.

All-Polyester Hull

The M-915 "Aster" is a new-generation minehunter. Its hull is built entirely of polyester reinforced plastics. It is the first of a series of 10 Belgian minehunters built under the tripartite--Belgian, Dutch, French--program.

The other nine ships are to be delivered to the Belgian Navy at 6-month intervals. This minehunter, incorporating highly advanced technologies, is also a sort of showcase for the know-how of several Belgian, French, and Dutch industries. Belgium's share of this tripartite program amounts to some 25 percent of the total contract signed by the three countries and calling for construction of some 40 ships. Several Belgian industrial firms--Mercantile-Beliard and ACEC [Charleroi Electrical Engineering Shops], among them--are participating in the program.

This new tripartite minehunter has an overall length of 47.1 meters, a beam of 8.9 meters, a draught of 2.45 meters, and a complement of 49 men. Its major items of equipment include a detection sonar, a classification sonar, two wire-guided unmanned submersibles armed with mine-destruction charges, lightweight

mechanical sweeping gear with its winch, a 20-millimeter gun for destruction of floating mines, and appropriate equipment for the ship's team of divers.

Minehunting has several advantages over minesweeping. Among other things, it makes it possible to: relieve mine warfare forces of the tedious task of having to cover a high number of times those channels deemed dangerous because of mines; hunt down mines that are nonsweepable or difficult to sweep because of the complexity of their ignition circuits; operate at a safe distance from a mine; reroute ships along controlled lanes through a mined area; and lastly, recover mines for the purpose of examining them. Equally noteworthy is the fact that minehunters can be used in peacetime to survey the seabed and also search for equipment and goods lost at sea.

Tripartite Cooperation

In his brief remarks made at the Mercantile-Beliard shipyard, Defense Minister de Donnea recalled that the tripartite cooperation agreement had been signed on 15 March 1975. He added that the agreement covered research, development, construction, testing, technical and operational evaluation, and logistic support of this new type of minehunter. The minister explained that under this agreement, the three contractual countries undertook each to build its own hulls and fit them with propulsion systems, armament, and also standardized machinery and equipment common to the three navies concerned. Minister de Donnea said that this high technology program had been made possible by the cooperation of the three countries.

According to the minister, the minehunters "Bellis" and "Crocus" will follow "Aster" in being officially turned over to the Belgian Navy. This program, he said, employed some 100 highly skilled technical personnel and had also created approximately 300 new jobs in Ostend and Rupelmonde.

8041

CSO: 3519/91

MILITARY

FRANCE

MANPOWER REDUCTIONS FORESEEN IN NAVY

Brest OUEST-FRANCE in French 26 Dec 85 p 199

[Article by Christian Cressard]

[Text] Manpower reductions in the Navy, envisaged in the 1984-88 planning law and expected to affect a total of 3,500 men over the five years, will be continued in 1986 and will affect 700 people, i.e., 30 officers, 140 petty officers and 530 enlisted men.

Thus, the manpower provided for in the budget, which totaled 67,711 in 1984 and 67,040 in 1985, will total 66,345 in 1986. This decrease is all the more fraught with problems because the Navy states that it would need 5,000 more men to cope with the constraints of military life and carry out its missions. To be sure, the decrease in the number of combat ships, which went from 183 in 1978 down to 145 at present, facilitates the decline to a degree. The present number of ships should not begin to increase again until 1991, after the scrapping of some 20 mine destroyers, which will be replaced in part.

But this parallel decline in combat ships and crews, regrettable as it may be, does not resolve all the problems caused by manpower reductions.

The two most important problems are insufficient staffing of cadres as the result of a shortage of officers, estimated as at least 300, and slow promotions, especially for leading seamen and petty officers.

Paradoxically, in order to resolve the problem of understaffing of cadres, it will be necessary, while decreasing the number of officers by 30 in accordance with the manpower reduction plan, in 1986 to create 20 new naval aviation pilot-officer positions for the benefit of petty officers and to release 30 other officer positions for the "restructuring of authorized manpower without effect on the budget."

By means of what clever arithmetic the personnel office will resolve this problem is not apparent from the 1986 Navy budget. But, if this document is to be given credence, there will be a total of 4,473 officers, as opposed to 4,458 in 1985, or an increase of 15.

On the other hand, nothing can prevent the average time in grade of ranking leading seamen from going from 2 years and 6 months in 1983 to 3 years and 7 months in 1985 or from continuing to go up.

Despite the elimination of 140 positions, the number of petty officers should go up from 28,951 to 29,346. Insofar as enlisted men are concerned, manpower reductions--which do not effect female personnel--will be borne essentially by volunteers. These involve 530 positions.

The number of long-term volunteers inducted, which increased from fewer than 500 in October 1983 to 4,157 in October 1985, should remain at the latter level.

These factors being taken into account, the Navy budget will provide for 4,473 officers, 29,346 petty officers, 13,957 volunteers and 18,569 conscripts. Women will number 1,520, of which 850 are petty officers.

Wages and fringe benefits for all personnel will represent a sum of 7.396 billion, i.e., an increase of 4.3 percent as compared with 1985.

12336/12951

CSO: 3519/94

MILITARY

FRANCE

5 NAVY SQUADRONS AT FULL STRENGTH

Brest QUEST-FRANCE in French 27 Dec 85 p 199

[Article by R. Cosqueric]

[Text] The arrival of the last gunboat of the A-69 series will be Brest's first Navy "event" of 1986. The Commandant L'Herminier not only concludes a very successful series; it is also, from the standpoint of propulsion, a prototype foreshadowing Brest's antiaircraft corvettes on the Cassard class.

Thirteen years after the keel-laying of the prototype Estienne d'Orves the Navy men who sail it are as enthusiastic as ever.

In 1986, five squadrons will be at full strength: one at Cherbourg, two at Brest, and two at Toulon.

"During our recent exercises in northern Scotland, the English were impressed by the quantity of arms and equipment that a ship as small as our Detroyat can carry," reports Commander Wybo, commander of the 2d gunboat squadron.

"We were the only French ship in a force of 35 from 10 different nations. Our gunboat, which was recently modernized, could stand comparison with ships of greater tonnage."

Economical...

In the nine years since they entered into service, the gunboats have become famous: Spanish fishermen will not soon forget the LV Lavallee, and even in the strait of Hormuz these 1,200-ton ships are beginning to be known. And they are being used farther and farther away from their bases: the Commandant Blaison has left for a 2 year cruise in the Pacific. It is the kind of mission that was not foreseen at the time the series was launched.

Budgetary restrictions on personnel and fuel are not unrelated to these experiences: in a month and a half, the Detroyat consumed the equivalent of the fuel that a fleet escort ship would need for 4 days of operations. Since the series was launched, moreover, new improvements have been effected: after the oldest one have been refitted, all the gunboats will have the new engine arrangement in which the drive shafts are disconnected thus saving fuel and facilitating the cleaning of the engines.

And hard-working

Originally envisaged as carrying six ASW rocket-launchers and a 10 mm gun, the gunboats have little by little become fully equipped war machines with Exocet 38 anti-ship missiles (and even in some cases Exocet 40 anti-ship missiles with an over-the-horizon capability) and a whole range of electronic warfare equipment.

The 100 mm guns have had their rate of fire increased from 60 to 80 or 90 shots a minute. The Vega II fire control equipment is the best in the Navy, except for that of the corvettes.

"A ship like the Commandant Birot which entered into service in 1984, was one of the first to be equipped with stabilizers. Though well equipped for ASW (especially at shallow depths), anti-ship and anti-aircraft operations, it cannot, or course, compete with larger ships," declares Commander Rolet, commander of the 4th gunboat squadron and of the Birot. It lacks helicopters, Malafons, Tartars, towed sonar, etc. But it is a very versatile ship, capable of doing good work both on its own and in cooperation with other ships or naval aviation.

And it has an additional advantage: at present, a squadron of three or four gunboats costs no more to build than a single new corvette. It is understandable therefore that the Navy proposes to provide the fleet with a good number (17) of them before beginning the construction of nuclear attack submarines and large new surface ships.

The squadrons at Brest have four ships each, whereas those in other ports have only three.

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CSO: 3519/94

MILITARY

FRANCE

MATERIEL SHORTAGES REPORTED BY ARMY

Paris LE FIGARO in French 30 Dec 85 p 5

[Article by Pierre Darcourt: "Materiel Shortages Plague Army"]

[Text] The Rapid Action [Redeployment] Force (FAR) is a heterogeneous command comprising five basically different divisions, namely airborne, amphibious, airmobile, light armored, and mountain. This avowedly "multipurpose" force is, in point of fact, in a position to intervene in overseas theaters of operations.

But the FAR will not have received all its authorized air defense missiles until 1990, all its forward-area armored vehicles (VAB), armed with HOT antitank missiles, until 1987, all its Sagaie wheeled light armored cars until 1989, and all its towed 155-millimeter guns until a date as yet unknown. Consequently, in the European theater the FAR will by no means be able to relieve the First Army's main battle force (called the mechanized armored corps). The First Army, with its 160,000 men and 1,300 AMX-30 main battle tanks, is currently the French Army's spearhead force (10 divisions, including two divisions made up of service school staff, faculty, and troops).

Despite the attachment of divisions to the First Army in an effort to mask a continuous reduction in force, the major cuts in army manpower show that the period of "large battalions", an expression of old, is definitely over. During World War I, France deployed no less than 93 divisions on the Eastern and Northern fronts. Since then, our weapons have improved and become more powerful and effective, but so have those of our adversaries.

The military manpower mobilized in 1985 was but 15 percent of the manpower mobilized during World War I when our population was 40 million!

The Soviets maintain a force of more than 100,000 armored vehicles. This seems to prove that, in the Soviet view, expecting armored warfare does not mean being "one war behind".

The obsolescence of France's tank inventory is a source of great anxiety at a time when only about one-fourth of the AMX-30 tanks have been converted into the modernized AMX-30B2 version. Even more alarming is the fact that 5 years from now, when the first of the future main battle tanks is expected to be

delivered, only half of the French tank inventory will consist of AMX-30B2 tanks, with the other half being old AMX-30's. Providing things go as planned, by the year 2000, only 60 percent of French Army tanks will be the highly touted future tank and 40 percent the AMX-30B2. Knowing that our adversaries will have their heart set on modernizing their armored vehicles, we can legitimately ask who is preparing to refight World War II. Is France's present socialist government giving the armed forces sufficient means with which to implement its directives and defense policy? New types of equipment recognized as brilliant technical achievements are still being allocated in dribs and drabs. For instance: only five or six of our existing 25 artillery regiments have received the self-propelled rapid-fire 155-millimeter gun; all artillery regiments still have to rely on old World War II-vintage halftracks for their antiaircraft defense; regiments of the DIMA [Marine Infantry Division] and the airborne division still have World War II-vintage GMC [General Motors 2½-ton] trucks; some motorized regiments are still transported on 40-year old 4 X 4 Dodges [3/4-ton trucks], and continue to await receipt of their authorized VAB's; and some reserve regiments are equipped with museum pieces.

One of the current major problems continues to be air defense weapons for units not stationed in eastern France where Hawk and Roland missiles provide proper protection. At the present time, these units have absolutely no air defense weapons and would, therefore, be unable to counter any air attacks. Because of this, their redeployment to the front in eastern France would very likely be a risky move. No doubt the Matra light SATCP [surface-to-air very short range] missile will solve this problem because it is apparently a highly effective weapon. But only a total of 300 have been ordered from 1986 to 1988, and these will be delivered in 3 or 4 years.

The complete list of all obsolescent materiel, obscured by the outstanding materiel being issued in driblets, would be lengthy. This list is indicative of the disquieting lag which has occurred since 1981. Sound management of our defense resources has been replaced by rhetoric and abstruse concepts coupled with budgetary contrivances designed to cover up the shortage of resources due to deplorable management in 1981 and 1982.

Officers and NCO's, who are competent, are hard put to cope with this materiel shortage that precludes their conducting field exercises with their organic weapons more than 40 days per year (100, but without artillerymen always having their cannon, and tankers their tanks).

Concern is greatest within the army's regiments. The army does not have the same patent indicators of shortages as the air force has with its minimum number of aircraft, or the navy has with its tonnage. A number of tanks, cannon, or radio sets is more difficult to evaluate, and it is always less conspicuous to reduce personnel than the number of aircraft or ships.

The army is composed mainly of draftees: 190,000 compared with 50,000 in the navy and air force combined. Hence the impact of current restrictions is greatest on the army. As a result, the army could in the future have difficulty accomplishing its assigned deterrence-related missions.

Many officers and NCO's have already warned the military high command and the socialist government leadership. But being duty-bound to exercise caution in their speech and conduct, these officers and NCO's have not flaunted their words of warning in public. However, some general officers mentioned by name by the present government in cabinet meetings thought they ought to make some of their warnings public, undoubtedly in the belief that beyond a certain point it would be unpardonable for them to remain silent.

In the interests of France's defense, we hope that our leaders will not be politically color-blind for too long. The credibility of our deterrent hinges thereon.

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MILITARY

NORWAY

NATO ALLIES SAID DISTURBED OVER AIR DEFENSE, PILOT DRAIN

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 9 Jan 86 p 9

[Article by Olav Trygge Storvik: "Allied Anxiety Over Norwegian Air Defense"]

[Text] There is anxiety in central allied quarters over the crisis in Norwegian air defense. At the same time the shortage of competent pilots, leaders and technicians in the air force is greater than has been experienced up to now, AFTENPOSTEN has learned.

The question is also being raised of whether the service branch is able to accomplish the tasks which have been assigned by political authorities, such as the situation is today.

It is emphasized to AFTENPOSTEN from central allied quarters that there is reason for anxiety concerning the state of affairs in the Norwegian air force when four out of five fighter plane squadrons are not able to meet the requirements for "operational status." It is being said that this anxiety also concerns the future, since, seen from outside it seems that the political system in Norway is not able to find a solution to the problem in spite of the fact that it has been so obvious for many years. To the question of whether confidence and credibility with respect to Norway's defense policy in an alliance context are in the process of being undermined because of the personnel crisis, the sources stress that this is to go too far at the present time.

Creating Stir

But there is little doubt that the situation in the Norwegian air force is now being followed with keener attention internationally. An expression of this is the fact that the American AIR FORCE MAGAZINE in its last issue has a commentary on the Norwegian fighter plane arm. Also, the well reputed British JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY periodical has begun to study the situation more closely.

From what AFTENPOSTEN has reason to believe, the shortage of competent specialists in the air force is greater than has been known up to now. Today there is not a single Norwegian fighter pilot who is competent to be promoted to squadron commander. In many squadrons there are also far more planes than

pilots, whereas the situation should be vice-versa according to the NATO standard.

Norwegian Supervision

The problem is that SAS and Braathens have recently recruited older pilots with long experience, so that the armed forces have not been able to sustain the leadership apparatus with squadron commanders, seconds-in-command and wing commanders. The leadership apparatus at air stations and other staffs are being injured, besides. Both the supreme commander of South Norway, Lieutenant General Eyvind Schibbye, and Air Force Inspector General Olav F. Aamo have pointed out previously that the shortage of leaders can come to shake a central principle in Norway's security policy, which is to the effect that all allied forces which are transferred to Norway must be subjected to Norwegian supervision. General Schibbye, who has operational responsibility in South Norway, has expressed it as follows:

"Without a continuous supply from below of all categories of air force expertise for operational staff units, there is obviously a limit to what we can as a nation demand of 'subordination' on the part of our allies."

It can hardly be said more clearly. It is important to procure officers who are able to make decisions with major consequences, both operationally and for flight safety. Several allied air squadrons are transported to Norway for exercises annually. In a crisis and war, according to the plans, it can be a question of transferring several hundred allied planes to Norway, first and foremost American. Is it reasonable that these be subjected to the leadership and supervision of Norwegian officers when they lack experience and competence? Here it is obviously a question of a confidence and credibility situation in NATO, as well as of making Norway's security policy credible with respect to the Soviet Union. These are factors which are difficult to measure, but from what AFTENPOSTEN has reason to believe, signals have come from allied air force quarters which indicate skepticism regarding the situation in the Norwegian air force.

The public's attention has been directed mainly toward the fighter plane arm, but the personnel crisis is more extensive than this. It is well known that 400 technical positions remain unfilled, and there is reason to believe that both the helicopter squadrons and the 333rd and 335th squadrons have experienced the pilot drain. The 333rd Squadron performs important transport duties, and the 335th Squadron is outfitted with "Orion" naval reconnaissance planes which keep an eye on Soviet activity both above and below the surface of the ocean in the Norwegian Sea and Barents Sea. The squadron constitutes a very important element of the surveillance and warning apparatus in the world's perhaps most strategic region.

8831

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MILITARY

NORWAY

POLL FINDS CONTINUED STRONG SUPPORT FOR NATO

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 9 Jan 86 p 20

[Article: "Two Out of Three Norwegians for NATO"]

[Text] A poll which was taken for FOLK OG FORSVAR [PEOPLE AND DEFENSE] in November 1985 shows that there is still very great support for Norwegian membership in NATO. Sixty-five percent answer that membership insures peace, and this is the next highest figure recorded since the polls began in 1966.

The percentage who warn that NATO membership increases the danger of attack has declined from 10 to 6 percent from 1984 to 1985, and the "Do Not Know" group has increased from 12 to 19 percent. The figure for support among men has declined from 75 percent in 1984 to 71 in 1985, whereas among women the figure has increased from 58 to 60 percent.

8831

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MILITARY

NORWAY

BRIEFS

CONTRACT FOR ARMORED TURRETS--The Lier Thune-Eureka firm of the Kvaerner concern has received an additional contract for armored protective turrets for the Norwegian armed forces. The turret is to be used on the M-113 personnel transport vehicle (PPK) for launching the TOW wire-guided antitank missile. The contract has a value of 36 million kroner. Development of the turret has taken six years, but nevertheless this can be regarded as a relatively short time, when the extensive assignment the firm received is taken into consideration, the director of the Lier firm, Olav Solberg, states.
[Text] [Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 9 Jan 86 p 45] 8831

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MILITARY

PORTUGAL

LEMONS FERREIRA ON 'ORION P3' PLANE USE

Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 13 Dec 85 p 2

[Text] In an interview which appeared yesterday in Ponta Delgada, Lemos Ferreira said that the nation's mission and the NATO mission are not choices between alternatives, but rather converging issues."

The Armed Forces chief of staff was on the Azores islands of Sao Miguel and Terceira at the beginning of the week, to meet with the Armed Forces commander in the Azores and to preside over the inauguration of a sports gymnasium at the Lajes air base.

In the interview published in the morning daily ACORIANO ORIENTAL, Ferreira said there were "several advantages" to the inclusion of the Azores in the CINCIBERLANT [Iberian Atlantic Area Command].

"There is no reason," he said, "why we should not go ahead with our intention to include the Azores in this area.

"Quite the contrary," he continued, "we must try to settle this question once and all, in the right way, in the appropriate forum and as quickly as possible."

The Azores are currently part of the area of the SACLANT [Supreme Allied Atlantic Command], headquartered in Norfolk (United States).

Orion P3 Bases in Azores

Lemos Ferreira announced that the ORION P3 planes used for sea patrol and anti-submarine warfare, which the Air Force will start to use within 2 to 3 years, will operated out of Lajes and Porto Santo.

The Armed Forces chief of staff admitted that the ORION would be used for exclusively national operations and could also act in bilateral coordination with the United States or within the general needs of NATO.

He noted that the airport facilities of Santa Maria "are of interest to the national military plan, on their own merit and not just as an alternative to the Lajes bases.

"Thus," he continued "the Armed Forces always keep close tabs on any projects related to Santa Maria."

Owing to what he called "huge budgetary restrictions" on the Armed Forces, Lemos Ferreira said there were no plans for the national military project for Santa Maria or for vacating the Fort of Sao Bras, in Ponta Delgado, the "cramped" headquarters of the Armed Forces commander for the Azores.

In the same interview, Lemos Ferreira denied there was any intention of building a general quarters devoted to NATO operations, with funding from infrastructures of the Atlantic Alliance.

6362

CS0: 3542/53

MILITARY

PORTUGAL

BRIEFS

NEW NAVY DEPUTY CHIEF--The Superior Council of National Defense yesterday approved the appointment of Vice Adm Jorge Rasquillo Raposo as deputy chief of staff of the Navy. During the meeting, the council approved the appointment of Brig Gen Rafael Guerreiro Ferreira to the post of command of the Madeira Military Zone. Army officers Rogerio Augusto Garret da Silva e Casto and Manuel Ribeiro de Oliveira Carvalho were promoted from brigadier to general [ranks not further specified]. In the Navy, Paulo Joaquim Costa Teixeira and Antonio Maria de Sa Alves Sameiro were promoted from rear admiral to vice admiral. Arnaldo dos Santos Aguiar de Jesus was promoted from captain to rear admiral. The meeting, which was chaired by Samalho Eanes, was held at Belem Palace and lasted about 2 hours. The Superior Council of National Defense also approved the strategic military concept, although with "some changes in formulation." In addition to the president of the republic and the prime minister, the council includes the Armed Forces chief of general staff, the other high military chiefs, the ministers of the republic, the presidents of the regional governments, two representatives from the parliament and the ministers of home administration, public equipment and transport, finance and others. [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 19 Dec 85 p 28] 0302

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ECONOMIC

PORTUGAL

RADICAL CHANGES AFFECT SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM

Lisbon TAL E QUAL in Portuguese 13 Dec 85 pp 8-9

[Article by Ferreira Pinto]

[Text] Just 15 years ago, Portugal had 14 workers paying into the Social Security system for each paid pensioner. Today, for 4 million contributing workers, there are about 2 million pensions to be paid out, a ratio of two workers to one beneficiary. The cake is not big enough to feed all the people at the table, and this is why the pensions and the retirement pay are so small.

Portuguese workers in industry, trade and service--those who contribute to Social Security (formerly, Insurance) are condemned by the state to be generous. Their contributions, together with the contributions of their employers, are paying the pensions of those who have already retired from the respective sectors and of their families. This is reasonable. However, there is little or no reason why they must also help to pay the pensions of hundreds of thousands of other citizens who have never paid into the system.

Nonetheless, this has been the case since the state decided to create a unified Social Security system. In expanding the system to the noncontributing brackets, the state promptly forgot to come up with the funds for the respective pensions. The result is obvious: Social Security is close to going into the financial "hole," and still the pensions and benefits granted are inadequate, both for those who have been paying in all their lives and for those who have never contributed.

From 1970 to 1985, the number of pensioners jumped from 165,000 to almost 2 million (12 times as many), while the value of the pensions paid went from 1.5 million contos to 192.5 million contos (128 times as much). This "explosive" growth is owing primarily to the aging population and the extension of Social Security to farm workers and to those who have never paid into the system.

Thus, 15 years ago there were 14 active workers for 1 pensioner. Today, this ratio is 2 to 1, a situation which the United States does not expect before the year 2010. Moreover, the increased number of pensioners far and above exceeded the increase in contributors and in the receipts. Naturally, dividing the cake among everyone meant a smaller piece for each one.

Social Security beneficiaries are divided among three systems: the general system (workers who contribute 8 percent of their wages, to which is added the 21 percent paid by their employers) and, in practice, the only system with its own revenues; the special system for rural workers (a system which contributes little); and the system for non-contributors. According to the bill for the unification of the welfare system, the state is obligated to contribute to the funding of the latter two systems, as well as to the so-called Social Action. But the state plays a role here which not even a Pilate....

Thus, in the last 3 years, the expenditures of the systems which put in little or nothing, as well as those of the Social Action, have risen to 176.5 million contos. The state budget, which should fund all of this, allocated only 40.3 million contos, or about 23 percent. The rest came out of contributions to the general system.

When all is said and done, in creating the Institute of Financial Management of Social Security, the state limited itself to functioning as the collector and redistributor of the monies. In practice, it distributes the misery among the communities. Thus the workers who put in their own funds (already financially integrated into the system) are worse off than they were. True, large segments of the population (specifically the rural and elderly population, who have never contributed) are receiving pensions which they did not have before, but, in the last analysis, pensions which are not enough to make a dent in poverty. In the end, it is the old politics of leveling downward.

Incidentally, the burden of the inactive population on the active population is such that the contributions this year (75 percent of total receipts) do not cover even 80 percent of current expenses, whereas 10 years ago the contributions exceeded expenses by 6 percent. On the other hand, the pensions for the current year (192.5 million contos) amount to 84 percent of the contributions. How can there be any decent family benefits and other subsidies for those who pay in?

To overcome the deficits resulting from the government's failure to fund the non-contributing systems, Social Security came to decapitalize itself, selling off certificates; the latter, which in 1975 amounted to 14.8 million contos (at 1975 prices) now amount to only 1.3 million contos. The logical corollary: to fill up the state's "hole," Social security also resorted to bank loans, which amounted to 7 million contos this year. To conclude, the system's debts will continue to grow and should reach 125 million contos by the end of the year (see below). Social security? The hole is in sight.

Bad debts: 125 Million Contos!

Under the protection of banking confidentiality, the debts owed to Social Security are flying high. That debt is growing at a rate of 2 million contos per month and should reach about 125 million contos by the end of the year. Who pays and who is in arrears is something that remains a secret of the protecting gods. But they always tell us, dear readers, that more than half the contributors are in arrears. And only 178 companies (0.2 percent of the debtors) are responsible for 40 percent of the bad debt. What an achievement!

Officially, at the end of 1985 "the debts will amount to about 96 million contos," according to a recent statement from the IGFSS [Institute of Financial Management of Social Security]. However, if one adds to that figure the debts turned into promissory notes by some contributors, the debt would really be 125 million contos. In 1984, the IGFSS put the debts at 74 million contos, excluding about 24 million contos in promissory notes and charges, which, until they are paid off, will continue to be a part of the Social Security debt.

With 187,000 contributing companies and institutions at the end of 1984, according to official IGFSS data, Social Security had 86,000 debtors (more than half the total number of contributors), responsible for an accumulated debt of 74.2 million contos. There were 41,500 debtors with debts exceeding 25 contos. Of these, 38,000 were private companies (with 58 million contos outstanding) and 186 were public and nationalized companies (8 million contos), so these two sectors together represented 66 million of the 74.2 million contos in arrears.

At the end of 1984, only 6,670 contributors (7 percent of the total debtors) had signed agreements to pay off their debt, but only 2,585 were meeting their payments. Moreover, there were 9,369 debtors who were not paying in anything at all--neither the company contributions nor employee withholdings.

In March 1985, not including the portion of the debt covered by promissory notes, the debt was already 80 million contos. There were 178 debtors owing 50,000 contos or more, representing about 32 million contos (40 percent of the total debt) and 2,084 contributors owed 5,000 contos or more. This 2 percent of the debtors accounted for about 57 million contos, a little over 70 percent of the debt. Finally, only 369 of those 2,084 contributors had established payment agreements, and only 102 were meeting those commitments in full.

Accumulated in the large companies, the debts to the Social Security system are concentrated geographically in Lisbon, Porto and Setubal. The regional centers of the three districts--responsible for receiving the contributions--showed a negative balance of 41 million contos at the end of 1984; contributors were 57.5 million contos in arrears to the country's 18 regional centers.

The rest of the debt was connected with the 26 company and sectoral insurance funds which have not yet been incorporated in the regional centers, although, financially, they are already integrated in the Social Security system. Of these 26 only 9 (Caixa de Seguros, Refinarias do Ultramar, Cimentos, Camera de Lisboa, TLP [Telephone Workers of Lisbon and Porto], Marconi, Soda Povoá, Gas e Electricidade and Lusalite) did not show a negative balance for contributions.

The Railway Workers' Fund showed a negative balance of about 4 million contos. The fund of the Companhia Uniao Fabril e Associadas was 5 million contos short. The Journalists' Fund had yet to receive 199,000 contos from the companies in the sector and this debt increased by another 40,000 contos by May 1985.

Portugal and the EEC

Portugal has the lowest PIB (Gross Domestic Product) per capita (the EEC average is 4 times as high).

We spend about 13 percent of the PIB on Social Security (the EEC average is 28 percent).

We have the highest rate of contribution by companies and employees to Social Security revenues: 75.1 percent, as against 54.9 percent in the EEC.

We have the lowest rate of contributions by the government: 20 percent, as against 40 percent in the Common Market.

Between 1975 and 1980, our number of old age pensions increased by 3 times as much as they did in the Common Market. Their weight in the benefits paid out by the system is 44 percent, equalled only by the United Kingdom.

And we are joining the EEC! With the Social Security system we have now, it is obvious....

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ECONOMIC

PORTUGAL

BRIEFS

SAVING FROM LOAN RENEGOTIATION--The renegotiation of two foreign loans will result in a savings of 1 million contos. The agreement was signed yesterday in London by Vitor Constancio, governor of the Bank of Portugal. This agreement to refinance two loans, contracted in 1983 in the amount of \$650 million, will offer more favorable interest terms and will enable Portugal to reduce a large portion of the debt service. The renegotiation was made possible by the easing of the foreign exchange situation resulting from the financial management practiced in 1985. The success of the operation could open the way for the refinancing of other loans before very long. According to sources in the Bank of Brazil, there is really an "idea of proceeding with new refinancing agreements, although no program to this end has been established yet." [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 18 Dec 85 p 5] 6362

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